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Abstract 
 
This thesis explores the process of economic transition in two contemporary developing 
countries from a political economy perspective. Tanzania and Vietnam were at the 
forefront of the struggle to construct socialism in the twentieth century. Since the 1990s 
Tanzania and Vietnam have been championed by international development institutions 
as success stories of market liberalization, achieving growth rates above their regional 
averages. Yet both economies have also been associated with high levels of corruption 
under the continued control of the pre-reform ruling party. The pattern of economic 
growth cannot be adequately explained by New Institutional Economics. Instead, the 
thesis uses a Political Settlements framework for analysis. Features of the formative 
socialist political settlement were critical for the evolution of the political settlement 
under liberalisation. The thesis explores how the political settlement influenced processes 
of political redistribution, primitive accumulation and technology acquisition under 
liberalisation. These processes are examined through case studies of reform in public 
finance, land management and industrial policy. Tanzania and Vietnam both have 
cohesive party states based on consolidated political power within the party institutions. 
The distribution of power within the party and society and the relationship between 
political and economic power were critical determinants of economic transition. While 
each of these states were able to direct some resources centrally to new economic 
activities, informal processes outside the central political institutions played a more 
important role in determining the path of the key transition processes. Both countries 
largely failed to manage rents that could generate greater productivity growth. Further, 
the focus on market liberalisation and roll back of the state did not strengthened state 
capacities in these critical areas. This does not auger well for the longer term path of 
economic development in Tanzania and Vietnam. 
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Chapter One 
 
 The Problematic 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Over the last two decades of the twentieth century, attempts by some of the poorest 
nations in the world to construct socialism were swept away in the wake of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union and the ascendancy of neo-liberalism. With the retreat from 
socialism, the ensuing restructuring of economic systems on the basis of ‘market 
principles’ led to the resurgence of a capitalist dynamic of social and economic 
transformation that has taken diverse forms in ex-socialist countries. This thesis 
examines the comparative process of economic transition in two of these countries, 
Tanzania and Vietnam, from a political economy perspective. 
 
Tanzania and Vietnam were at the forefront of the struggle to construct socialism in the 
second half of the twentieth century. The ruling parties, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) and the Tanganyika National Union (TANU), which emerged from the anti-
colonial struggle established political systems based on one-party rule. This involved 
subsuming all state institutions into the party and banning other forms of political and 
civil organisations. While these countries, and their approaches to constructing socialism, 
differed in many ways, they shared key institutional and socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
As two of the poorest countries in the world, the improvements in human welfare 
indicators such as health and education under socialism were remarkable. For a short 
period, they also achieved impressive rates of growth and industrialization. By the end of 
the 1970s, however, they were facing severe economic crises and the failure to establish 
viable socialism was becoming increasingly apparent. In the 1980s, both countries 
effectively abandoned the attempt to construct socialism and adopted liberal economic 
and governance reform programmes. Yet the political economy of the socialist period 
had important implications for the subsequent trajectory of economic growth under 
liberalisation.  
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Both countries were championed by international development institutions as success 
stories of economic liberalization. Following extensive market reforms, they achieved 
growth rates above the average for their respective regions. While the Tanzanian 
economy grew well relative to other African countries, Vietnam outperformed Tanzania 
in terms of both the rate of economic growth and of structural transformation. In fact, 
during the 1990s Vietnam became on of the fastest growing developing countries in the 
world (World Bank 2005). In both countries, economic transition under liberalisation 
involved removing state created rents of the socialist period and strengthening market 
mechanisms. Aid and foreign direct investment flowed into their economies and they 
experienced output expansion and export growth across all sectors.  
 
Tanzania experienced a rapid growth in mining as well as in manufacturing, but a more 
limited expansion in agriculture. Vietnam had very high growth in agricultural and 
industrial output. Industry expanded with rising exports of oil and gas and very rapid 
increases in the production and export of manufactured goods. While the increased flow 
of capital and new businesses increased overall economic productivity, state led industrial 
policies relating to technology acquisition and learning were not very successful. While 
manufacturing expanded in both countries, it remained near the bottom end of the 
productivity ladder. 
 
Economic liberalisation was accompanied by changes to the political system and in the 
constitutional arrangements that placed the party as the overarching institution of the 
state. Nevertheless, Vietnam remained legally constituted as a one party state. Tanzania 
formally adopted a multi-party system but actually retained the overwhelming political 
dominance of the pre-reform socialist party. The on-going strength of the ruling parties 
appeared to give the state a higher degree of centralised cohesion than in many other 
developing countries. However, both political systems also involved extensive clientelism 
and high levels of corruption.  
 
In recent years, one of the most influential frameworks for understanding growth 
transitions, both in terms of theory and policy, has been provided by New Institutional 
Economics (NIE). NIE, and the associated ‘good governance’ agenda, advocates 
property rights stability, reducing corruption, a transparent and accountable public 
sector, democratic government, rule of law and competitive (rent free) markets, as a 
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means to promote growth. Through the ‘good governance’ agenda, these 
recommendations have become central to reform programmes in developing countries, 
sponsored by the international financial institutions. Yet, the experience of economic 
transition in Tanzania and Vietnam under liberalisation, where higher rates of growth 
were coupled with ‘poor’ governance across a range of different criteria, adds to the 
growing evidence that the relationship between institutions and economic outcomes is 
complex and this cannot be explained within the NIE framework.  
 
Instead, we use the Political Settlements framework developed by Mushtaq Khan. A 
political settlement defines the combination of institutions and the underlying 
distribution of power in a society. The distribution of power in society affects the ability 
of historically constituted social groups to acquire or hold on to property rights that 
generate income or affect resource flows. A picture of the distribution of power in any 
society is not just a description of its political institutions but needs to be constructed 
from a reading of social and economic history, looking at the past outcomes of social 
conflict and the organisation of production. Differences in political settlements have 
important implications for the trajectory of economic transition in developing countries. 
In Tanzania and Vietnam, the formative socialist political settlement had significant 
legacies and unintended consequences for the evolution of the political settlement under 
liberalisation. We explore how the political settlement influenced three critical processes 
of political redistribution, primitive accumulation (the process of accumulation outside 
the formal market process where political power is used to privilege the accumulation 
activities of particular individuals),  and technology acquisition under liberalisation. These 
processes are examined through case studies of reform in public finance, land 
management and industrial policy.  
 
This Chapter sets out three areas of commonality between Tanzania and Vietnam that 
provide a basis for insightful comparison through which to investigate economic 
transition. These are first, the experience of attempting to construct socialism, second, 
the relatively successful economic performance under liberalisation, and third, their 
system of governance under liberalisation that involved the on-going dominance of the 
pre-reform political Party, combined with high levels of corruption and patron-client 
relations. The Chapter ends with an outline of the major findings of the PhD. Chapter 
Two, on the Analytical Framework, provides a discussion of three different approaches 
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to explaining the role of institutions in economic performance in developing countries: 
New Institutional Economics, Heterodox Theories of the State and Political Settlements 
Analysis. Each is assessed in terms of its suitability for the objective of the thesis. 
Chapter Two also defines the main analytical features of the concept of the formative 
socialist political settlement. Chapter Three provides an overview of the evolving political 
settlement in Tanzania and Vietnam and explores the comparative features of the 
formative socialist political settlement in each country. Chapters Four, Five and Six 
present the main research findings of the PhD based on three case studies. Chapter Four 
examines public finance reform, Chapter Five examines land management and Chapter 
Six examines industrial policy. To conclude, Chapter Seven draws together the main 
arguments and evidence on the political economy of economic transition in Tanzania 
and Vietnam. 
 
 
1.2 Justifications for a Comparative Political Economy of Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
1.2.1 Constructing Socialism 
 
Tanzania and Vietnam gained political independence against the historical backdrop of a 
world divided along Cold War lines between capitalist, socialist and non-aligned 
countries. The socialist experience in both countries was informed by the international 
political and ideological framework of that time. Tanzania and Vietnam, therefore, shared 
many common political features with a wider group of poor countries that became 
independent nations during the same period. There were also important differences 
between the socialist systems in Tanzania and Vietnam in terms of how the socialist 
parties came to power and in the particular forms of socialist ideology that they 
espoused. Nevertheless, they had significant similarities in terms of the institutional 
structure of the parties, the distribution of political and economic power between 
different social groups, the role of economic planning, and in policies towards 
agricultural collectivization and state led industrialisation.  
 
The Tanganyika National Union (TANU) came to power after a relatively short and 
largely peaceful anti-colonial struggle that swept it into office in 1961 in the first free 
elections. It was not until 1967, following President Nyerere’s Arusha Declaration, that 
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Tanzania adopted a radical socialist transition programme. The Declaration committed 
the country to a programme of state-led accumulation in industry, land reform and 
‘villagization’ in agriculture, limits on the emergence of capitalist forms of production 
and restrictions on private sector accumulation. TANU became Chama Cha Mapinduzi 
(CCM), the Party of the Revolution, in 1976 after merging with the Afro-Shirazi Party 
that had led the independence struggle on Zanzibar. In the years following the Arusha 
Declaration, Tanzania was ‘frequently listed along side Cuba, North Korea and North 
Vietnam as one of the few socialist countries in the underdeveloped world’ (Coulson, 
1984; 176).  
 
In reality, Tanzania’s socialism was quite eclectic and pragmatic. Tanzania maintained a 
non-aligned foreign policy through the cold war period (Pratt 1976). Julius Nyerere’s 
philosophy of African socialism, ‘Ujamaa’, was influenced by his idealized vision of 
traditional African village life based on equality and reciprocity. It was also influenced by 
British Fabianism and the more orthodox socialist ideology of Lenin and Mao and the 
economic policies of the USSR. Nyerere was a very charismatic figure within the Party 
and Tanzania’s non-aligned socialism attracted a huge amount of attention from within 
left wing academia in the 1970s (see for example, Saul 1974) as well from Africans 
involved in anti-colonial struggles on the continent. 
 
In the 1970s, on the other side of the globe, Vietnam was coming to the end of its 
protracted and bitter struggle for independence. The VCP, founded in 1930 by Ho Chi 
Minh and a small group of intellectuals, came to power in 1945 and ruled in the North 
from 1954 until the withdrawal of US forces from Saigon and the final unification of the 
country in 1976. Victory in the face of the vastly superior military and economic power 
of the US was hailed as a triumph of anti-imperial resistance, and in the West, the peace 
activism generated by the war was a defining feature of the decade. The route of the VCP 
to power was, therefore, very different from that experienced by the CCM in Tanzania. 
Further, unlike Tanzania, Vietnam adopted a more orthodox socialism along Marxist-
Leninist lines. In 1978 Vietnam became a member of the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (CMEA) and was part of the cold war Soviet bloc.  
 
Despite these differences, the ruling socialist parties shared a number of common 
institutional features. The historical parallels of a ruling party that was initially forged by 
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an elite group of intellectuals and developed into mass parties in the course of struggle 
against colonial rule were, in fact, common to many other ex-colonial countries (Alavi 
1982). TANU and the VCP, however, were more explicitly based on a Leninist model of 
the vanguard party that represented the collective interests of the workers and peasants. 
Both parties adopted the principles of Leninist democratic centralism where members of 
the party were officially free to debate policy internally but once a majority vote had 
determined policy, all were supposed to adhere to that position. Both countries banned 
other forms of political and civil organisation and officially became one-party states. 
Tanzania started off at independence as a multi-party democracy but in 1963 Nyerere 
announced that Tanzania would be a one-party state under TANU. After 1945 Vietnam 
was also initially ruled by a coalition of parties but from 1951 there was a process of 
consolidation of power by the VCP. 
 
In Tanzania, the National Assembly was constitutionally subordinate to the governing 
party. The most important policy decision making institutions were CCM sub-groups and 
the Cabinet, and more specifically the President himself. Similarly in Vietnam, the 
Political Bureau, Secretariat, Central Committee and a series of specialised committees 
held formal power at the centre. At the highest level of the Party apparatus, forming the 
executive committee of the Central Committee, were the General Secretary and the 
Political Bureau. This executive committee was supposed to constitute the most 
powerful political group in the country (Beresford and Phong 1998). Both countries, 
therefore, had the appearance of a high degree of political centralization through the one-
party system. Further, both parties were extensively institutionalized throughout society 
with party cells at village level and associational groups contained within the party 
structure.  
 
Tanzania and Vietnam adopted similar economic policies to bring about a socialist 
transformation. In both societies under colonialism, economic power had been held 
primarily by non-indigenous groups. Both aspired to bring about a fundamental 
transition in the distribution of power in society through socialism away from foreign 
and domestic capitalists and towards workers and peasants. Their economic policies 
involved a centrally planned economic system and administrated prices for most goods. 
Central planning is not synonymous with socialism (or vice versa) and aspects of central 
planning were used across a range of different countries with non-socialist political 
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systems during the same period (Ellman 1979). Yet the centrally planned economic 
system in Tanzania and Vietnam was never as extensive as in other more industrialised 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe or in the Soviet Union. Socialist economic policy 
also involved extensive state ownership of industry and the nationalisation of foreign and 
domestic companies. Peasant agriculture was to be transformed through land reform and 
collectivisation.  
 
The formative socialist political settlement became increasingly fragile as the 1970s 
progressed for domestic and international reasons. By the end of the 1970s, Tanzania 
and Vietnam were facing debilitating shortages and attempts to increase productivity in 
industry and agriculture appeared to be failing. The Vietnamese economy, already 
strained from war, was again overstretched by the challenge to integrate the South into 
the northern centrally planned economic system. The South, however, had become 
significantly market oriented under the Republic of Vietnam and the influence of US aid. 
This strain was compounded by falling support from the Soviet Union, war in Cambodia, 
decline in agricultural and industrial output, as well as by the growth in illegal trade 
outside the centrally planned system (Beresford 1988).  
 
In response to the economic crisis, Vietnam adopted a cautious ‘step by step’ approach 
to reform (Van Arkadie and Mallon 2003). This started with tentative price and trade 
reform from 1979, but policy oscillated between attempts to strengthen the existing 
system and efforts to introduce reforms. Deepening economic instability and shortages 
led to renewed commitment to market oriented reform and a change in economic 
objectives with the adoption of Doi Moi (Renovation) at the Sixth Party Congress in 
1986. The official timing of the Doi Moi announcement was also linked to a shift in 
political power within the Party from the ‘old guard’ to a group of younger leaders. Le 
Duan, who had been Secretary-General of the Party since 1960, died and Nguyen Van 
Linh was elected to the position in December 1986 at the Party Conference. At the same 
time, Do Muoi was elected as Prime Minister, replacing Pham Van Dong. The aim of 
transition to socialism within the subsequent five year plan was shelved and in its place 
the market and later, the private sector, were given an increasingly prominent role.  
 
Tanzania’s reforms also started tentatively in the early 1980s following a mounting crisis 
and fiscal deficit exacerbated by the war against Iddi Amin in Uganda, successive severe 
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droughts, mounting debt burden and declining aid. Internally, industrial output and 
official exports were falling, the administrative pricing system was in disarray and there 
was a burgeoning parallel economy. Income per capita fell by an average of 1.5% a year 
for the first five years of the 1980s (Bigsten and Danielsen 2001). President Nyerere 
stepped down in 1985 and subsequently the new President, Ali Hassan Mwyini, signed a 
standby agreement with the IMF and a Structural Adjustment Package with the World 
Bank.  
 
The common institutional and political features of their socialist experiences provide an 
interesting point of comparison between the two countries. The details of the 
comparative evolution of the formative socialist political settlement and its eventual 
demise are further discussed in Chapter Three. 
 
1.2.2 Economic Growth Under Liberalisation 
 
The second area of commonality involves the two countries experience of economic 
growth following liberalization. The comparative context of the policy reforms is 
discussed by Van Arkadie and Dinh (2005). They argue that Tanzania adopted a much 
more orthodox market reform programme while Vietnam maintained key elements of 
the centrally planned economy, most notably, an important role for state ownership. 
Many of the features of Vietnam’s reform programme were in line with orthodox market 
reform. They included price and trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization and a 
revaluation of the exchange rate, liberalization of foreign investment, recognition of 
private land use rights and reduction in state controls on the private sector, particularly 
after the introduction of the Enterprise Law in 2000.  
 
Other features of the reform programme were more unorthodox. Certain elements were 
very different from the ‘shock’ reform programmes in Russia and Eastern Europe and 
the conventional structural adjustment packages for developing countries of the Bretton 
Woods institutions. Vietnam focused on consolidating the State Owned Enterprise 
(SOE) sector, rather than opting for extensive privatization. The share of the state sector 
in the economy initially expanded before more extensive equitization was initiated after 
2000 and account for around 39% of GDP by the mid 2000s (Sjoholm 2006) 
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In comparison, Tanzania’s liberalization programme had all the elements of a 
conventional structural adjustment package. The liberalization programme was based on 
the assumption that the poor performance of the economy was mainly a result of 
extensive state interventions that had been implemented under the socialist ‘Ujamaa’ 
programme. The orthodox remedy was, therefore, to roll back the state, remove the rents 
associated with failing interventions and allow the market to allocate resources. This 
involved a shift to a market-determined exchange rate, price deregulation, removal of 
tariffs and subsidies and an extensive privatization programme. Restrictions on private 
accumulation and foreign investment slowly disappeared and the model of market-led 
development took the place of the egalitarian self-sufficiency of Ujamaa.  
 
The first round of reforms focused on trade and price liberalisation and significant 
exchange rate devaluation, cuts in public expenditure, dissolution of parastatal crop 
authorities and the reintroduction of local government authorities, which had been 
abolished in 1972. In 1989, the Government adopted the Economic and Social Action 
Programme, which widened the reform to include deregulation in the banking system, 
reforms in agricultural marketing and in the civil service. Unlike the unorthodox 
approach to the state sector followed by Vietnam, Tanzania’s parastatal sector, which 
was the largest in Sub-Saharan Africa at the end of the 1970s (Costello 1994) formally 
adopted a very thorough privatization agenda. Initially, however, the attempt at 
rationalizing parastatals led to an expansion in their numbers until the second half of the 
1990s when a more aggressive policy of privatization was put in place under the 
Parastatal Sector Reform Commission and by 1998 40% of the parastatal sector had been 
sold. 
 
After a number of years of liberalization, the rate of GDP growth accelerated in both 
countries. In Tanzania, growth accelerated after the initial market reforms implemented 
from the mid 1980s but this was followed by a period of declining growth rates. GDP 
growth started to accelerate rapidly from the end of the 1990s. From 1995 to 2005, 
Tanzania’s average GDP growth was 5.47%. Per capita GDP average growth rose to 
3.23% from 1995 to 2005, compared to -0.51% in the previous decade. Tanzania’s GDP 
growth experience under liberalisation was higher than it had been historically (Bigsten 
and Danielson 2001) and higher than the average for Sub-Saharan African countries over 
the same period. As Table 1.1, below, illustrates, from 1996 to 2005, Tanzania had higher 
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average GDP growth and per capita GDP growth than other developing countries 
classified as ‘least developed’ by the World Bank and also higher rates of growth in 
agriculture and industry than the wider group of countries that are classified as low 
income.  
 
Vietnams’ growth acceleration started earlier than in Tanzania, with sustained high GDP 
growth from the mid 1980s. Vietnam’s average GDP growth was 6.50% from 1986 to 
1995, rising to 7.22% from 1996 to 2005 and GDP per capita growth increased to 5.86% 
in the same decade. Vietnam’s impressive GDP growth performance marked it as one of 
the most rapidly growing low income countries in the world during the 1990s (Van-
Arkadie and Mallon 2003). Table 1.1 shows that Vietnam’s GDP growth appears to be in 
line with the average GDP growth in East Asia however as this average East Asia figure 
also includes China, Vietnam’s actual growth performance was considerably higher than 
most other East Asian countires, albeit that many of these countries had been through 
higher growth episodes during economic transitions in earlier decades, discussed below.  
Thus, while both Tanzania and Vietnam did well in comparison to many other 
developing countries, Vietnam considerably out-performed Tanzania in terms of GDP 
growth over the period of liberalisation.  
 
 
Source: Data from Maddison (2004) GDP per capita measured in international dollars. 
 
 
Chart 1.1: Vietnam GDP Per Capita 1947 - 2005 
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Source: Own calculations from Maddison (2004) GDP per capita measured in international dollars for data 
from 1961 – 2001 and World Development Indicators Database (2006) GDP per capita measured at PPP 
in constant international dollars. 
 
 
Chart 1.2: Tanzania GDP Per Capita 1961 - 2005 
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Table 1.1: Comparison of National and Sectoral Average Growth 1986 – 1995 
  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Tanzania Least Income 
Low Income 
Country Vietnam 
East Asia and 
Pacific China 
GDP Growth (%)         1.85          2.83          2.37          5.59          6.50          8.97         10.10  
GDP per capita growth (%) -        0.89  -        0.51  -        0.25          2.24          4.24          7.33          8.61  
GDP per capita       1,714.90        507.89         1,063         1,411         1,318         2,047         1,841  
Agriculture, value added 
(annual % growth)         2.71   3.42*         2.53          3.03          3.40          3.71          4.17  
Industry, value added (annual 
% growth)         1.01   5.92*         2.47          5.12          8.42         11.67         13.27  
Services, etc., value added 
(annual % growth)         1.98   n.a         2.22          5.31          7.70          9.00         10.13  
        
Table 1.2: Comparison of National and Sectoral Average Growth 1996 – 2005 
  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa Tanzania Least Income Low Income Vietnam East Asia China 
GDP Growth (%)         3.82  5.47         5.15          5.52          7.22          7.36          9.05  
GDP per capita growth (%)         1.38  3.23         2.67          3.50          5.86          6.31          8.19  
GDP per capita       1,718.23  549        1,159         1,885         2,128         3,997         4,227  
Agriculture, value added 
(annual % growth)         4.04          4.15          4.02          3.18          4.04          3.38          3.68  
Industry, value added (annual 
% growth)         3.75          8.43          3.35          5.72         10.41          8.44         10.18  
Services, etc., value added 
(annual % growth)         3.70          5.20          4.78          6.72          6.13          7.57          9.68  
Source: Own elaborations from World Development Indicators Database. GDP per capita is measured in PPP constant 2000 international USD. Tanzania and Vietnam are 
classified as low income countries in the World Development Indicators database while Tanzania is also classified as a least income country. *estimate 1988-1995  
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Chart 1.3 below illustrates the comparative growth performance of Tanzania and 
Vietnam against average GDP per capita growth for low income countries and for sub-
saharan African countries. 
 
Chart 1.3: Comparative GDP Growth Since Liberalization 
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Source: Own calculations based on World Development Indicators Database (2006). 1986 = 100 
 
Underlying Vietnam’s GDP growth acceleration was a considerable structural change in 
the economy. In Vietnam, as in other rapidly growing countries in Asia (McMillan and 
Rodrik, 2011), labour and resources shifted from low productivity activities to higher 
productivity activities, leading to growth enhancing structural change. The changing 
structure of the economy as reflected in employment shares is shown in Table 1.2 below. 
 
Table 1.3: Percentage Share of Total Employment in Different Sectors in 
Tanzania and Vietnam 2001, 2006 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
2001 2006 2001 2006 
% Employment in 
agriculture 
82.10 74.6 64.0 51.70 
% Employment in 
industry  
2.60 5.00 13.90 20.20 
% Employment in 
Services 
15.30 20.30 22.10 28.20 
  Source: World Development Indicators (2011) 
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The pattern of growth that has emerged in Vietnam since the mid 1980s has been driven 
by significant increases in output across the sectors. As can be seen from Table 1.1 
above, the value added growth in agriculture, industries and services was higher than the 
average for low income countries from 1986 to 1995, and was higher in agriculture and 
industry from 1996 to 2005. Agricultural growth rates started to increase in the early 
1980s and there were rapid increases in food production as well as a remarkable increase 
in agricultural export crops such as rice and coffee. Vietnam became the world’s leading 
exporter of coffee and reached the global top three countries exporting rice (Van-
Arkadie and Dinh 2004). Table 1.3 below illustrates the rapid output growth with a 
number of key agricultural products over the period of liberalisation: 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.4: Agricultural Output Growth Vietnam - Selected Crops (million tons) 
 
Crop 1985 1990 1995 1998 
Rice Paddy 15.9 19.2 24.9 29.1 
All grain, paddy equivalent 18.2 21.5 27.9 31.8 
Sugar Cane 5560 5405 10691 13844 
Coffee (‘000 tons) 35.7 64.2 216.8 408.9 
Rubber (‘000 tons) 47.9 57.9 124.7 225.7 
Tea (‘000 tons) 28.2 32.2 66.7 79.2 
Pigs (millions) 11.8 12.3 16.3 18.1 
Source: Adapted from Dapice (2000; 9) 
 
Industrial growth in Vietnam has also been very rapid. Early in the reform period, prior 
investments by the Soviet Union in oil and electricity boosted Vietnamese industrial 
output and exports significantly (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). From the early 1990s, 
industrial growth was driven by the rapid expansion of manufactured goods. Average 
industrial growth from 1986 to 1995 was 8.42% and from 1996 to 2005 it was 10.41%, a 
rate of industrial growth similar to China over the same period. The composition of 
Vietnam’s exports was also transformed as the manufacturing export sector grew rapidly.  
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Vietnam’s rapid export growth is shown in Chart 1.4 below and data is presented in 
Annex 1. 
 
Chart 1.4: Vietnam Export of Goods and Services as a % of GDP 1986 - 2005 
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The share of oil and gas in total exports declined as agricultural exports grew rapidly. By 
the mid 1990s, manufacturing exports were also growing rapidly and by the mid 1990s, 
the share of manufactured goods in exports accounted for two thirds of total 
merchandise exported (McCarty et al 2007). Nevertheless, manufacturing output and 
exports have remained overwhelmingly in the category of low value added products, 
dominated by garments and footwear as well as some electronics assembly. 
 
Table 1.5 Vietnamese export composition: 1995 – 2002 (percentages) 
 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Primary Products 
Rice 9.5 11.7 9.5 10.9 8.9 4.6 4.1 4.4 
Coffee 10.6 4.6 5.4 6.3 5.1 3.5 2.7 1.9 
Sea products 8.3 8.9 8.6 9.2 8.4 10.2 12.3 12.2 
Oil and 
petroleum 
19.7 18.3 15.6 13.2 18.1 24.2 21.9 19.5 
         
Manufactured products 
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Garments 8.3 15.7 16.4 15.5 15.1 13.1 13.6 16.4 
Leather and 
footwear 
3.8 7.2 10.7 11.0 12.0 10.1 10.8 11.1 
Electronics - - 4.8 5.3 5.1 5.4 4.2 3.1 
Handicrafts 1.3 1.1 1.3 1.2 1.5 1.6 1.6 2.0 
Source: (McCarty, Record, and Riedel 2007) 
 
Tanzania has also experienced higher growth rates in agriculture, industry and services 
since the late 1990s. Growth has been driven by expansion of natural resource based 
production, and good performance in a number of low technology manufacturing 
activities. Table 1.6 below provides data on average annual growth across a number of 
sectors.  
 
Table 1.6: Growth across sectors in Tanzania 
 Average annual growth rate Average contribution to GDP 
growth 
Type of 
Economic 
Activity 
1990 - 94 1995 - 99 2000-05 1990 – 94 1995 – 99 2000 – 05 
Agriculture 3.1 3.6 4.8 1.5 1.8 2.3 
Crops 3.2 3.9 4.8 1.1 1.4 1.7 
Livestock 2.5 2.7 4.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Forestry and 
hunting 
2.8 2.4 4.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Fishing 3.4 3.7 6.7 0.1 0.1 0.2 
       
Industry 2.0 5.4 9.0 0.3 0.9 1.6 
Mining and 
quarrying 
11.8 14.8 15.2 0.1 0.2 0.4 
Manufacturing 0.4 4.6 7.3 0.0 0.4 0.6 
Electricity and 
water 
4.0 5.7 4.4 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Construction 2.2 3.5 10.3 0.1 0.2 0.5 
       
Services 1.9 3.8 6.1 0.7 1.3 2.1 
Trade, hotels 
and restaurants 
2.0 4.5 7.1 0.3 0.7 1.2 
Transport and 
communication 
3.6 4.8 6.0 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Finance and 
business 
2.9 3.6 4.5 0.3 0.4 0.4 
Public 
administration 
and other 
1.9 1.6 4.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 
Source: Adapted from Utz (2007, 21) 
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Agricultural growth did increase to an average of 4.15% from 1996 – 2005 but overall the 
performance was quite variable as certain crops such as tea, tobacco and cashews 
improved. While output and exports of other major crops such as coffee, cotton and 
maize declined following liberalisation (Treichel 2005). Overall, there was very little 
increase in agricultural productivity and wages and this meant that rural poverty levels 
remained very high across the reform period (World Bank 2002). In contrast, in Vietnam 
rural poverty fell dramatically as agricultural output increased (Joint Donor Report 2004). 
   
Growth in industry overall was a contributor to GDP growth in Tanzania (Utz 2007). 
Growth in the manufacturing sector started to pick up in 1995 after a sustained 
downturn from the late 1980s (Szirmai and Lapperre 2001). From 1996 to 2005 the 
industrial sector grew at 8.43%, this was much higher than the average for sub-Saharan 
Africa during the same period of 3.75%. Growth in industry was driven by increases in 
mining and in manufacturing. A broad-based increase occurred in the output of a 
number of privatized industries including sugar, beer, soft drinks, cement and steel as 
evident from the data presented in table 1.6 below. Production of textiles and garments 
started to pick up again from 2001 (United Republic of Tanzania 2004).  
 
Table 1.7: Production of Selected Manufactured Commodities 1990 - 2003 
 Average 
Commodity 1990 - 
1995 
1996 – 
2006 
Consumer Goods   
Sugar (metric tons ‘000) 
    
109.2 154.8 
Cigarettes (pieces ‘000 000) 3.7 3.8 
Beer (ltrs ‘000 000) 60.9 167.5 
Soft drinks (ltrs ‘000 000) 83.2 168.0 
Textiles (Mtrs Sq. ‘000 000) 52.8 70.5 
Shoes (pairs ‘000 000) 0.4 - 
Intermediate Goods   
Cement (tons ‘000) 766.4 862.9 
Rolled steel (tons ‘000) 8.9 16.1 
Iron sheets (tons ‘000) 22.1 22.4 
Aluminium (tons ‘000) 2.5 0.2 
Petroleum products (tons ‘000) 346.2 273.1 
Sisal ropes (tons ‘000) 20.9 5.6 
Paints (ltrs ‘000 000) 2.4 9.3 
          Source: Treichel (2005; 6) 
 
From the evidence presented in Table 1.6 above, it is clear that mining and quarrying 
grew very rapidly over the period of liberalisation, reaching 15.2% growth from 2000 to 
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2004. The recent take-off in the mining sector started with small scale operations in the 
late 1980s. Following extensive mining exploration in the 1990s and a number of very 
large scale foreign investments in mining operations, Tanzania was ranked as the eighth 
largest producer of gold and the twelfth largest producer of diamonds in the world by 
2005 (Ministry of Finance 2004). The full extent of the mining sector was underestimated 
in official figures as investigations found that gold to the value of around USD 200 
million was being smuggled out of Tanzania each year up to 2003, equivalent to about 
half of the total value of officially exported gold (Ministry of Finance 2004), although 
such estimates of the extent of illegal trade in gold are obviously inherently difficult to 
calculate with precision. While the mining sector grew rapidly, the overall contribution of 
mining to GDP growth remained quite small, however as is evident from Table 1.7 
below, with the mining sector averaging around 1.9% of GDP from 1993 to 2003.  
 
Table 1.8: Contribution of the Mining Sector to the Economy 
 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Mining 
sector % 
 Of GDP 
1.1 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.1 2.3 2.5 2.7 3.0 
Gross 
Product 
Mining 
sector, 
Billion TSh 
19.1 26.2 35.2 38.5 53.5 74.4 85.8 99.5 120.5 153.0 191.3 
Real 
growth 
mining 
sector  
8.2 15.0 11.7 9.6 17.1 27.4 9.1 13.9 13.5 15.0 17.0 
Real 
growth 
GDP 
0.4 1.4 3.6 4.2 3.3 4.0 4.7 4.9 5.7 6.2 5.6 
Source: Ministry of Finance, Tanzania (2004) 
 
 
One of the major impacts of liberalisation on economic growth was the rapid rise of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) in both countries. FDI had been tightly controlled 
during the period of central planning. FDI to Tanzania started to grow in the early 1990s 
but picked up momentum from the end of the 1990s, as shown in Chart 1.4 below. Over 
the decade, average annual inflows of FDI increased six-fold to around USD 300 million 
(Treichel 2005). Mining was a major recipient, accounting for 40% of FDI, but 
manufacturing also received significant inflows, mainly due to the privatisation process. 
Tourism and financial services also received major inflows up to 2005 (Utz 2007).    
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Chart 1.5: FDI Flows to Tanzania 1985 – 2005 (USD Mill.) 
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Chart 1.6: FDI Flows to Vietnam 1985 – 2005 USD (Mill.) 
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Source: Own calculations based on data from UNCTAD (2006) 
 
Similarly in Vietnam, FDI started to increase at the end of the 1980s but then accelerated 
dramatically from the early 1990s and reached a peak in 1997 of 2,600 million USD. The 
Asian financial crisis constrained inflows for a number of years but the upward trend 
returned from 2002. The major sources of FDI were from countries in the East Asian 
region (Tran 2009). Vietnam’s geographic location within a region that had sustained a 
boom for many decades until the 1997 crisis is in stark contrast to Tanzania’s position on 
a continent with low growth over the same period.  
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FDI inflows into manufacturing played a major role in this rapid expansion with foreign 
invested firms accounting for well over 40% of total industrial output by mid 2000s 
(Hakkala and Kokko 2006). By the mid 2000s, foreign invested firms accounted for over 
half of Vietnam’s manufacturing sector (Cheshire and Penrose 2007). FDI also 
significantly boosted export production, particularly in low value added manufacturing.  
 
Aid flows also played a significant part of the improved economic growth performance 
under liberalisation, particularly in Tanzania. Aid played a significant role in financing 
investment in Tanzania since independence (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). In the era 
following liberalisation the volume of aid reached new heights and more than doubled in 
real value from the early 1990s with an increase of around 70% from 1993 to 2003 
(Lawson et al. 2005).  There was also a shift from project aid, favoured by donors in the 
1970s, to direct budget support through various forms of programme aid. Vietnam has 
also been a major recipient of aid since liberalisation. Western multilateral and bilateral 
donors started providing aid to Vietnam from 1993 and by the mid 2000s Vietnam had 
become the World Bank’s second largest aid recipient (Forsberg and Kokko 2005). 
However, Vietnam is by no means an aid dependent country as the contribution of ODA 
to GDP and to government revenues has fallen over the period of reforms from 5.9% of 
GDP in 2000 to 2.2% in 2008 (Cox et al 2011). In both countries, high levels of aid 
supported the expansion of public expenditure and investment. Domestic private 
investment also increased over the period of liberalisation but to a lesser magnitude than 
foreign inflows. 
 
Tanzania and Vietnam’s savings rates are in line with regional averages of around 15% 
for Sub-Saharan Africa and 30% of East Asia (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Serven 
2000). (See Appendix One for data on Savings as a % of GDP data). Some economists 
have argued that differential savings rates between East Asia and Africa is one of the 
major reasons for different growth rates in the regions (Elbadawi and Mwega 2000).  
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Chart 1.7: Savings as a % of GDP 1990 – 2010 
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Source: World Bank 2011 
 
From the early 1990s, Vietnam’s rate of investment increased rapidly while Tanzania’s 
rate of investment declined before rising again, but did not rise above 25% of GDP over 
the period under study as illustrated in Chart. 1.7 below: 
 
Chart 1.8: Total investment as a % of GDP in Tanzania and Vietnam 1986 - 2005 
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Source: IMF 2011 
 
Endogenous growth models predict that higher savings are critical in the explanation of 
growth differentials as they lead to higher investment which permanently lead to higher 
growth (Romer 1994). However the direction of causality is questioned by post 
Keynesian theorists and empirical studies that find that causality runs from higher growth 
to higher rates of savings (Rodrik 2000). 
 
Productivity Growth in Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
The evidence on the impact of liberalisation on productivity growth is more complex. 
Labour productivity increased from very low levels in Vietnam (Jenkins 2004) and 
manufacturing productivity increased overall in Tanzania (Harding et al 2006). In both 
countries, productivity grew across the sectors as new machinery and techniques of 
production were adopted. Value added in manufacturing grew more rapidly in Vietnam 
than in Tanzania. This is illustrated in Chart 1.8 below: 
 
Chart 1.9 Growth of Value Added in Manufacturing as a % of GDP in Tanzania 
and Vietnam from 1990 to 2010 
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However, both countries remained in very low value added manufacturing activities and 
were not able to significantly diversify into higher value added manufacturing. 
Productivity growth within the Tanzanian economy has been considerably lower than the 
rates achieved by Vietnam over the same period. Productivity growth in manufacturing 
in Tanzania has also been lower than in Kenya and also Mauritius, which is the only 
African country south of the Sahara to achieve rapid manufacturing export led growth. 
The contrast in growth in productivity in manufacturing can be seen from chart seven 
below. 
 
Chart 1.10: Comparison of Productivity Growth in Manufacturing in  
  Vietnam and Tanzania 
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Source: Own elaborations from UNIDO database ISIC 3 2005. Data logged and indexed from 
100 = 1990 
 
 
Firm level studies of productivity in manufacturing in Tanzania confirm that while there 
were declines in firm size, capital stock and employment across the 1990s productivity 
did not fall (Harding et al; 2006). This fits with the fact that over the same period, a 
number of large inefficient parastatals were closed down (Temu and Due; 1998). More 
recent indications, after 2000, show that there has been an expansion of new entry firms, 
which have higher levels of productivity than the average, driving up overall productivity 
growth. Further, exports of manufactured goods have grown, particularly within the East 
African region.  
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Vietnam was able to attain international competitiveness in many of its manufactured 
goods but Tanzania did not. Nevertheless, Vietnam’s manufacturing remained at the 
lowest rung of assembly even in low technology sectors such as garments and footwear 
(Lindhal and Thomsen 2002).  
 
While Vietnam has adopted national and provincial level strategies to enhance 
technological acquisition and learning as well as policies such as joint ventures requiring 
mandatory transfer of technology, the evidence on productivity growth below and in 
chapter 6 suggests that the impact of these strategies has so far been ambiguous. On 
initial analysis of aggregate data on value added growth, it is clear that productivity has 
improved across the economy as a whole and in manufacturing since 1986. However, the 
aggregate productivity data has to be interpreted with care. Measuring rates of 
productivity growth and absolute levels of productivity in different manufacturing 
sectors is fraught with difficulties. There is no single accepted method to measure 
productivity growth (Link 1987). Further, an aggregate productivity figure may not reveal 
if productivity in the new firms that are being set up is rapidly increasing or stagnant. The 
high levels of growth at a sector level, reflected in Table 1.1 above will lead to a high 
level of growth in productivity at the economy level. Productivity growth in the SOE 
sector increased, particularly since 1989, linked with restructuring and retrenchment. In 
the rapidly growing private manufacturing sector, productivity also increased, however 
Jenkins (2004) shows that labour productivity (measured by output per worker) in the 
private manufacturing sector actually declined over the 1990s as foreign firms were 
increasingly concentrated in labour intensive industries. 
 
This type of productivity growth, however, may not be related to an intensive process of 
technological learning necessary for a dynamic intensive growth path. Instead, it may be 
driven by the high level of entry into these sectors of new firms (foreign or domestic) 
with a high of turn-over of capital. Certainly, Ronnas (1998) finds that in Vietnam there 
has been a very high level of capital accumulation which reflects the rapid modernization 
in manufacturing and the import of new capital. Further, Jenkins (2004) reports that the 
ratio of imports to production in different industrial branches is correlated with 
productivity growth and points to the fact that productivity has grown fastest in the 
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traded goods sector where rapid modernization of capital was required to achieve global 
competitiveness.  
 
The trajectory of economic transition that Vietnam followed from 1986 to 2005 
appeared to involve less intensive labour productivity growth than in the Asian tiger 
success stories of earlier decades or, in China over the last twenty years. Evidence for this 
is presented in the paragraphs below. Comparative data on labour productivity is 
presented in Table 1.8 below: 
 
   Table 1.9: Value-added per worker in manufacturing (USD) in Selected       
Asian Countries 
 1990 2000 
Vietnam 971 2,130 
China 1,702 5,258 
Indonesia 5,155 6,151 
Malaysia 10,917 17,149 
Thailand 16,005 18,276 
   Source: Jenkins (2006; 203) 
 
The clear differences in labour productivity reflected in the table are perhaps 
unsurprising given that the other countries in the table were, even in 2000, at a much 
more advanced stage of industrialization. A more relevant comparison is to consider the 
growth in labour productivities achieved by these countries in transition. A focus on low 
value added manufacturing is consistent with the experience of initial rapid 
industrialisation in many East Asian countries (Perkins and Thanh 2005). This trajectory 
of productivity growth in manufacturing may be consistent with rapid industrialisation 
and growth of manufactured exports. 
 
Chart 1.11: Comparison of Growth in Labour Productivity during 
Transitions  
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The chart suggests that the rate of growth of productivity in Vietnam during the second 
half of its take-off period was quite similar to the rates of growth of productivity in other 
South East Asian economies. Growth in these economies was characterised as rapid 
while not on a very intensive trajectory compared to the North East Asian economies 
such as South Korea. South Korea and Taiwan also began shifting into competitive 
heavy industries after only a decade of rapid growth in low productivity manufacturing 
(Perkins and Thanh 2005). Vietnam has clearly not climbed the technology ladder as 
quickly as these countries during its transition process. 
 
The comparison with productivity growth in China during its take off period and during 
Vietnam’s more recent take off period suggests that Vietnam has also experienced lower 
labour productivity growth than China. 
 
Chart 1.12: Comparison of Labour Productivity Growth in China and 
Vietnam  
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Source: Own elaborations from UNIDO database ISIC 3 2005. China logged and indexed from 
100 = 1983, Vietnam logged and indexed from 100 = 1995 
 
Productivity in Vietnam is clearly growing however the aggregate productivity date 
suggests that this may not be primarily driven by a dynamic learning process of the kind 
that North East Asian countries pursued during their rapid transition to capitalism. 
Instead, it may result from extensive replication and upgrading of capital which does 
generate growth but at a slower pace and with fewer linkages and a lower level of catch-
up in terms of technology levels and income per capita. Extensive growth should be 
reflected in the productivity of existing firms growing slowly, but this could be consistent 
with average productivity growing rapidly if new firms were replacing traditional or 
informal firms.  These issues show how complicated it is to accurately assess the process 
of transition through aggregate productivity data. Neither Vietnam, nor Tanzania, 
conform to an unobtainable counterfactual of rapid technology acquisition during 
transition. Nevertheless, the success of each country in terms of its own strategies for 
technological learning and productivity growth can be assessed and these are discussed 
further in Chapter 6 on Industrial Policy. 
 
 
1.2.3 Political Institutions under Liberalisation 
 
The continued political dominance of the pre-reform ruling party over the period of 
liberalisation and high levels of political stability distinguished Tanzania and Vietnam 
from many other developing countries. During the same period, the political system in 
both countries was also characterised by very high levels of corruption and pervasive 
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patron-client relations that operated within the ruling party. In both countries, economic 
liberalisation was accompanied by certain forms of political reform. Differences emerged 
between the two countries as Tanzania moved away from the one-party system and 
instead became a dominant party system1. Yet despite this important difference, there 
were many similarities between the ways that the parties continued to be organised in 
both countries under liberalisation. 
 
Formal changes to the relationship between CCM and the state were introduced in 
Tanzania from 1992 and multiparty elections started in 1995. The factors that led to 
Tanzania’s adoption of multiparty elections included changes in the international context 
due to the ending of the Cold War, the move to democratic governance in other ex-
socialist states and increasing donor conditionality linked to democratisation. Factors 
internal to the Party were also critical in this decision. The Nyalali Commission was set 
up by the President in 1991 to assess public support for the one-party system. While it 
found little public demand for a move away from the one party system there was a vocal 
minority who wanted the change. Some of the top leadership within the CCM, most 
notably Nyerere, also supported a process of democratisation (Vener 1996).  
 
The early move to multiparty politics allowed the CCM to introduce a new constitution 
that was favourable to its own position of strength. For example, the new rules on public 
financing for political parties meant that a party was entitled to a government subsidy 
proportional to the number of seats it had in Parliament. This gave the CCM a huge 
financial advantage over its rivals (Mmuya 1998). Over the period of liberalisation, five 
main opposition parties were established: the Civic United Front (CUF), National 
Convention for Constitutional Reform (NCCR-Mageuzi), Chama Cha Demokrasia na 
Maendeleo (CHADEMA) and the United Democratic Party (UDP). These parties were 
predominantly organised by individuals who had previously held senior positions within 
the CCM. None of the parties had a distinct ideology although some of the parties were 
built on regional support bases.  
 
In the first three rounds of national multiparty elections, these opposition parties failed 
to make a significant impact on the political dominance of CCM. They suffered from 
                                                 
1
 The concept of dominant party system was originally proposed by Kothari (1970) to explain the 
dominant role of the Congress Party within the multi-party system in India in the 1960s. Khan classifies 
Tanzania as a dominant party system in Khan (2008). 
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lack of funding and internal divisions significantly reduced their effectiveness (Mmuya 
1998). The CCM increased its total support from 59% of all votes in 1995, to 65% of 
votes in 2000, to 70% of votes in 2005 (Skinlo 2007). Further, the advent of multiparty 
elections actually led to decreased competition in around 13% of seats as under the one-
party system the CCM fielded multiple candidates while under the new political system, 
the weak opposition parties could not afford to stand candidates in all seats (Kelsall 
2003)2. Most district and village authorities also remained under the control of the CCM 
(Pallotti 2008). Thus, electorally, the CCM remained in a dominant political position 
throughout the period of economic liberalisation. 
 
Structure of the Party 
 
The centralised structure of the party institutions that was established under the 
formative socialist political settlement changed very little under liberalisation. The Party 
Congress, the National Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the National 
Executive Committee made up the top level of the party at the national level. In theory, 
the Party Congress was the apex institution within the Party. In reality, decisions were 
highly centralised and determined by the Central Committee of the National Executive 
Committee (Kelsall et al. 2005). Methods of central control within the Party remained 
strong. The NEC and the Central Committee took on the role of controlling the elite 
within the Party. The Central Committee controlled party patronage by monitoring the 
activities of members and recommending appointments and removals of party officers or 
even expulsion of members (Skinlo 2007). The President, who was also Party Chairman, 
exerted power over the party through selection and appointments to positions 
throughout the state (Kelsall et al. 2005). Tight elite control even at the very top was 
evident from the fact that there were fairly regular reshuffles within the top party 
structure (Wang 2005). This reduced the ability of any senior politician to build up stable 
factional support within the party.  
 
                                                 
2
 Where multiparty politics has been most contentious has been on Zanzibar where CUF has a strong 
presence. Zanzibar has a population that is lower than many of Tanzania’s regions but it has been a 
political flash point during the period of liberalisation. The main political contention is between CCM and 
CUF and national elections have been accompanied by violence and accusations of election rigging. The 
political conflicts on Zanzibar are rooted in its specific colonial history and struggle against the Arab 
dominated Government that succeeded the British in 1961 (Maliyamkono and Kanyongolo 2003).  
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The removal of the one-party clause in the constitution also brought about the formal 
delinking of the CCM Party and the State (Wang 2005). Overall, however, the CCM has 
kept a significant degree of control over the other institutions of the state. Certain public 
service positions remained restricted to members of CCM and public servants prepared 
performance results against the objectives of the CCM manifesto, even at the local level 
(Kelsall et al. 2005). Permanent Secretaries and their deputies were Presidential 
appointees. Newly appointed civil servants were required to undergo training at the 
Kivukoni Political Education College. Formal links between the Party and the military 
were severed but informal links and movement from senior levels of the military into 
CCM positions remained common (Ramadhani 2001). The Party establishment therefore 
maintained influence over massive financial, managerial and organisational resources 
under the state agencies (Mmuya 1998). 
 
While local level state institutions were created that were supposed to be separate from 
the party, in reality, there was little distinction between local level party structures and 
state institutions. Local levels of the state consist of regional government institutions in 
Tanzania’s 26 regions. These were divided into 97 district councils and 25 urban 
councils. Underneath this were 10,075 registered villages. The Ministry for Regional 
Administration and Local Government was responsible for local government but in 
reality the President retained the power to select key state officials. Regional 
Commissioners, Regional Administrative Secretaries and District Commissioners were all 
Presidential appointments. Village Councils were elected by the Village Assembly which 
comprises all adults in the Village. The Party structures at the regional level consisted of 
the Regional Conference, the Regional Executive Committee, and the Political 
Committee of the Regional Executive Committee. The power of these regional party 
institutions was quite limited compared to the central party institutions (Kelsall et al. 
2005). At the lowest level of the state and the party, the ten cell party institutions and the 
state institutions of the urban ward and vitongoji in the Village overlapped in terms of 
members and activities (Kelsall et al. 2005).  
 
In Vietnam there were changes in the formal relationship between the VCP and the state 
during the period of economic liberalisation. The Constitution was re-written and 
amended a number of times to reflect an increased distinction between executive and 
legislative functions. By 2001, the new and amended constitution had enhanced the 
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powers of the National Assembly and recognised the independent rule of law, but 
continued to affirm the role of the VCP as the sole force leading the state and society. 
Internally, the VCP continued to be organised along democratic centralist lines and 
power within the Party appeared to be concentrated with its most senior officials. Overall 
within the Party, the positions with the most formal power were held by the Party 
Secretary, the President and the Prime Minister (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
Formally, the National Assembly appointed the President who was officially the Head of 
State. The President had the power to appoint the Prime Minister and other high level 
officials. The Prime Minister headed the cabinet that consisted of the heads of 26 
Ministries and Commissions. In practice, the Politburo of the Party remained a much 
more powerful institution than the Cabinet (World Bank 2009).  
 
Throughout the period of liberalisation, the overall leadership of the Party was provided 
by the Politburo under the General Secretary of the Party. The Politburo was formally 
elected by the Central Committee, and the Central Committee was elected by the 
National Party Congress, which met every five years. The Central Committee of the 
Party had around 173 members and the Politburo had around 14 members (Abuza 2001). 
In the early years of reform, the Politburo consisted of people who had played a 
prominent role during the war. This changed from the early 1990s, however, as the Party 
Chairs of the high growth cities of Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh were promoted into the 
Politburo (Gainsborough 2003). The Vietnamese People’s Army remained an important 
political institution and held around 10% as block seats on the Central Committee 
(Abuza 2001). 
 
Loyalty to the Party of members of the National Assembly was assessed by the 
Vietnamese Fatherland Front (VFF) prior to selection (Tonnesson 2000) although 
officially members were no longer required to be Party members. The umbrella 
organisation VFF encompassed 25 ‘mass movement’ groups linked to the Party and was 
defined in the constitution as representing the ‘political base of people’s power’ (World 
Bank 2009). Membership of the VCP itself was low, at around 3% of the total population 
(Abuza 2001). 
 
As in Tanzania, government and VCP institutions remained closely linked at lower levels 
of the state. Under the Central Government level there were 58 provinces and five 
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municipalities. These five municipalities, Ha Noi, Hai Phong, Da Nang, Ho Chi Minh 
City and Can Tho had the same political status in party and state structures as the 
provinces. The provinces were divided into districts, provincial cities and towns which 
were subdivided into towns or communes. The municipalities were divided into rural 
districts and urban districts, which were subdivided into wards. The ward was the lowest 
level of officially recognized state structure, although some villages retained separate 
party structures and some had appointed village leaders at this level within the ward 
(Kerkvliet and Marr 2004).  
 
Party institutions existed at each level of the state with a People’s council, People’s 
committee and branches of the VCP and mass organizations of the VFF. The Provincial 
Party Committee and the Party Secretary were the most important local level institutions 
of the Party (World Bank 2009). The People’s Committee acted as the executive agency 
of the People’s Council at each level. Provincial Party Secretaries were officially selected 
by the Provincial People’s Council but the Prime Minister had the right to approve or 
dismiss them. The Provincial Party Committee was responsible for deciding on 
provincial development strategies and could influence the selection of personnel within 
the state at lower levels and within State Owned Enterprises. The key officials at the local 
level of the Party consisted of a group of around twelve people. These were the local 
party secretary; the chair and vice chair of the People’s Committee; the members of the 
committee in charge of finance and other significant resources; the head of the local 
security police; the chairs of the local branches of the significant institutions attached to 
the VCP such as the VFF, the Women’s Association, Veteran’s Association, Peasant’s 
Association, and the Secretary of the Youth League branch of the VCP (Kerkvliet and 
Marr 2004). 
  
Institutions of the central state such as Central Ministries were also replicated at lower 
levels so each Ministry had Departments that operated at the provincial level. Central 
Government ministries formally administered their local equivalent agencies by giving 
instructions through circulars or directives to the local People’s Committee to pass 
implementing laws that would then formalise the application of the central ministry’s 
ruling at the local level (Fforde and Pty 2003). In effect, different ministries operated 
different levels of control in the provinces. For example, the Central Ministry of Planning 
and Investment issued general guidance, while the provincial level Departments of 
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Planning and Investment (DPI) produced detailed provincial investment plans and were 
in charge of business registration and managing the bulk of foreign investment. The main 
state institutions were replicated at the district level, including departments of ministries 
while at the ward level the basic state structure included People’s Council, the People’s 
Committee and the ward branch of the VCP, but at this level there were no judicial 
institutions. On the ground, there was considerable variation in the relations between 
these different institutions of the state both horizontally and vertically. In some cases the 
departments of line ministries provided technical assistance to People’s Committees and 
influenced local decision-making, while in others they had little interaction (Malesky 
2003). 
 
Table 1.10 Comparison of the Institutions of the Party under Liberalisation 
 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
Political System Multiparty system but CCM 
remained the dominant party. 
One Party State  
Relationship 
between the 
executive and the 
legislative branches 
of the state 
Formal division between the 
legislative and executive arms of 
the state but in practice they 
overlapped. 
Increasing formal divisions 
between Government and the 
Party but Party remained the 
apex political institution. 
Relationship 
between the Party 
and the army 
Formally no relationship but 
many informal links remained 
10% of block seats on the 
Party Central Committee. 
Structure of the 
Party at the central 
level 
Party Chairman  
Central Committee of the NEC.  
National Executive Committee 
(NEC) 
Party Conference 
Party Associations (Youth,  
Women, Teachers etc.) 
Party Secretary 
President 
Politburo 
Central Committee 
National Party Congress 
Vietnam Fatherland Front 
(umbrella organisation for 
organisations linked to the 
Party) 
Structure of 
government at the 
central level 
President 
Prime Minister and Deputy  
Cabinet 
Ministers 
Parliament 
Permanent Secretaries – who are 
appointed by the President  
President 
Prime Minister and Deputy 
Cabinet 
Ministers 
National Assembly 
Permanent Secretaries 
Structure of local 
government 
institutions 
Ministry of Regional Affairs and 
Local Government 
Regional Commissioners 
(presidential appointment) 
District Commissioners 
(presidential appointment) 
Provincial departments of 
central ministries 
 
District departments of 
central ministries 
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District Mayors, Councils and 
Wards 
Village Assembly and Village 
Council 
Structure of local 
party institutions 
Regional: Regional Conference,  
Regional Executive Committee, 
Political Committee of the 
Regional Executive Committee 
 
District: party branches 
 
Ward: party branches 
 
Ten cell units 
Provincial: Party Secretary, 
People’s Committee, People’s 
Council (the Provincial Party 
Secretary is formally 
appointed by the Provincial 
People’s Council but can be 
vetoed by the Prime Minister) 
 
District: Party Secretary, Party 
Committee, Party Council, 
Party branch 
 
Ward: People’s Councils, 
People’s Committee, 
branches 
 
Ten cell units 
 
High levels of corruption 
 
While the continued dominance of the pre-reform political party appeared to provide a 
degree of political cohesion and stability that was missing in many other developing 
countries, both countries were characterised as having very high levels of corruption 
within the state over the period of liberalisation. In 2005, Tanzania was ranked as 96th 
and Vietnam as 144th out of 159 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index, where countries are ranked in terms of the perceptions of corruption 
across a range of criteria from least corrupt (1) to most corrupt (159).Studies undertaken 
by the Governments in Tanzania and Vietnam identified extensive bureaucratic, political 
and grand corruption as well as theft by state officials and other variants of abuse of 
office by state officials for financial gain (United Republic of Tanzania 1996), 
(Committee for Internal Affairs of the Communist Party of Vietnam 2005). High levels 
of corruption across the period of liberalisation were also a cause of concern for donors 
and loan conditionality became linked to improvements in governance across a range of 
state activities. In both countries, corruption appeared to be taking place within the party 
system based on extensive patron-client relations. The extent and pattern of clientelism 
was opaque in both countries as it occurred behind the closed doors of the Party 
institutions. However, over the course of liberalisation an increasing number of cases of 
corruption were taken to court or received coverage in the local and international media. 
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These governance features of a relatively centralised Party with extensive corruption 
contained within its structures provides an important basis for comparison of economic 
transition in the two countries.  
 
5. Main Findings of the PhD 
 
Important aspects of the political economy of economic transition in Tanzania and 
Vietnam can be explained by examining how the evolving political settlement influenced 
processes of political stabilisation, primitive accumulation and technology acquisition. 
The theory of Political Settlements is outlined in Chapter Two as are the key transition 
processes of political stabilisation, primitive accumulation and technology acquisition.  A 
political settlement defines the combination of institutions and the underlying 
distribution of power in a society. Institutions in the Political Settlements approach are 
not neutral ‘rules of the game’ but have distributive outcomes. They establish a pattern of 
rights that determine the distribution of income and resource flows in a society. 
Historically constituted social groups will attempt to use power to hold onto or gain 
rights that confer income flows through redistribution and production. These struggles 
over income flows will shape how political stabilisation is achieved, the success of 
technology acquisition strategies and the role of primitive accumulation in economic 
performance.  
 
The concept of a formative socialist political settlement is developed in Chapter 2. The 
formative socialist political settlement captures features of the socialist political economy 
of these countries. Its most important features are first, the countries were ruled as one-
party states by socialist parties that came to power with mass support through some form 
of revolutionary process. The specific nature of the struggle to power was critical to 
understanding the extent that they were subsequently able to consolidate power within 
their institutions. Second, the ideological commitment to a socialist transition meant that 
capitalism was suppressed and domestic and international capital were restricted from 
formal positions of power. Instead, economic institutions in the form of collectives and 
state owned enterprises were created to give formal economic power, through the 
control of the Party, to workers and peasants. The extent to which this commitment to 
socialist ideology actually led to a change in the distribution of economic power away 
from the existing capitalist classes is an important factor in explaining the subsequent 
economic transition under liberalisation. Third, despite the creation of formal institutions 
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that were supposed to vest power in the hands of workers and peasants, the actual 
distribution of power was not held primarily by these groups. As in other developing 
countries, political power was largely held by intermediate class groups that led the 
Parties on behalf of the workers and peasants. The extent to which intermediate class 
groups were able to consolidate power within the party depended largely on their 
organisational capacities within the state, the extent of the suppression of political 
organisation outside the Party, and their ability to control the economic assets of the 
state, even though these were not highly productive. The extent to which the 
intermediate class groups were able to consolidate their political power within the party 
state and create a centralised party structure had important consequences for economic 
transition under liberalisation. And finally, fourth, despite the fact that the distribution of 
power was not aligned behind the formal institutions representing the poor, the extent to 
which formal institutions were created to give political voice to these groups had 
implications and unintended consequences for the subsequent path of economic growth 
under liberalisation.  
 
A critical feature of the political economy of Tanzania and Vietnam was the on-going 
dominance of the Party throughout the period of liberalisation. The institutionalised 
Party structures that broadly contained political competition were the product of the 
formative socialist political settlement. The ruling Party provided an overall political 
architecture that constrained factional competition and allowed certain forms of 
centralised resource allocation to the new growth sectors. However, in both countries, 
factional groupings at lower levels within the Party and within society had a significant 
impact on the outcome of transition processes. This reflected a more decentralised 
distribution of power that is not captured in institutional structures alone. The 
distribution of power within the Party was itself the result of a deeper pattern of 
economic and political power within society.  
 
The historical evolution of the political settlement in Tanzania and Vietnam is described 
and defined in Chapter 3. The impact of the political settlement on economic growth 
under liberalisation is explored through three case studies. Chapter 4 presents evidence 
on Public Finances, Chapter 5 considers Land Management and Chapter 6 presents 
evidence on Industrial Policy. Each case study covers both Tanzania and Vietnam. In 
both countries, the centralisation of political power within the party institutions as a 
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legacy of the formative socialist political settlement helped to create political stability by 
restricting forms of fragmented clientelist political competition outside the Party 
framework. Political stability was one of the reasons that both countries were able to 
attract high levels of aid and foreign investment under liberalisation. In Tanzania 
centralised power was based on a fluid equilibrium between factions at the centre rather 
than a strong centralised leadership that could impose decisions upon senior Party 
officials. The apparent strength of the CCM was, therefore, partly a result of the weaker 
distribution of political power within society overall. The result was that the Party could 
achieve political stability at relatively low cost but could not override small collective 
action groups in the form of internal factions when they coalesced to protect rent flows.  
 
However, these same characteristics also limited the extent to which internal factions 
could mobilise outside the Party and threaten the overall stability of CCM’s political 
control. In Tanzania, industrial policy was much less successful under liberalisation. The 
lack of compatibility between the structure of industrial policy and the underlying 
political settlement resulted partly from the difficulty of negotiating a viable settlement 
between largely non-indigenous capitalist groups and the Party. The Party cannot easily 
openly support policies that would further enrich this group. Nevertheless, the close 
relationship that exists may have discouraged risk taking by this group by allowing them 
access to income flows through political rent seeking rather than through more 
productive economic activities. 
 
In Vietnam, centralised control over aid and oil revenues helped the central VCP 
institutions meet the redistributive demands of provincial level leaders. The distribution 
of power between the provinces was largely constructed in the course of fighting the war 
although this balance has shifted over the course of liberalisation as wealth differentials 
between provinces have increased. Centralised control over these resources facilitated 
redistribution without impinging excessively on the revenues of the provinces that had 
greater economic growth. In Vietnam at provincial and district level there was a greater 
density of organisations such as banks and financial institutions that played a role in 
allocating resources through corruption and primitive accumulation processes. There had 
been a rapid commercialisation of Party institutions at the lower levels that started at the 
end of the socialist period that engaged with these financial institutions to attract 
resources.  
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However, the small factional networks behind these commercial activities within the 
VCP were subject to greater discipline in using these resources. These compulsions were 
not provided by the oversight of the central state but through horizontal competition 
between people with economic and political power at the local level.  This also meant, 
however, that the centre was constrained in its ability to impose its rules on lower levels. 
If a significant coalition within the VCP could find some type of collective action that 
provided sufficient rents to satisfy the coalition, it could go ahead even if the resulting 
investment project was basically speculative rather than developmental. These facets of 
the evolving political settlement may have made it more difficult for Vietnam to generate 
a rapid process of technological learning from FDI under liberalisation. The outcome of 
this was that while Vietnam’s manufacturing sector expanded rapidly, climbing up the 
technology ladder into new higher productivity manufacturing activities was slow. Under 
liberalisation, the focus on removing state interventions in both countries did not address 
the more fundamental constraints related to aspects of the political settlement that could 
allow for a more productive economic transition. 
 
The Conclusion in Chapter Seven draws out the main points developed through the case 
studies and argues that the legacy of socialism for economic growth under liberalisation 
can be understood in terms of its impact of the distribution of political and economic 
power in both countries. The impact of the mass political movement and consolidation 
of political power within the party structures meant that both countries established a 
more centralised institutional political system than in many other developing countries. 
However, the actual distribution of power within this institutional structure was much 
more decentralised. Differences in the actual distribution of power in the wider society is 
critical to explaining the differing experiences of economic performance under 
liberalisation. The political economy of transition in Tanzania and Vietnam shows that 
the distribution of power in society is a critical influence on the actual effectiveness of 
different decision making processes rather than the formal structure of political 
institutions. 
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Chapter Two 
 
The Analytical Framework 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses three different approaches to explaining the role of institutions in 
economic performance in developing countries: New Institutional Economics, 
Heterodox Theories of the State and Political Settlements Analysis. Each is assessed in 
terms of its suitability for the objective of the thesis in exploring comparative economic 
transition in Tanzania and Vietnam under liberalisation. The investigation of the role of 
institutions in economic performance was central to classical political economy but has 
since been absorbed into the mainstream of economic analysis through an expanded 
neo-classical framework in the form of New Institutional Economics (NIE). The chapter 
starts with an assessment of NIE and its limitations and explores the Weberian inspired 
theories of state power. It then sets out an alternative analytical framework that identifies 
the distribution of power as a critical determinant of the success of institutions in 
promoting growth in developing countries through the Political Settlements framework 
developed by Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2010). Khan argues that political settlements 
influence the pace and direction of economic transition through a number of 
mechanisms. These include the effect of the political settlement on three critical 
processes: political redistribution, primitive accumulation and the management of 
technology learning rents. In order to apply this framework to explaining comparative 
transition in Tanzania and Vietnam, the Political Settlements framework is expanded to 
include the concept of a formative socialist political settlement. To conclude, the chapter 
outlines the method of application of this analytical framework used in the subsequent 
chapters. 
 
2.2 New Institutional Economics 
 
Current scholarship on the impact of political institutions on economic transition is 
dominated by New Institutional Economics. Rather than building on the older 
institutional analysis of economists such as that of Veblen (2009) who advanced a rich 
sociological and historical understanding of institutions, NIE expands the economic 
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theory of neoclassical economics to explain how institutions affect economic outcomes. 
Institutions are defined by Douglas North, the main proponent of New Institutional 
Economics (1973; 1990; 1994; 1995), as the ‘rules of the game’. Institutions are an 
inherent part of all societies, according to NIE, because of the prevalence of transaction 
costs. These are the costs of negotiating and enforcing agreements, originally identified 
by Ronald Coase (1960). All transactions, it is argued, will be subject to the risk of moral 
hazard and asymmetric information as well as being constrained by the impossibility of 
obtaining comprehensive information about the value of the item to be exchanged. 
Transactions will therefore only be possible on the basis of an on-going process of 
bargaining, enforcement and monitoring, the rules of which are established by 
institutions. Williamson argues that transaction costs are the ubiquitous costs incurred in 
the running of all economic systems and likens them to the friction in physical systems 
(1985; 19). The cost of transacting is the critical impediment to economic activity. The 
lower the transaction costs, the more transactions will take place and society will achieve 
greater efficiency. Transition to economic systems with higher growth will occur, it is 
argued, through the adoption of both formal and informal institutions that lower the cost 
of transacting, thus bringing a closer alignment between society and the efficient market 
ideal of the neoclassical model.  
 
In the early NIE literature, institutional change that brings about lower transaction costs 
is driven by individuals engaging in a bargaining process. North and Thomas (1973) and 
Hayami and Ruttan (1984) argue that institutional change occurs as individuals respond 
to changes in relative prices and subsequently engage in a voluntary bargaining process to 
change institutions for their economic advantage. Negotiations are modelled on the 
perfect neoclassical process of price setting for goods. While high transaction costs can 
stop certain transactions occurring, this is unimportant as it is assumed that all Pareto 
enhancing transactions will take place. This is because individuals will be able to pay off 
losers at an agreed price that leaves both of them better off. Thus all negotiated 
institutional change is presumed to be Pareto efficient. This gives early NIE models a 
distinctly functionalist approach, as institutional change will be, by definition, Pareto 
enhancing. Over time, therefore, growth promoting institutions will emerge in any 
society. 
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Later NIE models move away from this functionalist model of economic history by 
attempting to model the political process and the state explicitly (North 1990),(North 
1994). In these models, it is not simply the economic costs of transacting, as in the earlier 
NIE models, but also the political cost of transacting over institutional changes that is 
deemed to influence the path of economic transition. North (1990; 109) argued that the 
political process can be likened to a political market where political transaction costs are 
the costs of bargaining, monitoring and enforcing political transactions. Where political 
transaction costs exist, a competitive political process cannot guarantee to weed out the 
inefficient rulers. North (1990) modelled the political process as a state consisting of a 
ruler and citizens. The ruler will maintain high transaction cost institutions when the 
political costs of changing to other growth enhancing institutions are higher than the 
benefits of economic growth to the leadership. It is assumed that the ruler has the 
incentive to maximise his short term profits over the interests of the citizens when the 
ruler cannot be sure of maintaining control over the state and hence future income flows. 
Where the ruler has longer time horizons, it will be in the ruler’s interest to maximise 
aggregate incomes for society by creating low transaction cost institutions. Low 
transaction cost institutions, according to NIE, will then lead to higher growth and a 
larger economy that the ruler will be able to tax, thereby increasing his incomes over the 
longer term.  
 
In Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), North no longer presents 
the extractive state as the main agent of economic change. Instead, a central role is given 
to organizations. Organizations are “groups of individuals bound by some common 
purpose to achieve objectives” (North 1990; 5) and include diverse structures in the 
political, economic and social realm, from political parties to firms, trade unions, 
universities and schools. Organizations cause incremental institutional change in the 
process of furthering their own objectives within the given institutional framework. In 
addition, an organization which sees that its objectives are not being best served by the 
current institutional framework will lobby for institutional change. Again, however, actual 
institutional change is a function of the level of political and economic transaction costs, 
and all changes involve agreement on the price of compensation and its payment in full.  
Although these additions to the NIE model mean that transformation is a more 
incremental process, NIE still presents a uni-linear path of development where 
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successful transition involves progress towards the neoclassical nirvana of a society free 
of transaction costs.  
 
NIE theory has been used to promote a very specific set of institutions as crucial for 
economic growth in developing countries through the ‘good governance’ agenda. This 
advocates property rights stability, reducing corruption, a transparent and accountable 
public sector, democratic government, rule of law and competitive (rent free) markets as 
the necessary lower transaction cost institutions for countries such as Tanzania and 
Vietnam to adopt in order to experience an economic transition to higher growth. The 
original NIE theory was developed through historical accounts, for example North and 
Thomas (1973), and Hayami and Ruttan, (1984), however, more recently, the NIE 
framework has received support from numerous econometric studies that purport to 
provide strong evidence of the link between these ‘good governance’ institutions and 
economic performance. The econometric studies have depended on the creation of 
‘indicators’ of institutional quality. The data and the econometric research have been 
critical to solidifying the consensus that has emerged about the role of ‘good governance’ 
institutions in developing countries, yet this research has a number of significant flaws. 
 
The early work on indicators of governance involved attempts to harness ‘objective’ 
measures of institutions, such as the work by Barro (1991) on political instability, as well 
as ‘subjective’ measures by Mauro (1995) and Knack and Keefer (1995), who use survey 
data from credit risk rating agencies. These approaches have since been expanded and 
refined to produce composite indices, using both subjective and objective measurements 
from a wide variety of sources. The most well known of these data sets are, arguably, the 
Corruption Perceptions Index produced by Transparency International and World Wide 
Governance Indicators (WGI) produced by Daniel Kaufmann and his associates at the 
World Bank. The WGI are based on composite indices of objective and subjective 
measurements of six variables of institutional quality measured from 1996. The WGI 
data for Tanzania and Vietnam over the period of liberalisation are presented in Table 
2.1 below: 
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Table 2.1: WGI for Tanzania and Vietnam over the Period of Liberalisation 
(observations from 1996, 2000 and 2005) 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
Percentile Rank (0 – 100) 
Voice and Accountability 1996 28.7 9.6 
2000 36.5 12.5 
2005 39.4 8.2 
Political Stability 1996 36.5 55.8 
2000 28.8 53.5 
2005 32.7 57.7 
Government Effectiveness 1996 25.7 48.5 
2000 39.8 40.3 
2005 38.5 48.5 
Regulatory Quality 1996 45.4 34.6 
2000 41.5 23.4 
2005 40.5 34.6 
Rule of Law 1996 45.7 34.3 
2000 42.4 41.4 
2005 45.7 46.2 
Control of Corruption 1996 13.1 37.9 
2000 10.7 29.1 
2005 28.6 25.2 
Source: Data from (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). Countries are ranked from 0 
– 100 where 0 is the lowest score. 
 
The basic problem with this sort of empirical assessment of the role of institutions in 
economic growth is how to accurately define and identify the abstract concepts of 
governance and whether the proxies that have been used actually reflect the institution 
that they are supposed to represent. Thomas (2006) argued that ‘The first question that 
should occupy potential users of any governance indicator is not the size of the 
measurement error, but whether the indicators are valid measurements of what they 
purport to measure’ (2006; 13). This problem bedevils all of the research using proxy 
indicators of governance, from Barro’s early work using violence proxies for property 
rights instabilities (Knack 2006) to the construction of the WGI data set shown above. 
Thomas (2006) argued that WGI indicators exhibit ‘concept vagueness’ that makes the 
whole exercise of data construction problematic. Kaufmann et al (2007) rejected this 
criticism, arguing that it is widely agreed that governance lacks an accepted common 
definition and that the WGI indicators are broadly in line with commonly used 
definitions. They suggest that problems of concept formulation are less apparent in the 
WGI indicators because of the high correlation between the different proxies they 
identify to measure particular concepts. While this may go some way to assuage fears that 
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the data is unreliable (Kurtz and Schrank 2006), it does not necessarily imply much for 
the validity of the concepts themselves. 
 
Knack (2006) highlights another area of definitional concern, echoed by Kurtz and 
Shrank (2006) and Glaeser et al (2004), that there is not enough discrimination between 
outcomes and processes in the measurement of governance. Knack (2006) argued that 
this criticism applies to most of the ‘first generation’ indicators discussed above, while 
Kurtz and Shrank (2006) make the specific point that the WGI indicators combine 
institutions, policy preferences and policy outcomes into single indicators. Knack (2002) 
argued that a further general problem is that ‘first generation’ indices measure 
performance very broadly rather than specific aspects of performance. This limits the 
usefulness of the indicators in terms of policy advice and monitoring. Knack suggested 
that existing research on governance ‘does not often point the way toward specific 
reforms, because it is based largely on very broad and aggregated indicators of 
institutional performance’ (2003: 294). He gives the example of corruption indicators that 
are rarely disaggregated between different types of corruption such as petty corruption 
and grand corruption or bureaucratic, legislative and judicial corruption. Such 
imprecision limits the use of these indicators to inform the research on the role of 
institutions in Tanzania and Vietnam.     
 
In terms of information sources, the fact that many of these indices rely on subjective 
views collected by public and private organizations for a range of purposes has been an 
important area of criticism of the data. This concern, expressed by Glaeser et al (2004), 
Knack (2006), Kurtz and Schrank (2006) and Arndt and Oman (2006), is based on the 
fact that subjective data risks the possibility that ratings are affected by experts’ 
knowledge of recent economic performance - for example, a country that has recently 
grown well will be assessed as having lower corruption than a country where the 
economy is stagnating. Kurtz and Schrank (2006) provided evidence that the 
Government Effectiveness measure in the WGI index, tends to have a significant partial 
correlation with two year average growth rates prior to the date of the governance 
indicator although their evidence is disputed by Kaufmann et al (2007). Lambsdorff 
(2004) defends the use of subjective data for analysis arguing that attempts at objective 
measures, such as the number of convictions for corruption used by Goel and Nelson 
(1998), are unlikely to give a true picture of the level of corruption.    
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Knack (2006) and Arndt and Oman (2006) make a related point that subjective indexes 
may be biased in favour of the interests of foreign investors who pay for the studies and 
that reports from one source may influence another. Arndt and Oman (2006) argue that 
while the list of sources appears to be diverse, the fact that the aggregation procedure 
used to calculate the composite indicator assigns less weight to sources that differ from 
the majority means that there is much more weight given to expert assessments and 
enterprise surveys than to population surveys. Further, both Knack (2006) and Arndt and 
Oman (2006) point out that due to the aggregation process used in the formulation of 
the WGI composite indicators, the measurement errors that relate to measurement bias 
in subjective data are magnified. Arndt and Oman (2006) suggest that the likelihood of 
correlation of errors among the 37 sources from which the composite WBI indicators are 
constructed are high. Knack writes ‘this unknown but substantial degree of 
interdependence among many of the sources also obviates any claim regarding the 
‘precision’ of these indicators’ (2006; 23).   
 
The correlation of sources of errors does have significant negative implication as it 
means that each additional source used to produce a given composite indicator actually 
contributes less additional information to the construction of the composite indicator 
than the authors assume and the statistical significance and reliability of cross-country 
comparisons among country scores is lessened. This argument is strongly contested by 
Kaufmann et al (2007) who see the fact that their scores are based on diverse sources as 
one of the strengths of the WGI compared to earlier governance measures. Further, they 
argue that their data is explicit about the problems of errors in measuring as their 
aggregated figures allow calculations of margins of error, which are large for each 
individual measurement. Yet, the rationale for aggregation is based on the presumption 
that different sources of errors are uncorrelated. They argue that the high degree of 
correlation between the numbers shown by some sources is not a reflection of a 
correlation of these sources’ measurement errors but instead is a reflection of their 
greater accuracy, compared to less closely correlated sources, in terms of the underlying 
reality of governance they are trying to reflect. They conceded, however, that isolating 
the effect of correlated errors in driving the observed correlation amongst sources is 
extremely difficult and is yet to be done.  
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Arndt and Oman (2006) raise the issue of whether the WGI provides a suitable basis for 
ranking countries or to judge changes in governance performance over time. They argue 
that due to the fact that data sources can vary from year to year and that the change may 
just be a statistical artefact, caution should be exercised in using the indicators for these 
purposes. Kaufmann et al (2007) refute this and argue that change in governance 
performance over time can be assumed from their data. Their rule of thumb for judging 
change is that if over two years, the confidence intervals for the two different scores do 
not overlap, it can be stated that change has actually occurred in the country during that 
period. Arndt and Oman point out that there are actually a very limited number of 
countries where, on this basis, change in any direction can be reasonably inferred from 
the WGI indices. Ranking countries based on the WGI indices is put into doubt by 
Knack (2006) who argues that where country indices on measures such as corruption are 
based on two completely different sources, comparison is rendered less meaningful. 
Kaufmann et al (2007) argue that by aggregation they are creating common units of 
governance that can be compared across countries.   
 
From the WGI data reproduced in table 2.1 above, it is clear that Tanzania and Vietnam 
both score very poorly in terms of institutional quality in ‘good governance’ terms over 
the period of liberalisation. Tanzania is in the 25th to 50th lowest percentile for all 
indicators except for corruption in 1996 and 2000 where it falls into the lowest 10th 
percentile. Similarly, Vietnam is in the lowest 25th to 50th percentile for all measurements 
except political stability where it is slightly higher, and voice and accountability where it 
falls into the lowest 10th percentile. The data does not cover the full period of 
liberalisation for both countries, nor is there any consistent sign, based on this data, that 
governance has improved considerably over the period of liberalisation as a cause of 
higher growth rates. Tanzania and Vietnam have very similar poor governance to many 
other developing countries, as most other developing countries fall below the 50th 
percentile across the different indices (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010). Thus, 
putting aside the considerable measurement problems discussed above, even on its own 
terms, the data indicates that Tanzania and Vietnam do not appear to conform to the 
NIE theory that growth will accelerate as developing countries adopt certain institutions 
identified by the good governance agenda with lower transaction costs. 
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Aside from all the specific problems with the data used in NIE research, the most 
fundamental problem facing this approach is the enduring problem of identifying 
causality. The methodological problems of cross country growth studies have been 
widely discussed in the literature in recent years (including Temple; 1999, Rodrik and 
Rigobon; 2004, Pritchett; 2000). The fact that rising incomes may improve the quality of 
institutions thus making institutional quality endogenous, causes problems of 
measurement error, reverse causation and spurious correlation. One way of reducing the 
problem of reverse causation is by going back as far as possible in time and measuring 
their dependent variables further forward in time. Yet, the fact that most of the data is 
only available for recent years means that many institutional variables can only be 
measured from the end, or close to the end, of the period under investigation. 
 
There is, of course, a wide body of economic literature that points out the links between 
rising incomes and improving governance. Econometric studies have proved 
inconclusive on the direction of causation, despite the fact that most of the NIE 
literature has attempted to deal with this problem through various econometric 
techniques. These include Mauro’s two-stage estimations, Knack and Keefer’s attempt to 
use longer periods of data and Rodrik and Rigobon’s (2004) use of Least Squares 
estimation. Even with more rigorous data tests, however, causality remains uncertain. For 
example Chong and Calderon (2000), apply a rigorous approach to causality, yet found 
strong evidence of causation running in both directions: from institutions to growth and 
from growth to institutional quality.   
 
A solution to the causation problem is to find a valid instrument to include in the 
econometric model that is exogenous, correlated with the endogenous variable for which 
it is instrumenting and does not influence the dependent variable through any channel 
other than the relevant endogenous variable (Rigobon and Rodrik 2004). For example, 
Mauro (1995) uses ethno-linguistic fractionalization of the population. Colonial 
experience has also been used to try to instrumentalize different institutional forms and 
remove the pervasive influence of rising incomes on the quality of institutions.  
Acemoglu et al’s (2001) work on colonial impact on property rights is perhaps the most 
well known attempt in this field and is credited (Glaeser et al. 2004) with reinvigorating 
the debate on governance and growth.  
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Acemoglu et al (2001, 2002) argued that where European colonizers settled, they brought 
with them institutions that protected private property and limited expropriation by the 
executive. Where European colonizers did not settle they introduced institutions of 
expropriation and arbitrary rule over the local population. They then argue that where a 
region was not densely settled by locals and where settler mortality was high, Europeans 
did not settle. They use this logic to argue that settler mortality and indigenous 
population density in 1500 can be used as instruments for modern day institutions that 
protect private property and constrain the executive. Their econometric results confirm 
that countries that exhibited this pattern of colonial settlement have experienced higher 
growth over time. Thus, their evidence purports to show that security of property rights 
and constraints on the executive lead to long term higher growth rates.  
 
This article attracted a great deal of praise for its innovative use of a colonial instrument 
to back up the good governance arguments. There are, however, a number of important 
critiques that undermine their conclusions. Glaeser et al (2004) pointed to the fact that 
while Acemoglu et al have shown that colonial history had an impact on growth, they 
have failed to prove that it was the security of property rights that colonial settlers brought 
with them. Kurtz and Shrank (2006) and Khan (2006) both pointed out that the early 
colonial experience in countries where settlement was the norm actually involved a huge 
amount of expropriation of existing property rights. Khan (2006) argued that the rapid 
transfer of property rights can under certain circumstances, be a pre-requisite for growth, 
in contrast to the property rights stability that Acemoglu et al argue is at the root of rapid 
economic growth. 
 
The political institutions prevalent in many rapid growth low income countries do not 
conform to the low transaction cost institutions identified as important to growth in the 
NIE inspired models and there are serious doubts about whether the NIE econometric 
research has been able to prove causality. This suggests that the NIE approach may not 
be suitable for exploring the comparative growth experience in Tanzania and Vietnam 
over liberalisation. On one level, the failure of NIE may suggest that an institutional 
analysis is not very relevant for exploring the drivers of growth in developing countries. 
This is the approach taken by Glaiser et al (2004) who go so far as to state that ‘the 
evidence that institutions cause economic growth, as opposed to growth improving 
institutions is non-existent’ (2004; 2). Influential econometric research by Sachs et al 
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(2004) also rejects the importance of institutions, arguing instead that other 
characteristics of developing countries such as low population density, high disease 
burden, ethno-linguistic fragmentation and poor infrastructure are much more important 
in limiting growth than institutions.  
 
On a number of these variables, the contrast between Tanzania and Vietnam is obvious. 
With a population of around 80 million, Vietnam has almost double Tanzania’s 
population (at 34 million) and six times the population density. Vietnam went through a 
demographic transition that led to lower rates of mortality and fertility by the mid 1980s 
(Van-Arkadie and Dinh 2004). Vietnam’s population is also much more ethnically 
homogeneous as 78% of the population are ethnic Kinh while Tanzania is made up of 
around 200 tribes with distinct tribal languages and customs. While these features may 
play some part in explaining their comparative growth experiences there are significant 
limitations to these arguments. First, appeal to variables such as climate or access to a 
coast clearly holds very little strength in explaining the difference between the growth 
performances of these two countries, both with long sea coasts and tropical climates. 
Second, the argument that low population density has hampered growth in Tanzania 
overlooks the fact that most people in Tanzania live in densely populated areas with high 
rainfall (Sender and Smith 1990). Third, while Tanzania has many diverse tribes, it has a 
strong national identity that was forged under the socialist era through the education 
system and the promotion of Swahili as the national language. These efforts are seen to 
have paid off in terms of reducing ‘ethnic fragmentation’ (Ndulu 2006). The longer 
history of Vietnam also involved the challenge of creating a composite national identity 
through specific actions of the state. 
 
The failure of NIE to provide a convincing argument about the role of institutions in 
economic performance should not necessarily cause us to reject the importance of 
institutions for developing country growth. One approach to this was by Dani Rodrik 
(2003, 2004) who argued that while the institutions identified by NIE are the institutions 
that are needed for growth in developing countries, the institutional function does not 
uniquely determine institutional form. Thus different institutional forms can achieve low 
transaction costs other than those identified by the good governance agenda. The 
problem with this argument is that in many developing countries, including Tanzania and 
Vietnam, while it is evident that the institutional forms do not match those advocated by 
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NIE, it is also clear that the institutions do not provide the general functions of ‘good’ 
institutions in the conventional sense along any of the criteria of NIE low cost 
institutions such as security of property rights, or accountability of the political system.  
 
The fundamental problem with the NIE argument about low transaction cost 
institutions, identified on the basis of generalised form or function is that poor 
institutions appear to be common in both high growth and low growth developing 
countries. This observation was originally set out by Mushtaq Khan in his reassessment 
of the governance data in 2004. He found that developing countries that lacked the ‘good 
governance’ institutions dominate across both the low growth and the higher growth 
developing groups. The evidence for this is summarized in Chart 2.1 below from Khan 
(2004): 
 
Chart 2.1: Relationship between Governance and Growth in Developing and Advanced 
Countries 
 
  
 
 
This chart highlights some of the problems with the standard regressions that purport to 
show evidence that good governance characteristics lead to growth. The chart breaks 
down the evidence into three distinct groups: advanced capitalist countries with good 
governance, rapidly growing countries with poor governance and low growth developing 
countries with poor governance. While it is clear that advanced capitalist countries have 
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higher growth rates and governance characteristics that conform to the ‘good 
governance’ agenda, there are a small group of developing countries that grew very 
rapidly with similar governance characteristics to the group of low growth developing 
countries. This is masked in standard regression analysis that uses the whole set of 
countries without making a distinction between transition economies and those OECD 
countries that have been through a much longer period of economic transition and 
acquisition of ‘good governance’ institutions as a result of higher income levels.  
 
The failure of the NIE low transaction cost approach both in theoretical terms and in its 
empirical evidence does not mean that a study of the impact of political institutions in 
Tanzania and Vietnam cannot shed light on their comparative growth experience. 
Instead, the question requires a different theoretical approach to understanding the role 
of institutions in comparative growth in developing countries. 
 
Collective Action 
 
Another branch of NIE analysis has focused on the role of collective action in 
determining economic performance. The models of collective action may have more 
relevance for exploring the role of political institutions in the comparative growth 
experiences of Tanzania and Vietnam under liberalisation. Starting from a similar 
methodological individualist approach as the NIE school, Mancur Olson set out a theory 
of collective action to explain why some political organisations are growth promoting 
while others are not. Olson’s theories of collective action are based on extending the 
logic of individual maximizing rationality to group behaviour to explain an organisation’s 
ability to further its own economic interests vis-à-vis other organizations. In The Logic of 
Collective Action (1965) Olson argued that the primary purpose of an organisation is to 
seek enrichment for its members. He identified the underlying problem of collective 
action as being how to balance the interests of individual members with the interests of 
the group overall. Once groups have been able to solve this, an organisation can serve its 
members in two potential ways: first, by increasing overall incomes in society including 
for its members, and, second, by getting a larger share of total incomes for its members. 
In his model, collective action organisations are overwhelmingly oriented to 
redistribution. For Olson, the typical organisation in society will not have much incentive 
to make any significant sacrifice in the interest of the society as a whole. Thus 
organisations focus on struggles over the distribution of income and wealth by making 
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re-distributional claims on the state. Olson asserts that such redistributive claims damage 
the long term efficiency of society.  
 
Olson claimed that organisations for collective action are more effective at achieving 
their redistributive ends when they are small and homogeneous. In Olson’s later book, 
The Rise and Decline of Nations (1982) the organisation of groups is the key to 
understanding the different outcomes in the growth path of nations. He argued that an 
economy will grow faster when the state is not dominated by the interests of small 
organisations that lobby for redistribution. In contrast, larger groups, that he calls 
encompassing organisations, are more likely to take into account the prosperity of society 
as a whole and weigh up the marginal costs of redistribution towards their members.  
 
Olson also argued, however, that once a small group has gained sufficient control over a 
society, its interests vis-à-vis economic growth change. In a 1993 article entitled 
‘Dictatorship, Democracy and Development’, Olson characterised this as a process of 
moving from roving banditry compared to stationary banditry as an allegory of 
fragmented and cohesive states. Where the state is fragmented and the small powerful 
group has only limited time in which to maximise returns to its members, it is likely to 
undertake predatory actions that damage the longer run growth prospects of a society. 
Where, however, the small powerful group has established its power over the economy, 
it will have more incentive to promote economic growth rather than simply plunder 
existing productive activities. Olson linked the analysis of group incentives to time 
horizons in his analysis of the economic performance of socialist one party states, 
particularly the Soviet Union, in Power and Prosperity (2000). He argued that ‘the 
economically most successful autocrats not only tend to have long planning horizons but 
also to resist or repress special-interest groups’ (2000; 100).  
 
The logic of this argument has been taken up in a wide range of applied analysis on the 
impact of political institutions on growth. For example, Shleifer and Vishney (2003) 
analysed effects of corruption in fragmented and centralised states. They argue that the 
impact of corruption on economic performance will be worse in states that are 
institutionally fragmented. In contrast, in states that are centralised, the leadership will 
have the capacity to ensure that its policies were effectively implemented. It can also 
direct the transfer of assets, through grey and illegal state practices, to productive groups 
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which can maximize growth and hence the longer term returns to the centralised 
leadership. The same basic idea is also used by Philip Keefer (2006) to argue that the 
institutionalization of political parties can reduce the cost of organizing voters and, 
therefore, make pre-election commitments for policies which can advance a more general 
definition of the public good more credible, and hence increase economic growth over 
time. 
 
These theories clearly raise some points of analysis that are relevant to the institutions 
that were prevalent during liberalisation in Tanzania and Vietnam. This argument 
suggests that the different experience of economic transition in Tanzania and Vietnam 
may be explained by looking at how effectively their ruling parties managed the pressures 
for redistribution from competing interest groups, how encompassing they were; and the 
time horizons of the leadership. As outlined in the previous chapter, the construction of 
the ruling party over time created an encompassing organisation that dominated the state 
in both countries. This dominant party structure provided a degree of centralising 
cohesion within the state that is absent in many developing countries. This may have 
increased the time horizons of the state and facilitated state interventions to promote 
economic growth.  
 
However, important characteristics of the political institutions of the two countries do 
not fit with these models of collective action and economic transition. In particular they 
fail to take account of the importance of corruption and patron-client networks within 
the institutions of the party. Olson’s models of collective action discussed above focus 
on the impact of collective action on redistribution through formal institutions and legal 
and official processes of redistribution. But many of the most important redistributive 
claims on the state in developing countries, including in Tanzania and Vietnam, actually 
occur through informal networks, often working within and outside formal institutions. 
The success of collective action in demanding redistribution depends on the distribution 
of power between different groups in society that may or may not be reflected in the 
formal structure of institutions. Shelifer and Vishney’s model of the different impacts of 
corruption within fragmented and centralised states also misses a vital characteristic of 
developing countries: that the degree of fragmentation or cohesion within the institutions 
of the state may not reflect the degree of fragmentation or cohesion in the wider 
distribution of power within society.  
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The impact of collective action and demands for redistribution may be important 
elements of an analytical framework for investigating the role of political institutions in 
growth in Tanzania and Vietnam. Yet, as with the limitations of the transaction costs 
models, these collective action models do not capture how collective action and 
redistributive demands actually work in developing countries. Some of the problems in 
using such models to explore actual processes of growth are well known and relate to the 
limitations of the methodological individualist model of individual and state agency taken 
directly from neoclassical economic theory (see for example Hodgson (2000) and 
Rutherford (1998)). In the transaction costs and collective action NIE models discussed 
above, the basic unit of analysis is to the profit maximising individual with rational 
expectations or the state which is modelled with exactly the same characteristics. The 
NIE establishes a false dichotomy between economic and political realms. The state is 
characterized as inherently predatory, while the market is modelled as a site of free 
transactions between individuals. The flawed neo-classical counter-factual of the perfect 
market, on which this is based, does not provide an appropriate basis for the analysis of 
real economic and political relations in countries such as Tanzania and Vietnam. Power is 
incorporated into the NIE analysis of the state based on the liberal political theory of 
Talcott Parsons (1991) where power is simply the ability that agent A has to get agent B 
to do something. Power in this methodological-individualist sense is stripped of its social 
context. This approach cannot capture the complexities of how the parties in Vietnam 
and Tanzania have forged their dominance. 
 
These approaches cannot capture how political and economic history has influenced the 
distribution of power in society within and outside the political institutions of the two 
countries. More important for investigating the impact of the ruling Party on the 
comparative growth experiences of Tanzania and Vietnam is that the NIE models do not 
provide an analytical framework that can capture the nature of power in developing 
countries. The distribution of power in such countries may not be reflected in the formal 
structure of political institutions but may provide a deeper determinant of the 
relationship between growth and institutions.  
 
2.3 Heterodox Theories of the Role of the State in Economic Development 
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Another set of theories that has emerged to explain the role of institutions in economic 
growth over the last few decades has focused on the role of state power broadly from a 
Weberian perspective. The most influential of these seek to explain the success of the 
‘developmental states’ of East Asia. The theoretical starting point for these theories is the 
Weberian understanding of state power. Weber considered that state power is the critical 
factor in explaining different economic outcomes (Weber 1978). He argued that certain 
characteristics of state power are critical to explaining how effective the state is at 
bringing about economic growth. He provided a historical analysis of two contrasting 
models of the state: the bureaucratic state and the patrimonial state. The bureaucratic 
state is a legal-rational state based on the establishment of normative rules and the right 
of those in power within the state, on the basis of these rules, to establish legal authority. 
The state in this model is run by a professional bureaucratic civil service. Weber argued 
that this ‘efficient’ state is required for successful capitalism.  
 
Weber contrasted this with the model of the patrimonial state where authority is based 
on personal loyalty to the leader. In a patrimonial state, authority is maintained through 
personal connections, favours and promises (Weber 1978). This leads to personalistic 
state policies rather than policies that would benefit wider society. Patron-client ties 
undermine a rational-legal framework of government and hamper its ability to promote 
growth. Weber thought that rational-bureaucratic states would eventually replace 
patrimonial states. However recent analysis has indicated that many developing countries 
are run as neo-patrimonial states where a bureaucratic framework for the state exists but 
is superimposed upon an enduring system of patrimonial power (Chabal and Daloz 
1999).  
 
The dominant view today is that patrimonialism is the central problem that constrains the 
ability of the state in many developing countries from promoting growth. Economic 
performance improves as states are able to constrain patrimonialism and move towards 
the bureaucratic state ideal. Within this debate, African clientelism is often presented as a 
particular problem for state effectiveness (Chabal and Daloz 1999), (Bayart 1993). Chabal 
and Daloz (1999) argue that what is common to all African states is an 
institutionalization of disorder based on a generalized system of patrimonialism and an 
acute degree of turmoil. They argue that this is evident from the high level of 
governmental and administrative inefficiency, lack of institutionalization, disregard for 
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the formal rules as well as the resort to personalised solutions to societal problems. In an 
extension to the idea that the state is less effective where personalised relations dominate, 
Goran Hyden (1980) argued that in Tanzania the predominant peasant culture has 
created an ‘economy of affection’ where people invest in reciprocal relations that are 
inimical to capitalist, or for that matter socialist, development.  
 
Interestingly, this argument is very similar to James Scott’s thesis in The Moral Economy of 
the Peasant (1977) concerning the Vietnamese peasantry (Khan and Gray 2006). He 
argued that during the 1960s agrarian change in the area was constrained by peasant 
social relations and their ability to defy the control of the nation state. The similarity 
between the cultural norms generated by peasant social relations in both countries 
undermines the idea that such informal institutions are the primary explanation for 
different patterns of social and economic transformation. More broadly, clientelism is a 
characteristic of both rapidly growing and poorly growing developing countries. As with 
the NIE models, the Weberian inspired state-centric models therefore do not provide an 
adequate framework for explaining why clientelism in different contexts has such varying 
impacts on economic performance.  
 
The literature on ‘developmental states’ that emerged from studies on the process of 
rapid economic growth in Asian economies, such as Chalmers Johnson (1982), Amsden 
(1989), Wade (1990), Evans (1995) and Aoki et al (1997), identified certain features of the 
state as critical for explaining success in managing the process of technology acquisition. 
Such states promoted rapid economic transition, not because they provided and 
maintained the ground rules of the market, as argued by mainstream economics, for 
example World Bank, (1993), but because they could effectively intervene in the market 
and create rents that provided incentives for entrepreneurs to acquire technology and 
engage in technological learning processes. These states were able to use interventions 
such as subsidies and tax breaks as incentive devices, as well as having sufficient control 
over these rents to ensure that rent recipients were subject to performance standards that 
could be monitored. If the rent recipients did not achieve the targets set by the state, 
there were credible threats that their rent would be removed (Wade 1990). Aspects of the 
‘developmental states’ analysis can be used to explain the comparative growth experience 
in Tanzania and Vietnam. Yet an important limitation of the ‘developmental state’ 
literature for the purposes of the analysis of growth in these countries is that it focuses 
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on just one of the processes that is important for rapid economic growth in developing 
countries. In both countries over the period of liberalisation, there were other critical 
processes of economic transition (such as those relating to the collapse of traditional 
property rights and managing the demands of political redistribution within the party) 
that cannot be captured by the developmental states analytical framework.  
 
A further limitation on the ‘developmental state’ theories is that they provide a state-
centric analysis that cannot account for the informal nature of the distribution of power 
in developing countries. The ‘developmental state’ approach assumes that effective 
management of the complex rent process relating to technology learning depends on a 
strong centralised state with some autonomy from competing demands for redistribution 
to enable it to manage these complex rent processes. Evans (1995) and Migdal (1988) 
look at the conditions under which states can support a process of late industrialisation. 
They argue that this depends on a set of characteristics of the state including the degree 
of autonomy of the state from society and institutionalized channels that bind together 
state and society. They identify successful developmental state institutions as being 
sufficiently centralised while having autonomy from redistributive pressures. Yet while 
the state may adopt formal industrial policies, the effectiveness of these policies may be 
constrained by patterns of power outside formal state institutions and thus only 
superficially related to formal characteristics of the state such its degree of centralisation. 
 
Another concept from within this school of thought that has become important in 
analysing the impact of institutions on growth in developing countries is the concept of 
the ‘infrastructural’ power of the state. Michael Mann (1984, 1993) developed this 
concept to explain economic change as a process of bureaucratisation of political 
institutions. In line with Weber, societies are conceived as manifestations of different 
forms of social power where transition is a process of progression from one form of 
domination to another. The drivers of social and economic transition in this framework 
are plural and depend on the prevailing forms of power that the society embodies. Mann 
argued that there are four distinct forms of social power: economic, political, ideological 
and military, each of which, in different epochs, held sway over the process of social 
change. Mann contended that economic change has to be explained by looking at the 
consolidation of state power over time. He argued that there are two types of state 
power. The first of these is despotic power. He defined this as the range of actions which 
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the elite is empowered to undertake without routine, institutionalized negotiation with 
civil society groups. The second form of state power for Mann is infrastructural power.  
 
Infrastructural power is the power of the state to penetrate civil society and to implement 
political decisions throughout the realm. It allows the state to co-ordinate society through 
its own infrastructure (Mann 1993). According to his argument, the process of economic 
transition will be determined by the extent to which the power of the state moves from 
forms of coercion to increasing infrastructural power exercised by a centralised state. 
Weiss (1998) built on Mann’s concept of infrastructural power to argue that a more 
important aspect of state power is the capacity of the state to be effective. Weiss argued 
that the infrastructural power of the state will vary across policy areas and that ‘the 
capacity to ‘get one’s way in spite of opposition’ shares little with the capacity to mobilize 
consent or to institutionalize co-operation’ (1998, 4). This follows Skocpol’s (1985) view 
that the unevenness of state capacity is most significant for understanding behaviour in 
certain spheres.  
 
Weiss is correct in so far as all states, including Tanzania and Vietnam, exhibit significant 
variability in terms of their effective capacities across different areas, and that this is 
important for understanding the extent to which political institutions can influence 
economic outcomes. Yet she does not identify the underlying reasons for the unevenness 
of state capacities and why some states lack the capability to enforce or implement 
particular types of decisions. While an analysis of the structure of the state and the degree 
to which the state has penetrated everyday life may capture some important features of 
the role of institutions in developing country growth, these state-centric approaches miss 
the importance of the social distribution of power outside formal state institutions.  
 
Mann’s ambitious theory of the classification of societies on the basis of the ‘mode’ of 
power is insufficient. The impact on society of the forms that power takes (for example, 
coercive, military, ideological, political, bureaucratic or infrastructural) needs to be fully 
understood within a context of how a society sustains and reproduces itself.  In reality, 
there is probably more plurality in the modes of power that all types of states use all the 
time. States use both infrastructural and coercive power simultaneously rather than 
dichotomously. Further, identifying the type of power that a political institution uses to 
enforce its interests does not address the question of whether the state will be effective in 
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achieving the ends that it seeks or why it seeks certain ends over others. These heterodox 
state-centric approaches are correct in identifying power as critical to the understanding 
of the impact of institutions on growth. However, the institutional framework they 
provide for analysis is not sufficient in itself to explain the nature of the distribution of 
power in society and in developing countries in particular. 
 
2.4 Political Settlements 
 
The underlying distribution of power in society is the critical determinant of the success 
of both formal and informal institutions in generating growth in developing countries 
according to the theory of political settlements developed by Mushtaq Khan (1995, 2000, 
2010) and applied and developed in various country contexts in Asia (Khan; 1995, 2000, 
2009, 2010), Latin America (DiJohn 2009), (Khan and Blankenburg 2009) and Africa 
(Khan and Gray 2006) (Gray and Khan 2010) (Khan 2010). A political settlement refers 
to a reproducible combination of institutions and the distribution of power in a society 
(Khan 2010). Unlike the NIE theory outlined above, institutions in the Political 
Settlements theory are not assumed to be neutral structures devised to reduce the 
technical problem of transaction costs relevant for political and economic interactions 
between individuals. Instead, they are assumed to be the product of substantive conflicts 
over distribution as all institutions create distributive outcomes (Knight 1994). 
Institutions, therefore, establish the pattern of distribution of incomes and resource 
flows in a society. 
 
The original analysis linking struggles over property rights and the distribution of power 
to economic transition is Robert Brenner’s analysis of the transition from feudalism to 
capitalism in Europe from the fifteenth century3 (1985). He argues that this occurred as a 
                                                 
3
 Robert Brenner criticised the earlier Marxist debates over capitalist transitions of the 1950s between 
Maurice Dobb and Paul Sweezy summarized in Aston and Philpin (1985).  Paul Sweezy argued primarily 
that the spread of trade was the prime mover in explaining capitalism, while Maurice Dobb, and later 
Hilton, argued that the dissolution of feudalism as a result of class struggle permitted capitalism to emerge.  
Elements of both of these approaches are found in Marx’s analysis of capitalist transition.  Brenner argues 
that in England the particular power balance during the 16th century involved strong landlords with 
support from the state.  They were able to capture land from serfs after the collapse in population 
following the plague.  The larger tracts of land under the enclosure system led to economies of scale and 
increased investment in new technologies.  Similarly, the restrictive guild system was challenged by these 
emerging agricultural capitalists who were able to reorganize production and in the process gain higher 
levels of productivity in urban industries.  This is contrasted with Eastern Europe, where the peasants were 
weak and could not resist the tightening of extra economic controls that led to an entrenchment of 
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consequence of changes in property relations, brought about by historically specific 
distributional struggles between different classes, fractions of classes and the state in the 
feudal economy. He provides a framework of analysis to assess the historically specific 
conditions that generate different patterns of capitalist development from within existing 
social relations and points to the specific nature of the relations of production that 
underlie capitalisms’ capacity for generating productivity growth. Brenner observes that 
the outcomes of contests over property rights (and the incomes that flow from their 
ownership) shape the way in which an economy evolves. Historically constituted social 
groups will use power to acquire or hold on to property rights that generate income or 
affect resource flows. Power in the political settlements framework refers to the ability of 
different groups to organise to maintain or challenge property rights that confer 
particular income flows. The rights in question go beyond the redistributive rights that 
are the focus of the NIE collective action models to also include the underlying property 
rights that structure production. 
 
The distribution of power between different groups and individuals in society depends 
on a range of socioeconomic factors. One element of the distribution of power is, of 
course, the economic resources available to any particular group. However, economic 
power may not be aligned directly with political power (Khan 2010) and the relative 
political power of a group, based on differential organizational and other capabilities, 
may be much more important in explaining its ability to defend or create a structure of 
rights that supports its perceived interests. Thus, the power of any group or individual is 
not simply a factor of its wealth.  
 
Further, political power can exist in institutional forms, such as through a formal 
position held within a party or government, but it can also exist informally, outside 
formal institutions. The political power of a group depends on a wide range of different 
sociological and psychological factors in addition to its access to economic resources or 
formal institutional positions. These factors include the legitimacy of the claims that it 
makes as perceived by broader society, and its past experience in political mobilisation. 
Importantly, the ability to organise politically, for example to mobilise people to resist 
changes by setting up a demonstration or organising a strike (Khan 2010) are critical to 
                                                                                                                                            
feudalism, and France where peasants won outright property rights and continued to produce in a system 
of subsistence agriculture. 
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the effective power of different groups but is not necessarily related to institutionalized 
political power. Such organisational capacities are normally acquired through a history of 
past struggles. Previous political struggles leave a social legacy of political mobilisation 
not simply in the institutional sense, for example as Hannah Arendt (2009) argued are the 
legacy of revolutions, but in terms of the capacity to organise people to achieve political 
ends. A picture of the distribution of power in any society is not just a description of its 
political institutions but needs to be constructed from a reading of social and economic 
history, looking at the past outcomes of social conflict and the organisation of 
production. 
 
Khan writes that ‘[a] political settlement is a combination of power and institutions that 
is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms of economic and political viability’ 
(4, 2010). For a political settlement to be sustainable it must have institutions that 
produce benefits consistent with the distribution of power. If institutions produce 
benefits that are not in line with the distribution of power, groups will be able to mobilise 
to overturn the existing institutional structures. For any political settlement to be viable, 
it must also achieve a minimum level of political stability and economic growth. The 
description of a political settlement is important as this has implications for the particular 
changes in institutions and the viability of particular directions of institutional and 
political reform. Change between types of viable political settlement can occur gradually 
from endogenous or exogenous developments that alter the balance of power and 
institutions. It may also occur precipitously as power and institutions become misaligned, 
leading to periods of more intense conflict and eventually to the re-emergence of a new 
stable alignment between power and institutions. There could potentially be a large 
number of viable forms of political settlement. Khan (2010) identifies four types based 
on the alignment between formal institutions and the distribution of power and the 
extent to which the formal institutions generate growth. These are pre-capitalist, 
capitalist, clientelist, and ‘in-crisis’ political settlements. 
 
The capitalist political settlement involves a distribution of power that is dominated by 
the economic power of capitalists. Formal institutions, the most important of which are 
the protection of private capitalist property rights, are broadly aligned with and sustained 
by the social, economic and political power that capitalists have, based on capitalist 
profits. Although there may be significant forms of struggle between competing groups, 
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redistribution occurs mainly through formal institutions. There is a reinforcing 
relationship between the generation of profits from formal capitalist property rights and 
the availability of resources to sustain those rights. Formal institutions and rights 
dominate in that they underpin nearly all output and incomes and the distribution of 
power is therefore determined by the incomes generated by these formal institutions.  
 
The pre-capitalist political settlement refers to the system of social and economic 
reproduction prior to the emergence of capitalism in Europe and prior to the 
intervention of colonialism in developing countries from the 18th century or earlier. 
These traditional social systems generated low growth and were broadly stable, with a 
process of slow change occurring within formal pre-capitalist institutions and the 
associated distribution of power. Formal institutions were built on the political power of 
landed and other pre-capitalist elites who organized production on different principles. 
The pre-capitalist political settlements in developing countries started to collapse when 
confronted with the economic and military competition from capitalist societies, 
generally through the process of colonisation.  
 
Most developing countries today have gone through a relatively long process of the 
collapse of traditional social and economic systems and the emergence of new social and 
economic structures. They are societies in transition, not in the teleological sense that 
they will inevitably progress to become more productive social and economic systems (as 
was one of the central tenets of some strands of Marxist theory) but in the sense that 
previous political and economic institutions and balances of power are in a state of 
collapse and new sustainable alignments of power behind formal institutions have not 
taken hold. The distribution of power in these transitional societies is not aligned with 
the incomes generated by formal institutions, as is the case under capitalism. The 
consequence of this is that powerful groups operate through informal routes to protect 
and generate income flows and to sustain their power. While most developing countries 
have some, or even significant, elements of capitalist production, the formal power of 
capitalists is generally weak because the modern capitalist sector, by definition, does not 
dominate these economies. The newly emerging productive sectors tend to be small and 
do not generate sufficient profits to enforce the formal institutions and rights on which 
this production is based. At the same time, other powerful groups, whose power is based 
on political capabilities have to use informal mechanisms to sustain their access to 
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resources because the formal constitution and legal framework based on more advanced 
capitalist countries does not formally recognize these claims. As the distribution of 
power across a broad range of developing countries lies significantly out of alignment 
with their formal institutions, this generates a system where power operates through 
informal institutions, primarily through patron-client networks.  
 
Khan, therefore, characterises a wide range of developing countries as having broadly 
defined ‘clientelist political settlements’ although there are significant differences between 
them in the details of their political settlements. These differences have important 
implications for the development trajectory of particular developing countries. Clientelist 
political settlements can produce economic growth and a movement towards higher 
productivity institutions over time, and they can be relatively stable, although their paths 
and rates of transformation may be quite different. They can also begin to collapse into 
crisis in some cases. In general, clientelist political settlements are distinct from political 
settlements ‘in-crisis’. Crisis political settlements are characterized by a breakdown in the 
balance between institutions and the underlying distribution of power and the exercise of 
power begins to be largely expressed violence. While there are many examples of 
countries going through extended periods of intense violence, most developing countries 
today are not in an acute political crisis as the operation of clientelist networks behind 
formal institutions can maintain the system by ensuring that powerful groups are 
accommodated through informal resource flows.  
 
2.4.1 Drivers of Economic Transition 
 
Economic transition in developing countries occurs through an iterative process of 
contested change in institutions and in the socioeconomic distribution of power that 
shapes the incentives under which accumulation and technology acquisition take place.  
While the drivers of this transition are broad and multifaceted, the political settlements 
framework allows us to examine three critical processes that are important for explaining 
the speed and direction of economic transition in countries such as Tanzania and 
Vietnam. These are the processes of political redistribution, primitive accumulation and 
the management of technology acquisition (Khan 2004).  
 
Political Redistribution 
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A degree of social stability is required for economic accumulation to drive growth. In all 
countries political institutions have to achieve political stability by meeting the 
redistributive demands of powerful groups that would otherwise threaten the stability of 
the system. In contemporary developing countries, the social conflict over incomes 
involves a broader range of formal and informal rights than those defining the 
productive surplus in the Marxist analysis of feudalism or capitalism. While incomes can 
be generated through rights established over assets and organizations involved in 
productive activities, politically created rights over transfers and subsidies generate 
important income flows that are contested through the political process. The underlying 
rights can be legal rights to a claim on the state, such as a subsidy, but can also be 
informal or even illegal ‘claims’ on off-budget resources. These income flows can broadly 
be classified as types of legal and illegal rents (Khan 2000). The ways in which political 
institutions are able to mediate conflicts over the distribution of these rents between 
powerful groups is critical to understanding the pace and direction of economic 
transition. 
 
An important distinction between the Political Settlement approach and Marxist theories 
of transition is the extent to which class is privileged over other forms of social 
organisation as the most important collective group structuring political conflict (see for 
example Shivji (1976) on Tanzania or Post (1989) on Vietnam). The analysis of political 
settlements recognizes that in most developing countries, including Tanzania and 
Vietnam during the period of liberalisation, political power was primarily organised 
around multi-class clientelist networks rather than class based groupings. While political 
struggles are often couched in terms of class rhetoric, the muted influence of overt class 
politics, compared to clientelist politics, in most developing countries relates to the 
structural conditions of the transition process. Class is determined by a group’s position 
within the social relations of production. For class to be an important political force it is 
not enough for a class to simply exhibit the structural characteristics of a class, (in 
Marxist terms have class-in-itself characteristics), but it must also have organisational 
ability and political aspiration, so that it has class-for-itself characteristics. It also requires 
that conflicts over the distribution of incomes between classes engaged in mutually 
dependent production relations are the most important distributive conflicts in society. 
Without these features class power will remain ‘latent’. In many developing countries 
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powerful groups are not yet engaged in sustained production relationships and the 
structural characteristics of classes are also (and partly as a result) more unstable. In 
advanced capitalist states, the establishment, over a long period of time, of defined 
classes related to the capitalist system of production created a political context very 
different from that in developing countries, where capitalism is being constructed. In the 
transition between traditional forms of production and new structures of production, 
new ways of production are being created and classes themselves are in a process of 
emergence and formation.  
 
The way that political institutions mediate redistributive demands in developing countries 
occurs largely outside formal redistributive flows, such as through the formal state fiscal 
policies. The fact that power often lies outside formal institutions means that the formal 
legitimacy of contending claims by powerful groups on resources has not been 
established, making more transparent processes of redistribution difficult to carry out. 
Redistributive demands also go beyond the realm of struggle over the distribution of the 
productive surplus in terms of profits and wages and include incomes that are created by 
the state not directly related to production. Thus political institutions meet redistributive 
demands by powerful groups through various means, such as the distribution of off 
budget resources, political and bureaucratic corruption and informal and sometimes 
illegal manipulation of formal market processes. When such redistributive demands are 
met successfully, a degree of social stability is achieved. Yet the impact of redistributive 
processes on economic transition goes beyond maintaining political stability alone. 
Patterns of political redistribution also influence patterns of accumulation and capability 
acquisition by emerging productive groups. Redistributive processes thus impact both on 
political stability as well as on processes of economic accumulation and capability 
development that drive growth. 
 
Primitive Accumulation 
 
The concept of primitive accumulation played a central role in Marxist theories of 
economic transition. Marx defined primitive accumulation as the “accumulation which is 
not the result of the capitalist mode of production but its point of departure” (Marx, 
1976: 873). In Capital (1976) Marx identified numerous forms of primitive accumulation 
in his analysis of capitalist transition in various countries. These include the 
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commodification and privatisation of land, the forceful expulsion of peasant populations, 
the conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights 
and the suppression of rights to the commons. They also include the commodification of 
labour, the suppression of alternative forms of production and consumption, colonial, 
neo-colonial and imperial processes of appropriation of assets, the monetization of 
exchange and taxation, the slave trade, usury, the national debt and the credit system. As 
well as the forms identified by Marx, primitive accumulation in developing countries in 
more recent history manifests itself prominently in forms of corruption, land grab, illegal 
manipulation of markets and the manipulation of privatization processes. We define 
primitive accumulation as the process of accumulation outside the formal market process 
where political power is used to privilege the accumulation activities of particular 
individuals. If primitive accumulation is significant, the pace and direction of economic 
transition is likely to be influenced by the incentives or disincentives for productive 
accumulation created by these processes. 
 
High levels of primitive accumulation are observable across developing countries because 
traditional property rights structures are in a process of collapse and transition. As 
market transactions presuppose a stable underlying structure of rights, ‘normal’ market 
processes in these contexts are necessarily mediated by the informal exercise of power. 
Property rights are particularly unstable in developing countries because most assets 
generate an inadequate surplus to pay for their protection. Protection of property rights 
is an expensive undertaking. Estimates of the cost of protecting, enforcing and 
negotiating transfers of rights in advanced capitalist countries indicate that the 
‘transaction sector’ can account for a large proportion of the turnover of an economy 
(North and Wallis 1987), (Khan 2000). The evidence on this directly contradicts Mancur 
Olson’s claim in Power and Prosperity (2000) that property rights are cheap to maintain. In 
reality, asset owners who do not generate a sufficient surplus are unlikely to be able to 
protect the rights that they may formally possess. Thus, there are structural features of 
economies in transition that result in a more or less gradual collapse of pre-existing 
property rights. Primitive accumulation can occur across different sectors of the 
economy but is most apparent in struggles over land ownership. Land was the critical 
asset in traditional agrarian societies and the re-allocation of land to new economic 
activities is one of the most contested processes of economic development. 
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The crisis of traditional property structures opens up opportunities for forms of 
primitive accumulation that may or may not be channelled into new productive 
investment. While in certain cases primitive accumulation may lead to a redistribution of 
property ownership that lays the foundation for a dynamic economic transition, it may 
also lead to continued churning of property rights and limited productive growth. 
Political institutions play a role in influencing which groups gain resources through 
primitive accumulation. However, it is impossible to judge on an ex-ante basis which of 
the groups will make investments that will establish productive businesses of the future. 
This makes it difficult for political institutions to engage in a rational process of 
reallocating assets away from traditional sectors towards new economic areas. Which 
groups can accumulate through primitive accumulation and whether these groups 
subsequently invest in new productive activities depends largely on the distribution of 
power in society and interacts with the types of redistributive demands that are made of 
political institutions, as described above.  
 
Technology Acquisition and Learning 
 
The economic transition in contemporary developing countries involves the acquisition 
of technologies and learning how to use these productively. Increasing productivity and 
economic growth that characterised the emergence of capitalism in Europe as described 
by Brenner (1985) and Wood (1999), was generated primarily through particular 
structures of capitalist market based competition. During the early transition to 
capitalism, competition through the market provided the motivation for innovation and 
productivity improvements that drove wealth creation and further transition (Wood 
1999). Yet, the conditions under which new industries in developing countries need to 
acquire new technology and learn how to use it competitively have become very 
different. Gerschekron observed in Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (1962) 
that the differences in global patterns of industrial development have created a situation 
where some countries are in a position of relative backwardness vis-à-vis the advanced 
economies. This means that technology is available to borrow and imitation has become 
the driving force of industrialization. However, the much larger scale of capital required 
to achieve competitiveness in late industrialization and the greater associated risk 
necessitates a more active role for the state in financing industrial development. The 
market is not sufficient to drive productivity growth under conditions of late 
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industrialization, where the scale and complexity of the industrial production process 
necessitates a period of learning and catch up, during which time the cost of production 
will be higher than the global market price, as determined by the already industrialized 
countries.  
 
This means that, in general, markets will not be able to finance technology acquisition 
and the learning processes required to make technology productive in developing 
countries adequately (Khan 2009). The state, therefore, needs to subsidise technology 
acquisition and learning as outlined by ‘developmental state’ theorists. The determinants 
of industrial competitiveness for countries undergoing economic transition therefore 
come to depend on the ability of the state to effectively implement and manage rents to 
induce technology learning and acquisition. Technology rents can take the form of 
specific subsidies as well as general infrastructural investment or service provision that 
provides implicit subsidies for industrial sectors and businesses. In contrast to the 
Developmental States analytical framework, the Political Settlements framework provides 
a broader analytical framework in which to assess the critical impact of these types of 
rents on economic transition. It is not sufficient for political institutions to provide 
subsidies or resources for learning. They also have to effectively manage the conditions 
under which technology rents are available to ensure that capability development 
outcomes are achieved. The conditions under which rents can be allocated or captured 
by emerging capitalists in turn depend on the underlying distribution of power in society. 
For example, the power of emerging industrial groups to protect incomes generated by 
state interventions will influence the state’s ability to monitor and discipline these rent 
recipients effectively. The extent to which any given set of institutions enables successful 
industrialization will also depend on the types and scale of technologies that a country is 
attempting to adopt (DiJohn 2009), (Khan 2000). The impact of technology rents on 
comparative economic transition can thus interact with the processes of political 
redistribution and primitive accumulation described above. 
 
2.4.2 The Formative Socialist Political Settlement in Developing Countries 
 
In order to explore the impact of political institutions on the comparative growth 
experiences of Tanzania and Vietnam under liberalisation, the Political Settlements 
framework needs to be expanded to include the concept of the formative socialist 
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political settlement in developing countries. This is necessary in order to get a better 
understanding of how the attempts to construct socialism in Tanzania and Vietnam 
influenced the distribution of power and the dominance of the Party in the era of 
liberalisation. Much has been written about economic transition in the post-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe and the USSR as well as economic transition under the 
Chinese Communist Party (see for example Ellman et al (1993) or Lavigne (1999)).  
 
However, providing an analytical framework to assess the experience of transition in 
socialist developing countries under liberalisation has attracted much less attention. This 
is probably because the forms of Third World ‘socialism’ were very diverse and therefore 
difficult to define precisely and often had a more limited impact on the social and 
economic structure by the time that liberalisation had taken hold. Further, the impact of 
the attempt to construct socialism in Tanzania and Vietnam is usually interpreted 
through the lens of its ultimate collapse and the re-emergence of a capitalist dynamic of 
economic transition under liberalisation from the 1980s, rather than seeking a more 
balanced interpretation of the legacy of the attempts to create socialism on subsequent 
economic growth. 
 
Historically and theoretically, the term socialism has been used to describe a range of 
different socioeconomic structures and institutional forms. Marx did not provide a 
detailed blueprint for the socialist economy but it is clear that he did not envisage 
socialism as a transition strategy for very poor countries. The initial understanding was 
that socialism would emerge after capitalism had reached its fullest development. In his 
writings, such as the Critique of the Gotha Programme (1978), he argued that under 
socialism class divisions would fade as the institution of private property was demolished 
and the means of production (already highly developed) were taken over by the workers 
(who would already be the vast majority of society) and owned collectively. Initially, 
under socialism, each worker would be rewarded according to his labour contribution to 
production and eventually under communism each person would be rewarded according 
to his needs. A socialist political settlement would therefore be one where productive 
rights are formally held by the collective, in contrast to capitalism, where productive 
rights are held in private hands with formal institutions oriented towards their protection. 
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Attempts to forge socialism in the 20th century involved moving from the political 
philosophy of socialism to the implementation of strategies for building socialism in pre-
capitalist countries where revolutions brought Marxist-inspired parties to power. The 
specific strategies included diverse forms, from the Stalinist model in the USSR, and 
Chinese Maoism, to a variety of Third World ‘socialist’ models. Much of the 
understanding of how to implement socialism in developing countries emerged from the 
experience of Soviet socialism under Stalin. Yet the extent to which this represented 
actual socialism was contested from the earliest days by Trotsky and others who pointed 
to the impossibility of socialism in one country, particularly in a pre-capitalist developing 
one. Theorists in the tradition of Trotsky, such as Cliff (1974), argued that the socialism 
that was being implemented in USSR, for example, was actually a form of state 
capitalism. Yet putting aside these important debates, some critical institutional and 
socioeconomic characteristics can be identified from actual attempts at constructing 
socialism to distinguish the common features of Tanzania and Vietnam’s formative 
socialist political settlement.  
 
Marx and Engels predicted in The Communist Manifesto (1976) that socialism would 
emerge first in advanced capitalist economies as capitalists and workers faced each other 
in increasing dialectical opposition. However, countries that attempted to construct 
socialism in the twentieth century actually did so from a position of low productive 
capacity and persisting pre-capitalist economic relations, particularly the predominance of 
peasant agriculture and limited industrialization. From the middle of the twentieth 
century, the main battleground for socialism shifted from the First to the Third World as 
anti-colonial struggles for independence increasingly provided the rupture that allowed 
new social and political formations to grasp state power. 
 
The political origins of socialist revolutions in poor countries have been well studied (see 
for example Barrington Moore (1966) and Wolf (1969)) and some attempts have been 
made to identify core common features between these systems. White (1983) identified 
the most important feature of socialism that distinguished ‘Third World’ socialist systems 
from other forms of government in developing countries as the common goal of forging 
the transition to socialism through the one-party rule of a vanguard party. Further, the 
commitment to socialist transition was enshrined in the constitution, there was a high 
and increasing degree of state ownership in agriculture and industry, and the beginnings 
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of a centralized command economy appears with limitations on the activities of 
autonomous capital and the market.  By the late 1970s, twenty two developing countries 
conformed to this categorisation (Thrift and Forbes 1986). Tanzania and Vietnam were 
at the forefront of this group.  
 
In terms of defining common aspects of a political settlement in these countries it is clear 
that they did not have a ‘socialist’ political settlement where formal productive rights 
were held by the collective. Instead in these countries, parties had come to power 
through various types of revolutionary processes that were attempting to bring about a 
socialist transformation. This generated a particular political economy whose 
characteristics can be identified as a formative socialist political settlement. These 
characteristics include first, a revolutionary struggle that brought to power a ruling party 
that formally represented the workers and peasants. The revolutionary and anti-colonial 
struggle underpinned a process of consolidating effective power within the institutions of 
the Party. Second, they shared the ideological commitment to a socialist path of 
transformation rather than a capitalist path. They were committed to a socialist ideology 
of creating a society where private capital ownership would not dominate. Formal 
constraints were therefore placed on capitalists and emerging capitalist groups. Open 
primitive accumulation by individuals was banned. The aim was to achieve a productive 
transition within the economy through state owned industries and collectivized 
agriculture. In common with other socialist countries of the era, both countries adopted 
forms of central planning to achieve this objective. Socialism and central planning are not 
however one and the same, and aspects of central planning were also used by many 
developing countries that were not socialist in the second half of the twentieth century 
(Byres 1994). 
  
While the Parties ruled in the name of the workers and peasants, the power that these 
groups actually held was quite limited in many respects. As these countries had not gone 
through a productive transition, most of the rights held by these groups hardly produced 
a surplus. This meant that, in reality, the economic rights held by the collective were 
quite weak. As collective production was still underdeveloped, the organizational power 
of the party and its ability to exert control over existing forms of production through 
collectivization and nationalisations, provided the basis for the concentration of power in 
the formal institutions of party and state. However, the underdevelopment of the 
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productive sector also meant that real power was not in the hands of the workers in 
industry and agriculture in whose name the party ruled. Rather, within the party and the 
state, power operated along informal networks that often did not correspond to the 
formal structures of power. The political institutions in countries with formative socialist 
political settlements were often run, not by members of the working class or peasants, 
but by people from the much narrower intermediate class groups.  
 
In this respect the socialist political settlement in developing countries had some general 
features in common with other developing countries. There were, however, important 
differences as well. Developing countries that did not have similar mass organizations 
could not concentrate power to the same extent within one-party systems. Further, the 
creation of formal institutions that gave a political voice to poorer social groups 
continued to have an impact on the political economy of these countries into the era of 
liberalisation. These formal institutions of representation may have lacked power but 
they did put constraints on what the party could feasibly do under liberalisation once a 
capitalist path of transition had re-emerged. 
 
In both countries, the productive transformation of the economy necessary to ensure 
transition to a genuinely socialist society was not realised. Countries that had a formative 
socialist political settlement actually shared many of the structural features of the 
clientelist political settlement, with a distribution of power that was not fully aligned with 
the formal institutions. After liberalisation in the 1980s, many aspects of the underlying 
clientelist political economy of both countries came to the surface. Nevertheless, 
common aspects of their formative socialist political settlement did have implications and 
unintended consequences for the subsequent experience of growth under liberalisation. 
For a number of reasons that are discussed in the next chapter, the formative socialist 
political settlement of the 1960s and 1970s in both countries ultimately failed to become 
viable. Yet it did leave a legacy both in institutional terms, with the dominance of the 
ruling party, and in terms of the wider distribution of power in society, that are critical for 
understanding the comparative experience of economic transition under liberalisation. 
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2.5 Conclusions 
 
This chapter has set out the analytical framework that will be used to assess the role of 
the Party in the comparative economic experience in Vietnam and Tanzania under 
liberalisation. The chapter outlined the NIE approach to understanding the impact of 
institutions on economic performance and set out its limitations. It then evaluated certain 
aspects of heterodox theories of state power and patrimonialism. These models do 
address critical features of the Party under liberalisation in Tanzania and Vietnam. Yet 
these state-centric models fail to address the pervasive characteristics of patrimonial 
politics in fast growing and in slow growing developing countries adequately. The 
Political Settlements framework addresses these commonalities and provides an analytical 
approach for investigating the impact of political institutions on economic transition, 
grounded in an understanding of the socioeconomic roots of the distribution of power, 
the role of institutions and the specific structural characteristics of developing countries.  
 
The first requirement of using this analytical framework is to establish the evolution of 
the institutions and of the distribution of social and economic power in both countries. 
This is undertaken in Chapter Three. An analysis in then needed of the way that political 
institutions have managed the processes of political redistribution, primitive 
accumulation and technology rents largely through informal income flows to different 
social groups. This requires an analysis of the pattern of formal state intervention as well 
as informal and often illegal income flows that take the form of corruption, off-budget 
transfers and political manipulation of market processes. These formal and informal 
mechanisms for managing the three processes under liberalisation are examined through 
a study of public finances (Chapter Four), land (Chapter Five), and industrial policy 
(Chapter Six). An overview of the impact of these processes for economic growth under 
liberalisation is provided in Chapter Seven. 
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Table 2.2: Comparison of different approaches to the role of institutions in 
economic performance in developing countries 
 
 NIE 
Theories 
Developmental 
states 
Marxist 
Political 
Economy 
Political 
Settlements 
Core units 
of analysis 
The rational 
profit 
maximizing 
individual or 
state 
The state Class Historically 
constituted social 
groups 
Drivers of 
economic 
change 
Negotiations 
to lower 
transaction 
costs 
Acquisition of 
technology 
Struggle over the 
surplus drives 
transition 
between a 
limited set of 
modes of 
production 
Struggle over 
rights to income 
flows drive 
changes in 
institutions and in 
the distribution of 
power. 
Role of 
power 
Assumed to 
be 
concentrated 
in the state 
which 
enforces 
property 
rights  
Assumed to be 
concentrated in 
the state which 
has the role of 
correcting 
market failures  
Power held by 
dominant class 
depending on 
the mode of 
production 
The distribution 
of power depends 
on political, 
economic and 
organisational 
factors and may 
not be aligned 
with formal or 
informal 
institutions. 
Relationshi
p between 
economic 
and 
political 
aspects of 
the theory 
Distinction 
between 
predatory 
political 
processes and 
‘free’ 
economic 
transactions 
Political analysis 
focuses on 
leadership 
quality and their  
compulsions to 
drive growth  
Dialectical 
relationship 
between 
economic power 
and political 
power 
Dialectical 
relationship 
between 
economic and 
political power  
Role of 
property 
rights 
Changes in 
property 
rights occur 
through 
negotiated 
agreements 
with 
compensation  
State 
manipulates 
property rights 
to drive 
industrialisation 
Transitions from 
one mode of 
production to 
another driven 
by fundamental 
changes in rights 
Configurations of 
rights and 
distributions of 
power explain the 
pace and path of 
transitions  
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Chapter Three 
 
The Historical Roots of the  
Political Settlement  
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter sets out the comparative evolution of the political settlement in Tanzania 
and Vietnam from the colonial period to the beginning of liberalisation. A description of 
the dominant political institutions of each period is presented in turn. The evolution of 
the underlying distribution of economic, political and organisational power is then traced 
through a historical exploration of the evolving structure of production and the 
important political struggles between contending groups in society. The chapter is 
divided into four sections: first, the colonial period, second, the independence 
movement, third, the formative socialist political settlement, and fourth, the collapse of 
the formative socialist political settlement. Each section ends with a comparative 
discussion of the political settlement in the two countries. The final section sets out the 
comparative institutional characteristics of the ruling Party during the period of 
liberalisation.  
 
3.2 The Political Settlement Under Colonialism 
 
3.2.1 Tanzania 
 
Modern Tanzania covers an area that had always been sparsely populated and was the 
home to numerous and diverse social groups. Forms of organised political authority were 
often quite weak and many social groups lived without distinct settlement areas (Iliffe 
1979). Tanzania’s economic history from the mid-nineteenth century involved the 
penetration of trade and commerce, largely under foreign domination. Extensive trade 
relations between the inland and the coast resulted from the rise of Zanzibar as a trading 
outpost of the Omani empire and later as the seat of the Omani Sultan. The rise of trade 
led to the establishment of vibrant market towns along the coast and the emergence of a 
successful Arab merchant class and an expanding group of Indian traders who, unlike the 
Europeans, had permission from the Sultan to engage in trade in the area. Trade between 
Zanzibar and the mainland was based on an expanding and destructive slave trade and 
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the extraction of natural resources such as ivory and forest goods. A significant impact of 
trade and commercial growth was the increased demand for food and agricultural 
supplies. This led to crop specialization and increased surplus production in agriculture 
that encouraged an expansion of peasant agriculture (Iliffe 1971). The main source of 
labour supply was the family and a shifting pattern of land tenure, and cultivation by 
direct producers, remained intact. Embryonic manufacturing activities of iron smelting 
and weaving were undermined by the expansion of specialized agriculture and extractive 
trade (Iliffe 1979).  
 
European colonialism in Tanganyika, initially under the Germans from 1885 and 
subsequently under a British League of Nations Protectorate from the end of the First 
World War, brought a further penetration of trade and commerce. However, Tanzania 
had lower levels of cultivated land, fewer settlers, and more limited industry and 
infrastructure than neighbouring Kenya. Iliffe (1979) argues that the main imperial aim of 
the British in Tanganyika was to deny the territory to others and that they were not 
particularly interested in exploiting the country economically as Protectorate status 
effectively put Tanganyika “at the bottom of the imperial pecking order” (1974; 302). 
This had important implications for the pattern of class development that emerged under 
colonialism and for the type of nationalist movement that developed to replace it and 
inherit the mantle of the state.  
 
The Colonial Impact on Economic Power 
 
The industrial sector in Tanganyika prior to independence was marginal but it grew 
throughout the colonial period. Colonial policy on industry primarily restricted industrial 
growth by limiting competition with British firms and Tanganyika was overshadowed by 
the larger, more well-established industrial sectors in Kenya and Uganda. 
Industrialization grew rapidly towards the end of the colonial period, driven by the surge 
in production of agricultural commodities for export and, from the 1950s, expansion into 
consumer and industrial goods (Silver 1984). Nevertheless, by the mid 1950s industry still 
accounted for less than 5% of GDP and only employed around 75,000 people, 27,000 of 
whom worked in sisal processing plants and a further 13,000 in other agricultural 
processing plants (Pratt 1976). Industrialists in pre-independence Tanganyika were 
overwhelmingly European or Asian rather than African. Further, the Asian industrialists 
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were often Kenyan or Ugandan based Asians rather than Asians who had settled in 
Tanganyika. The managers and executives of these foreign owned firms were 
predominantly also of Asian and European origin (Shivji 1976). An African industrial 
capitalist class was, therefore, non existent in Tanzania during the colonial period. 
Further, given the relatively small size of the sector leading up to independence, 
industrial capital did not hold significant economic power in the country. Industrial 
workers also played a relatively marginal political role as a result of the limited extent of 
industrial employment. In the years immediately before independence, however, the 
growing groups of urban workers, many of whom were employed in the nascent agro-
industrial processing sector, did provide support to the nationalist movement, and were 
organized under the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (Masanja 1990).  
 
In the agricultural sector, settler plantation agriculture expanded but received minimal 
support from the colonial authorities, and peasant agriculture remained dominant. Unlike 
Kenya, where large scale European settler agriculture led to the expulsion, of 
predominantly Kikuyu, peasants from the land, the expropriation of peasant land was 
minimal in Tanzania. Towards the end of the colonial period, peasant cash crop farming 
expanded, particularly in the coffee growing regions around Kilimanjaro and Lake 
Victoria. Cash crop production by Africans was initially opposed by colonial authorities 
under pressure from settlers. The colonial administration actively discouraged anything 
that might appear to be emerging African capitalist agriculture, including a capitalist 
market for land (Mueller 1981). Further, the colonial government restricted access to 
credit for Africans through the 1923 Credit to Natives Legislation (McCarthy 1982). This 
legislation required that loans to Africans be approved by a colonial administrative 
officer. This effectively meant that people lending to Africans had no legal recourse to 
reclaim their debt, or were inhibited by red tape and stopped granting credit to Africans 
at all. This was a major constraint on the emergence of a formal land market and a 
formal African business sector. 
 
It was only towards the end of the colonial period that the state actively attempted to 
encourage the emergence of African capitalist farming to increase food production to 
meet the post-war shortages in Europe. The colonial state also had a political objective in 
attempting to create a class of small holder capitalist farmers that it believed would be 
receptive to the agricultural modernization that the government aspired to at that time 
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(Coulson 1982). For most of the colonial period there was a slow and quite limited 
process of differentiation amongst small scale farmers. The spread of cash crops, while 
having important political implications for organization of the nationalist movement and 
the growth of co-operatives, had less impact in terms of the emergence of a significant 
stratum of richer commercial farmers. Most cash crops were grown by peasant farmers 
on relatively small plots of land held under customary title (Pratt 1976). As Iliffe (1971) 
argued, family labour predominated in the more commercialized areas, while in more 
sparsely populated areas labour was hired in, which also stifled the emergence of 
capitalist employment patterns. Thus, by independence there were just a few hundred 
African capitalist farmers (Mueller 1981).  
 
The Asian commercial class in the form of traders and wholesalers held a much more 
important role in the rural and urban economy than capitalist farmers or industrialists. 
The racial structuring of the economy under colonialism was the primary reason that this 
class was predominantly of Indian origin4. The well established Indian population of 
Tanzania was a result initially of Indian trading and commerce in Zanzibar that had 
attracted around five thousand Indians to the Island by the end of the nineteenth 
century. Later, British colonial policy actively expanded the Indian population in the 
region by bringing indentured Indian labourers to work on infrastructure projects, such 
as the Ugandan Railways, and to some subordinate positions within the administration 
and in the army (Mangat 1969).  
 
The largest stimulus to such employment was the expansion of the railway across East 
Africa, for which 32,000 indentured Indian labourers were brought to East Africa, 6,724 
of whom remained and settled in the area. The most important wave of voluntary 
immigration occurred from the early twentieth century, mainly due to the perceived 
economic opportunities available under British colonial rule in East Africa. Following the 
establishment of the British Mandate over Tanganyika, the employment of Indians in 
low-level colonial administrative jobs in Tanganyika expanded rapidly. By 1921, 804 
Indian staff were employed by the administration while another 886 were employed in 
the railways. Their role in private sector skilled labour and artisan work also expanded 
                                                 
4
 The term Indian is used for the period prior to partition of India and Pakistan in 1947 and prior to the 
end of colonialism in East Africa. I use the term Tanzanian Asian instead of Asian or Indian for the period 
after independence for people who are of South Asian origin but have Tanzanian nationality. 
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(Mangat 1969) as did their growing role in commerce. In ‘A History of the Asians in East 
Africa’ (1969) Mangat writes that by the turn of the century  
 
‘In every department of government – including the ones newly 
established - the Indians filled the middle ranks in an extensive 
variety of capacities: as hospital assistants, policemen, artisans, 
mechanics, carpenters, post and telegraph assistants, shorthand 
writers, typists, and compounders, etc’ (1969; 75) 
 
British colonial policy in Tanganyika promoted the Asian role in commerce and trade 
while simultaneously restricting Africans from engaging in business through credit and 
trading regulations (O'Niel and Mustafa 1990)5. For example, even at the brink of 
independence in 1961, not a single wholesale licence was issued to an African (Tripp 
1997). This policy of structuring the economy along racial lines, for political reasons, was 
common across British colonial Africa (Mamdani 1997). The consequence of these 
policies was to create an economic and social intermediate class group that were 
predominantly Asian, while restricting the development of an equivalent class of 
Africans. The Asian intermediate classes had much greater economic power than most 
Africans, but this did not directly translate into political power at this time. The attitude 
of the colonial authorities towards the Indian population varied across the colonial 
period depending on the extent to which Indian economic activities were perceived to be 
a threat to the economic interests of the European settler population and of the colonial 
state. Until the mid 1950s Indian political activity was focused on demanding the same 
legal and economic rights as the European colonialists over the local population and it 
was only in the last period of colonial rule that some segments of the Asian Tanzanian 
population aligned themselves behind the growing independence movement.  
 
The Political Institutions of Colonialism 
 
One of the most important political institution of colonialism was the system of indirect 
rule introduced in 1924. While the main decision making nexus remained the Colonial 
                                                 
5
 British colonial authorities conceived the laws that discriminated against African commercial activities in 
terms of protecting the local population from the perceived avarices of the Indian population. In a 
dispatch to the Foreign Office in 1919, quoted by Mangat (1969) the Consul wrote ‘the balance is against 
the Indians … and [they] must be compared …. to the small Jew traders in Russia who, if necessary to the 
life of the countryside, are at best a necessary evil.’ (115). 
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Governor and his Secretariat, indirect rule was seen as a route to stability and as a means 
of co-opting local elites into the colonial governance framework. The concept behind 
indirect rule was to construct a stable political system through a “tripartite chain of 
patron client relations linking the colonial administration to the population via chiefs” 
(Lange, 2004; 907). In Tanzania, indirect rule involved a native administration consisting 
of three parts: a native authority or chief council with legislative and executive powers; 
native courts and a native treasury, which collected all taxes.  
 
The British believed that by introducing indirect rule to Tanzania, they were reverting to 
an older form of tribal authority that had been undermined during the German colonial 
period. In fact, in Tanzania, tribe had always been just one of the competing forms of 
social organization. Iliffe writes that “Europeans believed Africans belonged to tribes; 
Africans built tribes to belong to” (1979; 324). This meant that in many areas, tribes had 
to be invented and genealogies of chiefs constructed. Further, when a chief was seen to 
be in opposition to the colonial authorities, he was removed and another chief was 
‘identified’ by the colonial authorities to take his place (Coulson 1982). The chiefs who 
gained power through indirect rule, therefore, often had little historical basis for 
authority to influence their local constituency. The developmental role of the native 
authorities was limited to implementing directives from the central authority. Coercion, 
with the backing of the Provincial or District Commissioner, was a prevalent feature of 
native authorities; the rural extension officers were essentially police men, who ensured 
that policy was being followed by farmers (Coulson 1982).  
 
In addition to coercive strength, the institutional authority of the chiefs depended on the 
control that native authorities had over tax revenue at a local level. These funds provided 
a source of rents to be distributed through patron-client networks, with the chief as 
patron distributing rents in the form of, for example, access to employment or payment 
for services (Iliffe 1979) to secure a degree of local level political stability and 
acquiescence to colonial policy. However, the budgets of native authorities were 
extremely limited and hardly stretched beyond the salary bill, as employment within the 
native authorities expanded to absorb potential dissenting locals, as a means of achieving 
local stability (McCarthy 1982). The strength of the native authorities was based on a 
local level political settlement that could not keep pace with the social and economic 
changes that were strengthening non-traditional groups, who were demanding greater 
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control of the state. On independence, the native authority structures were largely swept 
away. The power of local chiefs was undermined as the independent central state that 
emerged had more ambitious aims for transformation than could be achieved through an 
institutional authority structure grafted on a collapsing traditional political settlement. 
 
3.2.2 Vietnam 
 
In contrast to Tanzania, forms of village level political structures, as well as centralised 
political institutions, have a very long history in Vietnam. Vietnam was ruled directly by 
China from the late second century until revolts by local chieftains overturned their rule 
and instituted a long period of rule under a Buddhist state. From the mid 16th century the 
country was ruled by an Emperor under the Nguyen dynasty that had close ties with the 
rulers of China. The Vietnamese Emperor paid tribute to the Chinese emperor (Wolf 
1969) and Confucian political philosophy influenced the structure of the state with a 
judicial hierarchy, a centralized tax system, a royal courier network, and a royal palace 
complex based at Hue (Marr 1971). Under the Nguyen dynasty a formal bureaucratic 
state was introduced with a system of rule by mandarins and state examinations to 
determine positions within the ranks of the scholar-gentry. These institutions were largely 
based on the Chinese state model but a distinctive national identity was also forged. The 
anti-Chinese rhetoric and the mythology of earlier struggles against Chinese rule played 
an important part in the creation of a distinct national identity. The state during this 
period took on certain economic functions to enhance peasant agricultural productivity, 
and hence increase tax income by organizing and investing in irrigation schemes (Wolf 
1969). Despite these centralizing tendencies there was constant tension between the 
Emperor and local power holders (Marr 1971) who had varying levels of military strength 
and autonomy. By the time of active French colonialism in the mid 19th century, the 
Nguyen state had become internally weak and was stagnating in terms of economic, 
technological and military progress (Beresford 1988). 
 
The Organisation of French Colonial Rule 
 
France had had a long presence in Vietnam, mainly based on Catholic missions and trade 
routes with southern China crossing the region (Brocheux and Hemery 2001). After 
1848, and the advent of the Second Empire in France, it undertook a military campaign 
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to establish direct rule over Vietnam. The main motive for France in engaging in a 
military campaign for conquest that took over twenty years was that it secured trade 
routes to the lucrative Chinese market and restricted British and German colonial 
ambitions in the region (Murray 1980). French attempts to establish a colony involved a 
combination of treaties with existing leaders and military campaigns for direct rule. The 
decisive military victory came in 1861 when 22,000 Vietnamese troops, drawn loosely 
together from numerous regions, were defeated at Ky-Hoa (Marr 1971).  
 
In 1867 treaties were made with the Vietnamese Court at Hue, despite on-going 
resistance across the country, and direct rule over Cochinchina was established in the 
South. Subsequently, protectorates were created in Central and Northern Vietnam in 
1884, named Annam and Tonkin respectively by the French6. Differences, therefore, 
emerged between the north and south in terms of the colonial institutions of governance 
and the distribution of power. For example, the protectorates maintained their traditional 
government structures including the Vietnamese monarchy and mandarin hierarchy 
centred in Hue (Beresford 1988). Yet across the country it was the French who held 
ultimate power, despite the different formal relations between the provinces and the 
metropolis. France had an ideology of colonialism based on the idea of ‘mise en valeur’ that 
differed considerably from the British conception. Cooper argued that this term 
‘connotes not only economic development of the kind pursued by other capitalist 
imperial nations, but also the moral and cultural improvement to be wrought in the 
colonies. This emphasis on the moral and cultural dimension stemmed from the French 
belief in the universal value of its civilization which in turn found its roots in the nation’s 
revolutionary legacy’ (2001; 29).  
 
Yet, despite this ideological principle, the reality of the colonial organization of 
administrative and economic control in Indochina was that a complex hierarchy of racial 
and national inequality lay at its foundation. Thus, similarly to British colonial practice, a 
dual legal system was instituted by the end of the 19th century involving a ‘native’ system 
of law (Peycam 1999) and the imposition of collective responsibility on the village, 
elevating the role of the village chief to be the representative of the hierarchy of the 
colonial administration (Wolf 1969). Within the colonial state there was a heavy reliance 
                                                 
6
 The French colony of Indochina also included the modern states of Laos and Cambodia which were 
ruled under protectorates. 
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on non-Vietnamese staff; in fact, to a much greater extent than in other French colonies 
(Peycam 1999). French expatriates held senior positions but also many staff were 
recruited from other French colonies, notably Pondicherry in India. By the time of the 
First World War, Vietnamese staff had joined the colonial state but overwhelmingly at 
low levels in the bureaucracy.  
 
Colonial education policy played an important role in creating an intermediate class of 
Vietnamese workers for colonial state employment. The main drive behind the education 
policy was to provide a practical education and make it correspond quickly to the 
imperatives of ‘mise en valeur’ of the colony (Bezancon 2002). Thus, on paper, the aim of 
education policy was to provide a ‘modern’ education, as opposed to the Confucian or 
Buddhist education, for the majority of the population. This involved establishing an 
extensive education system involving all levels of schooling up to the level of Hanoi 
University and also giving access to the best students to universities in France. Despite 
expanding educational opportunities, the number of Vietnamese children who 
experienced anything more than a few months of primary schooling remained low. In 
1930 only about a fifth of school-aged children attended a colonial school for any time at 
all, with many of these children receiving just a few months of schooling (Bezancon 
2002). In 1938 only 1.8% of all students attending Franco-Vietnamese schools were at 
the post-primary level (Kelly 1982). Thus, cumulatively over the period of French 
colonial rule, only a few hundred thousand students studied in colonial schools. Yet, 
while this group was small, it was these educated Vietnamese who went on to work 
within the colonial administrative structure. This group was the backbone of the 
intermediate classes that became increasingly important for the anti-colonial movement 
as the older, more limited, group of intellectuals that formed a critical part of the 
traditional political elite, became increasingly irrelevant as an organizing force behind the 
anti-colonial movement (Tai 1992). 
Economic Structure Under French Colonialism 
Indochina was economically very important for France, with around 55% of all private 
assets invested in the French Empire concentrated there in 1914. There were two main 
branches of the colonial economy (Brocheux and Hemery 2001). The first was rice 
production and trade. Rice production was based on peasant agriculture. Chinese middle 
men dominated internal trade and later also external trade, along with large French 
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export houses. The second was rubber cultivation on plantations owned predominantly 
by French capitalists. The colonial state relied heavily for its finances on taxes on peasant 
agriculture and government monopolies in sectors such as salt, alcohol and opium 
(Beresford 1988). Revenues from taxation on peasant agriculture were, however, limited 
due to the small surplus and low productivity generated by this form of agriculture, with 
significant consequences for the ability of the colonial state to entrench its political 
power. For example, Murray (1980) argued that the bureaucratically centralized taxation 
of agriculture could not generate sufficient resources and that those who posed a threat 
to the system were instead paid off by land grants and the right to collect rents. This 
strengthened the autonomy of local leaders. The relative strength of local political power 
holders vis-à-vis the central state that had been a defining feature of Vietnamese political 
history, therefore, continued during the colonial system. 
 
The economy remained dominated by peasant agriculture throughout the colonial period; 
however there were changes and divergences in the pattern of land tenure in the north 
and the south. In the south the process of land concentration and land dispossession was 
more rapid. By the mid 1930s, large land owners owned about half of the arable land 
producing rice in the Vietnamese south and a growing class of landless tenants 
constituted around 57% of the rural population (Wolf 1969). Among the peasant 
population sharecropping became more common (Beresford 1988) as levels of rural debt 
increased (Murray 1980), representing a downturn in the living standards of many 
peasants. Land expropriation in the south led to large tracts of land being given to 
French and to some Vietnamese people, primarily from a small group of rich southern 
Vietnamese bourgeoisie, who rented the land out in small parcels for continued rice 
production. Wolf (1959) estimates that there were around 7,000 Vietnamese who became 
owners of large estates. In the north, colonial land grants never reached the same scale in 
the areas that were protectorates. Across the whole of Indochina, speculation and land 
hording was rife, leading to a situation where only around 40% of cultivable land was 
actually under production (Murray 1980).  
 
Another important development in the rural economy under colonialism was the growth 
in large scale plantation agriculture (particularly rubber plantations), on estates owned by 
French companies. Between 1907 and 1918, large scale plantations replaced small 
individual rubber crops as a number of joint stock companies backed by French 
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metropolitan capital were created (Kalikiti 1999), but it was after 1924, when world prices 
for rubber were at their height, that rubber plantations expanded most rapidly (Murray 
1980). From 1924 until 1929, when prices collapsed, rubber plantations received the 
highest share of investment from France. The companies concerned also received 
subsidies from the colonial Government (Kalikiti 1999). 68% of the area under 
plantation agriculture belonged to just 27 firms controlled by metropolitan holdings. 
Three large groups accounted for more than two thirds of the production in 1944 
(Brocheux and Hemery 2001). 
 
The expansion of plantation agriculture, and, to a lesser extent, of mining, had an 
important impact in terms of the recruitment of labour. There was a perceived shortage 
of labour in Cochinchina, where most of the large plantations were based, and, therefore, 
labour was predominantly recruited from the north under contract. Between 1926 and 
1927, in the rubber boom, an average of 17,500 labourers, mainly from Tonkin, were 
brought into Cochinchina every year. Powerful groups such as the Syndicat des Planteurs 
de Caoutchouc de l’Indochine lobbied the colonial state for rights for control over 
plantation labour that created some of the worst working conditions in Indochina 
(Beresford 1988). Poor labour conditions on plantations and increasing land 
expropriation were central to a growing political awareness among the peasantry under 
colonialism.  
 
Manufacturing in colonial Vietnam was limited predominantly to agro-processing and 
light manufacturing, mostly based in small factories rather than large establishments. The 
only exception was the Nam Dinh textile mill that employed 6,000 labourers in 1945 
working on imported cotton to supply the domestic market (Beresford 1988). Between 
1915 and 1930 the beginnings of a working class was forged in Indochina in extractive 
industries, agriculture and manufacturing as well as those in the service sector in areas 
such as transport and artisan work (Brocheux and Hemery 2001). Most of those who 
worked in these sectors were not, however, dispossessed of all access to land and most 
were still involved in peasant agriculture and returned to their villages for the harvest; 
therefore, most of this group did not fit into a classic definition of a working class as they 
often still possessed some land.  
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Chinese Capital 
 
As in Tanzania, the positions of economic power in Vietnam were largely held by non-
Vietnamese under the Colonial system. Apart from the large French capitalist investors, 
ethnic Chinese were the dominant commercial class. People of Chinese origin had played 
a role in the Vietnamese economy prior to colonialism. From the 17th century permanent 
Chinese settlements in the south of Vietnam encouraged a distinct and relatively 
permanent Chinese community within Vietnamese society (Khanh 1993). However, 
under French colonialism the Chinese population grew rapidly as the French actively 
encouraged Chinese immigration to fill the role of middle men in internal and external 
trade and, to a lesser extent, as workers in foreign owned enterprises.  
 
The French policy of encouraging Chinese immigration to fill specified economic roles 
was very similar to the British colonial policy in Africa and Asia (Marsot 1993). The 
French adopted a divide and rule policy of ethnic classification despite the fact that in 
the early 20th century most of those classified as Chinese residents had lived in Vietnam 
for generations and were often of mixed parentage. They were given rights by the 
colonial state to engage in business activities that were restricted for ‘native’ Vietnamese 
(Peycam 1999). Over the colonial period, however, the pace of new migration into 
Vietnam from China picked up. The Chinese, who mainly settled in the south, were 
encouraged to live separately from the rest of the population and were allowed to 
organize into business related congregations based on clan identities from their Chinese 
regional homelands.  
 
As with the British, despite the fact that colonial policy encouraged class and race 
distinctions to emerge, the racial minority commercial classes were often seen by the 
colonial authority as oppressors against whom the local population needed to be 
protected7. Over the colonial period the Chinese became an entrenched commercial 
                                                 
7
 Parallels between British attitudes to the Indian commercial class in Tanganyika and the French attitudes 
towards the Chinese commercial class in Vietnam are evident from the comparison between the British 
Foreign Office Consul’s comments on Asians in Tanganyika described in footnote 4 above with the 
statement by M. Robequan the Vietnam colonial administrator that ‘‘the Chinese are often criticized, and 
frequently with good reason, for their unscrupulousness and their harsh treatment of the natives: their 
practice of taking advantage of the shortcomings and poverty of the peasants is quite rightfully termed 
hateful, as is their shrewedness in evading the laws and regulations imposed upon them, in avoiding all 
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class. The colonial government gave the Chinese rights to a virtual monopoly in rice and 
other basic foodstuffs and to participate in the monopolies on opium and alcohol. The 
Chinese also played an important part in finance and banking, along with Indian money 
lenders. By the beginning of the 20th century, the Chinese were already dominant in 
commerce, despite the fact that they only made up around 1% of the population (Purcell 
1980). Further, Chinese made up around 17% of industrial workers and 7% of the total 
number of miners (Khanh 1993). Initially, Chinese business was restricted from 
competing directly with the French companies that dominated manufacturing and 
foreign trade but after 1930 and the Nanjing Agreement between France and China, 
people classified as Chinese in Vietnam got the right to participate in foreign trade and 
industrial activities (Khanh 1993) and were also exempt from certain taxes that fell on the 
local population.  
 
3.2.3 Discussion 
 
Significant differences existed between rural society in Tanzania and Vietnam prior to 
colonialism. Tanzania’s agrarian structures were much more egalitarian than those in 
Vietnam, where social hierarchies and political authority at the village level had been 
entrenched through a long history of village level political institutions. Vietnam also had 
a much longer history of nationhood and central state institutions than Tanzania. In 
Vietnam political power was distributed between political institutions at the village level 
and at the level of the central state. This balance generated on-going tensions as the 
centre attempted to assert its authority over local power holders. These tensions were not 
fully resolved even under colonialism.  
 
The organisation of colonial rule in both countries had important similarities in terms of 
the attempt to graft political institutions onto traditional power hierarchies while 
attempting to shore up the strength of the central state institutions. The economic 
transformation wrought on these colonial societies was limited primarily to the 
agricultural sector and there was hardly any industrialisation. Tanzania’s agricultural 
sector went through a much more limited transformation than in Vietnam, but in both 
countries peasant production remained the dominant form of economic organisation in 
                                                                                                                                            
official control, and in working under the cover of unstable and irresponsible associations …. The Chinese 
are branded as speculators shrewdly taking advantage of monetary instability’. (Mangat, 1980; 203) 
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the countryside. The industrial working class was still in the early stages of formation at 
the close of the colonial era. 
 
Both colonial states encouraged a non-native commercial class to emerge and restricted 
the petty capitalist economic activities of Tanzanians and Vietnamese. Larger scale 
economic activities were controlled exclusively by foreign capitalists. In both countries, 
but particularly in Tanzania, a lot of the resentment against colonial rule was directed 
against the Asian and Chinese petty capitalists as well as against the colonial power itself. 
Overall, the impact of class politics was weak in both countries as classes themselves 
were fragmented due to the relatively low level of economic transformation that occurred 
under colonialism.  
 
Probably the critical impact of colonialism on the distribution of power was the way that 
new intermediate social groups were created, largely through education and employment 
provided by the colonial state itself. While the emergence of intermediate class groups 
was quite limited compared to the situation in countries, such as India, which had longer 
colonial histories and entrenched colonial states, this group had significant organisational 
capacity and political power and came to play a critical role in leading the independence 
struggle.  
 
Table 3.1: Summary of Political Institutions and Distribution of Power under 
Colonialism 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
Main Political 
Institutions 
Colonial State 
Native Authorities 
 
Colonial state 
Imperial courts 
Village level authorities 
Distribution of Power 
between main economic 
groups 
Foreign capital: 
Held control of new 
economic activities in 
farming, mining and 
industry. The group of 
settler farmers was very 
small. 
 
Domestic capital: 
Overwhelmingly small scale 
production and 
commercial/trading 
activities dominated by 
Asians.  
Small group of African 
Foreign capital: 
Held control of new 
economic activities in 
plantation farming, mining 
and industry. 
 
Domestic capital: 
Overwhelmingly dominated 
by ethnic Chinese across 
small scale 
production/trading. 
Small group of Vietnamese 
capitalists in the South. 
 
Peasant farmers: 
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traders and capitalist 
farmers with a growing 
voice through the co-
operative movement. 
 
Peasant farmers: 
Numerically dominant but 
produced little economic 
surplus. Limited 
commercial farming. 
 
Industrial workers: 
Very small group of 
industrial workers emerged. 
 
 
Numerically dominant but 
produced little economic 
surplus. Limited 
commercial farming. 
 
 
Industrial workers: 
Small group of industrial 
workers and plantation 
workers. 
 
 
Distribution of Political 
and Organisational 
Power Outside Formal 
Political Institutions 
Limited intermediate class 
groups emerged from 
within the colonial state 
education and 
administrative structures. 
They played an increasing 
role in organising the 
nationalist movement. 
 
Important co-operative 
movement representing 
African traders and peasant 
farmers. 
 
 
The power and authority of 
the traditional intelligentsia 
was increasingly 
marginalised. 
 
Intermediate class groups 
emerged from within the 
colonial state education and 
administrative structures. 
They played an increasing 
role in organising the 
nationalist movement. 
 
 
3.3 The Impact of Independence Struggles on the Distribution of Power  
 
3.3.1 Tanzania 
 
During the early years of colonialism under the Germans there was almost constant 
armed resistance by Africans to colonial rule in different areas of Tanganyika. The most 
important act of organised resistance was the Maji-maji rebellion that lasted from 1905 
until 1907. The rebellion was brutally suppressed and vestiges of organised political 
resistance from this era were effectively crushed (Iliffe 1967). It was not until the 1920s 
that organised political resistance to colonial rule began to surface again. While the 
political institutions at a local level consisting of chiefs and native authorities were 
generally conservative and supported the colonial government, the changing economic 
and political power balance that eventually contributed to the overthrow of these colonial 
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institutions was largely generated from the process of economic development that 
occurred under the colonial system.  
 
The colonial structure of the Tanzanian economy, with a very small indigenous capitalist 
class in industry and agriculture, coupled with limited proletarianization and the 
persistence of peasant agricultural structures that were largely autonomous from the state 
meant that none of these groups were in a position to take a lead in the nationalist cause. 
Instead, the most important sector of the economy behind the anti-colonial struggle was 
the co-operative movement. In the 1950s cooperative societies and agrarian producers 
unions multiplied, primarily in the cash crop growing regions. These unions and co-
operatives were created largely to counter the economic power of Asian traders (Van-
Cranenburg 1990). African traders saw the nationalist movement as a way of ridding 
Tanganyika not just of British colonial power but also of the Asian commercial 
bourgeoisie with which it found itself in direct competition(Von-Freyhold 1979). It was 
the co-operative groups that mobilized peasants to oppose the colonial system by 
withholding taxes and resisting the authority of the colonial state institutions. 
 
While the material basis for the rural support of TANU was provided by African traders 
and mobilized peasant cooperatives (Shivji 1976), the political leadership was mainly 
provided by the small group of Africans who were employed in some form of 
professional capacity by the state. They included clerks and junior civil servants within 
the colonial administration and teachers. The roots of this group can be traced back to 
the first missionary schools and subsequent colonial education system which provided a 
new class of literate officials that had broken from the traditional authority structures of 
the village (Iliffe 1979).  
 
Access to education for Africans remained extremely limited throughout the colonial 
period. There was a post-war expansion of education, with an increase in children 
attending primary school from 10% in 1947 to 40% in 1956. By independence in 1962, 
however, there were only 20 Tanganyikan African students studying for degrees and 
another 59 in non-degree courses at universities or professional institutes (Coulson 
1982). The small numbers of Africans receiving any form of formal education, especially 
at higher levels, meant that even on the eve of independence, an African middle class 
hardly existed and the civil service remained dominated by Europeans and Indians. In 
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1937, 14 out of 18 clerks in the Secretariat were non-African, 37 out of 39 in the 
Treasury and 100 out of 114 customs officials (ibid). In 1962 there were 3,100 
professional, administrative and technical jobs in Tanganyika. Only 1,300 of these were 
held by Africans, of whom 1,100 were teachers, medical technicians or nurses (Pratt 
1976).  
 
The Early Organisation of the Ruling Party 
 
Despite their small numbers, the intermediate classes described above were able to lead 
the nationalist movement and subsequently take control of the state through the political 
institution of the nationalist party, TANU. The institutional roots of TANU lie in the 
urban Tanganyika African Association (TAA). This was established in 1929 and became 
popular amongst African civil servants in the 1930s. Julius Nyerere was elected as 
President of the TAA in 1953 and quickly acted to turn it into a political party, TANU, in 
1954, by which time other trade unions, co-operative associations and working 
associations of intermediate classes had also grown in strength. By the mid 1950s TANU 
had become a major political force with over 200,000 members (Pratt 1976). The 
Colonial authorities initially opposed TANU vigorously and refused to recognize it as the 
legitimate voice of Tanganyika, which they claimed was represented by the native 
authorities.  
 
The colonial government tried to circumvent the growing power of the nationalist 
movement by introducing multi-racial elections with two thirds of the seats reserved for 
European and Asian candidates8 but by 1958 TANU had gained all of the African seats 
and had also won the support of prominent Asians and Europeans in the Legislative 
Council, leading to the abandonment of multi-racial elections and an agreement by the 
British to concede full power to Tanganyika. Elections were held in 1960 that led TANU 
to an overwhelming electoral victory and independence followed in 1961.  
 
The nature of the independence struggle is critical to understanding the balance of power 
of the post colonial state. The independence struggle involved organized protests, non-
co-operation with Government policies and strikes by trade unions. However the 
                                                 
8
 Nyerere played a pivotal role in persuading the 1958 TANU conference to accept the colonial 
government’s proposals for multi-racial elections, thereby paving the way for a constitutional hand over of 
power rather than a more radical approach proposed by others in the party (Brennan 2005). 
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struggle was essentially non-violent and primarily followed constitutional means to 
demand the hand-over of power. Pratt (1976) contrasted the rapidity of Tanganyika’s 
electoral route to independence with other British colonies stating that ‘Nigeria and 
Ceylon, for example, each had a period of thirty-eight years between the year in which 
some members of the legislature were elected for the first time and the final achievement 
of independence’ (1976; 56). The fact that the nationalist struggle was relatively short and 
that mobilisation was limited in extent meant that the distribution of organizational 
capabilities as a legacy of the struggle was relatively narrow and was mainly contained 
within the intermediate classes that ran TANU.  
 
3.3.2 Vietnam  
 
Independence Struggles and Formation of the Ruling Party 
 
The way that the independence movement evolved in Vietnam also reflected the 
changing economic and social structures of colonial society. Despite the restrictions 
imposed upon Vietnamese involvement in the private sector, a small Vietnamese 
bourgeoisie did emerge, particularly in Cochinchina. Its economic power was linked to 
prior involvement within the colonial state and rewards for political collaboration with 
the French through land grants, business licences and access to education in France 
(Brocheux and Hemery 2001). Yet the wider political power of this group remained 
limited throughout the colonial period. The Chinese commercial class and French capital 
had much greater economic resources and the Vietnamese bourgeoisie only really had 
political influence in the south where it formed the backbone of the Constitutionalist 
movement calling for a transfer of political rights to them through parliament (Tai 1992). 
The political and economic weakness of this class meant that its role in the anti-colonial 
movement and subsequent position within the post-colonial political settlement was 
extremely limited. 
 
The other group that played an important role in the early anti-colonial movements but 
in the long run had limited political influence were the scholar-gentry, whose origins lay 
in the imperial courts and the Confucian education system (Marr 1971). Many of this 
group were absorbed into the nascent bourgeoisie. David Marr (1971) argues that the 
initial opposition to colonial rule from this group was not due to economic competition 
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with colonialists as many of the scholar-gentry maintained their position as long as they 
collaborated politically with the French. Instead, early opposition resulted from the attack 
on traditional notions of self and spiritual identity which French colonialism brought 
about. The political aims of the early anti-colonial movements were based on a desire to 
restore the position of the monarchy. This was manifested in regionally limited protest 
movements such as the Can Vuong movement and various secret sects that engaged in 
sporadic anti-colonial action (Brocheux and Hemery 2001). These early anti-colonial 
movements were based on Confucian philosophy. They tended to be elitist and were 
restricted in terms of their membership and action (Marr 1971). After 1920, opposition 
to colonialism took on a more economic motivation as pressure to integrate into the 
global economy and domestic changes in the structure of the economy took hold. Tai 
writes that ‘by the 1920s, colonialism had wrought massive changes in Vietnamese 
politics, society and culture, eroding both the cohesiveness of the elite and its faith in the 
ideology that had sustained it over the centuries’ (1992; 11). The next wave of anti-
colonial struggle involved the emergence of mass politics, albeit primarily under the 
leadership of the intermediate classes who were themselves a product of the colonial 
state apparatus.  
 
The Organisation of the VCP 
 
In the 1920s various groups existed that had been influenced by Western political ideas 
of nationhood and sovereignty. These included the Vietnamese Nationalist party 
(founded in 1927) and radical and anarchist groupings amongst petty bourgeois 
intellectuals (Tai 1992). However, it was the VCP founded as the Communist Youth 
League in 1924 by Nguyen Ai Quoc (later to be known as Ho Chi Minh) that became the 
pre-eminent organizing force behind the independence struggle. Most of the League’s 
members came from Nghe An, Nguyen Ai Quoc’s home province. In 1930 the 
Vietnamese Youth League became the VCP. Despite brutal suppression by the Colonial 
Government, it gained strength through clandestine organization and publications as well 
as organizing a major series of strikes in the plantations, docks and factories (Murray 
1980). In 1941 the Viet Minh, the League for the Independence of Vietnam, was formed 
and the VCP shelved immediate plans for radical land redistribution and class based 
politics. The League was ostensibly a non-Communist, broad-based coalition front of all 
anti-colonial forces, dedicated to ending both French colonial rule and, from 1941, the 
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Japanese occupation of Vietnam. The Viet Minh was successful against other anti-
colonial groups because it was well organized and was disciplined on Leninist party lines 
(Tai 1992) and because it benefited from the existence of mass organizations that had 
been built up by the VCP in the 1930s. At the end of the Second World War, the Viet 
Minh exhibited considerable tactical and strategic ingenuity and was able to declare 
Independence for Vietnam with only 5,000 members as the Japanese and Allied troops 
were still in disarray (Marr 1995)9.  
 
The way that the army was organised to fight the independence struggle reinforced the 
decentralised distribution of power within society. In 1945 the Viet Minh had very 
limited military capacity. It was only in 1944 that it created its first armed units within the 
small, communist-led, Liberation Army (Giai Phong Quan) (Marr 2007), which in 1945 
had around 5000 troops (Kolko). It was one of the central aims of the new state, the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV, in the north, to create a modern army, and one 
that was also integrated with the political aims of the VCP. In order to achieve this, the 
VCP designed a system with strict political controls, centralized authority and uniform 
territorial organization. The VCP wanted to create a political organization within the 
army that paralleled the military at all echelons to ensure its political dominance over 
army institutions (Tanham 2006). Within the army there was the Political Bureau, which 
was organized at different levels of the army, and there was also the Party organization 
itself throughout the army. Inside the pyramid of the armed forces from the High 
Command at the top to the infantry company at the bottom, the Party formed a tightly 
overlapping pyramid and a party apparatus sat at each level of the armed forces 
command structure (Yoon 1990). The integration of the army within the Party 
strengthened the overall political power of the party within society. 
 
Yet despite the intention to create a disciplined and hierarchical modern army, the 
realities and particularities of the thirty years war of independence meant that this 
centralized and disciplined structure was, for structural, tactical and ideological reasons, 
                                                 
9 In his detailed historical account of the lead up to the declaration of independence in 1945 David Marr 
(1995) describes the on-going importance of those involved in this independence day for the subsequent 
decades of rule under the Vietnamese Communist Party: ‘The generation of ICP members who had 
survived repression and jail in the 1930s, and who disseminated the Viet Minh message before August 
1945, went on to govern the DRV and command its armed forced for the next forty years. The generation 
of youths who joined patriotic groups in the summer of 1945, practiced marching, demonstrated, took 
control of offices, and formed local revolutionary committees became the vital middle echelon of Party, 
state and military hierarchies for those same four decades, although not a few died in battle or were purged 
during the bitter 1950s campaigns against ‘class enemies’.’ (1995; 552) 
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never as strong as intended. Marr (2007) argued that in the end ‘the tyranny of 
geography, poor communications, severe economic constraints, a paucity of specialized 
staff, and disruptive enemy counteractions meant that the DRV central government 
could never exercise the degree of command and control over subordinate institutions, 
including armed groups scattered around the country, that it wished’ (2007; 75). 
Vietnam’s military forces were divided into three troops: the regular army, the regional 
forces and the popular troops at the village level. This encouraged a disbursement of 
organisational power within the army structures. Strategic military tactics based on 
Maoist principles of guerrilla warfare also reinforced decentralised decision making 
within the army. The basic principle of the military tactics of the VCP was to inspire as 
much originality and responsibility as possible among the guerrilla and local forces where 
movement and mobility were the key military tactics (Kolko 2001) in the face of vastly 
superior military hardware. Another important factor that influenced the legacy of 
organisational capacity was that the supply system was largely decentralized, so that 
regional units had to organize their own systems of production (Tanham 2006).  
 
The Impact of the War on the Organisation of the VCP 
 
In the 1960s, the military tactics of decentralized command were adapted to the changing 
nature of the conflict. In 1955, the southern Republic of Vietnam was officially 
established. It had been set up initially by the French in 1948 with Bao Dai, the former 
emperor, as chief of state, and then supported by US military and economic aid under 
Ngo Dinh Diem who deposed Bao Dai. In 1963, Diem was assassinated and a 
succession of military governments took over with increasing direct military assistance 
from the US. In 1964, the US moved to direct military involvement engaging at its peak 
in 1969 542,400 members of its military on the ground. The human cost of the war was 
immense with 1.3 million civilians killed or wounded in Southern Vietnam from 1968 
until 1972 alone, mainly due to the massive aerial bombing campaign launched by the US 
and the army of the RVN (Kolko 2001). The US and Southern Vietnamese army 
depended on advanced weapons technology and heavy equipment with ‘the greatest 
flood of firepower against a nation know to history’ (ibid; 2001). Despite the fact that the 
US won a large number of battles and inflicted enormous loses, the Vietnamese army 
was able to retain tactical and strategic advantage.  
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As well as the structural impact of fighting the war on the organization of power within 
the VCP, the war had a crucial legacy in terms of class relations within Vietnam. It was 
during the course of the war itself that the Party was able to establish its political 
legitimacy as the representative of the peasants and workers of Vietnam. The war led to a 
wide acceptance of the Party in rural society (Wolf 1969). The politicization of the 
peasantry occurred first as their access to land came under threat in the south as a result 
of regressive land reform, but then further as the bombing campaign intensified. The 
lives of the peasantry were profoundly disrupted in the south. In 1971, it was estimated 
that around 25 – 30% of the south’s entire population had been refugees during the 
previous seven years (Kolko 2001). Many peasants in the south fled to the cities or joined 
the resistance as guerrilla fighters. VCP military forces, including guerrillas, grew from 
34,000 in 1962 to around 51,000 in 1964. In the North, a similar pattern of expanded 
participation occurred as the centralized army mainly recruited from the peasantry and 
part-time guerrilla forces were stationed in the villages.  
 
Despite the political mobilisation of peasants across Vietnam, the leadership of the VCP 
was drawn primarily from the Vietnamese intermediate classes; students and teachers of 
the colonial school system and employees in the colonial bureaucracy. A self-initiated 
study of the VCP after the Second World War showed that of 1,855 key positions, 1,365 
were held by intellectuals or sons of the bourgeoisie, 351 by peasants and 139 by workers 
(Wolf 1969). Yet the war itself imposed organisational demands on society that expanded 
the ‘intermediate classes’. It destroyed the traditional livelihoods of workers and peasants 
and pushed them into the hierarchies of the army and state at the local level where they 
acquired positions of relative power and organisational responsibilities and access to 
education and new ideas. This strengthened the distribution of political power in rural 
society. 
 
3.3.3 Discussion 
 
In both countries, the political institutions of the nationalist parties were formed largely 
by intermediate class groups from within the colonial state. These groups were able to 
engage in effective political mobilisation through the institutions of the nationalist 
parties. They appealed to the support of peasants and of the newly emerging group of 
workers from industry. The traditional elites that had been co-opted into the power 
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structure of the colonial system became politically obsolete. The party provided an 
encompassing institutional vehicle for these intermediate groups to pursue political 
power. Given that the intermediate classes were actually quite small, there was less 
potential for political competition between political institutions based on intermediate 
class factions.  
 
The role that the parties played in the independence movement and the nature of the 
struggle for independence had a critical impact of the distribution of power within each 
country. In both countries the political legitimacy of the party was forged during the 
independence struggles. In Tanzania, the relatively short period of political mobilisation 
and largely constitutional route left a much more circumscribed legacy of political power 
and organisational capabilities and the party institutions were still quite rudimentary in 
1961. Despite the relative weakness of their institutions at this stage, power within 
TANU was highly centralised. The low level of social and economic differentiation in 
society more broadly, facilitated the centralisation of power within TANU as there was 
less scope for political mobilisation. The central party institutions gained a degree of 
political power over rural society in the course of the independence struggle. However, 
the appearance of strength was partly a reflection of the weaker legacy of the distribution 
of power in rural social structures, as well as of the fragmented class structure. 
 
Vietnam’s much longer and more intense war for independence imposed much greater 
organisational demands on the party and on society. While the intention was to establish 
a highly centralised political institution, the realities of the war meant that within the 
party, power was much more decentralised. In Civil War is Not a Stupid Thing (2006) 
Christopher Cramer argued that the impact of war is often to impose organisational and 
financial demands that tend to strengthen the power of the central state. The war in 
Vietnam certainly did strengthen the political power of the VCP. It decisively resolved 
any question over the legitimacy of the party as the representative of the people and 
removed the potential for political mobilisation outside the VCP institutions. However, 
the war also had a wider impact on the social distribution of power, leaving a more 
hierarchical and politically differentiated society overall. These features, as well as the 
much longer legacy of the decentralised distribution of power within Vietnamese society, 
meant that political organisational capabilities were strong at the local level. This made it 
more difficult for the Party to centralise power within its institutions. Yet, local level 
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power was largely absorbed into the party institutional structures. Thus, in contrast to 
Tanzania the struggle for independence left a greater distribution of power at the local 
level, leaving greater scope for both horizontal and vertical power struggles within the 
party institutions over distribution, property rights and state created technology rents.  
 
 
3.4  Constructing the Formative Socialist Political Settlement 
 
3.4.1 Tanzania 
 
Socialist Party Institutions 
 
On independence, TANU had acquired formal control over the state but its own 
institutional structures were still in formation and the distribution of economic and 
political power in Tanzania lay largely outside the party structures. The state was still 
dominated by expatriate and non-African staff, in both senior and middle ranking 
positions. Although other organizations, notably the co-operatives, the trade union 
movement and the army, were in alliance with TANU, their separate institutional 
structures and political power had not been fully subsumed by the Party. During the first 
decade of independence, TANU struggled to subordinate these other institutions which 
represented the biggest potential threat to the institutionalization of its control over the 
state. In 1964 the army launched a mutiny fuelled by resentment at the fact that many 
senior and middle ranking army positions were still held by British officers. The mutiny 
was quickly quelled with the intervention of the British army and Nyerere rapidly moved 
to ensure that the Tanzanian army was integrated within TANU (Coulson 1982). After 
1964, the consolidation of TANUs’ influence over the army was achieved by giving 
military personnel jobs inside the Party and establishing TANU branches within army 
barracks (Bienen 1967).  
 
The independent trade union movement was also emasculated, particularly following the 
1965 elections and the detention of trade union leaders (Shivji 1976). Subsequently, 
union activities were only permitted within the party sanctioned national union. The 
importance given to strengthening the institutions of the party is evident from Nyerere’s 
decision to step down as President in 1962 and focus his efforts on building up the party 
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institutions across the country. In 1963 he announced that Tanzania would be a one 
party state and in 1964 party organs at all levels of society from village cells of 10 
households up to the National Executive Committee (NEC) were established. Civil 
servants and police were coerced into joining the Party and a TANU membership card 
became a requirement for state employment and access to resources in some regions 
(Brennan 2005).  
 
In 1965 the first elections under a single party state were held and the Arusha 
Declaration of 1967 committed TANU to building a socialist society where capitalism 
and feudalism would be abolished and the major means of production and exchange 
would be under the control of workers and peasants. Yet despite the intention to 
construct a mass socialist party directly involved in the transformation of society, in 
reality the party was never as strong nor as organized as in richer socialist countries. The 
strength of TANU was limited both by the lack of access to sufficient surplus, which 
hampered the implementation of party policy, and by the relatively limited extent of 
mobilization that preceded independence.  
 
In many practical ways the party lacked the capacity to turn its rhetoric into reality. It was 
not very well resourced at the centre; most of its offices were poorly staffed and had very 
little capacity to implement or monitor party policy. Thus, the National Executive 
Committee did not have the instruments of coercion, nor the internal cohesion to 
enforce its policies on lower levels of the Party and could not keep an effective check on 
the Regional Secretaries. Given the huge task it faced, the bureaucratization of the Party 
was actually quite slow(Bienen 1967). There were very few specialist staff to oversee key 
policies. For example, there were only eight educational officers to oversee the 
implementation of the policy of Education for Self-Reliance (Coulson 1982).  
 
The Party sought to overcome these institutional limitations by establishing a 
bureaucratized structure down to the village level and ensuring that the existing state 
bureaucracy constructed under colonialism was under its control (Goulbourne 1979). 
From the mid-1960s, TANU and the civil services were essentially indistinguishable as 
institutions (Msekwa 1979). As well as the penetration of the army and national trade 
union organization, the Party also took over other institutions that represented a 
potential threat to its power, most notably the co-operatives, with the disbanding of co-
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operatives and later the abolition of local authorities, in 1972. The local authority 
institutions were replaced by Party institutions but in reality these policies were more 
about promoting centralised Party control than decentralising power to lower level 
institutions (Jerve and Naustdalslid 1990). 
 
Restructuring Economic Power Under Socialism 
 
The critical aspiration of TANU’s socialist agenda was to reconfigure the inherited 
pattern of economic power and bring the economy under the control of workers and 
peasants, rather than capitalists of Asian and European origin. From the point of the 
Arusha Declaration, policies were introduced with the intention of restricting capitalist 
expansion and establishing a socialist economy. In rural areas the most important of 
these was the Villagization Policy of 1974 that aimed to restructure rural society around 
viable village communities under Village Authorities with the eventual aim of establishing 
co-operative farming of shared lands. Private involvement in commerce and trading were 
restricted by policies such as Operation Maduka of 1976, which attempted to nationalize 
local shops. The creation of parastatals in manufacturing and trade became the primary 
institutional mechanism through which the Party exerted economic control. Newly 
created industrial parastatals drove the industrialisation process which occurred much 
more rapidly than at any time during Tanzania’s history. While the extension of state 
control was meant to transfer power to workers and to peasants, in reality, economic 
control was increasingly vested in an expanding group of party, bureaucratic and 
management officials. This group has been defined as a ‘bureaucratic bourgeoisie’ by 
theorists such as Issa Shivji (1976) and Andrew Coulson (1982).  
 
Capital Under Socialism 
 
In reality, the transformation of the distribution of economic power was quite limited in 
a number of respects. In agriculture, the policy of Villagization and restrictions of trade 
did put a halt to the emergence of overtly capitalist farming. However, a process of rural 
differentiation occurred as the unintended result of state policies that allowed farmers 
with connections to the Party privileged access to state resources and to engage in forms 
of primitive accumulation that strengthened their relative economic position (Sender and 
Smith 1990). Similarly in industry, while formal policies restricted the emergence of 
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capitalist production there were still significant sections of economic production that 
were outside the orbit of formal Party control.  
 
While the impact of socialism in terms of restricting the economic power of foreign 
capital was quite evident, the impact on the largely Asian commercial and productive 
activities was much more ambiguous. There were certainly restrictions on many of the 
economic activities of this group. Given the dominant role of Asian Tanzanians within 
the economy under colonialism, almost all the firms that were nationalized in certain 
sectors, such as food processing, were Asian (Mukandala 1988). Through the 1970s, calls 
for nationalisations by the Party grew and open hostility by members of Parliament 
towards the commercial class, often framed in racist language, became more common 
(Brennan 2005). Nyerere was frank about the fact that many of the Ujamaa policies were 
designed to redress racial imbalance in economic power. In his speech on Economic 
Nationalism in 1967 he said that the decision to nationalise was not related to a particular 
path of capitalism or socialism, or to their ideologies, but to the demand by Tanzanians 
for key positions within their economy (Nyerere 1968). 
 
Attempts by the state to take over small scale commercial capital were undertaken with 
policies such as Operation Maduka and the nationalization of houses. These policies had 
a heavy impact on Asians and Arab traders who owned 70% of the shops in Dar es 
Salaam in the 1970s and led to an exodus of the urban Asian population (Tripp 1997). 
Thus, socialism did have a significant impact on the economic position of Asian 
businesses. However, other members of the Asian commercial bourgeoisie continued to 
operate under socialism and were protected by formal and informal links with CCM 
(Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990), (Mukandala 1988). Private sector economic activities 
were allowed to continue in certain sectors (Costello 1994) and some of the new 
parastatal investments were undertaken as joint ventures. In some cases the firms were 
partly privately owned or managed by the private sector (Silver 1984) and there were a 
number of cases of industrial units where the Asian owners stayed on as managers under 
the new ownership structure (Mukandala 1988).  
 
The formal power that Tanzanian Asian business groups held due to their economic 
resources was severely curtailed during the socialist period. Yet while many Tanzanian 
Asian business people left the country, others remained and continued to engage in the 
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dwindling area of legal private sector economic activities. For example, the Ismaili 
community continued to play an important commercial role in rural towns and villages. 
The Ismailis were not an ostentatiously rich group and their economic role was 
predominantly as shop keepers and petty traders (Kaiser 1996). Further, informal 
clientelist networks emerged between Asian business people and Party and State officials. 
These networks engaged in illegal economic activities such as racketeering and other 
forms of illegal rent seeking generated by the central planning price controls. The Party 
blamed the economic decline from the end of the 1970s upon ‘racketeers, smugglers and 
saboteurs’ who undermined the official distribution and pricing system (Tripp 1997). In 
1983, Operation Economic Saboteur championed by Edward Sokoini, the popular Prime 
Minister, led to the imprisonment of thousands of Tanzanian Asian shop keepers. 
Importantly, these arrests were not indiscriminate but targeted those in the commercial 
class who did not have links to the Party (Maliyamkono and Bagachwa 1990).  
 
The Party faced considerable constraints in its attempts to restructure the distribution of 
economic power through socialist economic policies. The significant economic challenge 
of bringing about both a productive transformation and a radical redistribution of 
economic power were not met by the centrally planned economic system in the 1970s. 
While at times the Party pushed for a much more dramatic social transformation, at 
other times the pressing need to generate growth within the existing social structure led 
the State to allow previously important economic groups to maintain their economic 
role. For political reasons related to the need to legitimise the political power of the Party 
in terms of its representation of the majority of Tanzanians, domestic small scale 
capitalists were largely excluded from holding formal political power. Yet behind the 
rhetoric, the attitude to private capital was often in reality quite ambiguous. Nyerere 
himself argued that there was ‘no inevitable clash between the government and business’, 
on the contrary ‘the government needs private investment if its plans are to be put 
speedily in place’ (1963). Given that open support to the non-African private sector was 
politically difficult for the Party, the existence of private capital was either completely 
ignored in development plans or decisions were postponed in order to avoid any 
forthright statement on the private sector which would alienate the Party’s main political 
base (Hartmann 1990).  
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3.4.2 Vietnam 
 
The Party and the Distribution of Power 
 
The VCP took full control of northern Vietnam after 1955 and launched a radical 
attempt to bring about a socialist transformation of society. In terms of overall economic 
planning, the Party was influenced by the Soviet economic model based on Stalin’s 
Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR (Post 1989) that emphasised heavy 
industry and nationalization with a minimal role for the private sector. The priority for 
economic transformation in the North was to bring about redistributive land reform to 
strengthen the support of the peasantry for the VCP. By 1956 nearly all the land had 
been redistributed more or less equally, benefiting 73% of the north’s rural population 
(Kerkvliet 2005). However, the human cost of the land reform was high, with between 
5,000 – 15,000 land owners killed by peasant courts and around 20,000 people 
imprisoned (Kolko 2001). Beginning in 1958, the VCP introduced collectivization and by 
the end of 1960 nearly 90% of farming households were in collective cooperatives 
(Kerkvliet 2005).  
 
The VCP also engaged in purges to ‘purify’ class elements within the party. This mainly 
involved the removal of land lords and ‘rich’ peasants from institutional positions and 
limiting their political power. This constrained potential dissent outside the Party 
institutions. The process in Vietnam was very different from similar processes of 
suppression in China and Russia where the larger intermediate class groups in urban and 
rural areas were seen to be a greater threat to the consolidation of the political power of 
the Communist Parties. Mao’s strategy involved a much more intensive mass 
mobilisation in rural and urban areas against the intelligentsia and intermediate classes.  
In contrast, in Vietnam, there were fewer people who could be classified as belonging to 
the intermediate classes and most of these had been absorbed within the VCP political 
institutions, leaving much less scope for informal political mobilization outside the VCP. 
 
From 1965 investment priorities were those of a war economy and emphasis was given 
to industries directly supporting the war, especially mechanical engineering, iron and 
steel, coal and electricity (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). The start of US bombing led to 
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widespread destruction of industrial capacity and many factories were physically 
dismantled and removed to rural areas so that concentrations of production were 
dispersed (Beresford 1988). The amount of investment directed to locally managed 
enterprises increased four-fold during the war years. Compared to other centrally 
planned economies, this resulted in a highly decentralised state enterprise sector both in 
terms of location and decision making (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). The economic 
transformation of the northern economy remained heavily dependent on aid from China 
initially and then increasingly from the USSR. Aid was critical both for the military effort 
and to sustain the non-military population as efforts to bring about a productive 
economic transition faltered and rural production stagnated. 
 
The war also had a profound impact on the structure of the economy in the South. A 
crucial feature of the southern economy during the war was its dependence on aid, 
mainly in the form of ‘stabilization’ funds for import support, from the US government 
(Dacy 1986). The colonial economic structures remained largely intact with a number of 
highly profitable foreign owned industries and plantations dominating the economy as 
well as a large Chinese commercial class. Land ownership was much more concentrated 
in the South and the Diem regime instituted regressive land reform which strengthened 
the position of middle peasants and large land owners (Kerkvliet 2005). The bombing 
campaign in the South, targeting areas that were perceived to be supportive of the 
National Liberation Front fighting against the Southern state, led to massive rural 
dislocation and growing urban populations. The falling rural population encouraged the 
mechanization of agriculture, increasing rural inequalities (Beresford 1988) and 
commercial agriculture spread.  
 
With the expansion of commerce, the role of the Chinese commercial class also changed. 
At the end of the colonial period, Chinese merchant capital took over the role that the 
French had played in the south and expanded its operations into wholesale and foreign 
trade (Khanh 1993). Thus, in the South, the economy was rapidly commercialized and 
social stratification proceeded at a heightened pace during the war while the economy 
was very dependent on US aid. At the end of the war, in 1975, the fall of the southern 
regime was rapid, but significant differences in the distribution of political and economic 
power had emerged between the North and the South of Vietnam. 
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The Impact of Reunification on the Party and the Economy 
 
Reunification between North and South Vietnam was initiated from 1975 and within two 
years of the establishment of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam it was claimed that this 
had been achieved, with the creation of a single customs entity, state budget, and banking 
system (Beresford 1988). In reality, different trajectories of institutional development and 
distribution of power remained. In the south there had been considerable development 
towards rural capitalism, while commercialization and import dependence had 
mushroomed through US aid dependency. There had been further class stratification and 
economic power remained chiefly in the hands of a predominantly Chinese commercial 
class. It was one of the first objectives of the newly unified government to strip 
economic power from those that had sided with the previous regime and then to follow 
through a socialist transformation of the economy in order to integrate the two halves of 
the country. Immediately following reunification, people identified as comprador 
capitalists were arrested and their property was confiscated. In 1978 nearly all private 
sector trade and business activities were officially abolished and regulations restricted 
traders to selling goods only to the state (Beresford 1988). Many private sector economic 
activities managed to continue, however, by transforming themselves into co-operatives 
and household production units (Khanh 1993).  
 
From 1978 significant nationalizations took place that led to the creation of around 645 
state enterprises from around 1,500 private sector businesses (Khanh 1993). The Party 
also established New Economic Zones to which many urban inhabitants and members 
of the commercial classes were sent. Around 30,000 business people from the south and 
150,000 of their relatives were sent to re-educational camps in these New Economic 
Zones (Lindahl and Thomsen 2002). The clamp-down on private capital following 
reunification led to a surge of Chinese-Vietnamese refugees fleeing Vietnam, which 
expanded in 1978 as tensions with China were heightened due to the war in Cambodia 
(Vo 2006). The first wave of refugees, who came to be known as the ‘boat people’, was 
mainly from the intermediate classes and particularly from the 1.5 million strong Chinese 
community in the South.  
 
The exodus was co-ordinated by middle men, often themselves of Chinese origin, along 
with state officials. The flight of ‘boat people’ continued into the 1980s. Between 1980 
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and 1984 a quarter of a million refugees arrived in the camps and the last major crisis 
occurred from 1988 to 1989 when 120,000 refugees came ashore in neighbouring 
countries. However by this time the class background of the refugees had changed 
considerably and in the last years the refugees were mainly students, fishermen and non-
professionals. The proportion of Chinese participation in trade and services in relation to 
their total population in Ho Chi Minh City (HCMC) fell from 70% before 1975 to about 
24% in 1988 (Vo 2006).  
 
The exodus of the old commercial classes had a considerable impact on the distribution 
of economic power as state owned enterprises largely under the control of local Party 
institutions stepped into the gap. The formal political power of the remaining ethnic 
Chinese (who were known as Viet Hoa) was greatly diminished. Yet in the South, and 
particularly in HCMC, the group did retain some informal economic power through 
continued involvement in production through co-operatives (Dolinski 2006), clandestine 
trade links with the Chinese diaspora in the region (Beresford and Phong 2000) and with 
lower level party officials enabling them to engage in illegal rent seeking activities related 
to state controlled goods and prices (Khanh 1993).  
 
3.4.3 Discussion 
 
The attempt to create a viable socialist political settlement in Tanzania and Vietnam 
ultimately failed. While most genuine socialist characteristics remained far from being 
realised, this period did see important changes to political institutions and the 
distribution of power. These developments had significant implications for the 
subsequent path of economic transition under liberalisation. The political institutions of 
the parties in both countries were firmly entrenched during this period. In Tanzania the 
socialist period started with a more limited distribution of informal power than in 
Vietnam, but TANU acted to consolidate its political power through its institutional 
control of the state and suppressed the emergence of other potentially powerful groups 
outside of the Party structure. In Vietnam, the process of fighting the war had already 
entrenched the party in the north and following reunification, the southern state was 
subsumed into the northern party structures.  
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In both countries, therefore, the institutionalisation of the party and consolidation of its 
political power was a critical outcome of the socialist era. Yet these party states were very 
different from those created by the Leninist parties that had taken power in the much 
richer socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the USSR. The CCM and the VCP 
attempted to strengthen the formal power of the state through forms of social 
surveillance and control. However, the capacity of the party institutions to bring about 
significant social and economic transformation was constrained by the low level of 
financial and material resources under their control.  
 
The impact of socialism on the distribution of economic power in Tanzania was much 
less successful than its political impact. Given the relatively short period of socialist 
economic policies, the achievements in terms of constructing an industrial base were 
initially very impressive. In addition, capitalist differentiation was largely suppressed and 
rural society remained very egalitarian. Yet, the attempts to improve agricultural 
productivity failed. Some state-led primitive accumulation did occur through villagisation 
as land was taken from peasants to establish larger state-owned farms. To a more limited 
degree, a similar process occurred in industry. State control of industries through 
parastatal institutions and restrictions on foreign capital in Tanzania meant that the 
economic power of large foreign capitalists was significantly reduced.  
 
The expansion of state trading companies and market restrictions also limited the role of 
the Asian commercial class and petty capitalists. Yet these limitations did not remove the 
economic importance of Tanzanian Asian petty capitalists to the same extent as measures 
in other countries that adopted a more violent form of suppression such as under Iddi 
Amin in Uganda. There were still areas of economic activity that remained under the 
control of Asian Tanzanian petty capitalists. Mutually beneficial informal clientelist 
networks were constructed between those with economic power and those who held 
political power within the Party. The failure to bring about a more productive economic 
transition meant that the surplus generated by the formal economy remained constrained 
and informal economic activities became an increasingly critical source of income for 
those inside the state. It was, however, politically impossible for the Party to openly 
support a dynamic of private accumulation that would have primarily enriched non 
native Tanzanians. 
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In Vietnam, the economic transformation under socialism was much greater than in 
Tanzania. Foreign colonial capital was removed but foreign capital, largely in the form of 
aid from the USSR, played a critical role in the industrialisation process under socialism 
and Vietnam had a much larger industrial base by the end of the 1970s. The political and 
economic power of factions of the intermediate classes outside the Party, such as richer 
peasants and Chinese petty capitalists and merchants, were reduced to a much greater 
extent than in Tanzania during the period of socialism. This left a vacuum in the social 
organisation of production that was filled by lower levels of the party state and state 
owned enterprises. Yet in the South, some sections of the Chinese-Vietnamese business 
class remained and were in a position to play a role in the private sector when it re-
emerged under liberalisation. 
 
State involvement in primitive accumulation, explicitly or implicit, was a feature of the 
socialist period in both Tanzania and Vietnam. Primitive socialist accumulation was first 
discussed by Preobrazhensky in the 1920. He defined it as ‘accumulation in the hands of 
the state of material resources mainly or partly from sources lying outside the complex of 
state economy’ for example through nationalisations of existing industries and through 
the ‘plundering’ of small-scale production and peasant agriculture (Preobrazhensky 
1972). In Tanzania and Vietnam policies such as forced collectivization in agriculture and 
land reform, and nationalisation of industry were used to attempt to re-cast existing 
property relations with the intention of raising the social surplus and re-moulding the 
existing economic and political order. The Parties both attempted to limit non-state 
primitive accumulation through policies that discouraged or banned personal enrichment 
through legal and non-legal channels. While there were cases of personal enrichment 
using state channels, these were quite limited. Thus, on the eve of the collapse of the 
formative socialist political settlement some forms of accumulation had taken place 
within the state, but this had not created levels of wealth amongst people with political 
power that could be tapped into when the formal restrictions on accumulation and 
private sector investment were removed under liberalisation. 
 
Only a few decades separated the initial rapid economic transformation in the early days 
of socialism in Tanzania and Vietnam, from its ultimate economic demise starting in the 
late 1970s. Both internal and external factors led to the economic collapse of the 
formative socialist political settlement as outlined in Chapter One. The industrial growth 
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of the 1960s and 1970s petered off into stagnation and decline. Attempts to transform 
the rural economy through collectivization were resisted by small scale farmers, who 
maintained production independent from the state and subverted state imposed controls. 
The general problems that became evident across many countries that adopted socialist 
central planning are well known and relate to information (Stiglitz 1997), innovation 
(Kornai 1992) and motivation (Ellman 1979). The central planning systems in both 
countries suffered from the same limitations as other socialist centrally-planned 
economies. Yet the period of socialism was even shorter in Tanzania and Vietnam and 
their parties were more materially constrained. Ultimately, they were unable to 
sufficiently transform the underlying distribution of economic power through a 
productive transition to fulfil the aspirations for viable socialism. 
 
The failure to transform the underlying distribution of power in society also meant that 
Tanzania and Vietnam shared many similar characteristics with the clientelist political 
settlement common to other developing countries. Even under socialism, there was a 
significant degree of informality that operated through and outside the political 
institutions in managing key processes of political redistribution, primitive accumulation 
and technology rents. The level of illegality and corruption involved in these critical 
transformational processes became increasingly apparent as liberalisation progressed in 
both countries. Yet the comparative economic transition cannot be adequately explained 
in either country without considering the legacy of the attempts to construct a socialist 
political settlement for the dominant political institutions and distribution of power. 
  
 
Table 3.2: Summary of Political Institutions and Distribution of Power under the 
Formative Socialist Political Settlement 
 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
Main Political 
Institutions 
Tanzania National Union 
TANU, became the Chama 
Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) after 
the union with Zanzibar in 
1973. 
Vietnamese Communist 
Party (VCP) 
Distribution of Economic 
Power between main 
economic groups 
Foreign capital: 
Largely excluded from 
economic activities.  
 
Western aid played an 
Foreign capital: 
Excluded from economic 
activities.  
 
Aid from USSR played an 
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important role in 
investment. 
 
Domestic capital: 
Economic activities of the 
primarily Asian domestic 
commercial classes were 
restricted but segments of 
the private sector continued 
to operate. Growth in 
informal economic activities 
involving state officials and 
the remaining private 
sector. 
 
State owned capital: 
Rapid expansion of state 
ownership in industry and 
trade mainly under central 
state institutions.  
 
Peasant farmers: 
Attempt to introduce 
collective farming and land 
reform. Collectivization was 
resisted from within. 
 
Some large state farms 
established that took land 
away from small scale 
farmers. 
 
Industrial Sector: 
Expanding group of 
industrial workers as 
industrial parastatal sector 
grew. The number of 
managers across parastatals 
also grew rapidly across the 
1970s and early 1980s. 
Tensions existed between 
Party officials and parastatal 
managers. 
 
 
important role in 
investment. 
 
Domestic capital: 
Chinese commercial capital 
was restricted after 
reunification and many 
business people fled in the 
1970s. A small group 
remained in Southern 
Vietnam but with greatly 
reduced economic and 
political power. 
 
State owned capital: 
Rapid expansion of state 
ownership in trade and 
industry but much of this 
was decentralised and was 
controlled by the VCP at 
the provincial or district 
level. 
 
 
Peasant farmers: 
Economic power of richer 
farmers was reduced by 
land reform. Attempts to 
introduce collective farming 
and land reform. 
Collectivization was resisted 
from within. 
 
Industrial Sector: 
Expanding group of 
industrial workers as state 
owned industry expanded. 
The managers of these 
industries were integrated 
within the Party structures. 
 
Distribution of Political 
and Organisational 
Power Outside Formal 
Political Institutions 
Political mobilisation 
outside party institutions 
was crushed.  
 
Independent co-operatives 
and trade union movements 
Political mobilisation 
outside the party 
institutions was crushed. 
 
The war brought a large 
proportion of intermediate 
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and opposition parties were 
closed down. 
 
Intermediate class groups 
were absorbed within the 
party.  
 
Networks of state officials 
and business people were 
established and engaged in 
racketeering and subverting 
official market controls. 
class groups as well as 
peasants and workers into 
the structures of the Party. 
 
Political and economic 
power of intermediate class 
groups in the countryside 
was removed through land 
reform and party purges. 
 
Some informal economic 
networks linking Party 
officials, private sector and 
Chinese diaspora in the 
region were established and 
engaged in illegal trading 
activities. 
 
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter set out the major characteristics of the political settlement in terms of the 
political institutions and the underlying distribution of power in Tanzania and Vietnam 
during the colonial period and under socialism. Under colonialism there were a number 
of similarities in their economic and political structure. Economic power was held 
predominantly by non-indigenous groups but the bulk of economic activity involved 
small scale farming by peasant farmers. Political power in Vietnam had a long history of 
decentralisation compared to Tanzania. Colonial government attempted to graft a 
political structure onto the ‘traditional’ authority structures however new political forces 
were emerging from within the colonial state itself. The intermediate class groups that led 
the nationalist movements were smaller in number than in other developing countries 
like India or China due to the lower level of social and economic differentiation. The 
different paths of the independence struggle led to a very different distribution of power 
within the state. The war for independence left a much greater legacy of organisational 
capability within Vietnamese society and a decentralised distribution of organisations at 
lower levels of the state. In Tanzania, the more limited independence struggle had less of 
a transformative impact upon society. Under socialism, both countries attempted to 
create a new political settlement through the control of the Party over political and 
economic activities. The attempt to reorganise economic power went further in Vietnam 
than in Tanzania where more private sector activities by the mainly Asian commercial 
 124 
class continued throughout the socialist period. Land reform and economic restrictions 
in Vietnam removed much of the Chinese and Vietnamese commercial classes. Yet the 
socialist political settlement in both countries was actually much more limited than in 
other more industrialised socialist countries. The period of socialism was shorter and the 
extent to which the state could re-organise society was also more limited. These features 
of the socialist political settlement had important implications for the political settlement 
that emerged under liberalisation and the ways in which the VCP and CCM were able to 
direct the economic transition processes of political redistribution, primitive 
accumulation and industrial policy rents described in Chapter Two. 
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Chapter Four 
 
Public Finances 
 
4.1  Introduction 
 
An analysis of patterns of corruption and reform in public finances provides an 
important window into the political settlement under liberalisation in Tanzania and 
Vietnam. Public finance plays a critical function in economic growth through a multitude 
of different avenues, not least through funding the economic policies of the state, 
providing direct and indirect finance to businesses and by lowering the costs of 
production through investment in infrastructure and public services. On the revenue 
side, the tax structure is an important aspect of the incentive structure of the economy. 
Public finance also play a vital political role in maintaining political stability in the face of 
competing demands for state resources from different social groups. Through these 
activities, the state is the major source of transfers and redistributions. Many of these 
transfers occur explicitly through the official government budget. These have been 
extensively explored in conventional economics through the public choice school (see 
for example (Buchanan and Tullock 1962)) and from a Marxist perspective (for example 
(Foley 1978), (Goldscheid 1958)) in terms of the way that formal political processes 
influence public finances.  
 
Yet, for reasons discussed in Chapter Two, many other important fiscal transfers occur 
outside official budget channels away from the glare of public scrutiny (MacIntyre 2000), 
where opposition to such transfers is likely to be muted. These take the form of off-
budget expenditure where state funds are channelled outside the official budget routes, 
or through forms of corruption and even outright theft where funds are diverted from 
their official purpose, sometimes simply on the basis of greed, but at other times to meet 
politically motivated demands. Forms of corruption and political manipulation on the 
revenue side can be characterised in the same way. These informal transfers play a critical 
role in the transition processes outlined in Chapter Two, through political redistribution, 
primitive accumulation and technology acquisition. 
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Reforming public finance was a central component of the governance reform agenda 
under liberalisation in both countries. The approach to reform was based on two main 
arguments. First, according to orthodox economic theory, high public spending was the 
root cause of high inflation in both countries, particularly as it was coupled with high 
levels of government debt. Inflation and price instability constrained private sector 
investment due to uncertainty. Further, public expenditure was supposed to have 
crowded out private sector development. Conventional economic analysis, therefore, 
promoted low public expenditure and low public deficits as the route to higher economic 
growth. The second argument related to the opportunities for rent seeking that public 
expenditure was seen to open up. New Institutional Economics portrays public finance 
as a site of damaging rent seeking that hinders economic growth by diverting scarce 
resources away from efficient state expenditures. At the same time, political manipulation 
of revenue systems could lead to political lobbying for rents that may create a tax system 
that generates little revenue and inefficient economic incentives (Krueger 1974). These 
orthodox approaches provided the theoretical backbone to the reform programmes in 
public finance in Tanzania and Vietnam. 
 
During the socialist period in both countries the state budget was the main vehicle for 
transferring resources to the state owned economic sectors. State revenues were, in turn, 
dependent on transfers from state owned enterprises, aid, and concessional foreign 
funding and command lending from the central bank. Actual data on budget activities 
were highly un-transparent, to the extent that the state budget was classified as a national 
secret in Vietnam until 1997 (International Monetary Fund 1999). Where data was 
available in Tanzania it was patchy and inadequate (World Bank 2002). Decisions over 
expenditure and revenue policies took place behind closed doors away from public 
oversight. While liberalising prices was the initial focus of the reform programme in 
Tanzania and Vietnam, this shifted to macroeconomic reform and public financial 
management along the lines of the good governance agenda in the 1990s. The economic 
crisis in both countries coupled with increasing donor concern about the sustainability 
and probity of public finances triggered extensive reform programmes. These became 
central to donor conditionality. At the very heart of these reforms has been an attempt to 
redefine and constrain the role of the state in the economy.  
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In terms of public finance reform, both Tanzania and Vietnam were seen to be relatively 
successful in many areas. Both countries brought down inflation through a combination 
of price reform, changing the pattern of deficit financing, reforming the financial sector 
and the central bank and constraining direct transfers to state owned enterprises. Good 
governance type reforms also had some notable successes within the arena of public 
finance. These included increasing the transparency of the budgeting process and 
reducing corruption on the revenue and expenditure side of the budget, as well as 
extensive institutional and policy reform of the tax system. Public finances were also 
significantly decentralised in a number of areas to lower levels of the state. 
 
The success that Tanzania and Vietnam had in ring-fencing particular expenditures and 
revenues from certain forms of corruption led to investment flows increasing in both 
countries in a number of areas. In Tanzania the overall improvements in public financial 
accountability and expenditure tracking led to very high inflows of aid directly through 
the budget. Further, very generous ring-fenced fiscal incentives were introduced for 
foreign direct investment, in particular for the mining sector. The impact of these 
reforms can be seen in the higher foreign investment flows into a number of sectors. 
Yet, even as Tanzania was championed for its ‘good governance’ reforms in public 
finance, grand corruption in public finance involving senior figures within CCM and 
prominent business people continued unabated.  
 
In Vietnam, foreign direct investment and aid flowed into the country following the 
reforms. These resulted in a very high level of capital expenditure that was critical for 
achieving higher growth rates, yet much of the increase in public investment was linked 
to inefficient and corrupt projects. Rather than achieving the reform objectives of 
removing direct political influence, the growth in investment inflows through public 
expenditure and quasi public expenditure in the financial sector were driven by the 
continued power of local level politicians and SOEs to solicit finance for projects from 
the state. These off-budget investment flows strengthened the burgeoning private 
commercial activities of these groups. Thus while public finances were channelled 
towards productive investment there were also many inefficient investments that were 
mainly driven by redistributive demands. 
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The chapter starts with an outline of the perceived problems in public finance in 
Tanzania and the reforms that were instituted under liberalisation. The chapter sets out 
the successful areas of reform and the impact that these had in triggering higher inflows 
of aid and FDI, particularly into the mining sector. The chapter argues that successes in 
these areas in Tanzania relate to the construction of a centralised party structure under 
the formative socialist political settlement. The chapter then examines the cases of grand 
corruption that reform was not able to tackle. The chapter uses these cases to explore the 
processes of political redistribution and primitive accumulation at the heart of the CCM. 
The chapter then outlines the main areas of public finance reform in Vietnam. The 
chapter establishes how redistribution between the provinces occurs through public 
finances. The rise in capital expenditures both on and off budget are explored and the 
role of provincial and district VCP institutions working with SOEs is described. The role 
that the banking sector plays in public finance is set out and the consequences for 
investment decisions are discussed. Finally the chapter provides a discussion that links 
these aspects to the political settlement and the path of economic transition. 
 
 
4.2 Tanzania 
 
On the eve of reform in 1986, public finances in Tanzania were facing a number of 
difficulties. They were under strain from the war with Uganda, a series of droughts, rising 
subsidies to the parastatal sector and a shrinking economy that constrained the size of 
the tax base. The fall in revenues was exacerbated by an increasingly generous exemption 
system and widespread corruption within the tax system (Fjeldstad 2002). The ability of 
the state to finance the budget was largely dependent on the availability of foreign 
finance in the form of grants and concessional loans (World Bank 2002). When these fell 
short, the Government turned to the central bank to print money. The main mandate of 
the Central Bank at that time was to cover the shortfall of finance generated by the tax 
system. The outcome was a fiscal deficit that reached 12% of GDP by the end of the 
1970s and an inflation rate of 32% by 1986 (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). Despite the 
fact that reducing donor dependency had been a central policy aim in the 1970s, public 
finances were increasingly dependent on aid. 
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During the 1990s, donor attention firmly shifted from price liberalisation and 
macroeconomic stability to improving public financial management in line with the good 
governance agenda. There were a number of crises in the relationship between donors 
and the Tanzanian state in the 1990s focussing on public financial management. These 
pushed the state to engage in a more rigorous reform process. These crises were 
triggered by corruption scandals, primarily on the revenue side of the budget. Corruption 
within the revenue system came in various forms from petty theft and extortion 
(Fjeldstad 2002) to political corruption linked to the granting of exemptions to 
businesses. Falling tax revenues and a number of large political scandals involving 
exemptions were the primary trigger for donors withholding vital finance from the 
Tanzanian state in the 1990s.  
 
In 1995 a report into corruption and the revenue system undertaken by the Office of the 
Controller and Auditor General found that around Tshs 70 billion had disappeared from 
the revenue system. Out of this, Tshs 20 billion was identified as tax evasion by 
importers, while Tshs 50 billion was due to tax exemptions (Fjeldstad 2002). The 
exemption system was perceived to be very generous (Bigsten and Danielson 2001) and 
most of these exemptions were deemed to have been granted legally. A large minority of 
cases, however, were found to be illegitimate, involving exemptions granted to various 
businesses. The source of the illegal exemptions was traced back to the Ministry of 
Finance and the Minister of Finance, Professor Kighoma Malima was forced to resign 
(Fjeldstad 2002). A year later, another scandal involving the tax system erupted, with the 
new Minister of Finance and the Permanent Secretary at the President’s Office accused 
of granting illegal tariff rates to certain cooking oil importers, going against the rates 
declared in the National Budget (Fjeldstad 2002). Although an investigation did not 
produce concrete evidence of corruption, the Minister was forced to resign.   
 
The expenditure side of the budget was also increasingly under scrutiny as a number of 
key donors prepared to change their modalities of giving aid away from projects towards 
direct support through the budget. As well as petty pilfering of funds channelled through 
the government system, there was also corruption in public procurement and 
government awarded contracts for public works (United Republic of Tanzania 1996). In 
addition, there were problems of off-budget expenditures not accounted for to the public 
or covered in the official budget document (United Republic of Tanzania and World 
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Bank 2001). Off-budget expenditures are notoriously difficult to identify given their 
covert nature but in Tanzania some examples include loans and gifts to the ruling party 
from business people, offshore accounts and repayments of commodity import support 
funds into off budget accounts.  
 
Aid projects were also often off-budget with little monitoring by the government of 
financial transactions. While the off-budget status of this project finance was a major 
concern of the state, as reflected in the Tanzania Assistance Strategy and subsequent aid 
policy documents (United Republic of Tanzania 2002), they presented a different 
political issue from the other forms of off-budget expenditure. Most project finance was 
not under the discretion of the government but was controlled and managed by donors. 
There may, however, have been certain off-budget projects that were directly under the 
control of the state. Another area where state activities were largely kept off-budget is for 
election expenses and financing political campaigns (Thomas and Barkan 1998). While 
Tanzania provided official funding for parties on a ratio dependent on the number of 
representatives in parliament, significant funds were also channelled outside the budget 
(Thomas and Barkan 1998). The concern over widespread corruption in public finance 
and the crises in donor financing led to the commissioning of the Warrioba Report on 
Corruption under the incoming president, William Mkapa in 1995 (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1996) and a much more rigorous reform programme ensued.  
 
4.2.1 Public Finance Reforms 
 
The reform programme over twenty years was successful at improving macroeconomic 
indicators but at a heavy cost to society as these achievements were mainly the result of 
drastic expenditure cuts coupled with high levels of aid, rather than improved revenue 
performance (International Monetary Fund 2006). Initially, the reform programme had 
some impact on constraining the fiscal deficit, which by 1998 had fallen to 9%. 
Significant reductions only took place after 1996, once major changes to budgeting, 
notably a strict cash budget, had been introduced (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). After 
concerted efforts at privatisation started with the establishment of the PSRC in 1992, 
government transfers to parastatals fell from Tshs 20 billion in 1992 to Tshs 2.2 billion 
by 1996 (World Bank 2002). The cost of the civil service was also cut dramatically as the 
service was reformed and reduced in size. In addition, there were significant reductions 
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in spending on public services. As a result, government spending as a percentage of GDP 
fell from 27% in 1992 to 11% by 1998. The inflation rate was brought down from 32.4% 
in 1986 to 14.4% by 1998 (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). External debt fell over the 
1990s from 130% of GDP in 1990 to 60% in 2004 (Utz 2007). 
 
A whole raft of reform programmes were introduced as part of the good governance 
agenda in public finances. These included the Civil Service Reform Programme, the 
Public Financial Management Reform Programme, the Legal Sector Reform Programme 
and the Accountability, Transparency and Integrity Programme. As well as the 
introduction of the cash budget, which limited payments to cash availability on a monthly 
basis, a centralised payments system was instituted. Payments were extensively 
computerized through the Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS) and the 
development of a medium-term expenditure framework (MTEF). Transparency was 
increased with the establishment of the Public Expenditure Review (PER) with 
government and donor participation. The PER reviews prioritised public expenditures in 
preparation for the budget. The allocation of finance through the budget was supposed 
to be aligned to fulfilling the targets established in the Poverty Reduction Strategy and its 
successor the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty.  
 
An expenditure tracking system was put in place to reduce leakages at service delivery 
level. Further, efforts were made to put a greater proportion of the previously ‘off-
budget’ aid financed projects through the official system (United Republic of Tanzania 
2002) and by 2002/03 76% of aid flows to projects were reflected in the Development 
Budget estimates (Ministry of Finance 2003). Annual reviews by the Controller and 
Auditor General pointed to significant improvement in the financial management of the 
budget, with fewer audit queries over time (United Republic of Tanzania 2007). 
Successive Public Expenditure Reviews have also reported a fall in off budget 
expenditures (United Republic of Tanzania and World Bank 2001). 
 
Following on from the major corruption scandals that hit Tanzania’s revenue system in 
the early 1990s, the Government undertook a radical restructuring of its revenue 
authorities and oversight systems from 1996. The outcome of this was an independent 
revenue authority based on an executive agency model of revenue institution reform 
(Fjeldstad 2002). The intention was that the tax authority would then be insulated from 
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political pressure, particularly by removing all revenue collection functions from the 
Ministry of Finance. Further, the new TRA was no longer under the control of the civil 
service, thereby removing the pay and incentive constraints of civil service regulations. It 
was intended that this would provide a new incentive structure, which would attract 
qualified staff and make dismissals easier. Nearly all the staff of the agency were initially 
sacked and subsequently re-employed on different terms (Fjeldstad 2002). Following this 
extensive reform there was an initial decline in corruption and an increase in reported tad 
revenue from 11% of GDP in 1995/96 to more than 12% in 1996/97 (Fjeldstad 2002). 
However, the reforms had very little long term impact on Government revenues during 
the period under study as these only started to increase after 2005 as illustrated in Table 
4.1 below: 
Table 4.1 Tanzania: Revenue as a % of GDP 
Fiscal Year Revenue as a 
% of GDP 
1995/96  13.2  
1996/97  13.5  
1997/98  12.2  
1998/99  11.3  
1999/00  11.3  
2000/01  12.0  
2001/02  11.8  
2002/03  12.1  
2003/04  12.9  
2004/05  13.3  
2005/06  12.5  
2006/07  14.1  
2007/08 15.9 
Source:  WDI 2010 
Of more concern for the period under discussion, in the three subsequent years tax 
revenue declined as a percentage of GDP and there were reports of increasing 
corruption within the revenue authority (Fjeldstad, Kolstad, and Lange 2003).  Tax 
revenues as a percentage of GDP started to rise again after 2000 yet the tax to GDP ratio 
remained low compared to other African countries with a similar economic structure 
(Gray and Khan 2010).    
 
Tanzania continued along its trend of low tax collection, however it retained a diversified 
tax base with a high proportion of direct taxes of an average of 30% of the Government 
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Tax revenue (Di John; 2010). However Tanzania’s tax effort, calculated as the difference 
between the actual share of tax and the expected share of tax is only slightly less than 
what would be predicted, therefore suggesting that Tanzania had a reasonable tax effort 
given its economic structure. This contradicts the idea that Tanzania’s considerable aid 
dependency may reduce the tax effort, although evidence here is complicated and Gupta 
et al (2003) find that while grants appear to reduce the tax take of countries, ODA in the 
forms of loans does not impact negatively on a country’s tax effort. Towards the end of 
the period understudy, Tanzania’s Tax to GDP ratio began to improve with an increase 
from 9% in 2002 to 13% by 2007 (and to 17.2% by 2010) (AfDB 2011).  
 
The composition of Tanzania’s Government revenues is shown in Table 4.2 below: 
 
Table 4.2 Composition of Government Revenues (1996/97 – 2007/08) 
 
Fiscal 
Year 
Sales 
tax and 
VAT 
Income 
tax 
Other 
domestic 
taxes 
Import 
duty 
Excise 
duty 
1996/97 24.1% 20.2% 15.3% 15.4% 18.1% 
1997/98 24.6% 21.8% 14.3% 14.6% 18.1% 
1998/99 35.6% 21.1% 9.9% 14.2% 13.6% 
1999/00 33.4% 19.8% 8.5% 12.4% 12.6% 
2000/01 37.4% 17.7% 2.6% 11.2% 18.0% 
2001/02 38.4% 19.2% 2.6% 9.2% 18.2% 
2002/03 39.5% 20.4% 2.3% 9.4% 16.4% 
2003/04 38.6% 22.4% 2.3% 9.5% 15.4% 
2004/05 43.1% 24.5% 1.5% 6.3% 14.1% 
2005/06 41.4% 25.9% 1.5% 8.8% 12.9% 
2006/07 33.8% 27.0% 1.4% 9.4% 18.6% 
2007/08 31.7% 26.6% 2.1% 8.8% 19.1% 
       Source: ADB (2010) 
 
4.2.2 Impact of Reforms on Aid Flows 
 
The capacity of the state to institute certain ‘good governance’ type reforms in public 
finance had significant impacts on inflows of aid and FDI into the Tanzanian economy. 
Since independence, Tanzania had been a major recipient of aid, however, following on 
from the reforms to public finances aid flows increased considerably. Aid more than 
doubled in real value since the early 1990s with an increase of around 70% from 1993 to 
2003 (Lawson et al. 2005). However aid as a proportion of GDP has fallen as illustrated 
in Table 4.3 below: 
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Table 4.3 Percentage of Aid in GDP 1986 – 2008 in Tanzania 
Years % of GDP 
1986 – 1990 16.3 
1991 – 1995 19.5 
1996 - 2000 10.8 
2000 - 2008 13.7 
        Source: Nord et al (2009) 
 
 
One of the direct impacts of the improvement in the quality of public financial 
management was that aid was increasingly funding government expenditures directly. By 
early 2000, aid accounted for around 40% of total government expenditure, with over 
80% of the development budget and 24% of the recurrent budget covered by aid 
(Ministry of Finance 2003).  
 
There was also a major shift in aid modalities away from stand alone projects towards 
general budget support as well as basket support in health and education. General budget 
support involved providing finance directly to the Government to be spent in the same 
way as other government revenues through official budget channels. General budget 
support was launched in Tanzania in 2000, and by 2005 14 donors were providing 
funding through this modality with GBS accounting for almost 40% of aid (Lawson et al. 
2005). The growth in GBS generated further donor incentives to monitor the probity of 
public finances while also providing high incentives for the state to maintain the 
improvements that it had achieved in constraining certain forms of rent seeking and 
corruption within public finance. While aid to Tanzania in the past seems to have been 
dissipated without very much impact on growth, high aid flows since 1995 had a positive 
and significant effect on growth (Utz 2007) (Treichel 2005) by funding a large increase in 
public sector spending which in turn fuelled consumption (Utz 2007).  
 
4.2.3 Ring fencing of Tax Incentives for FDI 
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The other major area where the state significantly modified rent seeking within public 
finances was in the framework for attracting foreign direct investment. The changing 
regime around FDI involves a number of policy areas, not least land and technology 
policy, covered in subsequent chapters. Establishing a fiscal structure that would attract 
FDI was a central part of the public financial reform programme under liberalisation. 
The system of granting tax exemptions on VAT and customs taxes as well as special 
relief and access to tax loopholes, which act as de facto exemptions, was central to this. 
Exemptions are a form of legal rent while the ‘seeking’ process that is generated by their 
availability is often associated with political corruption. The main aims of the structural 
reform programme were to reduce the number of exemptions, to improve revenue 
collection and to reduce corruption involved in the granting of exemptions. The state 
was successful in reducing the number of exemptions overall (Levin 2005). In the first 
half of the 1990s exemptions granted by government amounted to around 46% of all 
taxes and duties (Bigsten and Danielson 2001) while by 2005 tax exemptions were at 
about 22.8% of total tax revenue (Levin 2005).  
 
The state also attempted to tighten control over the routes through which exemptions 
could be granted. There were three main ways in which tax exemptions could be granted 
in Tanzania. The first was through inclusion in the exemption schedules of the tax acts. 
This requires parliamentary approval. The most important Acts outlining the major 
exemptions for FDI were included in the Tanzania Investment Act of 1997, the Mining 
Act of 1998, the Export Processing Zone Act of 2002, and the Special Economic Zone 
Act of 2005. The second route for granting exemptions is through the issuance of a 
Government Notice (GN). Parliament does not need to approve each of these; instead 
the exemption requires signature by the Minister of Finance and publication in the 
Government Gazette. The final system for granting exemptions was through special 
clauses in the tax acts. An example of this was the Income Tax Act of 2004. The special 
clauses included in this act meant that any binding legal agreement made by the 
Government that included promises of tax exemptions had to be respected. This was 
potentially controversial, as it opened the way for different Ministries or Departments to 
claim that they were signing for the Government10. While different parts of the 
Government could still potentially award exemptions the reforms gave greater security to 
                                                 
10
 Interview, name withheld, 2008. 
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the business sector once they had received the exemption that it would not be removed 
by the government at a later date. 
 
The most important piece of legislation to address exemptions and FDI was the 
Tanzania Investment Act, which was introduced in 1997 and offered both fiscal and 
non-fiscal incentives to foreign firms investing in Tanzania. As well as the non-fiscal 
incentives (which included various guarantees of transfer rights over net profits and 
emoluments) the fiscal incentives contained in the Act clarified the exemptions which 
would be available to foreign direct investment. These included import duty and VAT 
exemption on project/capital/deemed capital goods and an import duty drawback 
scheme. The drawback scheme allowed for the refund of duty charged on imported 
inputs used for producing goods for export and goods sold to foreign institutions such as 
the UN and its agencies operating in Tanzania. For large projects over twenty million 
USD, special investor status was offered, which allowed further special incentives to be 
offered by the Government which were not explicitly covered by the Act on the basis of 
individual negotiation.  
 
The Tanzania Investment Act also established the Tanzania Investment Centre (TIC) to 
offer advice and investment incentives to foreign investors. The TIC offered exemptions 
to foreign companies meeting the requirements set up by the various acts mentioned 
above. As shown in table 4.4 below, since its establishment, there has been a shift away 
from giving exemptions directly to private sector companies and individuals and a sharp 
increase in exemptions given via the Tanzania Investment Centre, from 12.6% of total 
exemptions in 1999 to 37.4% in 2004 (Levin 2005). The TIC was seen to perform its role 
in attracting foreign investment very well and it has won four international awards for 
excellence in its services, including an award for excellence from UNCTAD in 2007. It is 
difficult to know whether the establishment of the TIC reduced the overall informal rent 
seeking costs to business in gaining an exemption. However it is likely that the 
establishment of the TIC increased business investment security by reducing the 
channels for political influence that could lead to arbitrary removal of an exemption.  
 
Table 4.4 Distribution of Exemptions (% total of exemptions) 
 
 1998/99 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 
Government Institutions 17.1 16.1 20.6 7.0 6.4 
Parastatal Organisations 2.3 2.9 1.7 3.0 9.5 
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Religious Institutions 6.0 5.2 8.2 8.8 9.6 
Non-Government 
Organisations 
27.0 19.4 15.7 33.5 25.9 
Private Companies and 
Individuals 
35.1 40.6 33.6 20.0 11.2 
Tanzania Investment Centre 12.6 15.8 20.2 27.6 37.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Customs exemptions/total 
revenue collected 
66.0 76.2 39.9 39.4 30.3 
VAT exemptions/revenue 
collected 
92.4 22.0 22.7 40.3 34.0 
Levin (2005) 
 
 
4.2.4 Public Finances and the Mining Sector 
 
Under liberalisation, some of the most generous tax exemptions were given to the 
mining sector. These were critical in attracting the large in-flows of FDI into the sector. 
The mining exemptions also received considerable criticism, however, as they have 
meant that fiscal revenues from this sector were significantly constrained. As well as 
direct exemptions, there were other forms of tax relief, such as large deductions or legal 
loopholes, which allow companies to avoid paying the full rate of tax under certain 
circumstances. The fiscal framework for the mining industry in the 1998 Act brought 
about a lowering and simplification of taxes imposed on the mining industry. As well as 
the 3% royalty on gold and other minerals, and the 5% royalty on diamonds, the 
legislation granted a 30% rate of corporate income tax and no additional taxes on profits. 
There were also very generous capital reductions and additional capital allowances 
including an indefinite carry forward of losses, no import duty or VAT on mining 
equipment, expatriate salary tax at 3% and a withholding tax on dividends is 10% 
(Ministry of Finance 2004).  
 
Table 4.5 Changes in the Fiscal Framework for Minerals 
 
Description Previous Rates (1979) Revised Rates (1998) 
Income tax 35% 30% 
Royalties 3% off gross value 
(5% diamonds) 
3% of net back value 
(5% diamonds) 
Nil for cut and polished 
gemstones (deductible for 
corporation tax) 
Depreciation allowance 40% first year then 10% annually 100% depreciation allowance is 
available on all mining capital 
expenditure 
Additional capital allowance for Nil Balance of unrecovered capital 
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unrecovered development capital 
expenditure 
expenditure on mine 
development at the end of each 
tax year attracts an additional 
15% capital allowance each year 
Withholding tax on interest 15% not deductible Nil 
Withholding tax on dividend and 
tax on distribution of branch 
profits to non-residents 
20% 10% 
Import duty and VAT on mining 
equipment and supplies directly 
related to operations 
Various rates Duty and VAT on imports of 
equipment waived until one year 
after production starts. 
Thereafter, cap limit of 5% 
import duty and 5% VAT applies 
VAT 10% (deductible) Purchase of inputs and supplies 
VAT exempt where product is 
exported 
Export duty  2% of sales value (deductible) Nil 
Losses  Losses may be carried forward 
for an unlimited period of time 
State participation Mandatory state participation No concessional state 
participation 
Stamp duty 1.2% Reduced to a minor tax 
Ring fencing Separate taxation of each mine Ring-fencing around the mining 
sector – but not within it 
Domestic withholding tax on 
goods and services supplied 
2% Nil 
Domestic withholding tax on 
goods and services purchased 
2% 2% (credited towards recipient’s 
corporation tax liability) 
Withholding tax on technical 
service payments to both resident 
subcontractors and non residents, 
also management fees 
30% 3% of gross payments or 20% of 
gross if management fees exceed 
2% of operating costs 
Accounting currencies for tax 
purposes 
Tanzania shillings US dollar or Tanzania shilling 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004) 
 
As well as these generous fiscal terms, private companies were insulated from changes in 
fiscal regimes through the Development Agreement of the 1998 Act. The Development 
Agreement established a Special Mining Licence, mainly applicable to large scale projects 
involving foreign capital, where the companies could negotiate fixed royalties, taxes, fees 
and so on, for the life of the project (Butler 2004) outside the existing public financial 
system. As Butler points out, the Development Agreement had important ramifications 
as it ‘may limit the minister’s discretion in approving special mining licences for ‘non-
entitled applications’ e.g. companies or persons not already holding prospecting or 
retention licences; it may prevent the minister from rejecting an application for renewal 
of a special mining licence or limit the grounds for refusal; it may limit the ability of the 
minister to reject an amendment submitted by a company regarding the terms of their 
special mining licence including terms such as the details of the environmental 
management plan and plans for training and employing Tanzanians’ (Butler 2004). The 
mining companies were, therefore, given enormous control over their fiscal 
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responsibilities towards the Tanzanian state and were effectively able to opt out of any 
legislation that they perceived as damaging to their commercial interests. 
 
While FDI into the Tanzanian mining sector actually started to grow from early in the 
1990s, the new mining legislation was arguably the main trigger for the rapid increase in 
foreign investment inflows to the sector. For many of the companies in the sector, it 
took a number of years for them to raise sufficient finance and start production in 
Tanzania. For example, in 1996 Ashanti Gold of Ghana acquired the mining rights to the 
gold deposits in the Old Geita Gold Mine but they had problems raising capital and 
entered into a partnership with South African owned Anglo Gold. The mine only 
became operational in 2002 and is presently the third largest mine in Africa (Lange 2006). 
The changes in the fiscal regime around mining may have given international financiers 
greater confidence to provide the required financial backing to actually start production 
in the identified mining sites in Tanzania. 
 
The public financial reforms surrounding the mining sector caused considerable political 
controversy. The widespread perception within Tanzania was that mining provided very 
little direct benefits to the people of Tanzania due to the very generous tax incentives 
and low rates of royalties. Gold accounted for more than 50% of exports and its 
contribution to GDP grew from 1.1% to 3% by 2003. Thus, while government revenues 
have increased from mining they are still relatively low and significantly behind the target 
rate of 10% of GDP (Ministry of Finance 2004). In 2003, multilateral and bilateral aid 
still accounted for 47 times more as a proportion of government revenue than mining 
(OECD; 2005) and taxes from the Tanzania Breweries Ltd were more than the fiscal 
revenues generated by Tanzania’s six largest gold mining companies combined (This 
Day; 2007). In a comparative context the current contribution of the mining sector of 
around 3% of GDP is low compared to other African countries such as Botswana where 
mining accounts for 60% of GDP, or Peru where mining accounts for around 5% of 
GDP (Lange 2006).  
 
The tax revenues generated by the mining companies from 1997 to 2003 are listed in 
table 4.4 below. The most important revenues generated by the sector should be royalties 
and corporation tax. Due to delays in production, royalty revenues only became the 
largest source of revenue from mining in 2001, before which time taxes on expatriate 
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salaries were higher than all royalty payments. Corporation tax returns remain low due to 
the generous tax relief established under the 1998 Act. In fact, the Tanzania Chamber of 
Mines (2003) reported that prior to 2003 no mine had paid corporation tax under the 
new laws. The Ministry of Finance (2004) argued that this may have related to the low 
profitability of mining firms or the fact that they had brought in considerable levels of 
capital in the initial stages of production and that in the future their tax returns would 
rise. There are, however, a number of features of the corporation tax laws as applied to 
mines that make it possible for them to potentially defer corporation tax payments for a 
considerable time to come.  
 
Table 4.6: Taxes paid by mining companies (Million shillings) 
Name 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Paye Expat Salaries 212 220 255 2,743 1,467 6,544 5,952 
Payroll Levy-Expats 28 26 29 364 226 397 524 
Paye-Expat Gratuity 0 0 0 0 243 534 1,600 
Withholding Tax 27 69 263 4,713 4,855 5,403 5,345 
Payroll Levy 4 17 92 193 601 976 706 
Veta Levy 80 80 169 302 307 315 338 
PAYE 202 325 783 1,138 5,516 3,602 3,601 
Stamp Duty 0 1 2 92 134 194 21 
Road Toll 0 0 149 320 351 580 623 
Mining Lease 32 47 112 246 275 326 185 
Royalty 433 316 929 3,724 6,180 10,553 16,070 
Import Duty 102 133 150 305 220 1,446 2,170 
 Corporate Income 
Tax 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,155 
Others 0 0 273 0 0 0 1,582 
TOTAL 1,120 1,234 3,205 14,138 20,376 30,869 39,873 
Source: Ministry of Finance (2004) 
 
In 2006, the Government launched a review of the terms offered to mining companies in 
the light of the widespread perception that the mining tax regime was too generous. The 
review commission was chaired by Dr Kibokola who had previously been involved in the 
committee that established the 1998 Act (Lange 2006). In 2006, the world's biggest gold 
mining company, Barrick, paid the Tanzanian government 7 million USD as a "goodwill 
gesture" following the government's decision to review mining contracts (Mines and 
Communities 2007). Further, three of the major foreign mining companies in Tanzania, 
Anglo Gold, Barrick Gold and Resolute Gold volunteered to waive a 15% tax allowance 
on unredeemed capital and to pay annual levies of $200,000 directly to the local 
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government authorities in their respective areas of operation prior to the completion of 
the review by the committee (this 2007).  
 
In March 2007, the review concluded that there was no basis for a change in the terms 
applicable to foreign investors in the mining sector. The generous fiscal incentives 
remained until 2010 when Parliamentarians again pushed for revisions of the tax 
framework for mining companies. The outcome of fiscal reforms for mining was that the 
state was able to provide a ‘ring fenced’ fiscal regime for the mining sector that 
guarantees it low taxes and considerable discretion in terms of avoiding government 
policies that it may see as costly, but at a high cost in terms of the sector’s capacity to 
generate revenue for the state. The reasons for this lie not only in the fact that it fits with 
the general policy direction that has been promoted by development partners and 
adopted by the state, but also in terms of who benefits from within the state by the 
generosity of the tax system around mining. Partly this related to the formal interests of 
the state as the state owned mining company STAMICO was interested in encouraging 
joint partnerships with international mining companies for new mining activities (Paschal 
2004). Outside the remit of STAMICO, some of the most senior politicians within CCM 
have a direct interest in the sector as part owners or shareholders in mining firms 
(Lusekelo 2009),(Lange 2008). Further, they may have benefitted in terms of other 
aspects of the regime around mining such as renting land to mining companies, this is 
discussed further in the next chapter.  
 
The ability of the state under liberalisation to reduce certain forms of corruption in 
public finances and to provide greater security for incentives for FDI can be related to 
features of its political settlement. Compared to other developing countries, the 
institutionalisation of the party under the socialist settlement reduced political 
fragmentation within the state. Under liberalisation, the continued strong links between 
the political elite within the party and the top civil servants enabled the state to act more 
decisively to reform areas of public finance where the pay-off in terms of aid and FDI 
inflows would be highest. It also facilitated reforms that attempted to suppress 
redistributive flows based on bureaucratic corruption and petty predation from within 
the state bureaucracy. More broadly, the institutionalisation of political competition 
within the party helped to militate against more overt conflicts in society during the 
period of liberalisation. This enabled Tanzania to maintain its peaceful reputation as 
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compared to many other African countries, and this facilitated aid flows and foreign 
direct investment into the country. 
 
4.2.5 Grand Corruption and Public Finances 
 
From the outline above, it is clear that the state appeared to be relatively successful at 
instituting certain good governance type reforms to the formal system of public finance. 
In particular, it was effective in resisting certain forms of informal redistributive demands 
and was able to clamp down on corruption and theft at the lower levels of the 
bureaucracy. Yet, even as Tanzania was being lauded as a success story of the good 
governance agenda, corruption scandals in public finances involving high level politicians 
and business people close to the CCM were beginning to surface. The corruption cases 
that subsequently came to light involved high level corruption in the exemption regime, 
corruption in public procurement, corruption and theft of public resources, most notably 
through activities at the Bank of Tanzania.  
 
Scandals involving exemptions frequently appeared in the media across the whole of the 
reform period. Even following the extensive reforms and transparency initiatives of the 
1990s, there were a number of major scandals involving the granting of exemptions to 
manufacturing firms such as the exemption granted to NIDA textile firm for the 
importation of raw materials (Chatbar 2006), these are discussed further in Chapter 6. 
The most important case of corruption in exemptions since the reforms relates to the 
mining sector and involved people within the senior ranks of the CCM. In the early 
2000s the Government was attempting to bring greater transparency to the activities of 
gold mining companies in the hope of raising more taxes from the sector. A tender was 
put out for a company to audit gold production and export. It was won by Alex Stewart 
Assayers Limited from Britain, but a few weeks later a company with a very similar name 
from the US, Alex Stewart (Assayers) Government Business Corporation was awarded 
the contract (Mirondo 2010). The company charged vastly inflated fees amounting to 
1.3bn Tshs (around 1.3 million USD) a month from June 2003 until August 2007 
(Mirondo 2010).  
 
This caused significant controversy at the time and a committee was established to 
investigate the auditing process (Mirondo 2009). After the change of President in 2005 
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and a re-shuffling of ministers and civil servants, charges were brought against two senior 
politicians and the Permanent Secretary of the Treasury in 2007. The ex-Minister of 
Finance Basil Mramba, ex Minister of Finance and of Energy and Minerals, Daniel Yona, 
and the Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, Gray Mgonja, were accused of corruption 
involving the granting of tax waivers to the gold auditing firm and contracting it at vastly 
inflated costs, with the company taking 50 million USD in fees (Staff 2010). In court, 
they were charged with abuse of authority by illegally granting the company full tax 
exemptions, which lost the Government around 11 billion shillings in tax revenue 
(Mirondo 2009). Basil Mramba was also accused of having undeclared vested interests in 
the tender, as he held part ownership of the company (Mirondo 2010). The court case 
against them was on-going in mid 2011. Both Basil Mramba and Daniel Yona were seen 
to be very close to ex-President Mkapa and the fact that they were exposed in this way 
may have related to an internal shift in power once Jakaya Kikwete came to power in 
2005.  
 
There were also a number of corruption scandals involving senior figures in the Bank of 
Tanzania. Corruption cases that were taken to court involved inflated construction costs 
for a new Bank building (This Day Reporter 2010) and illegal printing of money by 
senior officials . Probably the most serious case of corruption related to the External 
Payments Arrears (EPA) account under the Bank of Tanzania. This account was the 
Banks commercial external debt account, set up to help service the balance of payments. 
Local importers could pay into the account in local currency and foreign service 
providers could then be paid by the Bank of Tanzania in foreign currency. Later special 
measures were introduced that allowed creditors to endorse debt repayment to a third 
party (Asset Recovery Knowledge Centre 2007). After rumours started circulating on the 
internet and following pressure from development partners, the Government asked 
Ernst and Young to undertake an audit into ‘dubious payments’ to local firms that had 
been made from the account (Staff 2010).  
 
The firm identified 131 million USD that had been improperly paid to 22 local firms. 
Five major banks were also identified as having colluded in laundering the money (Asset 
Recovery Knowledge Centre 2007). Dr Daudi Bilali, the Governor of the Bank of 
Tanzania, who had previously worked for the IMF as well as advising the President of 
Tanzania, was directly implicated in authorising the payments. The firms that received 
 144 
the money belonged to a number of prominent business people with strong links to 
CCM and to senior members of CCM. Following the accusations, the Governor was 
sacked and fled to the USA where he died shortly afterwards, reportedly from cancer 
although there was much speculation in the media as to whether he had actually been 
murdered or had faked his own death (Staff 2010). The President issued an ultimatum 
that the stolen funds had to be repaid and in 2008 it was announced to the media that 
most of the money had been repaid, although who actually repaid money and how much 
remained a secret (Asset Recovery Knowledge Centre 2007). Some business people were 
later sent to prison; however the Government was accused of protecting the business 
people who had links to the CCM (Reuters 2011).  
 
The business people and politicians involved were a small clique whose names crop up 
time and time again in the cases of grand corruption in Tanzania. It includes a group of 
very successful Asian Tanzanian business people, some of whom have formal links to 
CCM, while others are business associates of senior politicians (Asset Recovery 
Knowledge Centre 2007). As described in Chapter Three, under the socialist political 
settlement the predominantly Asian business class were largely excluded from formal 
positions of power within CCM, although there were a small number of Asian Tanzanian 
MPs even during this period (Fazal 2005). Over the period of liberalisation the 
relationship between the CCM and prominent figures from the private sector changed as 
the needs for private, non state financing for CCM grew (Mmuya 1998) and the 
ideological animosity of the CCM towards private economic activity diminished. Many 
more institutionalised channels of communication between the private sector and the 
State were constructed since the 1990s such as the National Business Council, chaired by 
the President. There were also an increasing number of CCM MPs from the private 
sector, including Asian Tanzanians, such as Rostam Aziz and Mohamed Dewji who had 
major private sector companies. However, these more formalised relations were often 
built on informal relationships that had already been constructed during the socialist 
period. The on-going informal relationships between the business sector and the party 
remained very opaque but the corruption cases provide an insight into the distribution of 
power within the CCM party under liberalisation.   
 
Probably the corruption cases that had the greatest political repercussions involved large 
procurement deals. A deal with the British firm BAE for the purchase of a civil aviation 
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radar led to an international scandal when investigators from the British Serious Fraud 
Office identified the deal as significantly corrupt and BAE was forced to pay 30 million 
pounds in fines. On the Tanzanian side, the deal was brokered by a Tanzanian Asian 
business man Sailesh Vithlani and the investigators found that part of the considerable 
kick-backs paid to him by BAE were used to bribe senior government officials working 
in Mkapa’s government. The main political support came from a number of figures 
whose names were frequently associated with corruption scandals of the era including 
the Attorney General at the time, Andrew Chenge, as well as the Governor of the Bank 
of Tanzania, Dr Daud Bilali and Dr Idris Rashidi, a previous Governor at the Bank of 
Tanzania (This Day Reporter 2010). While Mr Vithlani was pursued by local courts over 
this case, the Tanzanian Prevention of Corruption Bureau was not granted consent by 
the Tanzanian Director of Public Prosecutions to prosecute other cases related to the 
affair (Tanzanian Affairs 2009). Andrew Chenge initially resigned from his position but 
was later brought back into the Cabinet by President Kikwete as Minister for 
Infrastructure Development. 
 
Similar patterns of corruption in public procurement have emerged within the energy 
sector. An early case during the reform period involved a large power supply contract 
signed in 1995 between the IPTL company and the Government. IPTL was set up by a 
Malaysian firm, Mechmar, which had been involved in energy projects in countries 
outside Malaysia before, and a Tanzanian company, VIP Engineering Ltd (VIPEL), 
which had no previous experience in energy provision but had been involved as a 
negotiator in a number of previous investment projects (Gratwick, Ghanadan, and 
Eberhard 2007). The project was controversial from the outset. No official tender was 
received for the project and it was opposed by a number of key officials within the 
Ministry of Energy and Minerals (MEM) (Cooksey 2002). At the same time the Songo 
Songo IPP was under negotiation as part of a wider project of gas production in 
Tanzania which had backing from the World Bank, EIB and SIDA. The important 
business figures in this case were a group of prominent Tanzanian business people 
whose names feature in a number of reports on other major corruption scandals. In 
terms of the political actors, it involved a number of senior CCM elected officials within 
the inner circle of the CCM, again including Andrew Chenge (Cooksey 2002). 
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In the context of extreme power shortages, the IPTL proposal was discussed by high 
level officials within the energy sector in 1994 but was rejected on the grounds that it 
could not fulfil the short term needs of electricity production, although it might be 
considered in the context of the longer term plans for IPPs within the sector (Gratwick, 
Ghanadan, and Eberhard 2007). Despite this decision, a twenty year agreement was 
signed in 1995 between the Government of Tanzania and IPTL for a 100MW diesel 
generator which would eventually be replaced by gas powered turbines once the Songas 
project had been completed. The cost was USD 163.5 million, including an Engineering 
Procurement and Construction contract (EPC) price of USD 126.39 million, and with a 
‘reference tariff' of USD 4.2 million per month plus 3.25 US cents per kWh of electricity 
actually produced. The contract stipulated that the final tariff would depend on actual 
costs incurred (Cooksey 2002). Finance for the project was eventually provided by two 
Malaysian banks, Sime Bank and Bumiputra Bank, and an informal guarantee by the 
Malaysian Government to the banks that their investment would be secure in Tanzania 
(Gratwick, Ghanadan, and Eberhard 2007). 
 
From the evidence reported in Cooksey (2002) and in Gratwick et al (2007) it is clear that 
the agreement was significantly over priced and not in the economic interests of the 
country. There were serious accusations of corruption surrounding the tendering 
process. Opponents of the project included the Commissioner for Energy when IPTL 
was first launched, Patrick Rutabanzibwa, and a number of others involved in the Energy 
sector as well as the World Bank. The attitude of senior politicians towards the project 
appeared to waver. President Mkapa was under pressure from Prime Minister Mahathir 
of Malaysia to support the deal and domestically did not want to be seen to be caving 
into what sections of the media and IPTL presented as donor pressure (Cooksey 2002). 
Cooksey reported that at one point the Tanzanian Prevention of Corruption Bureau 
(PCB) was close to pressing corruption charges over the case, although these never 
materialised. Nevertheless, the case was finally referred to the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) in 1998 and TANESCO requested the 
ICSID to consider corruption charges in 2000.  
 
Sworn statements on corruption charges were provided by the Permanent Secretary of 
MEM, the Assistant Commissioner for Energy and the Assistant Commissioner for 
Energy. Finally, however, the charges of corruption were dropped as the Government 
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failed to provide sufficient evidence within the given timeframe imposed by the ICSID. 
The Tribunal did, however, force IPTL to reduce its capacity charges to more accurately 
reflect the costs it had incurred (Gratwick, Ghanadan, and Eberhard 2007). The eventual 
outcome of this case was that, although no one was officially charged with regard to the 
allegations of corruption, Tanzania was locked into a costly twenty year agreement with 
IPTL whose charges were almost double those of the other IPP, Songas.  Gratwick et al 
(2007) point out that IPTL had the highest costs of construction per kilowatt compared 
to other independent power producers of similar size and technology in other 
developing countries. The case did little to dent the political careers of the senior CCM 
officials involved, for example Andrew Chenge was appointed onto the ethics committee 
of CCM in 2010 (Muga 2010). 
 
The second major case of corruption in the power sector was of a lesser financial 
magnitude than IPTL but the political fallout was much greater. This corruption story 
started again with the acute power shortages in 2005. In June 2005 TANESCO 
advertised a tender for emergency power supply, but in February 2006 all the proposals, 
including one from a firm called Richmond Development Company LLC (Richmond) 
that had previously been involved in a failed attempt to construct an oil pipe line from 
Dar es Salaam to Mwanza (Athumani 2008) were rejected as none of them showed 
sufficient competence and financial surety (United Republic of Tanzania 2008). The main 
political support for Richmond came from Mr Msahaba, the Minister for Energy and his 
successor Mr Nazir Karamagi as well as from the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa.  
 
Despite TANESCO’s rejection, Mr Msahaba moved all tendering to his Ministry and 
Prime Minister Edward Lowassa instructed that officials in the Ministry of Energy and 
Minerals should disqualify other bidders and award the tender to Richmond (Navuri 
2008). Thus an agreement was signed with Richmond in 2006 to provide 100 MW of 
emergency power. Problems started shortly afterwards, however, as Richmond failed to 
achieve financial backing and it was only with funds provided by the Government of 
Tanzania that it was able to bring in the generator to convert gas from Songo Songo into 
electricity as it had agreed to do (Gratwick, Ghanadan, and Eberhard 2007). Later that 
year, the Prime Minister, Edward Lowassa, intervened to ensure that Richmond’s 
contract was extended, despite contrary advice from TANESCO (United Republic of 
Tanzania 2008; BBC Correspondent 2008).  
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The on-going electricity crisis and Richmond’s failure to deliver electricity brought the 
company under scrutiny in the media in Tanzania. The contract was signed by a company 
registered in Houston, Texas. However, investigations revealed that no such private 
company was registered in Houston at the time that the contract was signed and the 
address provided was a residential address (United Republic of Tanzania 2008). Once the 
company had been traced, it turned out that the Parent company was in fact a small 
publishing company. Two Tanzanian born business men were listed as the share holders 
in the company, which had a turnover in the US of between 1,000 USD to 499,000 USD 
per year (Athumani 2008). By the end of 2006, Richmond was facing extreme difficulties 
in fulfilling its commitment to produce electricity and it approached Dowans, which 
operated in South Africa, but was registered in the UAE, to take over the contract 
(Gratwick, Ghanadan, and Eberhard 2007). While the acute power shortages that 
inspired the original Richmond contract had diminished it was revealed that the 
government was paying the company 100,000 USD a day despite non performance (BBC 
Correspondent 2008). 
 
Concerns about irregularities in the tendering process led to an investigation by the 
Prevention of Corruption Bureau, which announced that they had found no evidence of 
corruption. Nevertheless, within a few months a Parliamentary Commission was set up 
by Samuel Sitta the Speaker of Parliament to investigate the Richmond saga (United 
Republic of Tanzania 2008). It concluded that there had been corruption in awarding the 
contract to Richmond. As a result, the Prime Minister Edward Lowassa tendered his 
resignation as did Mr Msahaba and Mr Nazir Karamagi. While Lowassa himself had 
previously been removed from his position over a corruption scandal involving land 
under President Mwinyi (BBC Correspondent 2008), it was unprecedented for such 
senior members of CCM to resign over a corruption scandal. The scandal nearly reached 
the door of the President (Staff 2009) but in the end the party pulled together to stop any 
further outcry. The full political fall-out from the case was limited as the government 
issued a response to the report which exonerated all politicians and senior civil servants 
from wrong-doing. The only people that were prosecuted in this case were the owners of 
the Richmond company itself. The implication of these cases of corruption within public 
finances for the political settlement and transition are discussed in 4.4 below. 
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4.3 Vietnam 
 
When Doi Moi was introduced in 1986, Vietnamese public finances were in disarray. 
Prior to the reforms, the public finance system had been based on the Soviet model of 
direct control of resource allocation, incomes and prices(Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003) 
with the transfer of an agreed surplus from state enterprises to the central state. Public 
finance  was redistributed to lower levels of the state based upon on-going negotiations 
between the provinces and the centre with the intention that richer provinces would 
transfer resources to poorer provinces (McLure and Martinez-Vazquez 1998). Lower 
levels of the state had considerably more discretion over the use of state resources than 
in many other centrally planned economies. One of the reasons for this was that under 
central planning there were substantial financial gaps in the central plans that had to be 
made up by local funding from provincially managed state owned enterprises (Malesky 
2003). This strengthened the already existing tendency for local public finance 
independence due to the war as outlined in Chapter Three.  
 
In addition to domestic resources, for most of the 1980s Vietnam was heavily dependent 
on Soviet aid. Soviet aid made up about 10 percent of GDP and covered more than 40 
percent of the government budget and 75 percent of total public investment at its peak 
in the mid-1980s (Forsberg and Kokko). On the expenditure side, large transfers to 
underperforming SOEs were a significant drain on public finances. In fact, transfers 
from the state to SOEs were larger than the transfers from SOEs to the state (Ngu 
2002). Inflation spiralled out of control, leading to an inflation rate of over 700% in the 
mid 1980s (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). The collapse of government revenues as the 
economy declined and Soviet aid dried up led to a squeeze across the system of public 
finance. Local authorities responded to this by increased reliance on illegally generated 
revenues at the local level. This involved various illegal practices such as the sale of 
goods above official state prices or the manipulation of other state owned assets for 
private gain (Beresford and Phong 2000). Tensions, therefore, existed even at this stage 
between the centre and lower levels of the state over the control of public finance. Apart 
from these activities, there is very little information in the public domain about 
corruption within the state during this period, given the secrecy and media control that 
existed at the time. 
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The reforms ushered in by Doi Moi were initially focussed on price and trade reform. 
Macroeconomic stabilisation policies included tighter credit policies, enhanced revenue 
collection and a reduction in subsidies to SOEs. The monopolistic role of the Central 
Bank was reformed in 1991 and a two tier banking system was established with its 
commercial activities being split from its macroeconomic management role. These 
reforms had a large impact on reducing the rate of inflation, which fell to 67% by 1991 
(Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). As the 1990s progressed, macroeconomic stability was 
achieved and the reform programme moved from a focus on price liberalisation and 
inflation towards the quality of public financial management. Public finances for most of 
the reform period were still undertaken largely behind closed doors with a very low level 
of transparency. Moves towards increasing transparency were only launched in 1998, the 
year that the Government published the first fiscal out turn for the previous year, 1997, 
and the approved budget for 1999, but with highly aggregated data (Allen et al. 1999). 
Statistical data on public finances from the Government Office of Statistics only became 
available from 2000.  
 
The State Budget Law of 2002 increased the degree of transparency and following this, 
the Ministry of Finance State Budget Department produced consolidated operations of 
the state budget, published after 18 months, covering all four levels of government: 
central, provincial, district and commune (eStandards Forum 2008). Notwithstanding 
these changes, budget transparency remained extremely low (eStandards Forum 2008). 
However, there was growing awareness of corruption within public finances through 
court cases, the national and international media and donor funded studies. An Anti-
Corruption Management Unit was established, which produced the Government’s Anti 
Corruption Strategy in 2005. Bureaucratic corruption and petty theft of public resources 
were identified as major problems within public finances (Anti- corruption Management 
Unit 2005). On a larger scale, there were increasing reports of public procurement deals 
and investment projects linked to grand corruption (Asian Development Bank 2005) and 
a number of high profile corruption cases went to court in Vietnam in the reform period. 
These are discussed further below. 
 
The State responded to the perceived growth in corruption within public finance by 
launching a Public Administration Reform Master Plan in 2001. This covered the main 
elements of good governance within public financial management. Many facets of the 
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reform programme were similar to those implemented in Tanzania, under the tutelage of 
the donor community, particularly the World Bank. The Government introduced an 
Integrated Financial Management System (IFMS), a GFS-based functional classification 
budget system and moved towards the introduction of a Medium Term Expenditure 
Framework. Other areas of reform included increasing transparency, separating and 
clarifying the powers of different arms of the state in the budget process, decentralisation 
to local People’s Committees and People’s Councils and devolution of control over 
allocations to spending units.  
 
The push of the reform programme was both to increase fiscal decentralisation in line 
with good governance principles and to achieve greater clarity in terms of the 
accountability of different parts of the central state for different parts of the budget. In 
terms of the central state, the Ministry of Finance was designated the lead agency in 
preparing the budget but centralised control of the budget was weakened by the fact that 
in reality other parts of government continued to play an important role in setting 
expenditure. In practice, the Ministry of Finance controlled the Current Budget while the 
Ministry of Planning and Investment controlled the Capital Budget. Departments of the 
MPI at lower levels also prepared the Public Investment Program and the investment 
budget, including capital expenditure and donor funds (World Bank 2009). The National 
Assembly was given a strengthened role of oversight and review of the budget and 
formally the ultimate responsibility for the execution of the budget was given to the 
Prime Minister.   
 
Along side this attempt to clarify the role of the central state in the budget, a process of 
fiscal decentralisation was also undertaken after Doi Moi. This was one of the hallmarks 
of the reform process (World Bank 2009). The degree of fiscal decentralisation, both in 
terms of revenue and expenditure, was considerable. The sub-national government share 
of total expenditures increased from 26% in 1992 to 48% in 2002 (Socialist Republic of 
Vietnam and World Bank 2005). In 1996, the State Budget Law constituted the first 
attempt at providing a legal and publically available framework for government finance 
and fiscal relations between the centre and lower levels of government. This law was 
modified in 2002 with the approval of revised laws that strengthened fiscal 
decentralisation and increased transparency in budgetary processes, as well as introducing 
a number of administrative reforms.  
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The new formula for the redistribution between centre and localities was designed to 
impose greater transparency and predictability within the budget process. The transfers 
between the provinces and the centre were fixed for three years. Within the budget three 
types of revenue were defined: first, taxes that accrue just to the central level. These 
included export and import taxes, VAT and excises on imports, taxes and other revenues 
from the petroleum industry, and corporate income tax on enterprises with uniform 
accounting.  Second, there were taxes assigned totally at the provincial level. These 
include land and housing taxes, natural resource taxes (excluding those on petroleum 
activities which still accrue to the centre), license tax, tax on transfer of land use rights, 
fees on land use, land rent, revenues from the leasing and sale of publicly owned 
dwellings, registration fees and most other fees and charges. Finally, there were shared 
taxes between central and provincial government. These included all VAT receipts with 
the exception of VAT on import goods, corporate income tax with the exception of 
receipts from enterprises under the whole-unit accounting system, personal income tax, 
special consumption tax on domestic goods and services, gasoline and oil fees.   
 
As well as greater control over revenues at lower levels of the state, the reform process 
also further decentralised control over expenditures. As described above, the local and 
provincial levels have long had considerably more control over expenditure than in many 
other centrally planned economies, particularly over capital expenditure (McLure and 
Martinez-Vazquez 1998). While the central government remained in control of very large 
investment expenditures, whose impact was beyond the province, provincial 
governments took charge of other capital investments. Provincial and local governments 
were also permitted to establish off-budget financing mechanisms for capital projects and 
to modify fiscal policy, in certain respects, in order to attract FDI. 
 
4.3.1 Outcome of Public Finance Reforms 
 
The reform programme in public finances was very successful at bringing a number of 
macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation, under control and at bringing down 
subsidies to SOEs over time (Warner 2001). Probably the most remarkable feature of 
public finances over the period, however, was the increase in on-budget revenues and 
expenditures. This was in striking contrast to Tanzania where revenues and expenditures 
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were severely squeezed during the initial period of reform. Between 1998 and 2003, total 
government spending rose at the remarkable average annual rate of 16% (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and World Bank 2005).    
 
The driving force behind the increase in overall expenditure was the rapid rise in capital 
expenditure. Growth in capital expenditure outpaced growth in recurrent expenditure 
and capital expenditure grew faster than the increase in total public expenditure (Thanh 
et al. 2008) with capital expenditure growing at 20% between 1995 to 2005 (Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam and World Bank 2005). Local expenditure as a proportion of total 
expenditure grew until 2003 (Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007). The picture of capital 
expenditure was not, however, fully captured in budget data as there was also a very rapid 
rise in off-budget capital investment projects, which form a part of public investment 
figures, but not of state expenditure. These were reflected in very high investment rates 
in Vietnam, which were driven, for the most part, by public rather than private 
investment (International Monetary Fund 2007).  
 
Reforms of public finance, however, did little to reduce the perception that corruption 
related to public finance remained high under liberalisation (Gainsborough, Dang, and 
Tran 2009). One of the critical areas that seemed largely to have been untouched by the 
good governance type reforms was corruption associated with capital investment 
spending of the state (Asian Development Bank 2005). While only a few of the cases of 
corruption associated with capital investment spending have been exposed in the media 
or taken to trial, let alone successfully prosecuted, estimates put losses from corruption 
involving infrastructural investment projects at between 5 – 40% (Asian Development 
Bank 2005) and surveys place corruption in public construction projects as the second 
most corrupt area of state activity, after land (Dang 2008). The magnitude and speed of 
the growth in capital expenditures reflected the nature of a rapidly industrialising 
economy. Capital investment was driven by economic growth and fuelled growth in turn 
(International Monetary Fund 2007). Sources of finance for investment included on-
budget increases in revenue generated through the tax system and increases in foreign 
financing, much of it on concessional terms. Finance for investment has also flowed in 
from off-budget sources. Some of this was recycled aid funds channelled through off-
budget investment vehicles, while other sources included the banking system which acted 
as a semi-fiscal channel of finance to SOEs and local government.  
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In terms of on-budget revenue, the rise in domestic revenue was a huge success of the 
reform process in Vietnam. The reforms reduced inflation while not constraining the 
economy. Early economic take-off in oil exports as well as rice and marine exports and 
increased capital inflows were the most important contributors to the increasing budget 
resources (Weeks 2001). Although Vietnam was one of the top 5 recipients of ODA in 
the world, the share of ODA in the national budget declined from 23.9% in 2000 to 
7.1% in 2008 (Cox et al; 2011).  
 
Unlike the situation in many other developing countries undergoing structural 
adjustment, government on-budget expenditure and revenue grew across the reform 
period as the economy grew. The changing structure of the economy meant that there 
was a shift away from dependence on SOEs towards greater revenue collection from 
foreign firms and the private sector, although the SOE sector remained the largest 
revenue contributor. Revenue from foreign enterprises rose rapidly from 10.2% in 2000 
to 18% in 2007, while revenue from domestic private sources increased from 12.5% to 
17.9%. The other dramatic change in the structure of domestic revenue was the increase 
in revenue generated by land and houses, from 6.1% of total domestic revenue in 2000 to 
19.5% in 2007 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 2011). It is important to note 
however, that these resources were not generated from a modern property tax but mainly 
from fees generated from land transactions and sale of government land as well as one-
off land use charges. These resources represented a one-off source of revenue for the 
state. In fact, in terms of revenues generated from property tax, Vietnam is in line with 
other developing and transition countries in that it struggled to implement an effective 
progressive modern property tax. Despite the appeal of this form of taxation, property 
taxes in developing and transition economies raise revenues of an average of around 
0.6% of GDP (Bahl and Martinez-Vazquez 2007) In Vietnam, the Tax on Buildings and 
Land, which is the land tax that approximates to a sustainable property/land tax only 
generated about 2.58% of land-based revenues and represented just 0.06% of GDP from 
1996 until 2008 (Loan and McClusky 2010). The role of land taxes is discussed further in 
Chapter 5 page 178).  
 
Overall, since the first published data by the GSO in 2000, the contribution of domestic 
revenue to total government revenue remained stable at just over 50%. Oil revenue 
accounted for around a quarter of domestic revenue over the same period, custom duty 
contributed around 20%, while grants recorded in the budget as revenue accounted for 
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around 2% of total revenue. The composition of government revenues shown in table 
4.7 below: 
 
      Table 4.7: Vietnam Composition of Government Revenues  
(% share of revenues) 1998 – 2002 
 
Type % of 
Revenue 
Oil Revenue 26.5 
Trade Taxes 13.1 
Consumption Taxes 21.1 
Corporate Income Tax 12.8 
Other taxes   7 
Non-Tax revenue and grants 12.4 
     Source: IMF (2006) 
 
 
 
 
While revenue from state owned enterprises continued to be the largest contributor, this 
declined from 42.6% in 2000 to 28.0% in 2007 (General Statistics Office of Vietnam 
2011). In contrast, over the 1990s, around a quarter of total state revenue came from 
SOEs and two thirds of these were generated by the largest 200 SOEs (Painter 2003). In 
fact the return from SOEs was concentrated even further than this, with the largest 
contributor, the state owned oil and gas company, Petrovietnam, accounting for a very 
large proportion of the tax collection of the state (Socialist Republic of Vietnam and 
World Bank 2005).  
 
The second source of increased funds for capital investment was the great increase in 
concessional foreign financing and aid (International Monetary Fund 2007). Concessional 
financing from IFIs has played a major part in increasing budget revenues since the 
reforms, with Vietnam becoming the World Bank’s largest recipient of funds (Forsberg 
and Kokko). Such finance covers state expenditure through a number of different 
channels. In some cases, these resources are channelled directly for investment projects 
that form part of the capital budget of the state. In other cases, foreign financing is 
recycled through on-lending to various investment vehicles that are off budget, such as 
the Development Assistance Fund. These are discussed further below. The third source 
of capital investment related to changes to the financial system. These increased the 
availability of off-budget resources from state owned banks that acted as semi-fiscal 
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channels of financing for capital expenditure. Changes that allowed local government to 
raise investment finance through investment bonds also increased funds for capital 
investment at the provincial level (Socialist Republic of Vietnam and World Bank 2005). 
 
In certain respects, the reforms to public financial management have enhanced 
transparency around the capital expenditure of the state, in that investment projects on 
the official budget records are now open to some degree of public scrutiny. Yet during 
the reform period there was also a huge increase in off-budget funding for state capital 
projects and many of the investment projects, both off and on budget, were mired in 
corruption that seems not to have been dented by the reform programme (World Bank 
2009). Many of the grey and illegal activities associated with capital investment were 
linked to redistributive demands and primitive accumulation activities from within the 
state. Despite numerous attempts to reduce corruption associated with this aspect of 
public finance, the VCP was quite ineffectual at stopping a large number of investment 
projects that not only involved corruption allegations and scandals but were also 
questionable in terms of their economic efficiency (Thanh and Dapice 2009).  
 
4.3.2 Corruption Associated with On-budget Capital Expenditures 
 
This section outlines the types of corruption associated with the huge increase in capital 
expenditure in the budget, how this helps to explain the distribution of power, and its 
implications for the economic transition under liberalisation. On-budget expenditure 
increases were driven by the state undertaking large infrastructure investment projects. 
There were a number of cases of grand corruption at the central level which were 
associated with these large public investment projects. Exposure of senior politicians to 
allegations of corruption was still very tightly controlled. While there were often rumours 
linking senior central politicians to local corruption cases that were taken to court, there 
were very few cases where the links were made formally (Gainsborough 2003). An 
example of this is the PMU 18 corruption case that was widely followed in the media 
(McKinley 2009). In 2005 it emerged that the head of a Project Management Unit (PMU) 
within the Ministry of Transport responsible for road and other large infrastructure 
projects was being investigated for corruption over the use of aid funds. Investigations 
led to the downfall of the Minister and arrest of the Deputy Minister for Transport, 
although charges against him were eventually dropped. Commentators argued that the 
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reason that this case was allowed to be exposed in the media related to high level political 
manipulation just prior to the elections for the new VCP Central Committee, for which 
both politicians were standing at the time (McKinley 2009).  
 
At the provincial and district level, politicians involved in corruption are more regularly 
exposed (Gainsborough 2003). For example, cases that were followed in the media 
included a case where the former director of the Ho Chi Minh City Department of 
Transport was accused of accepting bribes from a Japanese construction consultancy 
company (Duc 2009). Corruption in construction projects in one province, Thanh Hoa, 
from 2000 to 2006 involved huge losses to the state and implicated a number of 
provincial level institutions and individuals (Dang 2008). There was considerable 
evidence in the public domain of on-going corruption surrounding public investment 
projects throughout the period of liberalisation (World Bank 2009).  
 
In reality, the local and central levels were often inextricably linked in these deals. Many 
of the investment projects were undertaken at the request of provincial governments 
based on regional development plan proposals and then developed by SOEs and 
provincial governments in partnership (Thanh et al. 2008). The central Government had 
a critical role in giving consent to the largest of these investment projects, yet in many 
cases there were political pressures for the investment from below to which the state 
succumbed. One reason for these political pressures at the central level was the political 
power that different provinces hold over the central decision making process. For 
example, an important feature of the state’s infrastructure investment was that the 
projects were scattered across the country in both rich and poor provinces. This suggests 
that having the political influence to attract central investment in large infrastructure 
projects was not simply a function of the economic strength of the province but may 
have depended on political influence within the party structures. Such decision making is 
not transparent but the fact that major investment projects have been allocated along 
grounds which appear not to be efficient suggests that the political influence of 
provincial governments relates to other factors, such as the influence of the leaders of 
the provinces within the party. Thanh and Dapice present evidence that ‘a 
disproportionate number of infrastructure projects … are economically non-viable but 
approved under political pressure with inflated costs.’ (3; 2008). 
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The pattern of these redistributive demands relates to the construction of the political 
settlement, as outlined in Chapter Three. The structures of the VCP were 
institutionalised in the course of fighting the war. During the war, provincial level party 
structures gained a high level of independence from the central party institutions. 
Patterns of political influence within the party structures were created at this time as 
some provinces produced leaders who played important roles during the war and held 
considerable influence within the party. This distribution of power survived under 
liberalisation.  The on-going impact of the war on the distribution of power within the 
party was reflected in the difficulty that Southern politicians had in entering the top 
power ranks within the VCP (Malesky 2008). Over the period of liberalisation there was 
a slow shift away from this as the economic power of different provinces diverged. By 
the mid 1990s, the Party Chairs of the high growth cities, Hanoi and HCMC, had been 
promoted into the Politburo (Gainsborough 2003). 
 
Possibly the best known examples of large scale on-budget investment projects with 
dubious economic rationale have been the construction of a number of oil refinery 
plants. The first oil refinery was proposed for construction at Dung Quat. Construction 
of the refinery took much longer than initially planned, mainly because the required 
foreign financing was not forthcoming (Energy Information Administration 2007). The 
main reason for this was that there were serious concerns about the location of the 
proposed refinery as it was more than 600 miles from Vietnam’s main oil field at Bach 
Ho and far from the population centres at Hanoi and HCMC. Construction finally began 
in 2005 (Thanh and Dapice 2009).  
 
The political influence of Vietnam’s state owned oil company can partly explain the 
Party’s commitment to building these oil refineries at huge public cost. The state oil 
company, PetroVietnam held a monopoly position in all segments of Vietnam’s oil and 
gas industry. It was also the single largest contributor of taxes to the state, in 2007 it 
contributed 31% of total state budget revenue and in 2008 it accounted for 18% of 
Vietnam’s exports (Staff 2009). Yet, the influence of PetroVietnam is not the full story. 
Another political dynamic related to the fact that that Dung Quat is situated in a poor 
province that had been the birth place of Ho Chi Minh. Leaders from this province were 
given a high status within the VCP given their historic role in the independence struggle. 
Two further oil refineries are currently under construction, one at Nghi Son in the north 
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of the country, which is closer to users but very far from the main oil producing areas, 
and the third at Vung Ro in Southern Vietnam (Energy Information Administration 
2007). Both provinces were relatively poor but could exercise significant political power 
within the party structures based on the distribution of power that was established under 
the formative socialist political settlement.   
 
Another factor that facilitated transfers from the centre to poorer provinces through 
capital projects was the centralised control over oil and aid revenues. The fact that the 
centre had control over high levels of revenue from these sources meant that the political 
pressure to take resources from richer provinces to support poorer ones could be 
minimised, while at the same time meeting the aspirations of the poorer provinces for 
capital investment. The proposal to construct 100 deep sea ports is an example of the 
political influence of poorer provinces on central investment decisions. These were 
proposed by provincial level party institutions working with provincial level SOES. The 
central Government agreed to these investments despite evidence that building a major 
port in nearly every province lacked economic rationale.  Thanh and Dapice (2009) argue 
that this decision was a result of political pressure to invest heavily in under developed 
areas to eliminate the gap between richer and poorer provinces. The impact on 
Vietnam’s economic transition under liberalisation of investment flows determined by 
demands for redistribution is discussed in section 4.4 below. 
 
4.3.3 Off-budget Funds and the Relationship between SOEs and VCP 
Institutions 
 
The patterns of corruption surrounding capital expenditure and the inappropriate 
allocation of investment expose a complex relationship between the centre and lower 
levels of the state in Vietnam. As well as investment projects being driven by demands 
on the central state from poorer provinces, another dynamic emerged where provincial 
governments and SOEs co-operated to attract significant capital expenditure 
independently of the central state. The political dynamic that drove these increased 
expenditures related to the power of local and provincial level officials to leverage 
finance to support their own burgeoning private or quasi-private economic interests. 
Many of these activities involved political redistribution and forms of primitive 
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accumulation as they involve the exercise of political power to manipulate formal, official 
and market based processes.  
 
The level of capital expenditure during liberalisation was actually much higher than was 
officially recorded in the state budget. In reality, much of the finance was shifted off-
budget. Some off-budget funding was relatively transparent and the extent to which such 
funds could be considered as part of the fiscal system was open to different 
interpretations. The question of whether other more explicitly ‘political’ funds were 
hidden and were fully under the control of the political elite is not known and would be 
difficult to explore, given the closed nature of the VCP. Off-budget expenditure, which 
was left out of the official budget record of capital expenditure, included extra budgetary 
funds such as the Social Security Fund, Enterprise Restructuring Fund, Development 
Assistance Fund, Export Support Fund, local development funds and the Sink Fund (for 
the repayment of  loans). Many of the banks that had officially become commercial 
banks also continued to be involved in policy based lending influenced by their formal 
and informal links to the party. IFIs pushed for further separation between policy based 
lending and commercial lending and pointed to the risk of macroeconomic instability 
generated by the fact that so much lending that was essentially state directed was kept 
off-budget (Biallas and Dan 2008). In reality, the distinction between off-budget and on-
budget liabilities of these funds and banks was blurred in Vietnam, as in other countries, 
given that state interventions to re-capitalise banks and funds in the face of high levels of 
non-performing loans would by default bring off budget loans back on budget by 
default. The attempts by the state to minimise the impact of non-performing loans by 
these funds and banks is discussed on p 149 below. 
 
A significant feature of public finance after reform was that despite the fall in on-budget 
subsidies to SOEs, they continued to attract a very high level of state subsidy for various 
forms of investment through these off-budget investment vehicles. SOEs in partnership 
with provincial and local party leaders were able to maintain, and even expand, their 
activities over the period despite the formal commitment by the VCP to cut subsidies to 
SOEs. The financial institutions mentioned above and many state owned banks acted in 
a semi-fiscal role by channelling public resources to investment projects which, in the 
end, fulfilled the commercial aims of these organisations (Du 2005). Provincial and local 
party structures played a pivotal function in this process. Provincial and district Party 
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Committees worked closely in a tri-partite relationship with SOEs and financial 
institutions to attract high levels of capital investment. The increasing power of 
provincial level governments over public finance had divergent outcomes. Some 
provinces used these powers to raise significant resources off-budget and attract high 
levels of capital flow, while attempts in other provinces to manipulate public finance to 
attract higher capital inflows failed. The characteristics of successful versus unsuccessful 
provinces in attracting capital inflows are discussed further in Chapter Six.  
 
One of the largest sources of off-budget finance for capital projects undertaken by 
provincial governments and SOEs was the Development Assistance Fund (DAF). The 
DAF was wholly owned by the state and it was actually the largest financial institution in 
Vietnam, managing assets equivalent to 14% of Vietnam’s GDP in 2005 (Loi 2006). 
However, similarly to other investment funds, it was not under the control of the State 
Bank of Vietnam (Du and Kien 2005). The DAF was created in 1999 after policy lending 
through SOCBs was formally abolished. The main tasks of the DAF were to mobilise 
funds for economic development and to provide finance for long term investment 
projects in eligible sectors. Since 2002, it has also been involved in short term export 
support (International Monetary Fund 2007). Further, it acts as the main agent in 
disbursing and collecting on-lent funds from ODA. The DAF had 61 branch offices 
across the country and a head office in Hanoi. At a local level, the DAF carried out loan 
appraisals and servicing functions as well as mobilising corporate deposits in the local 
market and managing trust funds for large investment projects in the area. DAF local 
branches worked closely with local government and in 11 regions they managed the 
development funds that were established by chairmen of local People’s Councils, which 
are funded from local revenues (International Monetary Fund 2006). 
 
Control of the DAF was ultimately vested in the Prime Minister but it operated under 
the supervision of the Ministry of Finance. All of DAFs operations were kept off budget, 
except the interest subsidy provided by the State (International Monetary Fund 2006). A 
major source of off-budget finance to SOEs was through the DAF to SOE’s undertaking 
investments deemed to be of ‘strategic importance’. In fact, around 70% of the total 
number of projects financed by DAF were channelled through SOEs (International 
Monetary Fund 2006). Funds to be on-lent through DAF were mobilised from ODA 
sources and domestically through borrowing from pensions and social funds such as the 
 162 
Vietnam Social Insurance fund, Post Office savings through the system of Vietnam Posts 
and Telecommunications Group and the issuance of government bonds. Policy lending 
through DAF expanded very fast. Lending was based on plans submitted by Ministries in 
priority sectors. The DAF has invested in numerous large scale projects such as the 
Vietnam National Shipbuilding Corporation, Son La Hydro-power project and the 
Haiphong Cement Project but most of its investments were in transport infrastructure 
(Socialist Republic of Vietnam and World Bank 2005). 
 
Officially, the percentage of non-performing loans was very low at around 2%. However, 
the IMF (2006) argued that this is likely to be a serious underestimate given that the 
Fund was relatively recently established and that the General Director had considerable 
discretion over extending and rescheduling outstanding loans. There was also little direct 
scrutiny of the Fund. The first external audit was performed by the State Audit of 
Vietnam (SAV) in 2003 but their findings remained unpublished (International Monetary 
Fund 2006). This meant that the DAF was operating with very little public scrutiny of 
the type promoted by the good governance reform agenda. The DAF channelled 
resources for investment based on demands emanating from the politically powerful 
coalition of provincial party officials and SOEs.  
 
Thus, more important than the official status of the DAF and other development funds 
as off-budget financing institutions was the fact that their lending decisions appeared to 
be influenced by informal political processes outside the official mechanisms established 
for project approval as described below. In Vietnam, the rapid pace of economic 
transition and the power of politicians at the provincial level and below meant that 
demand for investment finance was greater than what the central state wanted to, or 
could, provide. The demand for investment finance from below fuelled the creation of 
local investment vehicles that inhabited a grey area in terms of their position within 
public finance. As well as the DAF, there were other local off-budget sources of finance 
for capital projects. In total, there were 13 non DAF local investment funds and the 
DAF at HCMC and Dong Nai had their own staff and were administered independently 
from the central DAF (International Monetary Fund 2006). These became increasingly 
important for provincial and city level investment strategies as the growth rate of 
transfers from the centre to the provinces fell. One way round dependence on the centre 
for transfers was for provinces to borrow from banks, and HCMC was even allowed to 
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issue bonds (Rosengard et al. 2007). With the introduction of the State Budget Law of 
2002, provincial governments were given the right to borrow domestically without 
requiring further approval from the central state. Districts and communes were not 
allowed to borrow, but provinces relied increasingly on borrowing to cover not just 
capital investment but also their recurrent expenditure on a regular basis (Hani and 
Huyen 2004).  
 
Provincial governments were very dependent on assistance from the central state to 
cover their planned expenditure: 28 out of 33 provinces depended on the central state to 
cover over 50% of their total planned expenditure in the early 2000s (Hani and Huyen 
2004). The fall in central transfers compared to rising local expenditure meant that there 
was a growing fiscal gap at the provincial level. While the richer provinces provided an 
input into the revenue collection of the central state and were allowed to keep a 
proportion of revenue collection above this amount, this still did not cover their 
increased capital expenditure, particularly in the case of the fastest growing provinces and 
of cities such as HCMC.  
 
HCMC’s size enabled it to engage in more creative ways of raising finance, as well as 
using the investment vehicles discussed above. For example, it was the first city or 
province to issue a municipal bond and it also used Build-Operate-Transfer Mechanisms, 
and city land plus private construction packages for many infrastructure projects 
(Rosengard et al. 2007). Growth in spending outpaced growth in revenue within HCMC 
and the city increasingly depended on forms of off-budget investment. Rosengard et al 
(2007) estimated that around 80% of total capital mobilised for investment in HCMC 
was generated through off-budget resources. At the local level, off-budget resources were 
generated through the credit system, for example, through the investment vehicles and 
state-bank relations discussed below. Yet HCMC’s official debt statistics excluded the 
city’s considerable contingent liabilities, incurred through its explicit and implicit 
guarantees of off-budget borrowing not only by the provincial level Party Committee but 
also by local government entities at the district level.  
 
The HCMC Investment Fund for Urban Development (HIFU) and the Thu Thiem 
Urban Development Project Management Unit were two city owned financing entities 
that played a similar role to the DAF in terms of providing semi-fiscal off-budget 
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resources, but entirely at the city level. The HIFU was established in 1997 with a board 
of directors and management separate from the local and provincial state, while at the 
same time being under the ultimate control of the People’s Committee of HCMC. It was 
given the task of financing urban infrastructure development projects and the 
infrastructure for industrial parks presented in the City’s development plans (Thanh 
2008). The control of the fund was closely linked to the city’s political structure. While 
there was supposed to be central influence over the Fund, the central level was 
represented on the board by a member from the city level office of the State Bank of 
Vietnam and by the city department of the Ministry’s Bureau of Investment and 
Development. Thus the board was entirely made up of individuals whose positions 
depended on the political dynamics of the Party within HCMC. On establishment of the 
HIFU, all outstanding loans made by the Ministry of Finance in HCMC were transferred 
to the HIFU, effectively placing outstanding debt off the official state budget records.  
 
The HIFU played an extensive role in funding investment projects and from 1997 to 
2005 it lent around USD 190 million for around 200 projects (Rosengard et al. 2007). 
Further, HIFU arranged for co-financing with banks and insurance companies of USD 
88 million for another 40 projects. It also engaged in direct investment, which totalled 
around USD 9.8 million (Thanh 2008). The types of direct investments that were 
undertaken by HIFU involved buying stakes in equitized SOEs and in activities in the 
real estate market, such as building houses (Rosengard et al. 2007). Thus, the HIFU 
facilitated the construction of needed infrastructure in HCMC but also served the 
commercial interests of the local party and state organisations such as People’s 
Committees and SOEs. These institutions engaged in profit making activities across a 
number of markets including real estate, where rising prices created opportunities for 
speculative profit making. These local investment vehicles made it even more difficult for 
the central state to control the spending commitments of lower parts of the state. They 
had little control over investment in projects that may have been adopted for speculative 
reasons with dubious economic justification, thus risking fuelling inflation and instability 
rather than longer term growth (Binh 2008). 
 
4.3.4 The Banking Sector 
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As well as the off-budget development related funds at a central and local level, another 
critical source of off-budget finance for capital expenditures of the state came from the 
banking sector. Segments of the banking sector played a significant semi-fiscal role in 
channelling funds, particularly to SOEs, under the direction of the state. The changes 
that happened within the financial sector over the reform process that permitted this 
situation to arise started with the breaking up of the Central Bank. From 1975 until the 
reform period there was no independent financial sector. Instead, there was one bank 
which essentially carried out the budgetary activities of the state. In 1990, however, new 
regulations were introduced which split the Central Bank into two levels. At the top level 
the Central Bank continued with state financial management, overseeing the state’s 
financial policies and issuing money (Du and Kien 2005). Below this, commercial banks 
were allowed to operate, and the state established a number of large State Owned 
Commercial Banks (SOCBs).  
 
Prior to 1990, the Central Bank had had an extensive branch network at provincial level 
with a high degree of formal branch autonomy. This created the potential for political 
pressure for targeted credit at the provincial level (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). From 
1991, foreign banks were allowed to enter the market and joint-stock commercial banks 
were also permitted (Du and Kien 2005). There was also considerable diversification 
within the financial sector and other financial institutions emerged such as insurance 
companies, pension funds, leasing companies and under-regulated finance companies. 
Many of these were established by the powerful SOE groupings called Economic 
Groups (discussed further in Chapter 6), seeking to diversify from their core activities 
(Biallas and Dan 2008). During the 1990s finance companies also emerged linked to local 
party and government institutions, particularly to city-level departments and the districts 
in HCMC (Gainsborough 2003).  
 
A number of different institutions were involved in the quasi-fiscal role that the financial 
sector played through government directed or influenced lending not recorded in the 
state budget. The most important institutions in this respect were SOCBs and to a lesser 
extent the joint stock financial companies. Much less is known about the role of the 
finance companies linked to local party institutions (Gainsborough 2003). While SOCBs 
were established in 1991 with an explicit role as policy driven lending vehicles, successive 
changes in the regulatory framework have tried to break the link between the 
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government and these banks and put them on an increasingly commercial footing (Loi 
2006). The four biggest SOCBs were the Bank of Investment and Development of 
Vietnam, the Bank for Foreign Trade of Vietnam, the Industrial Commercial Bank of 
Vietnam and the Agriculture and Rural Development Bank.  
 
Table 4.8: Relative Size of Financial Institutions 
Dong (Tril.) 
 Chartered Capital Outstanding Loans 
 2003 2004 2003 2004 
SOCBs     
VBARD 5.45 6.14 87.08 123.47 
VCB 2.42 4.03 30.00 46.49 
BIDV 3.75 3.87 48.09 64.01 
ICB 2.91 3.33 49.63 62.10 
DAF 4.98 4.98 64.81 76.93 
Source: IMF (2006) 
 
 
SOCBs accounted for around 70% of the credit market (Loi 2006) and loans grew 
consistently across the sector. Much of SOCB’s loaned funds came from overseas 
finances as well as from state capital through the State Bank of Vietnam. While the DAF 
was meant to be the main agent channelling on-lent ODA funds, in reality around 20% 
of ODA was channelled through SOCBs up to 2005 (International Monetary Fund 
2006). Each SOCB originally focussed on certain industry segments but in 1999 the 
government officially removed the policy based lending role of the SOCBs. In reality, 
however, they have continued to perform an important role in policy-based lending and 
remain strongly influenced by their links to local government and SOEs. It is widely 
accepted that SOCB lending provided an important source of off-budget finance to state 
institutions during the period of liberalisation (International Monetary Fund 2006).  
 
Many branches of SOCBs were involved in loaning money to local authorities to fund 
aspects of their socio-economic plans, or even directly for their budgets. Thus SOCBs 
acted as a ‘budget channel providing capital for ministries and branches and enterprises.’ 
(Du 2005). Du (2005) argued that there was a tri-partite relationship between local 
authorities, SOEs and SOCBs. This was generated in a number of ways. Part of the 
reason for their strong links to local government and SOEs was historical and related to 
the formative socialist political settlement. When the Central Bank was split up, the 
SOCBs were established from very strong branch networks that were politically 
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integrated and already had a high degree of formal autonomy from the central offices. 
SOCBs had a centralised management system but, in reality, a high degree of autonomy 
from the centre, and strong local influences continued.  
 
One of the routes through which local government maintained influence over SOCBs 
was through the appointment process for senior managers. While formal control over 
the appointments system was held by the head office, in reality it was impossible for a 
head office to appoint a director or vice-director of a branch without agreement with the 
local Party Committee. In many cases, the local party committees effectively vetoed 
candidates until they had someone they approved of (Du 2005). This meant that local 
branch managers of SOCBs were keen to remain on good terms with the local Party 
Committee by providing funding for development plans and even direct support of the 
budget (Du 2005). Local branches of SOCBs had a considerable degree of independence 
from their Head Offices, to the extent that there were cases where, despite proposals for 
projects from local authorities being refused by the Head Office, branch offices went 
ahead and provided loans (Du 2005).  
 
The tri-partite relationship extended to the influence of local Party Committees on 
SOEs. Appointment of senior managers within SOEs was also heavily influenced by 
local Party Committees and this created the motivation for SOEs to take on local socio-
economic development objectives that may not have related to their core business 
activities (Du 2005). SOEs and local Party Committees and authorities drew up 
investment proposals for which they requested funding from SOCBs. The outcome of 
this relationship was that SOCBs played a semi-fiscal role by providing funding for state 
projects at a local level and channelling credit to SOEs with the purpose of maintaining 
investment and employment targets of provincial and local governments. Beyond the 
relationship between local authorities and SOEs, SOEs were highly dependent on 
SOCBs for maintaining their operations. Credit for SOEs in the total volume of credit 
gradually declined from 1998 but SOEs remained the main customers of SOCBs (Biallas 
and Dan 2008). 
 
The SOCBs took on loans for political reason but often with very poor economic 
rationale. This led to a high level of non-performing loans (NPLs) in the sector. The 
actual extent of NPLs is difficult to gauge as the data is weak (Loi 2006). While overall 
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outstanding bank loans in Vietnam were at around 55% of GDP in 2005, which is quite 
low by international standards, the vast majority of the NPLs were held by SOCBs 
through loans to SOEs (Loi 2006). SOCBs were sheltered from bankruptcy by the state 
despite their poor economic performance. The political fall-out from a collapse in many 
SOCBs would have been too high for the state to deal with. For example, in 2001 the 
state, through the State Bank of Vietnam, stepped in to supplement the capital of SOCBs 
and to restructure NPLs. The SOCBs are thus another channel through which the state 
has been able to continue to channel huge amounts of public finance to SOEs despite 
the fall in explicit, on-budget, subsidies to SOEs. This strengthened the economic 
position of the SOEs and their supporters in local party positions within the rapidly 
commercialising economy. 
 
While SOCBs played the most direct role in politically influenced lending, there were 
other segments of the financial system which played a similar role. These included the 
joint stock banks which tended to be smaller than SOCBs but by 2006 accounted for 
12% of the credit market (Loi 2006). A number of these joint stock banks were set up by 
SOEs and Economic Groups (Economic Groups and General Corporations were 
conglomerations of SOEs that were formed during liberalisation and are discussed in 
Chapter 6). In other cases, Economic Groups or General Corporations have taken large 
stakes in these joint stock banks (Thanh et al. 2008). This gave the joint stock banks 
privileged access to state assets, such as land and natural resources, in a similar way to 
SOCBs. As well as joint stock banks, there was a rapid expansion of new finance 
companies, often set up by local Party Committees working with SOEs. This sector was 
very poorly regulated and there is little information about its activities (Biallas and Dan 
2008), but it is likely that the political system at the local level had even greater discretion 
in directing the resources of this type of financial institution towards investments that 
furthered its commercial interests.  
 
4.4 Discussion 
 
Underneath the appearance of relatively successful good governance reforms and 
orthodox macroeconomic stringency in public finances in Tanzania and Vietnam lies a 
much more complex story of informal redistribution and primitive accumulation shaped 
by the underlying political settlement. In Tanzania, the state made considerable efforts to 
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reduce corruption in public finance, as well as adopting macroeconomic reforms that 
constrained state expenditures and investment. The state was successful in reducing petty 
and bureaucratic corruption within public finances, and in improving many of the 
technical aspects of the budget process. Successes in these areas had an important impact 
on aid and FDI inflows. The increased inflows played a pivotal role in enhancing GDP 
growth under liberalisation. Donor approval of the reform process brought in high levels 
of aid, and particularly direct budget support. These fuelled consumption and demand 
within the economy and led to higher growth. Further, ring fencing investment 
incentives for FDI promoted foreign investment, in particular into the mining sector.  
 
The greater political control over the bureaucracy that was established under the 
formative socialist political settlement facilitated the reforms that reduced petty 
corruption and financial mismanagement as there was a lower degree of institutional 
fragmentation within the state, compared to many developing countries. The continued 
strength of the CCM under liberalisation helped to provide greater overall political 
stability by constraining political competition. In this respect, the situation in Tanzania 
compares favourably with the situation in some other developing countries, such as 
neighbouring Kenya, where such competition has spilled over into more overt forms of 
conflict. Ring fencing incentives for FDI by establishing the TIC and enacting laws that 
reduced the ability of politicians to change the incentive structure appeared to have 
provided greater security to investors and helped to generate higher investment inflows. 
Whether this greater security was also accompanied by a reduction in the cost and overall 
extent of rent seeking is difficult to assess. Yet, the ability of the state to tackle certain 
forms of bureaucratic corruption did not strengthened its capacity to manage more 
complex rent processes linked to industrial policy and managing backward and forward 
linkages from FDI, that are discussed in Chapter Six. 
 
However, the attempts to constrain corruption through good governance reforms appear 
to have had little impact on the prevalence of grand corruption involving large 
investment and infrastructural projects. These infrastructural investments clearly 
involved huge kickbacks to senior politicians. While this may be common practice in 
many developing countries (Khan 1996) the types of investment projects that Tanzania 
ended up had particularly negative effects on economic development and the long term 
burden that they imposed on the Tanzanian state. The fact that the central party 
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leadership could not discipline the internal factions within the CCM at the top level that 
backed these projects shines a light onto the otherwise closed workings of the party at 
the most senior level and provides clues as to how political stabilisation within the Party 
has been achieved under liberalisation. It suggests that the political strength of CCM that 
was constructed during the socialist period, endured under liberalisation. The party 
continued to exert a centripetal political force that constrained factions from organising 
outside the party institutions. However, the most senior politicians do not appear to have 
the political power to overrule these internal factions.  
 
The distribution of power between these internal factions appears to be relatively equal 
insofar as no one faction was able to consistently dominate within the National 
Executive Committee of the CCM under liberalisation. Factions appear to emerge on an 
ad hoc basis when big rents and transfers are at stake, such as in the case of the private 
power plants. Similarly, for the public finances surrounding gold mining, the aim of 
getting a greater return from the sector failed when internal factions at a high level within 
the party had a commercial interest in preserving a generous fiscal policy towards mining 
companies. One of the reasons for the weakness of these factions vis-à-vis each other is 
probably the limited legacy of political organisation outside the party. The relatively short 
period of anti-colonial struggle and the subsequent suppression of political organisation 
outside the party (as described in Chapter Three) limited the scope of political organisers 
to tap into clientelist networks outside the framework of the Party. The apparent strength 
of the CCM therefore, probably relates more to the limited distribution of political power 
outside the party, rather than the CCM itself having a very strong centralised power 
structure. This conflicts with the heterodox model of the successful developmental state, 
discussed in Chapter Two. It is likely that increased economic differentiation and 
growing political mobilisation surrounding multiparty politics may change this weak but 
stable political equilibrium as the capitalist economic transition continues.  
 
The cases of grand corruption within public finance also highlight the changing 
distribution of power between the CCM and domestic capitalists. At the highest level 
within the Party, there were close links between certain business people and the top 
leadership. The political power of this group of domestic capitalists became increasingly 
formalised over the period of liberalisation. While under the formative socialist political 
settlement, Asian domestic capitalists were largely excluded from formal power, they did 
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build up informal networks with CCM politicians. Under liberalisation, some of the most 
economically powerful domestic business people became prominent CCM politicians 
while others operated in a more shadowy role as party funders. Overt political 
relationships between politicians and domestic Asian business people were still often 
controversial, however, given that many within the CCM still supported more radical 
programmes of economic indigenisation (Fazal 2005), (Tripp 1997). 
 
The close links between fractions of domestic capital and the CCM is in contrast to the 
situation in Kenya. In Kenya, Kenyan-Asian capitalists were largely excluded from formal 
political positions. The fact that the Asian Kenyan business elite had a harder time 
accessing formal state power and state created rents may have pushed Asian Kenyans to 
engage in more risky forms of economic investment such as in industry. The inclusivity 
of the CCM is one of its strengths in terms of its ability to absorb the potential for 
political mobilisation outside its own institutional framework and hence maintain 
stability. Yet, this inclusivity may also have reduced the capacity of CCM to effectively 
manage rents for economic development.  
 
At one level, it has been difficult for the CCM to pursue policies that would more overtly 
lead to enrichment of the private sector. It was politically difficult for the party to 
provide backing to broader groupings or institutions representing the interests of 
domestic capitalists. This factor is discussed further in Chapter Six on industrial policy. 
Yet inclusivity may also have restricted the ability of the state to enforce stronger 
performance criteria on powerful rent recipients, thus establishing a political equilibrium 
that discouraged risk taking by domestic capitalists. However, it is not the case that fewer 
political links between domestic capitalists would have strengthened the ability of CCM 
to manage economic rents effectively. Instead, the highly particularistic nature of the 
relationship between domestic capitalists and the CCM led to fragmented support to 
individual capitalists and did not generate effective solutions to collective action 
problems generated by the high costs of economic transition in Tanzania.  
 
In contrast to Vietnam, where the local level of the state has played a critical political role 
in directing public finances both on and off-budget, the Tanzanian state at a local level 
played a much weaker role in public finance. Widespread bureaucratic and petty 
corruption existed over public finances at the local level but these seem to have taken 
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place on the basis of fragmented individualistic interests outside any kind of economic 
institutional framework. While the party had built a structure down to the village level, 
this did not lead to the strength or depth of institutional structures at the local level as in 
Vietnam. Thus on liberalisation, there were fewer and weaker organisations related to the 
state at the local level. The constrained political role of local political elites in public 
finance in Tanzania partly results from the fact that the volume of state finance 
channelled to lower levels of the state was quite small. In addition, the liberalisation 
programme emasculated the lower levels of the state by shearing off state economic 
entities, such as parastatals, that could have sought to access public finance in partnership 
with local party institutions. The fact that the state has been reduced in these areas 
fragmented economic power at the local level. Local political actors appear to be tapping 
into ephemeral factions of the CCM at a higher level to use local political influence to 
acquire land and natural resources potentially for speculation (Gibbon 1996), (Gibbon 
1995), (Kelsall 2000), and is discussed further in Chapter Five, but this has not occurred 
to the same degree in public finances. This means that while the type of primitive 
accumulation associated with corruption in public finances at lower levels of the state 
may lead to individual enrichment there is little systematic accumulation within the lower 
levels of the party state of the kind that occurred in Vietnam. 
 
In Vietnam, attempts to institute reforms of public finance and reduce rent seeking and 
corruption had important implications for how the budget was managed. The appearance 
of a more transparent rules based system that conformed to the demands of the 
international financial institutions and investors for macroeconomic stability was 
achieved. The on-budget resources to SOEs were constrained and standardised transfers 
to lower levels of the party state were instituted. Public finances in Vietnam during the 
period of reform were remarkable for the rapid growth of revenues and expenditures, 
which took place within a context of rapid growth. The formal budget, however, only 
captures a partial picture of the much wider phenomenon of rapidly increasing capital 
investment at all levels of the state. Despite attempts to reduce corruption associated 
with public finance, many of these investment projects have been mired in corruption 
both at the central, provincial, and lower levels of the state. The provincial and district 
VCP institutions played a critical role in collusion with SOEs in pushing for investment. 
This occurred through central investment vehicles such as the DAF but also through 
investment vehicles that were under the control of provincial level party institutions.  
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Patterns of primitive accumulation relating to corruption in public finance were very 
different in Tanzania and Vietnam. In Tanzania, there is little evidence that corruption in 
public finances generated a process of primitive accumulation that led to productive 
economic investment. In contrast, many of the investments related to corruption in 
Vietnam were linked to projects that supported the wider economic transition, albeit 
often with high levels of inefficiency. The reasons for this relate partly to the weakness of 
lower party organisations in Tanzania. Fundamentally, however, the distribution of 
power within the respective party structures was a reflection of the differences in the 
organisation of the underlying society. Tanzania and Vietnam are similar in that the 
intermediate class groups were largely contained within the institutionalized structure of 
the party and the scope for political mobilization outside this structure were limited 
compared to many other developing countries where intermediate class groups have 
been the backbone of political mobilization (Khan; 2010). Tanzania and Vietnam did not 
have to deal with political problems generated by redistributive demands from 
intermediate class groups outside the party structure. This did not however translate into 
central state effectiveness in rent management along the lines of the successful 
developers in North East Asia such as South Korea. In Tanzania, the lack of political 
mobilization outside the party meant that the state could impose a degree of social order 
to maintain the political stability for the state at a relatively low cost. Yet the much more 
circumscribed history of state formation and relatively limited social transformation that 
occurred during the course of the independence struggle and construction of socialism 
meant that central state authority was also more limited than in Vietnam. Thus, while the 
central state in Vietnam only had limited control over primitive accumulation at lower 
levels of the party state, the central party had much stronger capacities to direct 
economic management than in Tanzania. 
 
The relative weakness of the lower party organisations in Tanzania compared to Vietnam 
was a reflection of the greater weakness of all lower-level organisations both within the 
Party and within society in Tanzania. This reflected the different patterns of economic 
differentiation and organisational development under the colonial and socialist period. 
Lower level political and economic organisations in Vietnam had a long history of 
decentralisation and this was further strengthened during the socialist period. As a result, 
at the lower level there was a greater density of organisations such as banks and financial 
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institutions that played a role in allocating resources through corruption and primitive 
accumulation processes relating to public finance. Individuals or small factional networks 
within the VCP at the local level were, therefore, probably less able to engage in forms of 
corruption that simply led to capital flight as happened in Tanzania, where local level 
organisations were significantly weaker. Individuals and organisations from the private 
sector in Vietnam were largely excluded from processes of primitive accumulation related 
to public finance due to their more marginalised political position. Political power was 
overwhelmingly held by people with positions within the VCP hierarchy. In Vietnam 
corrupt activities led to investments that were not productive and many of the financial 
institutions were financing political projects driven by redistributive demands, rather than 
investing in efficient infrastructure. However, the greater financial discipline imposed by 
lower level organisations led to a higher degree of investment overall in Viet Nam that 
supported a more rapid economic transition under liberalisation than in Tanzania.  
 
The legacy of the distribution of power within the VCP from the formative socialist 
political settlement also impacted on the way that the central party institutions allocated 
public funding to the provinces. At the central level of the VCP, a number of poorer 
provinces exerted a strong political influence for historical reasons. This encouraged a 
relatively egalitarian distribution of investment spending. The formalisation of transfers 
from the richer provinces to the centre and the redistribution to poorer states helped 
incentivise provincial party structures to push for growth that generated revenues overall. 
Too much redistribution from the richer provinces might have discouraged the effort 
needed to make economic growth successful. Central control of oil and aid rents also 
helped the central state to meet the redistributive demands of poorer provinces, while 
minimizing the redistributive pressures on richer provinces. Huge economic inequalities 
between provinces persisted across the period of liberalisation. This exacerbated the 
already decentralised distribution of power as a legacy from the formative socialist 
political settlement. While the VCP was committed to addressing these economic 
inequalities through infrastructural investment, it may be that on-going uneven economic 
transformation will reduce the political influence of poorer provinces over time. 
 
A further aspect of public financial reform and the political settlement relates to the 
continued influence of SOEs on the state. The many off-budget sources of investment 
finance, such as the DAF, SOCBs and other banking institutions, allowed high levels of 
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capital investment to occur off-budget. This permitted the state to maintain a façade of 
macroeconomic control and a commitment to the more fiscally austere approach that 
was promoted by the IMF and other IFIs. Maintaining high levels of investment may 
have served some of the political interests of the central party institutions, for example, 
keeping lower levels of the Party content and providing higher levels of employment and 
demand during the economic transition. The continued support to SOEs through off-
budget mechanisms may also have reflected a desire on the part of the state to preserve 
the commanding heights of the economy in state ownership (Cheshire, Penrose, and 
Nguyen 2006).  
 
The power of local party officials and SOEs over the pattern of lending of these 
institutions served to strengthen their burgeoning commercial interests. Yet many of 
these commercial interests have been in speculative activities, based on the rising prices 
of critical assets in the context of increased marketisation, rather than in productive 
investments. The central state seems to have been very weak in terms of its ability to 
constrain lower levels of the state from taking on inefficient economic investment 
projects.  The efficiency of the high level of capital expenditures is explored by Thanh et 
al (2008) who calculate the ICOR for Vietnam during its rapid growth period from 1991 
to 2007 with the ICOR of other countries in the region during their rapid growth 
periods. Their data is presented in Table 4.9 below 
 
Table 4.9 ICORs in Selected Asian Economies 
 
 % GDP Growth ICOR 
Vietnam 1997 – 2007 7.2 5.1 
Korea 1969 – 1988 8.4 2.8 
Malaysia 1977 – 1996 7.4 4.9 
Thailand 1976 – 1995 8.1 3.6 
Taiwan 1963 – 1982 9.8 2.9 
Indonesia 1977 - 1996 7.2 2.8 
     Source: Thanh and Dapice (2009; 7) 
 
They find that Vietnam was one of the least efficient users of capital in their sample and 
capital efficiency actually got worse after 2000. Only Malaysia, which is renowned for 
inefficient subsidisation of state owned firms and politically connected businesses, 
performed worse than Vietnam in terms of the amount of capital needed to generate a 
unit of growth. Another indicator of the inefficiency of capital expenditure is that, 
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despite such high levels of infrastructural investment, poor infrastructure is increasingly 
identified as the biggest hindrance to Vietnam’s international competitiveness (Thanh 
and Dapice 2009). 
 
There is little evidence that the state in Vietnam had the capacity to correct or change 
economic activities linked to primitive accumulation of lower state actors. However, 
provincial and district party institutions did not have a completely free hand in terms of 
their ability to engage in forms of primitive accumulation over public financial 
investment. Such activities had to be, at least formally, justified in terms of their 
contribution to economic development to a much greater extent than in Tanzania where 
much weaker large scale investment projects were adopted by the central party 
institutions. Further, at lower levels of the Party in Vietnam there have been increasingly 
frequent court cases and exposure of corruption surrounding investment projects. This 
suggests that there is an internal tussle for power with the centre trying to impose its will 
on lower levels (Gainsborough 2003).  
 
There has been a greater degree of competition within the party structures than in 
Tanzania, which has led to a closer monitoring of investments. The complexity and 
density of organizations within and outside the party in Vietnam made it impossible for 
an individual or small network to operate on its own. This also meant, however, that the 
centre was constrained in its ability to impose its rules on lower levels. If a significant 
coalition within the VCP could find some type of collective action that provided enough 
rents to satisfy the coalition, it could go ahead even if the resulting investment project 
was basically speculative rather than developmental.  
 
This form of competition between networks within the party shares certain common 
features with the competitive clientelist model that has been used to describe Thailand’s 
political economy (Doner and Ramsay 1997) Donner and Ramsay (1997) argue that 
competitive clientelism in Thailand was based on intra-elite rivalries that were the basis 
for competing networks of politicians and the mainly Chinese commercial classes. The 
institutional richness within Thailand’s private sector supported the development of 
successful collective action solutions within the business community that did not rely on 
effective state institutions for economic development. The clientelist competition over 
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state-created rents led to an economic transition based on the rapid growth of exports of 
agricultural and basic manufactured products.   
 
The pattern of Vietnam’s clientelist competition differs from this model of Thai 
competitive clientelism in a number of important respects. First, the institutionalisation 
of the VCP and suppression of political competition outside the party framework meant 
that clientelist competition was constrained within the party institutions. Second, the 
suppression of the Chinese commercial classes and private economic sector meant that 
struggles over accumulation and rents occured within state institutions. The institutional 
richness of the state rather than the private sector, as in Thailand, is therefore a critical 
feature in explaining why there is a higher degree of competition between clientelist 
networks within Vietnam than Tanzania and why primitive accumulation has been 
mainly channelled back into Vietnam’s economy rather than largely generating capital 
flight as in Tanzania. 
 
The central problem for Vietnam is not that the centre cannot stop public finance-based 
primitive accumulation by lower levels of the Party that strengthen their commercial 
interests. This has clearly been successful insofar as it has generated a rapid economic 
transition based on export growth and diversification into low value added 
manufacturing. In contrast to the neo-classical economic models where allocative 
efficiency is seen as critical for achieving economic growth, Vietnam’s experience 
highlights the importance of dynamic processes of accumulation that may involve 
considerable deviations from an efficient allocation of resources based on current market 
prices. Yet the main problem for Vietnam is that the type of clientelism that has 
generated this economic transition did not promote greater coordination to overcome 
inhibitions to more complex forms of technology acquisition that would strengthen 
Vietnam’s longer term economic transformation.  
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Chapter 5 
 
Land 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Control of land played a pivotal role in the struggles for independence, in the ambitions 
for socialist transformation and, more recently, in the rapid re-emergence of capitalism in 
Tanzania and Vietnam. With 885,800 sq km and a population of 37 million by the mid 
2000s, Tanzania has a relatively small, but growing, proportion of its land under 
agricultural cultivation and around 0.1% of land under urban settlement (Gordon 2007). 
In contrast, Vietnam has a land mass of 310,070 sq km and a population of 82 million 
and was already highly urbanised by the end of the socialist period. Despite these 
different conditions, a transition in land use occurred very rapidly in both countries 
under liberalisation. Land reform since the 1980s involved instituting market based 
mechanisms and reforms to the state along good governance lines with the intention of 
improving transparency and reducing corruption in land transactions. Yet the path of 
land transition occurred, to a considerable extent, outside this official framework. In 
both countries, informal political dynamics featured prominently in these transitions and 
high levels of corruption and primitive accumulation in land became the most 
contentious area of governance during the liberalisation period. 
 
The land reform programmes initiated by both countries under socialism had many 
common features. Both Tanzania and Vietnam aspired to overturn inequality in land 
ownership and strengthen communal land rights while keeping ultimate control over land 
vested under the central control of the party-state. The collective agricultural system that 
both countries attempted to install was also very similar (Kerkvliet 2005). The 
collectivization programmes made a proportion of land in each village communal, under 
the control of the village level party institutions, while peasants continued to have control 
over a small amount of land for domestic production. In both countries this system was 
subverted from the inside as peasants effectively used the communal lands for private 
production and tried to withhold their labour from collective production. Land 
transactions between individuals occurred illegally within this framework. By the early 
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1980s, the official land rights system was increasingly dysfunctional and was seen to be a 
critical barrier to driving up agricultural productivity. 
 
The reforms that were implemented since the mid 1980s tried to mediate between the 
desire to maintain equity and the rights of smallholders. They sought to institute market 
based reforms while maintaining the power of the state to manage the land transition 
process in the national interest. The economic justifications for these different 
approaches relate to different theoretical perspectives on the role of property rights in 
economic development, ranging from ‘land to the tiller’ type arguments to the standard 
market orthodoxy of neoclassical economics. A full discussion of the theories behind 
these arguments is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, it is worth outlining briefly 
the theory that has become the dominant influence on official reform in both countries 
among the competing elements that have informed the new corpus of land policy. In 
recent years, the drive has been for individuation, formalisation and marketisation of land 
rights. This approach has been popularised by Hernando de Soto’s ‘The Mysteries of 
Capital’ (de-Soto 2000) and promoted across developing countries and with International 
Financial Institutions through his Institute for Liberal Democracy.  
 
This theory holds that the most important element of land reform is to grant secure and 
formal rights to land for individuals. This transforms the ‘dead’ capital of the poor into 
potentially productive capital. Land transactions in an efficient market are then able to re-
allocate land to the most productive users, in turn resulting in higher levels of growth. In 
addition, the land market reforms need to be supported by an efficient, corruption-free 
and transparent state system for granting land rights to the poor (de-Soto 2000). There 
are a number of problems with this theory, not least that it is based on the idealised 
market of neo-classical economics that has little basis in the realities of developing 
countries. The theory also overlooks the historical record that shows that capitalism 
emerged in contexts where property rights were highly unstable for the many; widespread 
security of property rights resulted from capitalism and wealth rather than the reverse 
(Khan 2004). Further, the amount of land that is actually owned by the poor in 
developing countries is often so small that realising its capital value has a negligible 
impact on the owner’s chances of pulling him or herself out of poverty. 
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The realities of land reform in Tanzania and Vietnam are in stark contrast to the idealised 
theories that provided its intellectual foundation. Over the period of reform, types of 
corruption and unlawful primitive accumulation, as well as legal forms of primitive 
accumulation such as compulsory land purchases, became more prevalent in land 
transactions than in any other area of state activity in both Tanzania and Vietnam  (Dang 
2008), (Shivji 1998). This is not surprising given that land expropriation under various 
guises is the archetypal form of primitive accumulation (Marx 1990). It is clear that many 
of the land transfers in Tanzania and Vietnam since liberalisation were accompanied by 
examples of grave injustice towards existing land owners, where land was expropriated 
forcefully or without adequate compensatory payments. To identify the impact of these 
transfers on the path of economic transition under liberalisation is more complex. 
Establishing the political contours of corruption and primitive accumulation in land 
transfers is critical to understanding their implications for economic growth in Tanzania 
and Vietnam.  
 
In Vietnam the land transition was shaped by the fast pace of industrialisation. The 
transition from small scale agriculture to industrial and commercial activities was, to a 
large extent, mediated by the state but not through the formal system established by the 
land reforms since Doi Moi. The most contentious land struggles occurred in rural land 
near cities. Here, land was in high demand for development, both as industrial zones and 
for residential and commercial use. While the central VCP institutions sought to control 
the land transition primarily in the interests of rapid economic development, it was the 
lower levels of the VCP that had had the most direct control over land transactions. 
Increasing commercial interest in land transactions at the lower end of the state 
generated corruption and political manipulation over markets. While this led to 
speculation and hoarding of land in some cases and the transfer of land to inefficient 
users, there were sufficient transfers to more productive users to largely accommodate 
Vietnam’s rapid industrialisation process under liberalisation.  
 
This chapter starts by providing the historical context to land transition from the colonial 
and socialist periods in Vietnam. The main features of land policy under liberalisation are 
then described. The impact of formal and informal land transactions in rural areas and in 
the creation of industrial zones is examined and the role of SOE and VCP institutions at 
the provincial and district level is established. The outcome of these processes on 
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economic transition is related to features of the political settlement in Vietnam. The 
Chapter then sets out the main historical features of land management in Tanzania and 
the changes to land management under liberalisation. The impact of corruption and 
informal primitive accumulation are examined through transactions that occurred in land 
for mining and agriculture and in urban areas. In both countries, aspects of the formative 
socialist political settlement endured under liberalisation. The distribution of rural land 
was fairly egalitarian and organised political competition was largely constrained by the 
Party institutions. These features minimised the number of serious case of political 
conflict generated by the rapid land transition that was occurring in both countries under 
liberalisation. However, in neither country was the land transition process directed ‘from 
above’ by the central state. Instead, political dynamics at the lower levels of the Party and 
society were more important for explaining the outcome of land transition. The pattern 
and economic consequence of this decentralised land transition were very different in the 
two countries and this is also related to important differences in the evolution of their 
political settlements.  
 
5.2 Vietnam 
 
5.2.1 Historical Overview of Land Management 
 
Prior to the colonial period, land was predominantly administered by autonomous village 
level structures where community members had rights to use land but not to sell it. The 
succession of feudal dynasties that ruled Vietnam before the arrival of the French 
attempted to introduce more centralised land management on top of these traditional 
practices (Tinh 2001). Throughout the colonial period, the economy remained dominated 
by peasant agriculture based on small plots of land; however there were changes and 
divergences in the pattern of land tenure in the north and the south. In the south, there 
was a more rapid process of land concentration and land dispossession. Land 
expropriation in the south led to large tracts of land being given by the colonial state to 
French investors and to some Vietnamese, primarily from a small group of rich southern 
Vietnamese bourgeoisie, who rented the land out in small parcels for continued rice 
production. Wolf (1969) estimated that there were around 7,000 Vietnamese who 
became owners of large estates. The rapid expansion of rubber plantations, mainly 
owned by French companies, up until the end of the 1920s was also a cause of growing 
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concentration of land and landlessness (Kalikiti 1999). By the mid 1930s large land 
owners owned about half of the arable land producing rice in the Vietnamese south and 
a growing class of landless tenants constituted around 57% of the rural population (Wolf 
1969). Most farmland was either owned by French plantation owners or by large 
Vietnamese land owners, with 53% of farmland owned by only 3% of the indigenous 
population (Do and Iyer 2008).  
 
In the north, colonial land grants never reached the same scale in the areas that were 
protectorates. Across the whole of Indochina, speculation and land hording was rife, 
leading to a situation where only around 40% of cultivable land was actually under 
production (Murray 1980). The redistribution of land to peasants by the Viet Minh was 
an important way of mobilizing support in rural areas for the anti-colonial struggle. In 
practical terms, this meant that by the time French colonial rule came to an end in 1945, 
approximately one-quarter of cultivated land had been redistributed to the peasants 
(Kerkvleit 2006). In the north, after 1945, a radical land reform programme was adopted 
and around 73% of land was redistributed (Kerkvleit 2006), benefitting over 2 million 
peasant farmers.  
 
The human cost of this land reform process was, however, extremely high. The figures 
for the number of land owners killed at the height of the land reform process vary 
considerably. Kolko (1997) estimates that between 5,000 – 15,000 land owners were 
killed by peasant courts and around 20,000 people imprisoned, while others have put the 
figure for the number of people killed as high as 50,000 (Fall 1963). In August 1956, Ho 
Chi Minh apologized to the nation for the excesses of the land reform policy (Kolko 
1997). Beginning in 1958 the party introduced collectivization in the north and by the 
end of 1960 nearly 90% of farming households were in collective cooperatives (Kerkvliet 
2005). While the land reform programme was very popular, collectivization had less 
support. Under the collective system all households were paid a share of output 
depending on the hours that they had contributed to work on the local communal land 
(Do and Iyer 2008). 
 
In the south the initial system of land management followed a very different path from 
the north. Under Ngo Dinh Diem, land holdings became more unequal and there were 
growing numbers of large privately owned farms. This led to increased rural unrest and 
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support for the Viet Minh. Attempts to reverse this process and win rural support were 
launched with a ‘land for the tiller’ programme in 1970 which gave greater land rights 
recognition to small holders and involved some redistribution of land to the poor (Dacy 
1986). In the last years of the Southern regime however, large parts of the rural south 
were under de facto control of the Viet Minh who implemented land reform in the areas 
they controlled.  
 
On re-unification there were attempts to institute radical land reform and collectivization 
in the south but commercialization of agriculture had already taken root and was harder 
to dismantle (Beresford 1988). By the early 1970s there was a perception that the rules of 
collective farming were being flouted and a major campaign to reverse this trend and 
improve collective farming was introduced. Yet by the end of this decade it was clear that 
the collective farming system was running into difficulties as agricultural output fell and 
discontent in rural areas became widespread (Kerkvliet 2005). Across Vietnam, the 
collective system started to fragment from the inside as farmers found ways to subvert 
the requirements of collective farming and use their land for private production 
(Kerkvliet 2005). While farmers had no rights to sell or lease land, in reality informal 
arrangements occurred relatively frequently which allowed famers to by-pass the state 
and buy or rent land from other farmers. The formal process of land redistribution 
coupled with the limitations on private accumulation and limited impact of ‘socialist’ 
primitive accumulation of land means that land distribution was highly egalitarian by the 
end of the socialist period. 
 
5.2.2 Land Reform Process Since Doi Moi 
  
In many ways the 1988 Land Reform Act was a formalisation of the informal markets 
that had developed under the formative socialist political settlement. The 1988 Land 
Laws granted greater rights to occupiers but did not extend to full ownership rights over 
land. The most important component of the new law was ‘Resolution 10’ that permitted 
land that had previously been owned by cooperatives under the collective system, to be 
allocated to organisations, households or individuals for long term use. Land was 
distributed to households through the local commune, the lowest level of the state in 
rural areas. Further, land that was owned by farmers prior to 1975 was supposed to be 
reallocated to the original owners (Do and Iyer 2008). The 1988 Land Laws, however, 
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forbade the selling of land. Thus, while land transactions continued informally there was 
no official market for land. These land reforms were credited with dramatically increasing 
agricultural output by giving producers greater control over their surpluses and 
improving incentives for longer term investment in agricultural capital (Van-Arkadie and 
Mallon 2003). 
 
Subsequent changes to land policy in Vietnam focused on three, sometimes conflicting, 
areas. These were, first, the granting of secure tenure and establishment of land markets 
through Land Use Rights (LURs), second, the decentralisation of land administration and 
particularly the process of land use planning, and third, improving the processes of 
compulsory land purchase by the state. Dissatisfaction with the pace of the emergence of 
formal land markets led to the introduction of new land laws in 1993. The central focus 
of these laws was to expand the coverage of formal titles to land and to establish efficient 
land markets. This involved the introduction of land title certificates called Land Use 
Rights (LURs). Formally, the LURs did not confer full ownership of the land; this 
remained with the state. Nevertheless, the certificates conferred five critical rights over 
land. Holders were given the right to exchange, transfer, lease, bequeath, gift or mortgage 
land and to use land as a guarantee. Thus, to all practical purposes the LURs conferred 
the rights of ownership to holders. Further, possession of a LUR permitted the 
householder to receive compensation in case of land recovery by the state and allowed 
them to use their land as a form of capital contribution to enterprises wishing to use their 
land.  
 
The idea behind these reforms was that a market in LURs would address the initial 
inefficiencies in land distribution following the allocation of communal land by 
administrative means after the 1988 land laws (Ravallion and van de Walle 2006). The 
formal pricing system for land, however, remained largely under the control of the state 
through statutory pricing formulae based on the intended use of the land and the status 
of the purchaser (AusAID 2001). This opened up significant divergences between the 
official price of land and the cost of land in shadow markets, where the price of land 
could be three to four hundred percent higher (AusAID 2001). Attempts to address this 
anomaly were introduced with the amendment to the Land Act that aimed to create a 
more market oriented mechanism to ‘price’ land and grant further rights to business 
holders of LURs (Carlier and Tran 2004).  
 185 
 
Under liberalisation, there was a decentralisation of control over the formal land 
management system.  Thus, by law, while all land belonged to the state, in practice local 
government played the most important role in implementing and interpreting national 
guidelines and laws (Kerkvleit 2006). At the local level it was the commune People’s 
Committees that were most involved in the formal land management system. In order to 
claim title over land, an individual had to apply for a land use certificate through the 
commune level People’s Committee. Commune party structures had to work with state 
institutions in the next level up to get approval for certain forms of land sales and 
activities. The District Bureau of Land Administration (DBLA) held the information on 
local land ownership. A land registration committee, made up of the DBLA and 
representatives of the party committee at commune, district and provincial level assessed 
transfer applications. Once the committee had made a decision, a public meeting was 
held to announce the decision; disputes were aired and if unresolved were forwarded to 
the General Department of Land Administration (Do and Iyer 2008). In 2004 an 
amendment to the land laws introduced a registration system through a network of 
district Land Registration Agencies (Carlier and Tran 2004). 
 
The granting of LURs initially proceeded at a slow pace. By 1999 only 11% of urban 
households had received land use certificates (AusAID 2001). The slow pace of 
allocating LURs restricted the growth of private sector economic activity. LURs were 
critical for gaining credit and for engaging in joint ventures with foreign companies. 
Foreign companies were not allowed to own land directly, nor were domestic firms 
legally allowed to rent land directly to a foreign enterprise. A private enterprise, however, 
could contribute its LUR, often its most valuable asset, to a joint venture with a foreign 
company on condition that the land rent was paid for the entire lease period or that the 
rent for the land had been paid in advance for at least five years. In practice, these 
financial requirements restricted most private enterprises from taking on joint ventures 
with international companies. In contrast, SOEs continued to have privileged access to 
land under liberalisation, although there were some formal restrictions on their abiliy to 
lease land out to other companies (Carlier and Tran 2004).  
 
As well as granting title, the state managed land through land use planning and through 
compulsory purchase orders under liberalisation. Land use planning played a critical role 
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in the transfers of land to new economic activities. Land could not be formally acquired 
for commercial or industrial use without having been included as such in local land use 
plans. Formally, this process was managed by the state at the provincial, district and 
commune level. The consequence of such planning was to control the amount and 
location of land available for development (Hung 2007). The process of land use 
planning was central to the establishment of Industrial Zones. These Industrial Zones 
were critical for Vietnam’s economic transition under liberalisation but their 
establishment was also a focus of conflict over changing patterns of land ownership.  
 
Compulsory purchase of land was an important aspect of the formal process of land 
management under liberalisation. Land rights could be claimed by the state through 
Compulsory Purchase Orders for various reasons including national defence, company 
bankruptcy, wrongful use and for the purposes of economic development. Economic 
development was the most common justification for the state engaging in compulsory 
purchases of land under liberalisation (Hung 2007). While compulsory purchases could 
be directed by the central state, it was, in most cases, the local party institutions that 
managed this process. Once land use plans had been devised by the local People’s 
Committee, the state could require existing land owners to sell their land to the state. 
Prices were determined by People’s Committees. The prices that owners of land received 
depended on the use to which it was currently being put. For example, a farmer would 
receive the official rate for agricultural land, rather than the official price for industrial 
land even though it was intended to be used for industry (Hung 2007). In fact, official 
prices used by People’s Committees were generally much lower than the non-official 
market prices that owners would receive if they were not forced to sell the land through 
Compulsory Purchase Orders. This was one of the major reasons for conflict around 
Compulsory Purchase Orders, as is discussed below. The 2004 amendment to the Land 
Act strengthened the state’s ability to use Compulsory Purchase Orders, particularly to 
re-claim granted land that it deemed to be under-utilised (Carlier and Tran 2004). 
 
5.2.3 Corruption and primitive accumulation associated with land transition 
under liberalisation 
 
The outcome of the new land laws was a formal land management system based on 
increasing marketisation but with significant powers vested in the state through land use 
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planning and compulsory purchase orders. The reforms were designed to improve the 
governance of these state-led processes by devolving power to the local level.  The 
reality, however, was very far from this, with the land sector increasingly dominated by 
informal arrangements and corrupt practices. Over the period of liberalisation, a land 
transition occurred very rapidly, yet most land transactions involved informal 
arrangements rather than operating through the official channels outlined above. 
Informal arrangements also operated through the official channels because officials had 
considerable discretion and often ignored the formal system. For example, over 95% of 
household land was bought and sold outside the formal system for purchasing LURs in 
2000 (AusAID 2001). The dominance of the informal land market meant that a dual 
pricing system operated in Vietnam: one price was the official price of the LUR as 
determined by the state. This depended on the intended use of the land and who the 
leasing parties were. The second was the market price. This bore little relationship to the 
official price (Carlier and Tran 2004). The informal market price reflected the necessity 
of paying illegal side payments to the local authorities responsible for issuing the LUR.  
 
In fact, over the period of reform, land constituted the most corrupt sector in Vietnam 
(Joint Donor Report 2005). Illegal land dealing became so widespread that the land 
market in Vietnam was seen as one of the least transparent in the world. Jones Lang 
LaSalle, a US-based real-estate-services provider, rated Vietnam's real-estate transparency 
index as the lowest among 56 countries it surveyed (Lam 2006). Corruption related to 
land involved a multitude of different activities. These included taking advantage of state 
projects to appropriate or share land; abuse of power to award favourable land 
settlements or sell land below official prices to companies offering kickbacks; and 
seeking to profit through land grants, especially for investment purposes. Gifts or bribes 
were also demanded to perform formalities related to land, such as land allocation, land 
lease, land rights transfer, land use certificate granting, land compensation and site 
clearance (Molen and Tuladhar 2006). 
 
On occasions, cases of corruption in land, such as those described in the next section, 
involved actions by the central party institutions. Provincial level party institutions were 
also implicated in corruption and illegality surrounding the establishment of larger 
Industrial Zones (Lam 2006). Yet, the vast majority of corruption cases involving land 
that came to light through the media involved illegal actions by the state at the lower 
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levels, particularly at the commune and district level. For example, in 2009 Vu Chi 
Thanh, a former vice chairman of Haiphong People's Committee, and eight other 
officials and civil servants from Haiphong were prosecuted for having inappropriately 
allocated hundreds of acres of land lots from an "urban housing project for the poor" to 
family members and officials from various offices in Haiphong (Bureau of Democracy 
2010). Land use plans were often manipulated by Commune officials to enable profiteers 
to buy land designated for agricultural use and then sell it under another category for 
vastly inflated profits (CECODES and Finland 2008).  
 
One caveat to this portrayal of extensive land management corruption at a local level is 
that stories of corruption that were exposed in the press were usually tightly controlled 
by the central Party. Thus it may have been that the media coverage of local level 
corruption in land was officially orchestrated by the central party institutions in an effort 
to bring pressure on local officials to reduce abuses (Bureau of Democracy 2010). 
Notwithstanding the cover up of corrupt activities in land involving the central party 
institutions, the local level dynamics of corruption have undoubtedly had important 
implications for the outcome of informal land transactions for Vietnam’s growth path. 
 
5.2.4 Rural Land Transition 
 
In many cases, corruption associated with land transactions did not occur in a way that 
necessarily restricted the pace of economic transition. On the contrary, there was a very 
rapid land transition to accommodate the dramatic speed of industrialisation and 
expansion of commercial agriculture in Vietnam. The type of land transition in rural 
areas, however, has been different from the land transition experienced in urban and 
semi urban areas. In rural areas, most of the land was still held by smallholder farmers 
across the period of liberalisation. The commitment to egalitarian land rights that was 
established under the socialist political settlement continued to be important under 
liberalisation. There were formal attempts to stop the emergence of large farms through 
legal restrictions on the amount of land any one family could hold. A household farming 
rice and other crops with short growing seasons was allowed no more than three 
hectares. For other kinds of crops, the limit was 10 hectares in lowland regions of the 
country and 30 hectares in upland regions (Kerkvleit 2006). Despite these restrictions, 
there was some concentration of land over the reform period with the emergence of 
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large farms, particularly in the south (Akram-Lodhi 2005). Given that LURs were often 
sold informally in rural areas, as in urban areas, the pace of concentration may have been 
more rapid than was officially recognised.  
 
Despite formal restrictions, some large farms started to emerge after Doi Moi, 
particularly in the South (Akram-Lodhi 2005). For example, while the 1993 land law set a 
maximum farm size of 5 hectares, by 1995 there were already 113,700 farms larger than 
this and 1,900 in excess of 10 hectares (Akram-Lodhi 2005). The process of granting land 
titles was faster in the south, particularly in the Mekong Delta (Hare 2008). In this area 
land was less fragmented and plot sizes were larger due to the more limited socialist land 
reform. The extent to which local state institutions in rural areas were complicit in the 
emergence of larger land holdings varied across the country.  
 
Given the decentralised distribution of power within the VCP, the attitude of local 
officials to larger land owners and to ‘outside’ investors influenced this process. In some 
cases local officials hindered market based land transactions that threatened to push local 
farmers off their land. For example Ravallion and De Walle (2001) described a case 
where local officials resisted purchase of land by ‘outsiders’ and pressured the local 
commercial agricultural bank to refuse to accept LURs as collateral for loans. Probably 
the area where there was most contention was when local authorities were complicit in 
larger expropriations of land. As with the urban and semi-urban land transition discussed 
below, many of these land appropriations were for the purposes of infrastructural 
investment or for the creation of industrial land or state owned plantations.  
 
Some of the largest land expropriations in rural areas were directed by the central state. 
Probably the most notorious example was the establishment of coffee plantations in the 
Central Highlands. The phenomenal growth in coffee production was linked to land 
transfers directed by the central level of the VCP in the Central Highland Provinces 
where 85% of Vietnam’s coffee harvest originates (Greenfield 2004). The coffee farms 
have their origins in a massive state orchestrated resettlement program of ethnic Kinh to 
the borderland region to ensure political stability in the face of potential unrest from 
local ethnic groups. The state exercised its right to purchase land by compulsion to set up 
New Economic Zones in the late 1980s and early 1990s on land traditionally owned by 
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tribal groups and encouraged ethnic Kinh to move into the area and establish coffee 
farms.  
 
The economic success of coffee production attracted a massive flow of migration into 
the area. This further hastened the transformation of land into coffee plantations. An 
estimated 80% of coffee trees in the Central Highlands were owned by small scale 
farmers with less than two acres while the remaining 20% were owned by the state-
owned Vietnam Coffee Corporation (VINACAFE) (Greenfield 2004). Thus, while small 
holding farmers were the main producers, their access to land was a result of actions by 
the Central VCP institutions. The region faced unrest and riots by ethnic minority groups 
unhappy with the state led expropriation of their homelands (BBC 2001). In 1997 the 
worst episode of unrest since the end of the war occurred in the Central Highlands in 
north-eastern Thai Binh province, with protests involving thousands of people against 
land distribution (Johnson 2001). Small scale uprisings against land appropriations by 
local government in rural areas were relatively frequent across the reform period 
(Kerkvleit 2006). While these incidents of revolt against land expropriation may have 
slowed down the land transition in certain cases, for the most part the transition has 
occurred without generating significant political unrest. The consolidation of political 
power within the institutions of the VCP under the formative socialist political 
settlement probably helped the VCP to maintain a high degree of social order in spite of 
the rising tensions around land over the period of liberalisation.  
 
The example of central state interventions in land to support coffee expansion supports 
the argument that the central state in Vietnam did have a degree of control over property 
rights transition that was also described in the previous chapter in terms of its control 
over redistribution of oil rents. However, similarly to the case of public finances, the 
control of the central state was subject to on-going challenges from lower levels of the 
state that had significant power. Thus, while the central state was initially successful in its 
intentions to encourage coffee expansion, it was unable to push through its policy of 
restricting the output of coffee in the face of collapsing global prices. In 2000, the global 
price of coffee had fallen dramatically due to rapid increases in supply. The Vietnamese 
state announced that it would stockpile coffee in order to push up global prices. Despite 
this formal policy, the state was unable to restrict the supply of Vietnamese coffee onto 
the global market and traders continued to sell coffee above state imposed quotas 
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(Greenfield; 2004). Further, agricultural policies to encourage diversification into higher 
value added coffee and coffee processing have been largely unsuccessful (World Bank; 
2004). The failure of central state policies to encourage technology acquisition are further 
explored in Chapter six. 
 
5.2.5 Industrial Zones 
 
Notwithstanding the tensions in the highland areas, the major pressures on land and the 
focal points for political disruption linked to corruption and mismanagement were in 
semi-urban areas and rural areas near large cities. Extensive conversion of land from 
agricultural use to industrial and commercial use took place in these areas under 
liberalisation. Rapid industrialisation led to construction of housing, infrastructure and 
industrial zones on formerly agricultural rural land on the outskirts of cities. The pace of 
transition was very high, but exact figures are difficult to obtain as prior to the 2003 land 
laws, land for industrial and commercial purposes was simply included in the ‘special use’ 
category of non-agricultural land (Hung 2007).  
 
Local institutions of the VCP engaged in formal and informal land transactions that 
promoted and facilitated investment. Making land available for investment in 
infrastructure, new industries, commerce and residential properties offered opportunities 
for job creation and economic growth, but also for personal enrichment by officials in 
Party Committees at the commune, district and provincial level. As outlined in the 
previous chapter, many infrastructural projects were undertaken by coalitions of local 
People’s Committees, SOEs and foreign investors. This encouraged Party Committees to 
engage in the illegal or informal sale of land to investors. Investment projects often 
bought ‘kick-backs’ to commune leaders. Land was the critical resource over which local 
Party Committees and SOEs had control. Where local budgets were limited, or central 
funds were not forthcoming to fund new projects, land sales to investors were often used 
as the main mechanism for financing infrastructural deals. Direct land swaps by the state 
with private investors also became common (Thanh and Dapice 2009). These deals were 
often problematic as they were usually non-transparent and provided scope for 
corruption, inflated investment costs and loss of state resources. They also created 
incentives for private investors to take on non-viable investment projects in order to get 
valuable land in return (Thanh and Dapice 2009). Land transfer arrangements in HCMC 
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were particularly important given the rapid growth of the economy and the high price of 
land.  
 
Investment in transport infrastructure often came with lucrative land swap deals, for 
example the road infrastructure investments that have taken place in HCMC (Rosengard 
et al. 2007). In 2007 and 2008, the provincial government signed memoranda of 
understanding with three large construction companies, from Vietnam, South Korea and 
Malaysia, for the construction of new toll roads in HCMC. Despite the offer of toll 
revenue, the deals also came with additional land access and lucrative rights to develop 
housing and commercial properties. The ability of the state to offer land to private 
investors pushed up the rate of investment and allowed increasing private sector 
participation in public sector investment projects. The Phu My Hung residential area is 
an example of this. The city granted the residential property rights to 600 ha of land to a 
foreign company that wanted to invest. In return, it received a 30% share in the joint 
venture and was able to raise further finance to build the road infrastructure of the 
surrounding area (Rosengard et al. 2007). Within the context of the vibrant HCMC 
economy, much more land was developed without the city’s equity participation. In other 
areas of Vietnam where the economy was less dynamic offers of land for investment 
deals have not been so successful (Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007). (These cases are 
discussed in chapter 6) 
 
Such activities could not however continue completely without sanction from higher 
levels within the party and many communes used up to a third of the revenues generated 
from such sales to pay off higher levels of the state, the district or the provincial level 
(CECODES and Finland 2008). Researchers for the Finnish Embassy in Vietnam found 
that in Trieu Son District, Thanh Hoa Province, 16 communes revealed they had all sold 
land illegally, with the cost of side payments to officials at the district level and above 
(called ‘transaction’ and ‘reception’ costs) accounting for 30–35% of the budget 
(CECODES and Finland 2008). From the 1990s, the central state defined investment in 
infrastructure as critical to its national goal of promoting economic growth. This led to a 
situation where local Party Committees were keen to put investment projects in place 
that would gain approval from higher levels within the VCP on the basis of their 
contribution to economic development. However, many of these projects were also 
about securing property rights over land for local party institutions. Many district and 
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commune Party Committees tried to take advantage of access to land that could be 
offered by the state for economic development by setting up infrastructural development 
projects which would then be allocated land (CECODES and Finland 2008).  
 
Land and housing sales became an increasingly important part of local government 
finances. All housing and land tax were assigned to the local level. Taxes related to land 
included the land transfer tax, the agricultural land use tax (which was phased out from 
2003), land use fees, rental of land, proceeds from the sale and use of state owned houses 
and buildings and Land registration fees (Hanai and Huyen). As described in Chapter 
Four (p x), the high revenues from land were not a result of Vietnam implementing an 
effective modern property tax. The importance of revenues generated through land 
transactions were particularly important at the district and commune levels of the state. 
However, they were also very important for city level provincial governments of HCMC 
and Hanoi where land sales and sales of government housing was an important one-off 
source of revenue. For example, 80% of licences and registration fees, the second largest 
single source of local revenue for HCMC, came from the registration of new and 
transferred real estate in the early 2000 (Rosengard et al. 2007). Other sources of income 
from real estate include annual fees and charges on land use. HCMC’s non-regular 
income generated from one-off activities of the city has a very high dependence on the 
growth in the real estate market with the share of the contribution to revenue from the 
sale of land use rights and buildings rising from 30% of special revenue in 2001 to 70% 
in 2004 (Rosengard et al. 2007).  
 
As well as the needs for land transactions to generate public revenue, the proliferation of 
business interests within the VCP at the local level also encouraged a rapid land 
transition. Local Party Committees were interested in promoting land transition as they 
profited directly from land sales through the establishment of land holding companies 
and real estate agencies (Gainsborough 2003). The department and district levels were 
particularly prolific in establishing housing and land companies to take advantage of the 
rising land prices in Ho Chi Minh City (Gainsborough 2003).  
 
Many of the local VCP commercial activities in land were purely speculative and did not 
facilitate a productive land transition. However, land transactions of local VCP 
institutions did also contribute to the rapid development of Industrial Zones.  
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Establishing industrial zones became very attractive for local VCP institutions from the 
1990s. Industrial zone creation allowed the local state to make money on the sale or lease 
of land to the companies operating the zones and subsequently the companies locating in 
the zones boosted the tax revenue and employment in the area. Provincial line ministries, 
particularly the Ministry of Construction and the Ministry of Agriculture, also derived 
income from the sale of large tracts of land (Hung 2007). The creation of industrial 
zones was largely a politically driven process involving non-market transactions under 
provincial and district authorities. After the first step of land use planning outlined 
above, the compulsory land recovery process gave the local state discretionary powers in 
terms of site approval and lease or allocation approval.  
 
Land in industrial zones was in very high demand and it often took two or three years for 
a firm to be allocated land within an industrial zone. Firms often had to provide extra 
benefits required by the local authorities to gain leasehold, for example by promising to 
employ a proportion of their work force from the local area.  In well managed zones, 
land was very expensive, out of the range of most domestic private firms, while cheaper 
industrial zoned land tended to be in ‘uncleared’ industrial zones where firms had to face 
the costs of compensation to existing occupiers and to prepare the land. In addition, 
infrastructure services in these sites tended to be limited (Carlier and Tran 2004). The 
poorer and more remote provinces have tended to impose higher entry requirements for 
firms wishing to locate in their industrial zones, for example with local input and 
employment requirements. Hence, while the formal price of the land is cheaper, the 
other costs make such options less economically attractive (Carlier and Tran 2004).  
 
By the end of 2004, 162 industrial zones had been approved by the government and 68 
were in operation, while 44 were under construction. The political implications of the 
expansion of industrial zones was significant given that seventy-six percent of land in 
industrial zones had been converted from agricultural land and on each site an average of 
over two thousand people had been affected (Hung 2007). The prices used to 
compensate occupiers for the acquisition of land use rights over their land proved to be 
one of the most contentious areas. As described above, prices for land taken under 
compulsory purchase orders were determined by the relevant People’s Committees. 
Farmers were only entitled to receive compensation based on the value of their land for 
agricultural use and therefore, did not share from the increase in value when the land was 
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converted into industrial use (Hung 2007). The problem of providing adequate 
compensation to existing land users was exacerbated by the fact that compensation levels 
were often inconsistent across administrative boundaries and across time so that farmers 
from the same area received different offers of compensation relating to the same 
development project.  
 
As a result, the creation of ‘new’ industrial land from re-zoning of agricultural land faced 
stiff political opposition from existing residents and users of the land. Such opposition 
has slowed the process considerably. The state sometimes responded to this by engaging 
the security forces to induce residents to move off land under compulsory purchase 
(Hung 2007). In some cases, land disputes disrupted investment plans. An example of a 
very large scale investment project that was delayed by land disputes was at the 30 
hectare An Khanh Industrial Zone in the Ha Tay province outside Hanoi. The residents 
of the area resisted the conversion of their land for many years claiming the 
compensation that they were being offered was too low. Many of the enterprises that 
were allocated land subsequently failed to find sufficient funding to initiate production in 
the Zone as investors were frightened off by the conflict (Carlier and Tran 2004). 
Another example occurred in the construction of the Trung Trac Industrial Zone in 
Hung Yen province. Here, additional retrospective compensation demands were made 
on enterprises that had received land use rights in previous years (Hung 2007). 
 
While corruption in land in many cases did not constrain economic growth, there were 
cases where the informal political pressures that mediated land management had a clear 
negative impact on investment. In some cases, the interests of local government in profit 
making from land went against the interests of the central party to achieve development 
goals. As well as exposing local level corruption in land in the media and pursuing local 
corrupt local officials through the courts, the central party institutions tried to impose 
greater control over local party management of industrial zones by for example, setting 
time limits on approval processes (Hung 2007).  In reality, the power to control land 
seemed to be largely within local hands. An example of different levels of government 
struggling for control of land can be found in a major foreign investment deal involving 
Tata Steel. Tata Steel’s proposed steel project was delayed because of problems over land 
allocation. The USD 5 billion steel project was a joint venture between Tata Steel and the 
Vietnam Steel Corporation and the Vietnam Cement Industries. The project involved the 
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construction of an integrated steel mill in the Ha Tinh province. The Planning 
Department gave clearance for 1,100 hectares of land to be available for the project 
within an economic zone. Problems emerged, however, as the local VCP organisation 
had granted land access to firms in parallel to the central VCP institutions. Too many 
projects were accepted within the same economic zone by the local authorities in charge 
of setting up the industrial zone and there was not sufficient space to accommodate 
these firms alongside the proposed steel mill (John 2008). It was not immediately 
possible for the central state to grant the land that it had promised to Tata Steel, despite 
the considerable size of investment and the fact that it had been firmly behind the 
investment deal. 
 
Another impact of the greater power of local level VCP institutions on land transition 
was that they often lacked sufficient staff and budgets to manage the land transition well. 
This meant that frequently the offices responsible were weak and there were overlapping 
responsibilities and control between the provincial level and district state authorities 
(Gomez-Ibanez 2008). Further, the content of land use plans tended to be based on 
politically generated targets (Hung 2007) influenced by where real promoters and city 
officials believed the profits would be highest and the resistance lowest (Gomez-Ibanez 
2008) rather than on rational planning to accommodate changing economic demands for 
land. 
 
Many private sector businesses faced restrictions on growth because of lack of availability 
of suitable land and the high price of land. Tenev et al (2003) found that most companies 
said they would expand if they had more reliable and cheaper access to land. Despite the 
growth in officially designated land for national and foreign firms, most industry and 
commerce owned by domestic businesses was not located on land that had been 
officially designated for such activities. Very few domestic private firms could afford to 
operate within an Industrial Zone or hold the correct LUR. As a result most domestic 
private businesses had to rely on their own residential land. This is clear from the 
evidence gathered by Tenev et al (2003), in Table 5.1 below, who interviewed 746 private 
enterprises on their land tenure across Vietnam. 
 
Table 5.1: Land Tenure Type  
Land Tenure Type % of sample 
Leasing land in industrial zones 8% 
Renting residential land from households 13% 
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Renting land from SOEs 14% 
Using owners residential land 50% 
Other 15% 
 Source: Adapted from Tenev et al (2003) 
 
Overall, expansion of economic activities was restricted by the high formal and informal 
cost of land in Vietnam under liberalisation. These high prices were partially a reflection 
of the fervour of activity in land markets, often driven by the actions of local party 
institutions which had hoarded land to make profits for their related businesses in real 
estate and land management (Gainsborough 2003). Rising land prices were a major 
feature of the economy since the mid 1990s. There were intense periods of land price 
speculation, for example in 1995 and in 2000. During these periods, market prices rose to 
among the highest in the world relative to GDP (Carlier and Tran 2004). Another factor 
in the lack of availability of suitable land for expansion of economic activities was the 
control that SOEs exercise over land. SOEs had privileged access to land as they were 
granted land for an indefinite period by the state or paid rents to the state at a subsidised 
rate of twenty to forty percent of the market based rents (Staff 2009). SOEs typically had 
more land than they could use efficiently, while private enterprises had to wait many 
years to be allocated appropriate land officially (Tenev et al. 2003).  
 
Formally SOEs were only permitted to use the land for the purposes for which it was 
allocated and were not allowed to sub-lease or sell it without permission from the state. 
In addition, as land was treated as having no consumption value in the Marxist value 
theory adopted by the state, the price at which SOEs were evaluated for equitization did 
not formally reflect the value of land which they occupied. In reality, land was often the 
most valuable asset that SOEs had under their control. SOEs had little incentive to lease 
or sell their land through formal mechanisms as they were not officially allowed to retain 
the proceeds. In some cases, SOEs rented their land illegally. For example, an 
investigation by the provincial Economic Committee in HCMC found that more than 3.8 
out of 6.3 million square metres of public land lots and houses allocated for use by SOEs  
were being illegally rented out to the private sector (Staff 2009). In many cases, however, 
SOEs simply occupied the land without putting it to productive use. For example, in 
HCMC, land lots of up to 60,000 square metres owned by SOEs had been neglected and 
left unused for years (Nam 2009). The attitude of provincial Party institutions to SOEs 
hoarding land in this way was ambiguous. While the provincial Party Committee of 
HCMC revoked 165 plots owned by SOEs, covering 605,900 square meters (Nam 2009), 
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SOEs would not have been able to maintain control of the land nor engage in illegal 
renting or sale of their land without the complicity of the local and provincial level 
administration (Staff 2009).  
 
The ability of the lower levels of the VCP and SOEs to exercise significant political and 
economic control over the land transition under liberalisation facilitated certain forms of 
land transfers where they had a direct economic interest. Similarly to the situation with 
regard to corruption in public finances, if a faction within the VCP at the local level 
could find a way of using land that provided enough return to satisfy that group, it could 
feasibly go ahead with the action. Competition between lower level organisations may 
have driven officials to look for productive uses of land that could generate greater 
returns over time and, therefore, attract greater protection from higher levels within the 
VCP. However, this distribution of power also meant that the central VCP could not 
effectively discipline lower levels of the Party and many land transactions were merely 
speculative, rather than productive.  
 
5.3  Tanzania 
 
5.3.1 Historical Overview of Land Management 
 
The struggle to tame the land in a context of low population density meant that over 
most of Tanzania during the pre-colonial period, the pattern of land use was primarily 
based on shifting cultivation patterns (Iliffe 1979). There were varying practices 
surrounding land tenure under different social and agricultural systems such as 
pastoralism, banana cultivation in areas of heavy rainfall, special areas of intensive 
cultivation such as the irrigated settlement at Engaruka and on the island of Ukara in 
Lake Victoria where all land was owned by the oldest male in the household and was 
divided between sons on marriage (Iliffe 1971). Changing land tenure would also have 
been driven by trade with Zanzibar whose growth as a major trading centre for slaves 
and ivory caused increasing demands for food, which led to agricultural specialization 
and exchange production in mainland Tanzania (Iliffe 1979).   
 
The exchange driven processes of change in land tenure as a result of trade with 
Zanzibar were brought to a halt with the German conquest of Tanganyika in the 1880s. 
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As under other colonial regimes (Mamdani 1997), the Germans introduced a dual land 
tenure system based on the distinction between ‘customary’ land rights and statutory land 
rights. Customary rights were based on the assumption that individual ownership of the 
land did not exist traditionally in Tanzania and did not need to be protected in law. 
Among peasants and pastoralists, therefore, ownership was established through 
membership of a ‘native’ community, these ownership rights had no legal protection 
through the colonial state (Tenga). As outlined in Chapter Three, village level chiefs who 
had been elevated to official positions within the colonial government structure were 
responsible for land issues. They depended on the support of powerful clans and families 
within the village (Daley 2005). Their role was to maintain the traditional patterns of land 
transaction and land holdings while at the same time implementing colonial policy 
towards increasing the productivity of peasant agriculture. In contrast, in the urban 
sector and on plantations, land ownership was controlled by statute, and ownership was 
supported by documentary proof in the form of title deeds. Probably one of the most 
important aspects of colonial land policy was the vesting of radical title, and thus the 
ultimate ownership and control of all lands, in the state. 
 
This land rights structure was concretized under the British with the Land Ordinance of 
1923 (Shivji 1998). The British land policy continued along the same basic principles 
established under German colonialism. The policy aimed to protect settlers and 
plantations in the face of conflicting interests with existing peasant communities. Land 
could, therefore, be alienated from peasants to new settlers on the basis that the land was 
not in productive use (Shivji 1998). However, the colonial state was also unwilling to 
push a radical programme of land transition in the face of political resistance from 
Tanzanians. The ambiguous attitude towards customary tenure was perpetuated, partly as 
a result of the status of Tanganyika as a Trust Territory under the League of Nations. 
This had imposed a duty on the British to protect indigenous rights with the long term 
aim of eventually returning the land to Tanzanians. There were increasing pressures for 
change in land tenure during the British colonial period. The first was the development 
of plantation and settler agriculture, the second was the evolution of African capitalist 
farming, which was encouraged by the colonial state after 1940. The promotion of settler 
agriculture never became official colonial policy under the Germans, or the British, and 
thus remained modest for most of the colonial period. By the time that the plantation 
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sector had grown to a substantial size, a rival African cash crop sector had developed 
(Iliffe 1971).  
 
In terms of the consequences for land tenure, the limited spread of plantation agriculture 
meant that peasant land tenure patterns remained largely intact. This is in contrast, for 
example, to Kenya where the Kikuyu were expropriated by powerful European farmers. 
Prior to the late 1940s, the basic principle of British agricultural policy in Tanzania had 
been to preserve peasant farming and stabilize peasant farming systems through 
promoting forms of communal land tenure which the British had construed as 
traditional. This attitude changed towards a desire to increase capitalist farming following 
the second-world-war, partly due to the increased metropolitan demands for agricultural 
produce, but also due to the emerging political pressures from a class of wealthy African 
farmers (Iliffe 1971).    
 
Despite the changing direction of colonial land policy as the colonial period drew to a 
close, peasant land tenure remained stronger politically than the emerging pressures for 
freehold and formal land markets. An attempt by the colonial Government to introduce 
individual freehold land rights to Tanganyika in 1958 was resisted by the nationalists. 
While in Kenya, nationalists campaigned for years for freehold rights, the nationalists in 
Tanzania, led by TANU, actively campaigned against this change (Iliffe 1979). While 
there was a growing group of African capitalist farmers who wanted to change the law, 
this group did not hold sufficient weight to influence TANU, which feared that the law 
would simply strengthen the non-African farmers that dominated the capitalist 
agricultural sector. 
 
On Independence, in 1962, all land was nationalized and placed under the ultimate 
control of the President and in 1972 the Native Authorities that had held control in the 
regions were abolished. In terms of control over village level lands, this meant that 
formal responsibility was vested in the new Village Councils (Daley 2005), which in many 
places were simply a re-configuration of existing power structures at the village level. In 
1967 the government also nationalized a number of large farms that had been established 
in the colonial period under leasehold tenure and set up parastatal farming companies 
(Coulson 1982), probably the best know of which was the Tanzania-Canada wheat 
growing scheme under the National Agricultural and Food Corporation (Freeman 1982). 
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These farm nationalizations were marginal compared to the vast area of land that was 
held under customary ownership. In this regard, the most important process concerning 
land in the post-independence era was the policy of Villagization which was a central 
component of Nyerere’s Ujamaa programme.  
 
The Villages and Ujamaa Village (Villagization) Act was adopted in 1975 with the 
intention of grouping people into viable villages rather than scattered settlements. The 
eventual aim was to establish co-operative farming of shared lands. In fact, the 
compulsory process of locating all rural inhabitants into recognised villages run by 
Village Councils started before this in 1973 and was the largest resettlement effort in the 
history of Africa. The Village Council had responsibility for allocating land to 
households. Each household was granted a homestead plot of 0.5 ha and communal 
lands were also maintained by the Village Council that were intended to be farmed and 
used co-operatively by the village inhabitants. By the close of the Ujamaa period, 
Tanzania had a more equal distribution of land compared to other African countries of a 
similar income level. For example, in 1983 Tanzania had a land Gini co-efficient of 0.35 
while the Gini co-efficient was 0.55 in Kenya, 0.55 in Somalia, and 0.64 in Ghana (Ghai 
and Radwan 1983). 
 
5.3.2 The Reform of the Land Laws 
 
Parallel to developments in Vietnam, the formal land laws constructed around 
cooperative land ownership and villagization were beginning to fragment from the inside 
by the end of the 1970s (Kerkvliet 2005). This process was driven by villagers who 
resisted working on communal lands, the subversion of regulations surrounding land 
allocations by those with power within the village (Kerkvliet 2005), and population 
pressures which meant that village governments were no longer able to provide younger 
people and newcomers with land (Daley 2005). These features led to the emergence of 
informal land markets. In 1983 the National Agricultural policy recognised these changes 
and permitted private ownership of land within the boundaries of the village (Tenga). 
Despite the official policy that forbade formal village land markets prior to this, actually, 
there has been a much longer process of commodification of land within the communal, 
‘customary’, land tenure systems that were dominant in Tanzania.  
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An extensive land reform process began in 1991 with the establishment of the 
Presidential Commission on Land Reform under Professor Issa Shivji. Its 
recommendations were to establish strong security for peasant land rights at the village 
level (United Republic of Tanzania 1996). A National Land Policy was adopted in 1995 
and the final land laws were enacted in 1999. The Acts deviated from the conclusions of 
the Commission in a number of important areas. In the Acts, the Ministry of Lands, 
supported by numerous consultants sought to strengthen the role of land markets and 
the rights of new investors in lands as opposed to the Commission, which focused on 
securing customary tenure (Shivji 1998). The outcome was a set of laws that attempted to 
combine these contradictory pressures (Manji 2001). The final Acts had three main 
features; first, the formal registration of individual land claims, whether statutory or 
customary, second, increasing the marketability of land but with a high degree of 
bureaucratic discretion, and third, formalizing decentralised control over village lands 
under Village Councils. Thus the corpus of land reforms was very similar in many aspects 
to the land reforms implemented in Vietnam over the same period. 
 
The new land legislation consisted of two land acts of 1999. These were the Land Act 
which covered the general category of land including urban and reserve land and the 
Village Land Act. Reserved land was defined as land that the state was planning to use 
for purposes such as environmental protection areas as well as land set aside for spatial 
planning and future infrastructure development. This accounted for around 28% of the 
land area. Village land was defined as land within the boundaries of the village. This 
category covered around 70% of land in Tanzania and supported 80% of the population. 
Only 2% of land was classified as general (mainly urban) land supporting 20% of the 
population (Kironde 2009). While the Village Land Act and the Land Act set up different 
processes for the recognition of land rights and rights over transactions, all land was still 
ultimately under the ownership of the President of Tanzania and he had the power to 
transfer any area of village land to the category of general or reserved land for the public 
interest. Further, unused or unoccupied Village Land was defined as general land in the 
Land Act, thus putting it automatically under the control of the President rather than the 
Village Councils (Olenasha 2006).  
 
5.3.3 Title Recognition and Registration 
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Registering formal title over land was pivotal to the policy on land in Tanzania based on 
the economic logic outlined in the Introduction to this Chapter. Most land in Tanzania 
lacked formal records of ownership yet across the country land was ‘owned’ and used by 
groups and individuals without formal documentation and there were often multiple 
competing claims of ownership. One of the most important aspects of the Village Land 
Act was that it removed the distinction between customary and granted land rights by 
making both equally recognizable within the law (Palmer 1999). The processes for 
recognising and recording title were different according to the type of land. For general, 
reserved and urban land under the Land Act, title required statutory documentation to be 
presented to the Ministry of Lands, for development or use conditions to be fulfilled and 
any fees to be met. The Commissioner for Lands at the Ministry of Land, Housing and 
Urban Development (MLHUD) was vested with the formal role of approving titles but 
in reality this power was decentralised to District Land Officers in the 132 local 
authorities (Derby 2006). Five zonal land registries were established to record titles 
within their respective regions and feed information back to the central Registrar of 
Lands (Kironde 2009). 
 
For Village lands, the intention of the land laws was to decentralise control to the village 
level. The Village Councils were vested with the formal power to register and administer 
land within their boundaries. Prior to this, Village Councils had maintained records of 
land ownership and transactions but these did not have the same formal status as 
statutory land rights recognised and recorded at the central level by the Ministry of 
Lands. Under the new laws, the Village Council was required to first obtain a certificate 
of village land that involved determining borders with neighbouring villages. The village 
was then required to identify three sorts of lands within its borders – communal village 
land, individual and family land, and reserved land. Villagers and non-villagers could 
apply to receive a Certificate of Customary Rights of Occupancy, which could be 
allocated by the Village Council based on the length of occupancy and development of 
the land. The Village Council would then issue a Letter of Offer stating development 
conditions, yearly rents and any fees (Sundet 2005). Once the fees had been paid and 
agreed, the Village would issue the Certificate of Occupancy and would register the land 
in the Village Land Register. This information would then be shared with the regional 
land registries. 
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On both General and Village lands, if development conditions were not met, the land 
could be reclaimed by the state and be re-allocated to new owners. This was supposed to 
reduce land speculation (Sundet 2005). Where disputes over ownership occurred for 
Village lands, the dispute resolution mechanism relied first on the Village Land Council 
Dispute Committee, set up as part of the Village Council. Impartial adjudicators could 
then be called upon if a resolution was not forthcoming. Finally, land dispute settlements 
could be decided by the Courts under the Land Disputes Settlements Act of 2002 
(Kironde 2009). The courts, however, were very effective at resolving land dispute cases 
and the Commissioner for Lands retained an important role in adjudicating in land 
disputes. Despite the commitment to decentralisation, formal power over land 
transactions remained fairly centralised under liberalisation. 
 
5.3.4 Buying and Selling Land 
 
Contradictory pressures to create fully functioning land markets but also to protect small 
holders from expropriation by larger investors, meant that the intentions of the new land 
laws with regard to markets were rather confused. The Land Act itself set up a 
straightforward process for buying land in urban areas or under the category of general 
and reserved lands. If the land was free of title disputes and had already been registered 
at the Ministry of Lands the seller had first to obtain an official search at the Land 
Registry. If all taxes had been paid, then a valuation report had to be obtained. A 
government valuer would inspect the property to determine its value. The disposition of 
the property had to be formally approved by the Commissioner for Lands; in practice, 
this meant that approval had to be given at the level of the district land office. This 
required full documentation of ownership and an official valuation of the land. The 
official fees for completion of a land purchase transaction were very low. However, the 
actual costs involved in selling or buying land were usually much higher in reality due to 
the significant bureaucratic corruption in land management. Transacting partners often 
had to pay bribes to officials to recognise the various steps of a sale (United Republic of 
Tanzania 1996).  
 
Informal land market transactions actually had a long history in Tanzania. In both the 
colonial and socialist periods, formal land markets were severely restricted. While the 
main direction of policy was to strengthen market processes, particularly through the 
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Land Act Amendment of 2004, there was still a high degree of bureaucratic control over 
land transactions under liberalisation. This political control over land transactions was 
exercised from the village level up to the highest level of the state. The level of the state 
that was in control of the transactions varied depending on the size and scope of the 
transaction in question. District land officers had an official and direct role in managing 
land. Considerable powers were vested in district council land offices to determine prices 
and allocations of land and to refuse to let transactions take place if they contravened 
numerous conditions, for example, that the land had not been sufficiently developed 
(Sundet 2005). For Village Lands, if the owner leased or sold land held under a 
Customary Right of Occupancy, it became a ‘derivative’ right. The state also held 
considerable powers over these ‘derivative’ rights transactions. The Village Council had 
the power to veto the issuing of a derivate right and to establish joint ventures with 
domestic and foreign firms who wanted to use Village Land. 
 
For large investment projects, however, land sales were under the discretion of the 
central state.  For land over 250 hectares, the final decision was reserved for the Minister 
of Lands. The new laws that vested considerable power in District level authorities and 
above for large land transactions meant that the ability of the Village Assembly to use 
formal mechanisms to halt a land transaction was weak relative to the formal power of 
higher level state institutions. In rural areas the people with the greatest formal political 
authority were the District Commissioners, the Regional Commissioners, (who were 
Presidential appointees) and important village leaders, who often also have an official 
position within the Village CCM and state institutions (Kelsall et al. 2005). Aside from 
the formal process of land management, those with formal and informal political power 
were able to influence land transactions under liberalisation through more informal 
forms of political mobilisation, such as by organising popular protests or bribing local 
security officials to harass investors.  
 
The formal regulations surrounding foreign ownership of land were, on one level, 
unequivocal. Non-nationals were not allowed to ‘own’ land and individual Tanzanians 
were not allowed to sell land directly to non-nationals. There were a number of routes 
however, in practice through which foreign companies were able to gain rights to land in 
Tanzania. For Village Lands, investors had to reach a deal with the Village Council to put 
together a joint investment plan, which would then have to be approved by the District 
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Council Land Committee (Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice 2010). Once this 
was approved, the land would be transferred from Village to General status, making it 
available to be leased by the foreign investor.  Foreign companies were allowed to hold 
derivative rights over this land. For land classified as General Land, foreign investors 
were required to go through the Tanzania Investment Centre. Foreign investors could 
formally only lease General lands if approved by the Tanzania Investment Centre and if 
they were in target investment sectors covered under the 1997 Investment Act (Sundet 
2005). Compensation to existing land owners was based on rates determined by the 
Commissioner for Lands. As in Vietnam, compensation rates reflected what the land has 
been previously used for and in many cases where the land had not been formally 
developed, it was assigned a very low value, regardless of its potential value to the 
investors. 
 
For Village Lands, in practice it was the investor who was responsible for negotiating and 
compensating existing land users. For General Land, the TIC was supposed to have 
undertaken negotiations with Villagers on behalf of investors. In order to facilitate 
foreign investment in Tanzania, the TIC established a Land Bank in 1998. This was 
essentially a depository of records of lands that were deemed to be suitable for 
investment (Olenasha 2006). Much of this land was the privatised land assets of defunct 
parastatals. Officially, the Land Bank had 743 land parcels which covered 3.14 million 
hectares of land. The idea behind the land bank was that the TIC would act as a mediator 
between the potential investor and the village and would, therefore, facilitate mutually 
beneficial land transactions. The success of the Land Bank was, however, quite limited. 
Some land was sold via the Land Bank, including land in prime beach locations and some 
land held by ex-parastatal companies such as the Mufindi Paper Mills in Iringa (Olenasha 
2006). Local level conflicts over the land that was supposed to be in the Land Bank 
meant that in reality it was not a very effective way of delivering new land rights to 
investors (Global Exchange 2009).  
 
5.3.5 Corruption and Primitive Accumulation Associated with Land Transition 
under Liberalisation 
 
The formal arrangements outlined in the previous sections suggest that new investors 
should have been able to acquire land through transparent processes that also gave rights 
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to existing land holders to just compensation. In reality, the type of land transition that 
occurred apace across Tanzania largely happened outside the formal remit of the state 
land management systems (Manji 2001). The manner in which the distribution of power 
affected processes of corruption and primitive accumulation in land had important 
implications for the economic transition under liberalisation.  
 
The predominance of informal transactions was partly a result of the slow establishment 
of formal market mechanisms for land management. For example, the actual process of 
establishing formal title was very slow. By 2008, only about 2% of rural land, and 20% of 
urban land, carried titles; overall there were only 165,000 registered land parcels out of 8 
million land parcels that were still to be registered (Kironde 2009). The establishment of 
the institutions and capacities needed to implement the new laws also proceeded very 
slowly and the process was very dependent on donor funded programmes in specific 
districts. For example, by 2005, only 40% of villages had a village land council and only 
20% were functional (Pedersen 2010).  
 
The formal land reforms did very little to constrain the growing corruption in land 
transactions and the widespread unrest over land issues. The extent of contestation over 
land is also evident from the findings of the Presidential Ad-hoc Committees which were 
established by the newly incumbent President Kikwete in 2005. The disputes submitted 
to these committees are outlined in Table 5.2 below: 
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Table 5.2: Disputes submitted to the Presidential Ac-hoc Committees, May-2006 
 
Nature of the Dispute 
 
Numbers 
Lack of adequate compensation in cases of compulsory land 
acquisition 
2,717 
 
Double allocation 1,355 
Plot and farm invasion     1,225 
Stopped from developing the plots     936 
Invasion of open or other public spaces   714 
Failure to develop the plots     639 
Taking plots without following proper procedures 605 
Change in land uses without following proper procedures 469 
Plots and farms being taken 453 
Showing prospective owner the wrong plot 348 
Failure to give letters of offer after plot allocation 202 
Boundary disputes 179 
Plot allocation without following proper procedures 167 
Boundary changes by surveyors 156 
Wealthier people taking over farms belonging to poorer 
people    
81 
Surveying of squatter areas 44 
Levying of land rent without following procedures 15 
Other disputes 3,453 
Total 13,758 
Source: Kironde 2009 
 
As in Vietnam, there was a high degree of corruption associated with land matters under 
liberalisation. The extensive role of corruption and informality within the emerging land 
market framework is very similar to the situation in many other developing countries, for 
reasons outlined in Chapter Two. Despite high levels of corruption and frequent 
incidents of popular protest against particular land deals, in neither country did these 
incidents spiral into widespread civil unrest. In both countries the institutionalisation of 
political competition within the party structures helped to maintain a higher degree of 
social order in the face of structural change in patterns of land tenure. There were, 
however, important differences in the way that informality impacted on land transition 
that then had implications for the pace of economic transition under liberalisation. 
Differences in the political settlement under liberalisation in the two countries affected 
the pace at which land was transferred to new economic activities. This is explored next 
through the cases of land corruption in different sectors in Tanzania.  
 
5.3.6 Land for Mining 
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Mining was a rapid growth sector under liberalisation, as described in Chapter One, with 
new mining sites opening and existing mining sites being expanded and the transfer of 
small scale mining operations to larger international mining companies whose operations 
covered larger areas of land.  The 1998 Mining Act set up different ownership patterns 
over mineral rights in land from the rights over land established by the land laws outlined 
above. Rights over land were legally separated from rights over minerals found in the 
land. The Land Acts established rights over the surface land and below but excluded 
rights over minerals and petroleum (Hernandez 2003). With the expansion of the sector 
and the changing patterns of production from small scale mining to larger international 
companies, there were a growing number of disputes over land within the sector. Yet, 
while the tensions between small scale miners and international mining companies over 
mining rights spilled over into civil unrest, the land requirements of the sector were met 
overall without generating high levels of conflict.  
 
One of the reasons for this was that power over issuing mining licences and resolving 
disputes surrounding land issues that might arise with respect to mining were highly 
centralised under the Commissioner for Minerals and the Minister responsible for 
Minerals (Lange 2008). The Mining Act gave the Minister responsible the right to 
designate any ‘vacant’ area as an area exclusively reserved for prospecting and mining 
operations (United Republic of Tanzania 1998) without specifying exactly what ‘vacant’ 
land meant. Most mines were on land classified as General Land (Hernandez 2003) 
although given that Village Land could be transferred to the category of General Land 
based on a decision of the President, as described above, it may be that some mines were 
established on land that was historically defined as Village land. Legally, the landowner 
should receive rents from the companies or miners for the use of the land, but small 
scale miners who were usually immigrants to the area were often already in dispute with 
local landholders before the larger mining companies appeared on the scene.  
 
Most of the conflicts over mining and land rights were solved by private agreement and 
involved the regional mining offices playing the role of arbitrators between mining firms 
and local land holders or mining rights holders (Hernandez 2003).  Lange (2008) 
describes a number of cases that involved conflict between small scale miners and 
international mining companies. Most of these cases primarily concerned the conflicts 
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between small scale miners and international mining companies over mining rights, 
rather than over land. In these cases, land was not a contentious issue as the land had 
already been mined and, therefore, competing claims for its use had been dealt with 
informally over a longer period of time. Under liberalisation, international mining 
operations tended to occupy larger areas of land that were blocked off with security 
fences in order to exclude small scale miners. In these cases, the Commissioner for 
Lands was involved in establishing a settlement between existing land owners and 
companies. A few cases went to court over settlement payments, for example, at the 
Bulyanhulu gold mine there were disputes between the company and the local authority 
over the appropriate level of compensation to land owners (Hernandez 2003). There 
were also tensions between mining companies and pastoralists over land and access to 
water on land identified for mining activities (Lange 2008). One other important factor in 
explaining the relatively low level of conflict surrounding the land aspect of mining is the 
asymmetric power relations between international mining companies and local 
communities. International mining companies invested in private security by bringing in 
guards and security officials. They did not have to rely on local provision of security 
provided by regional or district officials to the same extent as other smaller scale 
investors. 
 
Nevertheless, in most of the disputes that have reached the media, district officers 
normally supported the international company’s claims rather than the land interests of 
the local people (Lange 2008). This was in contrast to the position taken by many MPs 
representing areas where mining was taking place who spoke out vociferously against 
international mining companies, reflecting the sentiment that these companies returned 
very little to the local communities. The most senior politicians, however, such as 
President Mkapa supported the expansion of international mining activities (Dean 2001). 
High level support and a centralised system for granting rights over mining and over land 
aided the formal process of land transition to mining companies. Conflicts at a local level 
have been muted, perhaps because of the existing pattern of small scale mining and the 
co-option of district level leaders by mining companies.  
 
Forms of primitive accumulation such as land grab by people with political connections 
played a role in the transfer of new land into mining activities. For example, it was 
reported that in the Mpwapwa district where ruby mining had been undertaken by small 
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scale miners, large areas of land were grabbed by the District Commissioner as well as by 
local MPs, a district security officer, and leaders of CCM, the CCM youth wing, the 
women’s wing, the parents’ wing and their family members (Staff 2009). Undocumented 
reports based on personal communication11 indicate that similar land grabs also occurred 
with land that was subsequently mined for gold involving senior politicians, although no 
cases were ever prosecuted or exposed in the media. These incidents suggest that initial 
primitive accumulation in land through land transfers based on the use of formal 
executive power as well as land-grabbing by people with strong political connections may 
have facilitated the transition of land use towards mining under liberalisation. 
 
5.3.7 Land for Agriculture 
 
The transition of land in agriculture is a much more complex story. Agriculture is the 
most important sector in terms of output and employment and, while small scale farming 
remained dominant under liberalisation, there were diverse land holding patterns across 
the country. Large commercial tea and coffee estates of the Southern Highlands 
coexisted with smallholder coffee and horticulture that dominated production around 
Kilimanjaro. The pace of transition in rural land appeared to speed up under 
liberalisation, with more land under cultivation and larger farms emerging, but also with 
rising levels of land speculation. As with land rights in the mining sector, the transfer of 
property rights over agricultural land occurred mainly outside the formal framework and 
with high levels of conflict, as shown by the increasing number of demonstrations, riots, 
clashes with security forces and deaths resulting from land disputes in rural areas 
(Hirschler 2004).  
 
A number of factors drove the land transition process in rural areas with different types 
of political involvement and different implications for longer term economic dynamism. 
One factor has been an expansion of the total amount of land under agricultural 
production. In the 1990s, the agricultural growth process was largely driven by the 
expansion of land under production (Gordon 2007). The proportion of land under 
regular cultivation was quite low in Tanzania, so farms of all sizes expanded production 
by taking more land into use (Utz 2007), rather than adopting higher productivity 
                                                 
11
 Interview with employee from the mining sector, name withheld by mutual agreement, Dar es Salaam, 
August, 2006. 
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farming techniques. Much of the land that was integrated into agricultural production in 
the 1990s would have been used by pastoralists, or as a source of non-agricultural food 
for local communities from woodland. This is reflected in the many cases of conflict 
between pastoralists and settled farming communities in Tanzania (Myenzi 2009). 
 
In addition, there was a slow re-emergence of larger privately owned farms. This 
continued a longer term trend that had been brought to a temporary halt under the 
socialist period. The process was partly driven by the return of land that had been 
confiscated from larger land owners during Villagization (Shivji 1998). Larger farms also 
emerged through the privatisation process as land that had been nationalised in the 
establishment of agricultural parastatals was sold off under liberalisation. While this land 
was supposed to be under the management of the Land Bank, in reality much of it was 
directly redistributed to people with strong political links to the state (Gibbon 1995). In 
the Arusha region in the horticulture sector, a lot of private estates that had been 
established during the colonial era were nationalised under Ujamaa and then broken up 
again in the 1980s. People with the right political connections were able to obtain this 
land, but there were considerable disputes over ownership with local villagers and 
investors (Kelsall 2003).  
 
A third factor in agricultural land transition under liberalisation was the increasing level 
of international investment in land globally. The reasons for this included food security 
concerns in rich countries, expansion of bio-fuel production, rising commodity prices 
and expectations of land price rises (Cotula et al. 2009). Large scale land claims were still 
only a small proportion of total land claims in Tanzania (Cotula et al. 2009) but they grew 
significantly in importance over the period of liberalisation. One reason why Tanzania 
was seen to be an attractive investment location for biofuels was the perception that land 
rights were quite weak (Sulle and Nelson 2009) and that there was a considerable amount 
of ‘underused’ land. The expansion of biofuel production has become a policy goal of 
the Government and there was increasing interest in biofuel production (Centre for 
Human Rights and Global Justice 2010). This did not necessarily involve the 
establishment of large farms, however, as biofuel production was also carried out on a 
contract basis with existing farmers (Sulle and Nelson 2009). Jatropha was the crop that 
was associated with some of the largest foreign investments and land acquisition 
proposals from foreign companies (Sulle and Nelson 2009). These land deals attracted 
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international concern over land grabbing and loss of land access for local residents of 
areas around Dar es Salaam, where the large scale jatropha plantations were established 
(Kachika 2009).  
 
The political settlement in Tanzania that generated higher levels of political stability may 
have encouraged international investment in land. However, other aspects of the 
distribution of power under liberalisation led to a slower land transition than that 
experienced in Vietnam. For example, despite official commitment to expand biofuel 
production and facilitate foreign investment in agriculture, the central state was not able 
to secure access to land rights for foreign investors to the extent that it intended. By 
2009, over four million hectares of land had been requested for biofuel investments, 
particularly for jatropha, sugarcane and oil palm. By 2008, 640,000 ha of land had been 
allocated for large scale investments in biofuels, but out of that, only 100,000 had been 
granted formal rights of occupancy (Sulle and Nelson 2009).  
 
Thus while an increasing number of projects were formally allocated land by the state, 
very few investors were able to obtain formal rights of occupancy of land (Gordon-
Maclean et al. 2008). Legal disputes over the allocated land and conflict between Villagers 
and investors slowed the process and increased the actual costs of buying land (Sulle and 
Nelson 2009). Often the key players in rural areas, the Regional Commissioners and 
District Commissioners went against the wishes of Village Assembly leaders and 
intervened to ensure land transfers to foreign investors took place. For example, a UK 
company, New Forest Limited, set up a carbon off-set project with a plan to plant mainly 
pine trees on 3,000 hectares of land. A lot of pressure came from central government on 
the Village Assembly to approve the request for land, which led to a transfer of the land 
from its status as Village Land to the status of General Land which made it leasable to 
the foreign company. While the lease of land to the foreign company went ahead with 
the backing of the central state and the Regional Commissioner, Villagers were able to 
stop the investors gaining access to the land (Kachika 2009). Another example of the 
difficulty that the central state had in enforcing land transfers that were not supported by 
local Villagers included the case of Bioshape, a Dutch/Belgian company, that acquired 
33,000 hectares of land for investment. The land contract was signed with the Regional 
Commissioner without the villagers being aware of the deal (Kachika 2009), which led to 
resentment and resistance at the village level.  
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Kelsall (2005) also described a case of a foreign investor who had bought land that had 
originally been parastatal land. The purchase was resisted by the local villagers and the 
investor had to use political connections at the highest level within CCM to put pressure 
on the Regional Commissioner to intervene. The high level political intervention did lead 
the Regional Commissioner to intervene and ensure that the District Commissioner 
supported the investor by persuading the villagers to accept his land claim. Sufficient 
hierarchical control existed within CCM for the centre to be able to sway lower levels of 
the Party structure. However, despite commitments of senior CCM officials, the Villagers 
continued to encroach upon the land and undermine the effective property rights of the 
investor. The investor had to maintain a significant private security presence to maintain 
control over the land. These cases of resistance by villagers to land transfers suggest that 
the central party institutions did not have sufficient power over lower levels of society to 
enforce their desired property rights changes. Local power holders inside and outside the 
formal state structures were able to successfully mobilise to protect their existing 
property rights, even though the hierarchy within the Party structure appeared to be 
respected.  
 
Another example of a failure of the central state to override local political dynamics 
occurred with British investors in the Killimanjaro region in Northern Tanzania. The 
investors finally lost their land and their case was taken up by British Parliamentarians, so 
some of the details of the case are in the public domain (HC Deb 2008). In 2004, the 
investors leased land from the owner who was related to Reginald Mengi, a media mogul 
in Tanzania. The payment for the lease involved both parties holding shares of the 
company holding title to the land. The land was to be used for trials of genetically 
modified crops and a US company started carrying out trials but eventually pulled out of 
the business. It was claimed by the Tanzanian partner that the company was bankrupt 
and that he therefore had the right to reclaim the land for re-sale. The investor claimed 
that the company still operational and that there were no legitimate grounds for 
removing his leasehold on the land. In 2005 the Tanzanian partner attempted to re-sell 
the lease for the land to a neighbouring farmer (who was also an expatriate). Court cases 
were started by both sides to claim legitimate rights over the land. The conflict 
intensified and the investor and the managers and workers at the farm started to be 
intimidated by the local police and thugs bought in by the Tanzanian partner.  
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Various high level interventions were undertaken by the British Government in support 
of the investor and senior Tanzanian politicians voiced their support. However, on the 
ground, intimidation continued and the investor was arrested as was his Tanzanian 
management team. Despite official pledges of support, local intimidation continued. The 
local police and judiciary were firmly on the Tanzanian partner’s side and the 
intimidation continued over a three year period. At the national political level, statements 
of support to the investors were given when there were interventions by the 
representatives of the British Government but these were not followed through on the 
ground. There were a host of legal cases in the courts surrounding the lease of this land 
and the claims and counter claims of illegality and intimidation. In the end the investor 
fled the country in 2008. This is an example of how, despite high level political 
commitment to the investors, they were overridden by local level political dynamics and 
the use of security people to destroy the effective property rights of the investor. While 
CCM has well established hierarchical rules of authority within its institutions, actual 
control over society is more limited. This means that it is possible for people with 
economic and political power at the local level to block actions of the central state. The 
reasons for the weakness of central level political authority vis-à-vis local levels are 
however different from Vietnam, as set out in section 5.4 below.  
 
Despite the formal commitment to encouraging private sector investment in agricultural 
land under liberalisation, the actual political commitment within CCM to a capitalist 
transition process in land where rights would be transferred to private businesses was 
much more ambiguous. The legacy of the formative socialist political settlement on the 
attitudes within CCM to a more overt capitalist land transition constrained the extent to 
which the state was prepared to sanction land transfers to new investors. This is in 
evidence in land cases where rights were supposed to be transferred from parastatals to 
private sector investors. Under the formative socialist political settlement, land held by 
parastatals had privileged protection from the state. In the process of privatisation this 
was sometimes lost as land was transferred to new owners who had a more complicated 
relationship to state power. An example is reported by Ojalammi (2006) concerning a 
land dispute that emerged between the Soitsambu village in northern Tanzania and the 
parastatal company Tanzania Breweries Ltd, which was later to be privatised.  
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In 1984 Tanzania Breweries Ltd acquired land for a large scale agricultural project for 
commercial wheat and barley farming from the Soitsambu village. The land had been 
communal land used by the Maasai for homesteads and grazing. Ten years later, the local 
Maasai group raised a case to sue the company with the help of a local NGO. The land 
grant decision by the village authorities was taken to the High Court. During the course 
of the drawn out court case Tanzania Breweries Ltd went into a joint venture with a 
South African private company for barley production on the land. In 1994, the Maasai 
were told that they had lost the land case on the basis that the land was public land that 
had been granted to a state owned company TBL and, therefore, the land grant was legal. 
Following on from this decision and the privatisation of TBL, the land grant was 
transferred solely to the South African investors. Shortly afterwards, however, the land 
title was revoked and the land returned to the Maasai group on the basis that the 
utilization of land and resources was meant for wildlife conservation along with livestock 
grazing, not for large-scale agriculture (Ojalammi 2006).  The South African company 
could not protect its interest in the privatised land in the face of mobilised actors at the 
local level who put pressure on the central state to intervene in their favour. CCM had a 
formal commitment to an ideology of economic development based on the promotion 
of foreign investment, however, as this example shows, local political realities meant that 
this commitment sometimes failed to translate into active support to foreign investors. 
This contrasts with the mining sector where foreign mining companies received greater 
political protection. One of the reasons for this is that the high centralised rents 
generated by this sector contrast with the lower scope for centralised rent control from 
agriculture, as well as the greater scope for mining companies to use private means of 
protecting their property rights rather than relying on the Tanzanian state as described in 
the previous section. 
 
5.3.8 Urban Land, Manufacturing and Tourism 
 
While there is a low percentage of urban land in Tanzania, conflicts in semi-urban areas 
abound with the proliferation of land grab, informal markets and high levels of 
speculation (Kombe 2010). Much of this land had previously been under Village councils 
but the expansion of cities, particularly Dar es Salaam, merged the lines of authority over 
semi-urban land. Unlike Vietnam, the pressures on urban and semi-urban land were not 
primarily due to industrial expansion although there were cases, where industries 
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struggled with local authorities to get land in urban areas. One case involved land that 
had been allocated for the expansion of a cement factory on the outskirts of Dar es 
Salaam. This land that had originally been designated for industrial use in the 1979 Dar es 
Salaam Master Plan (Kombe 2010). The cement company, originally established as a 
parastatal in 1965 bought the title deeds to adjacent land from Village leaders in order to 
expand its activities in 1993 (James 2010). The company did not immediately develop the 
land and the company was privatized in 1998 and bought up by foreign investors, 
becoming a subsidiary of the Norwegian Cement giant Scancem (which has since 
become a subsidiary of the German company Heidelberg Cement). It changed its name 
to the Tanzania Portland Cement Company (Hargen 2008). In 2003, the company 
attempted to evict the residents but faced concerted opposition. The Villagers were taken 
to court by the company. Various court rulings were issued in favour of the company 
and in 2007 the inhabitants were ordered to leave the area by the courts (James 2010).  
 
The case became increasingly politicised as the villagers sought to resist eviction and raise 
awareness of their plight. Kombe (2010) reported that the municipal council was 
generally seen to be on the side of the company as key members had been paid off by the 
company while opposition parties CUF and CHADEMA were able to make political 
capital by supporting the villagers. Initially CCM was seen to be supporting the company 
but the rising unrest and political advantage that the opposition was able to gain led the 
Regional Commissioner to intervene in 2008 on the side of the Villagers and he 
overturned the court ruling in favour of the cement company (Kombe 2010) and allowed 
the residents to remain on the disputed land. This was despite the fact that TPCC, which 
was producing over 40% of Tanzania’s cement, threatened to reduce production if they 
were not allowed to take over the land (Kombe 2010).  
 
The multi-party aspect of the political system under liberalisation had an impact on the 
outcome of land transition in this case. While CCM was prepared to push through an 
unpopular land deal in the interests of wider economic development, opposition parties 
were able to give political voice to the opposition to the deal of local residents who 
would directly lose out from the transfer. While in the cases of failed land transfers 
discussed above, where fragmented political power at local levels allowed local power 
holders to block transfers to new investors, in this case, formal electoral competition may 
have slowed down a potentially productive land transfer. The trade-offs between the 
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potential for greater voice that multiparty politics in Tanzania may achieve and the need 
for directed state interventions to promote a productive economic transition defy the 
simplistic conclusions of the ‘good governance’ agenda about the benefits of multiparty 
politics for economic growth. 
 
Another critical feature of land transition in urban and semi-urban areas was the very 
rapid increase in the formal and informal cost of land due to speculative activities that 
have emerged as land has become increasingly marketized. Rising land prices encouraged 
corruption by politically connected people to grab land with the intention of hoarding 
land until market prices made it worthwhile to sell. These actions were very prevalent in 
prime beach locations across Tanzania, and particularly in Zanzibar, where expectations 
were high that future investors in the tourism sector would purchase the land at inflated 
prices. This may have facilitated investors in tourism over the period of liberalisation, in 
the same way as land grab facilitated the transfer of land rights to mining investors. 
There is no guarantee that these types of land speculation will necessarily lead to an 
economically positive land transition. For as long as the market price of land continues to 
rise there may be little incentive for entrepreneurs to put the land to productive use.  
 
The development criteria in the reformed Land Laws were meant to minimise hoarding 
by requiring that land invest in land or risk losing title to the land. However, these criteria 
could be met with minimum investment in building foundations rather than substantial 
land investment. Whether a land holder risked losing land due to lack of development 
depends depended on political connections to the state that enabled the land owner to 
resist legal development requirements. For many firms and households, land became by 
far their most valuable asset even without any investment in the land. This led to the 
sometimes perverse situation of previous manufacturing firms abandoning production in 
favour of renting out land for warehousing or lower value-added assembly type activities. 
For example, Khan (2010) discussed the case of a manufacturer whose most profitable 
activities changed from cashew processing to dependence on the rising value of the 
urban land owned by the company that had previously been used for production. The 
incentives around manufacturing are discussed further in the next chapter. 
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5.4 Discussion 
 
Similar approaches to land under the formative socialist political settlement in the two 
countries had created a highly egalitarian land distribution in rural areas and private land 
accumulation had been suppressed. State led primitive accumulation had also been quite 
limited. The reforms under liberalisation sought to reduce corruption and introduce 
transparent market based mechanisms, while retaining state control of the process of 
managing land transition in the interests of national economic development. However, in 
both countries strong elements of corruption and illegal primitive accumulation by 
individuals and institutions influenced the outcome of land transactions.  
 
Market processes operated with considerable informality and there was extensive 
manipulation and corruption associated with the formal processes of buying and selling 
land. In both countries there are examples of how the central Government attempted to 
direct this process. Overall, the most important dynamics were generated by local level 
political power holders. The different patterns in the distribution of power within the 
Party and society help to explain why Tanzania and Vietnam had different outcomes 
from this decentralised process. In Vietnam land transition was rapid and accommodated 
extensive transformation of agricultural land into land for industry and commerce. In 
Tanzania land transfers to accommodate new economic activities, such as mining, 
tourism and commercial agriculture, occurred. In both countries there were rising 
tensions surrounding land over the period of liberalisation, yet these tensions did not 
spill out into more serious cases of conflict of a kind that might have risked undermining 
the central authority of the state. The centralisation of political power within the CCM 
and VCP under the formative socialist political settlement may have reduced the scope of 
political organisers to mobilise around these issues.  
 
In Tanzania much of the land transfer to new investors occurred through fragmented 
land grab by people with political connections at different levels of the Party. Land for 
mining activities appeared to be one of the less controversial areas. Tensions usually 
focussed on mining rights rather than land rights. This was partly because small-scale 
mining had often occurred at the same locations over a long period and, therefore, land 
issues with existing land owners had been ‘resolved’ prior to the entry of the larger 
mining companies. The central leadership within the CCM gave formal backing to 
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protect the property rights of new investors but these were often not seen through in 
reality. Attempts to ring fence land for foreign and domestic investors through the Land 
Bank were not very successful. Attempts by the Tanzania Investment Centre to have an 
organised market based transfer of lands to new investors has been hampered by the fact 
that effective property rights over land by the state were not been established in the 
earlier period of socialist primitive accumulation. The transfer of ownership of the 
parastatal land back to private hands or to the TIC opened up scope for downward 
plundering of land rights by those with political power higher up the state. Yet with little 
effective monitoring of the productivity of land use or incentive to put the land to more 
economically efficient uses the main dynamic of land markets has been based on 
speculation and hoarding. Market processes alone cannot guarantee a productive land 
transition. 
 
Despite high level political commitment to new land investors, central commitments 
were often overridden by local level power holders. The role of the District 
Commissioners and Regional Commissioners in these practices seems to vary greatly. 
While there are some cases where RCs and DCs have bypassed the village institutions to 
make deals with investors for land access, there are many other examples of RCs and 
DCs reversing local decisions over land transfers in order to maintain local political 
stability. As RCs and DCs are Presidential appointments it seems that there is 
considerable pressure on them not to allow the political situation to become too 
unstable. The needs of the central state to maintain Tanzania’s reputation as politically 
stable is perhaps a motivating factor in these decisions, as donor aid and investors have 
been attracted to the country on these credentials. However, while CCM has well 
established hierarchical rules of authority within its institutions, actual control over 
society is more limited. This means that it is possible for people with economic and 
political power at the local level to block actions by the Party. Despite the centralising 
impact of the formative socialist political settlement, local level power holders could 
effectively veto central decisions over land under liberalisation. Central political control 
over the security services was weaker so local power holders could buy off security to 
sustain their hold on property against the wishes of the central state. Power was also 
more fragmented at the local level. Smaller, more fragmented coalitions would compete 
against each other over property rights. This led to a situation where the outcome of land 
transfers to new investors was less predictable. 
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The degree of contestation over land under liberalisation in Tanzania was lower than in 
many other African countries where land issues have sparked major civil war or 
intractable internecine conflict. The formal commitment of the CCM was both to 
provide land to new investors but also to protect the rights of existing smallholder 
farmers. The political legitimacy of the CCM depends significantly on its ability to claim 
that it represents their interests. The CCM has had an overriding interest in maintaining 
political stability, particularly given the importance of political stability for its success in 
ensuring high levels of aid, as discussed in Chapter Four. Numerous formal organisations 
were created through the land reform process to attempt to give voice to this group and 
ensure that the land transition could occur without high levels of injustice to traditional 
owners. In reality, however, these institutions have lacked sufficient power to override 
informal local political and economic power holders.  
 
Further the legacy of egalitarian land ownership that resulted from the relatively limited 
rural transformation that occurred under the colonial period but also the extensive land 
reforms that took place during the socialist period may have led to more muted conflict 
over the land transition. While landlessness is a growing feature of the emerging capitalist 
economy in both countries, it is not one that has defined political struggle under 
liberalisation in the same way as many more unequal societies, such as in many states in 
India. Yet, in Vietnam particularly, there has been a massive displacement of people 
caused by this land transition. There is more evidence of political unrest in the south as a 
result of the more rapid pace of land expropriations and larger farms emerging. 
However, the political fall-out of this process may have been softened by the increase in 
off farm employment opportunities and jobs in industry.  
 
The political legitimacy of the Party as the representative of the poor in Tanzania also 
constrained the extent to which it could openly support an unequalising land transition. 
The political fall out of a large scale land transition was not one that could be 
countenanced by the CCM. Thus Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners 
had an overriding interest in maintaining the peace. As in the case of public finance, this 
suggests that part of the apparent strength of the political authority of the CCM related 
to the more egalitarian society in which it was formed, where political opposition was 
more muted due to the less differentiated structure of society as a whole. These features 
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meant that the process of land transition under liberalisation was much slower and more 
uncertain in Tanzania than in Vietnam.  
 
In Vietnam, there were more examples of large scale organised land transfers from 
existing land holders to new economic activities, for example in the coffee growing high-
lands and in semi-urban areas, for industrial zones. Some of these occurred through 
centrally directed initiatives and the ability of the state to push through these transfers 
suggests that the legitimacy of the VCP was more secure than the CCM, due to its role in 
the war. Land transfers on the basis of economic development had greater political 
legitimacy in Vietnam than in Tanzania, perhaps because in Vietnam, it was people who 
had political power within VCP that were often enriched in the process. Most land 
transfers were driven by provincial and district level coalitions of VCP institutions and 
SOEs, often working with foreign investors. Foreign investors wishing to access land had 
to go into partnership with SOEs and provincial or district VCP institutions, but this 
gave them considerable political security. A viable political settlement between foreign 
investors and the Party was negotiated – if foreign investors worked through the Party 
they would be given security. 
 
Land transition was driven by the rapid commercialisation of lower levels of the VCP. 
Entrepreneurs with formal political positions within the VCP or within SOEs used state 
assets in semi-private ways. Broader coalitions had to be formed to access land involving 
institutions of the VCP and SOEs, often in partnership with foreign investors. If a land 
deal could be set up that provided enough payoff to the group, the deal could go ahead 
even if it was opposed by the central level within the Party. This meant that the centre 
could not direct the land transition very effectively and many land deals were mainly 
redistributive rather than productive. Many of the Industrial Zones were established but 
not all of them have been successful. As in the case in public finance, primitive 
accumulation in land was subject to greater discipline in Vietnam than in Tanzania. 
However, this was not the result of a centrally enforced process, but through 
competition generated by the density of political power vested within lower level 
institutions of the Party and state.  
 
So far, SOEs have been somewhat immune from pressures to release land to more 
productive uses and have instead primarily hoarded land in order to speculate on rising 
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asset markets. So while there has been a transition in land use towards new and higher 
productivity investors, there are also countervailing pressures within the system to use 
political power of the local party to establish property rights and engage in market based 
speculation. While foreign capital can engage in this land market despite its high costs, 
these costs have been a constraint on the emergence of a domestic capitalist class outside 
the political framework of the party.  
 
Tanzania the state’s role in managing the land transition has been much more 
ambiguous. Many of the large scale investments in land that appear on paper were not 
seen through in reality or became mired in conflict. At all levels of the state, the 
commitment of state-party institutions towards new investors in land varies from active 
support to active obstruction. In many cases it seems that the party institutions at the 
Village and District level have been involved in deals with new investors to transfer 
lands. In some cases this has been based on a land grab by those with official positions in 
the state at the local level and has been against the will of the local population.  
 
The emergence of multiparty political competition in certain areas in Tanzania has 
further complicated the role of the state. In the case of the cement company described 
above, the impact of mobilization by the opposition party, CUF, was important in 
securing the land rights for existing inhabitants, against the commercial interests of the 
cement company. Yet, until recently multiparty politics was not a critical factor in most 
areas of Tanzania, given the on-going dominance of CCM, and the drivers of state 
decisions over land transfers relate primarily to the internal balance of power within 
CCM and between the state and society rather than between political parties. 
 
More important perhaps is the fact that even when local state institutions have 
committed to new investors’ property rights, they lack the infrastructural power to secure 
them. This has a more limited impact on investors who have their own security 
arrangements, such as the large mining companies, but a much more significant impact 
on the smaller scale investors in the agricultural sector who depend on state security 
services to maintain their effective property rights. This is also complicated by the fact 
that private commercial interests can more easily buy off local security institutions than 
in Vietnam.  
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The rise of multiparty competition in certain areas of Tanzania will change this dynamic, 
but not necessarily in a direction that supports a productive land transition, nor one that 
serves the interests of the weakest in society who have lost out most from its current 
direction, such as the pastoralists and women (Manji 2001) who are marginalised in 
mainstream political competition.  
 
In both Tanzania and Vietnam, the introduction of market mechanisms has generated 
high levels of speculation over land and this may also have affected the political dynamics 
around land transition. The rising price of land in both formal and informal markets 
acquired by the politically powerful through primitive accumulation has served to buy off 
and co-opt local elites who might otherwise mobilise against land transfers. There were 
extensive profit-making opportunities for those who could engage in land transactions. 
While there was an increasingly market driven process of transferring land, this did not 
guarantee a smooth transfer of property rights from traditional uses to more productive 
economic activities. The distribution of political and economic power remained critical 
for explaining the outcome of land transactions and hence the associated path of 
economic transition.  
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Chapter 6 
 
Industrial Policy  
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The successes and failures of industrial policy in Tanzania and Vietnam played a critical 
part in economic transition under liberalisation. Formally, industrial policy is the official 
strategic effort to develop the industrial sector, however, industrial policy involves a 
number of different policy areas and institutions for promoting investment and 
technology acquisition. Examining industrial policy is therefore also important because it 
provides a window into a range of different areas of state intervention that are critical for 
economic development across all sectors. Developing technological capabilities across 
agriculture and services involves many of the same tools. Industrial expansion is 
important, however, for while there could be different routes to economic transition, 
industrialisation, and more specifically, manufacturing growth, provides a well established 
road to prosperity in developing countries (Moreira 2007). Kaldor (1967) argued that 
because of the embodied nature of technology, expanding manufacturing activities 
facilitates technological acquisition within the economy overall. Further, in the context of 
developing countries, industrial policy is important given that manufacturing growth 
produces more jobs than high value services or agriculture (Thirlwall 2002).  
 
As outlined in Chapter Two, technology acquisition and learning how to use technology 
efficiently is one of the key processes of economic transition. Neo-classical economics 
does not give sufficient explanation for the complexities of acquiring technological skills 
in developing countries (Lall 1992). Neo-classical economics argues that countries should 
produce according to their endowment of capital and labour, which will determine the 
factor price ratios and hence the efficient level of capital/labour intensity at which they 
should produce. Technology acquisition will occur through better flows of international 
capital responding to market prices (Balassa 1977). However, for reasons outlined in 
Chapter Two, related to inherent risks and market failure, successful industrial policy has 
played an important role in driving technology acquisition in developing countries.  
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Tanzania and Vietnam experienced a quickening of the pace of industrialisation under 
liberalisation. Following a period of negative industrial growth from the early 1980s until 
the mid 1990s in Tanzania, industrial growth picked up to an average of 7% a year from 
1996 to 2005 and average manufacturing growth increased to 15.3% between 1996 to 
2003 (Treichel 2005). The pattern of industrial growth in Tanzania involved a rapid 
expansion of mining activities but also manufacturing growth from the end of the 1990s 
in a number of low value added sectors including food and beverages, garments and 
textiles. Vietnam, on the other hand, experienced a much more fundamental shift 
towards becoming an industrialised economy under liberalisation. In the 1990s, industry 
grew at 10.41% a year. Industrial growth was initially driven by increases in output from 
the oil and gas sector. Vietnam’s dependence on oil and gas did not, however, lead to a 
‘dutch disease’ with an overvalued exchange rate that would discourage manufacturing 
export growth  2004 (Barbier 2007). Despite high inflows of foreign exchange from oil 
and gas, as well as FDI and ODA, Vietnam’s manufactured exports expanded very 
rapidly as described in Chapter 1 (page 27) suggesting that Vietnam’s economy was able 
to use these inflows to expand supply and maintain a low cost structure in manufacturing 
(Ohno 2004). In the early 1990s, virtually no Vietnamese industries had attained 
international competitiveness (Perkins and Vu Undated) but as the 1990s progressed 
there was a very rapid growth in manufactured goods for export. Despite their expanding 
industrial sectors, both countries struggled to move into higher value added 
manufacturing over the period of liberalisation.  
 
Reforms to industrial policy under liberalisation dismantled much of the formal 
framework of state support to industry that had been constructed during the socialist 
period. The growth of industry under liberalisation appeared, at least superficially, to 
confirm the conventional view that reducing state intervention in the market would 
reduce distortions and corruption. This would allow a return to a path of industrial 
growth determined by fundamental cost structures where comparative advantage would 
be found in low value added manufacturing based on low wages and natural resource 
extraction. However, on the basis of a comparison between these two countries, this 
simple market liberalisation account is not satisfactory on a number of levels. First, 
Vietnam remained more interventionist than Tanzania yet its industry grew faster and 
experienced greater diversification. Second, as outlined in the previous two chapters, 
throughout the period of liberalisation, rents and interventions in public finance and land 
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played an important role in providing hidden subsidies to emerging industries. Third, 
industrial development under liberalisation was built on the industrial capabilities that 
were constructed through state intervention during the socialist period. Fourth, while 
many of the industrial policy rents of the socialist period were abandoned under 
liberalisation, both countries used forms of industrial policy to attract FDI into industry.  
 
Chapter Two set out the reasons why contemporary developing countries cannot rely 
solely on the market to drive rapid productivity growth in industry. Industrial policy is 
necessary under conditions of ‘relative backwardness’, where inherent risks mean that the 
market will not be able to adequately fund the periods of learning required to make 
industry competitive with the advanced economies (Gershenkron 1962). Successful 
industrialisation involves a process of ‘learning-by-doing’ where skills are acquired 
primarily from learning to use technology that is embodied in capital equipment (Khan 
and Blankenburg 2009). Openness to foreign investment without state led industrial 
policy may bring in new capital and technology for industrial processes; however, these 
will be based primarily on existing technological capacity and will lead to slow 
productivity growth in industry. For industrialisation to occur with rapid productivity 
growth, the state needs to create specific and targeted incentives and compulsions to 
drive a learning process (Khan 2009).  
 
However, the experience of industrial policy in Tanzania and Vietnam during the socialist 
period was of ineffective and poorly managed industrial policy rents. Industrial policy did 
not drive a dynamic learning process and industries in neither country attained 
international competitiveness. This was also the experience of many other developing 
countries that attempted state led industrial policy of varying types in the 1960s and 
1970s. The few cases in East Asia of very successful industrial policy formed the basis of 
the ‘developmental states’ analysis discussed in Chapter Two p 65 - 70 (and include 
notably Wade, 1990, Amsden, 1989 Aoki et al 1997, Evans 1995). These were states that 
were identified as having a high degree of central control over industrial policy rents. 
This did not necessarily mean that the systems were corruption free, or free of other 
forms of rent seeking. Instead, according to the theory, the key feature of success was 
that the central state could exert a credible threat that if rent recipients did not improve 
their performance, the rent would be removed.  
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The degree of centralised control and state capability in these countries contrasts with 
Tanzania and Vietnam, even given the greater formal centralisation of power within their 
political systems that resulted from the structures of their ruling Parties. Yet, while 
examples of very successful industrial policy are limited to just a handful of cases, there is 
a much wider group of developing countries whose industrial experiences, while much 
less impressive, were still linked to the success of aspects of their industrial policies. This 
was also the case for Tanzania and Vietnam. The reason for the actual diversity in 
developing country experience, in terms of the types of state and forms of industrial 
policy, relates not to formal state structure or capabilities as argued by the developmental 
state theorists, but to an underlying compatibility between some industrial policy 
instruments and the political settlement that allowed some learning and capability 
building to take place (Khan and Blankenburg 2009).  
 
This chapter starts with an outline of industrial policy during the socialist period in 
Tanzania and in Vietnam followed by a discussion of their comparative experience. 
While industrial policy in both countries during the socialist period failed to construct 
internationally competitive industries, it was important in generating an industrial base in 
both countries from virtually nothing. The reasons for industrial policy failure relate to 
weaknesses within the political settlement that meant that the Party could not effectively 
discipline managers in state owned industry. The Chapter then outlines Tanzania’s 
experience with privatisation and Vietnam’s attempts at reforming the structure of state 
owned industry. Industrial policy under liberalisation in both countries is subsequently 
examined and comparative successes and failures are linked to features of their political 
settlements.  
 
6.2 Socialist Industrial Policy 
 
6.2.1 Tanzania 
 
As described in Chapter Three, on independence Tanzania had a tiny and largely foreign 
owned industrial sector that was dominated by agro-processing and a number of low 
value-added manufacturing activities. Creating a large modern industrial sector was 
central to Nyerere’s socialist vision for Tanzania. However, until 1967, industry 
continued to grow along the lines established during the colonial period. The main 
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objective of industrial policy at that time was to create productive capacity within the 
sector, rather than to redress the racial imbalance in ownership; foreign investment was 
central to this aim (Costello 1994). Industry grew rapidly during the 1960s, largely 
because of a number of rents that made manufacturing more profitable as part of a 
strategy of import substituting industrialisation. These included tariffs on manufactured 
imports that attracted foreign capital and some of the Asian domestic capitalists who had 
been involved in trade to establish manufacturing activities behind high tariff walls. In 
fact, tariffs were usually set based on discussions between investors and the Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (Rweyemamu 1979).  
 
This industrial policy was initially successful as expansion and diversification of the 
industrial sector took place; for example, Tanganyika’s first five textile mills were 
established between 1961 and 1968 (Rweyemamu 1979). Another factor driving 
industrial growth at this time was the shift of Tanzanian Asian business people out of 
trade into industry, which was seen as more secure given the spread of the co-operative 
movement into trading activities (Coulson 1982). In the 1960s there was a rapid growth 
in Tanzanian Asian manufacturing, firms such as Sunguratex and Kilitex producing 
textiles were established as well as Kioo Limited for glass bottle manufacturing and 
ALAF (Aluminium Africa Ltd) for aluminim products (Fazal 2005). This initial 
expansion of Asian manufacturing activities reflected a shift in the distribution of 
economic power after the end of the colonial period that produced greater economic 
opportunities for domestic capital once colonial restrictions had been removed. This 
direction of economic transformation was constrained under the formative socialist 
political settlement. 
 
The Arusha Declaration spelt out a more activist role for the state in the industrialisation 
process. This was to be achieved primarily through nationalisation of segments of 
existing industries and the creation new industrial parastatals. The Arusha Declaration 
did lead to a transfer of some economic control away, not only from foreign capital, but 
also from the predominantly Asian commercial class involved in trade and in the small 
existing industrial sector. Given the colonial racial structuring of the economy, almost all 
the firms that were nationalized in food and agriculture processing, were owned by 
Tanzanian-Asians (Mukandala 1988). Table 6.1 below provides a breakdown of fixed 
capital formation in the public sector and in the private sector. The extent to which 
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nationalisation affected the ownership structure of industry was, in some ways, quite 
limited.   
 
Many of the new parastatal investments were undertaken as joint ventures and in some 
cases the private sector continued to have important ownership stakes in nationalised 
firms. In other cases, the previous owners stayed on as managers under the new 
ownership structure (Silver 1984). This was the case for the National Milling 
Corporation, created in 1967 by the merger of 8 private sector milling factories. The 
owner of the largest private domestically owned milling factory, Jayantilal Keshavji 
Chande was appointed as General Manager (Coulson 1979) and he maintained close 
relations with the CCM throughout the Ujamaa and liberalisation period. An important 
feature of the formative socialist political settlement in Tanzania was that the desire to 
close off capitalist ownership was never as complete as in Vietnam. Also, despite 
nationalisation, close relations were maintained between segments of the private sector 
and the ruling Party that persisted through both the socialist and liberalised eras. The 
more limited extent to which the economic power of the business sector was re-
organised under the formative socialist political settlement had important implications 
for the path of economic growth under liberalisation. 
 
 
Table 6.1: Fixed Capital Formation by the Public and Private Sectors 1961 – 1998 
in Tanzania 
 
 Public Sector Total Public 
Sector 
Private 
Sector Year Central 
Government 
Non-profit 
Bodies 
Parastatals 
1961 41.7 - 3.7 45.4 54.6 
1965 18.9 8.4 4.3 31.6 68.4 
1970 22.4 7.0 34.5 63.8 36.2 
1975 23.8 7.2 31.0 62.0 38.0 
1980 23.7 0.5 15.2 39.5 60.5 
1985 11.4 0.8 22.8 34.9 65.1 
1989 3.9 0.3 55.1 60.2 39.8 
1990 3.4 0.2 36.9 40.6 59.4 
1995 4.0 12.8 0.5 17.2 82.8 
1996 2.6 18.0 0.5 21.1 78.9 
1997 3.7 15.6 0.5 19.9 80.1 
1998 15.5 3.4 3.5 22.4 77.6 
Source: (World Bank 2002) 
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While some industrial activities remained in private hands, the main focus of formal 
industrial policy was on the state owned industrial parastatals. During the 1970s, 
industrial parastatals produced half of all industrial output and controlled two thirds of 
the fixed assets (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). The types of industrial policy rents 
available to industrial parastatals included direct state subsidies, access finance directly 
from state owned commercial banks (Bigsten and Danielson 2001), foreign concessional 
financing by donors for specific projects, as well as rents related to import substitution 
such as the highly effective protection afforded by tariffs and exchange rate policy 
(Bigsten and Danielson 2001). As with many other import substitution strategies adopted 
by developing countries, manufacturing activities with the highest rates of effective 
protection in Tanzania were the consumer goods industries, particularly the less durable 
and luxury goods type (Rweyemamu 1979) and most industry was focussed on assembly 
type activities at the last stages of production (Coulson 1982). Tariffs were often 
established on the basis demands from investors rather than on the basis of a well-
thought out industrialisation strategy (Rweyemamu 1979). Initially the National 
Development Corporation (NDC) was the main state institution involved in establishing 
and controlling parastatals on behalf of the state. It acted as a holding company across a 
number of sectors as well as the industrial sector (Mukandala 1988). The corporation’s 
subsidiary and associate companies total investments were estimated at Tshs. 1,273 
million by the early 1970s (Mukandala 1988). It had control of most government assets in 
manufacturing, tourism, food processing plants as well as in agriculture.  
 
Industrial Policy was thus successful initially in so far as there was an expansion of 
industrial parastatals which led to growth of industrial output and to industrial 
diversification. Labour productivity also grew, up to 1973 mainly as a result of rapid 
capital investment (Szirmai and Lapperre 2001). By the end of the 1970s, the parastatal 
sector had grown to be one of the largest in Africa (Costello 1994). The creation of an 
industrial base from virtually nothing was an important achievement of the socialist 
period that had significant implications for industrial development under liberalisation. 
 
Yet despite high levels of investment (as shown in Table A.3 p 335) and capital 
accumulation, the sector was beginning to show signs of poor performance from as early 
as 1972 (Chachage 1990). As the 1970s progressed, the contribution of industry to 
overall growth declined and became negative by the end of the decade. The major 
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problem was that the high investment rates that were maintained in the 1970s were 
coupled with falling productivity. The main cause of this was the chronic under 
utilisation of capacity, falling to below 30% across manufacturing enterprises through the 
1970s (Bigsten and Danielson 2001) and to less than 10% capacity utilization in many 
textile mills by the mid 1980s (Ladha 2000). Some cases were even more extreme, for 
example the Morogoro Shoe Company, built with donor finance to produce shoes 
mainly for export, never reached more than 4% of installed capacity (Temu and Due 
1998). In many parastatals, under utilisation of capacity coexisted with continued 
investment in capacity expansion (Wangwe 1979). This kind of severe under capacity 
utilisation was a result of the failure of Tanzania to implement an effective industrial 
incentive regime through very high levels of effective protection for import substituting 
industries and restrictive trade policies as outlined above. Yet at a deeper level of 
causality, the failure of the regime related to the lack of compatibility of industrial policy 
with the underlying political settlement as described below. 
 
As efficiency and profits fell, industry became increasingly dependent on state created 
rents to survive. By the end of the 1970s, 11% of total government expenditure was 
dedicated to direct subsidies to parastatals (Costello 1994).  The size of the parastatal was 
a critical factor in determining the level of subsidy that could be negotiated with the 
central state. From the end of the 1970s, the state tried to reduce the growing cost of 
subsidisation and parastatal influence through a rationalization programme that involved 
splitting up existing parastatals into smaller units and attempts to cut down on the overall 
number of parastatals. These policies were largely subverted from within as managers 
made deals with supportive politicians and bureaucrats within line ministries to expand 
by establishing new subsidiary parastatals, starting new branches or new areas of activities 
(Mukandala 1988). Instead of reducing the overall number of parastatals a proliferation 
took place over this period. The sector grew to be the second largest parastatal sector in 
Africa with 450 parastatals (Bigsten and Danielson 2001).  
 
Some of the reasons for this failure to drive up industrial productivity relate to the sheer 
scale of the industrialisation challenge facing Tanzania. As a new nation with limited 
industrial experience and economic resources, problems such as shortage of inputs, 
foreign exchange limitations (Bigsten and Danielson 2001) and poor infrastructure 
(Wangwe 1979) were huge constraints that Tanzania shared with other poor countries 
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seeking to pursue ambitious industrialisation strategies. Beyond these reasons, however, 
was a political problem relating to the compatibility of industrial policy with the 
underlying political settlement.  
 
The expansion of subsidies coupled with falling productivity suggests that the power of 
the central party institutions to manage the industrialisation process by disciplining rent 
recipients of the kind that was used in successful ‘developmental states’ was largely 
absent under the formative socialist political settlement. The central leadership within the 
Party could not effectively impose discipline on different parts of the state responsible 
for industrial policy. Crucially, the Party could not force managers to use rents efficiently. 
Managers were able to maintain their hold on state created rents even when their 
performance was poor. Managers of parastatals were very much part of the cohesive 
intermediate class group that ran TANU (Mukandala 1988). However, the Party was not 
able to internally discipline this group as they were able to make coalitions with 
supportive bureaucrats and ministers to maintain rents despite poor performance. The 
Party attempted to reduce the ability of parastatal managers to collude with other parts of 
the state, initially by removing many of the parastatals from under the NDC and placing 
them under the direct control of parent ministries (Coulson 1982). However, this did not 
address the underlying weakness of the central authority of the Party to impose its will 
on its different constituent parts. As described in Chapter Four, the stable and inclusive 
coalition within TANU gave the overall appearance of strength, but central control over 
the constituent parts was actually quite weak. As plants in the parastatal sector were 
directly a source of rents for ministers and key bureaucrats, and given that the political 
leadership was not necessarily able to impose discipline on managers, the outcome was 
collusion between politicians, bureaucrats and managers to share rents in a way that 
undermined the effective disciplining of managers.  
 
The fragmentation of power within the Party was similar to the fragmentation of power 
found within many developing country states, captured by the clientelist political 
settlement as described in Chapter Two. A difference, however, with Tanzania was that 
under the formative socialist political settlement, formal institutions had been created 
within the Party to represent workers.  As described in Chapter Three, an industrial work 
force in Tanzania was under-developed prior to the socialist period and remained 
relatively small throughout the socialist period. However, an important part of TANU’s 
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programme of socialist transformation was that it formally represented the workers and, 
therefore, established formal institutions to represent workers rights within TANU. 
While these institutions lacked true economic and political power, because of the small 
size and low productivity of the industrial sector, the formal institutions created to 
represent the interest of workers within TANU did influence the way in which the Party 
attempted to manage the industrial process.  
 
From the early 1970s, industrial workers were encouraged to organise within the CCM 
political framework (Mukandala 1988). This was achieved by establishing CCM worker 
councils in all public corporations and in firms employing more than ten workers. The 
policy of Mwongozo initiated a period of worker activism that led to 31 strikes in a two 
year period (Mapolu 1979). This level of worker activism also became a threat to political 
stability and while workers were still encouraged to mobilize on the factory floor, the 
CCM put a stop to any co-ordinated union action that could lead to wider political strife. 
The CCM exercised strong central control over the umbrella trade union organization, 
the Union of Tanzanian Workers, through Presidential appointments to all key positions. 
In response to worker mobilisation, managers adopted a hands-off policy of managing 
workers. For example, Wangwe (1979) describes how one industrial parastatal opted for 
a strategy of low capacity utilisation in the face of labour troubles. Instead of pushing for 
higher productivity, managers adopted other profit making strategies involving forms of 
legal rent seeking over state subsidies and illegal activities such as racketeering. The 
consequence of this was that while the state found it difficult to enforce and monitor the 
effort of industrial managers in parastatals the managers in turn struggled with labour 
discipline.  
 
Once the economic crisis had taken hold by the early 1980s, manufacturing output 
effectively collapsed. Parastatal managers, with support from politicians and bureaucrats, 
increasingly engaged in illegal activities to bolster their falling incomes and racketeering 
became common. Racketeering involved managers trading goods illegally at high prices 
based on their monopoly status. This form of corruption usually involved collusion 
between parastatal managers, CCM state officials and private business people who sold 
the goods on the black market (Tripp 1997). The formal industrial policy rents that 
created high prices for manufactured goods led to informal rent seeking through 
corruption and racketeering that involved parastatal employees and elements of the 
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remaining private sector who were able to trade these goods. Political leaders were 
outspoken in their condemnation of these activities but were relatively powerless to stop 
them. Small coalitions involving government workers and business people could gain 
rents. This kind of primitive accumulation was not invested back into the economy. 
Restrictions on private sector economic activities and insecurity in private investments 
meant that a large part of the resources involved probably went overseas. 
 
6.2.2 Vietnam 
 
Following independence in the North, a rapid industrialisation process and the 
promotion of heavy industry was critical to the VCP. Industrialisation was to be achieved 
through a Soviet-inspired model of a centrally planned command economy. The Party 
established a list of commodities and inputs that were to be allocated under plans, based 
on the Soviet material balance system (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). Prices were 
centrally determined as were physical inputs and the types of outputs that could be 
manufactured. Industries and manufacturing enterprises were nationalised and heavy 
restrictions were placed on the remaining private sphere of economic activity. The 
distribution of economic power was changed more fundamentally and the role of private 
capital was constrained further, under Vietnam’s formative socialist political settlement 
than in Tanzania.  
 
As outlined in Chapter Three, the war had a very significant impact on how industrial 
policy actually operated. Nationalised industries were much more decentralised in terms 
of management than in many other centrally planned economies. Local party structures 
had an increasing role in managing factories as the war progressed, rather than the central 
party. State owned enterprises that produced goods deemed to be a priority for the war, 
such as mechanical engineering, iron and steel, coal and electricity were given preferential 
access to inputs and were heavily subsidised by the state (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). 
The heavy bombing of the North after 1965 meant that many factories operated well 
below capacity and had to be de-concentrated. This process decentralised actual control 
over industry to lower levels of the party and gave greater de facto independence to SOE 
managers. The war also meant that the list of commodities allocated under the plan was 
always much more limited than under Soviet central planning (Fforde and Vylder 1996) 
and, despite the rhetoric of self reliance, the industrial sector was heavily dependent on 
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foreign aid-financed imports of capital goods and raw materials, and a large proportion 
of manufactured goods were imported (Beresford and Phong 2000).  
 
Yet while the centrally planned industrial system never operated as intended, industry 
grew very rapidly during the period before re-unification. The centrally planned system 
actually worked quite well in terms of raising resources for the priority sectors of the war 
(Doanh 2002) and led to a rapid growth in heavy industry from a very low base. From 
1960 to 1975 industrial investment grew at three times that of the agricultural sector. The 
share of industrial production in national income grew from 18.2% in 1960 to 24.2% in 
1974, with most growth occurring prior to 1965. This was mainly the result of an 
increase in external assistance in the form of equipment, raw materials and fuel for 
industry, (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003).  
 
In the South, the manufacturing base in 1954 was even thinner than in the north (Dacy 
1986). After 1954, the approach to industrialisation in the South diverged from the 
northern priority of heavy industry and instead, focussed on the development of light 
industry (Doanh 2002). The influx of foreign forces during the 1960s stimulated the 
demand for food processing and other light industries such as garments, construction 
materials and wood products (Beresford 1988).  
 
Vietnamese-Chinese played an important role in many of these activities. While there was 
some manufacturing growth in South Vietnam after 1970, the economy remained 
dependent on aid related imports and the southern industrial sector was much weaker 
than its northern counterpart. Following reunification, there was an initial attempt to 
strengthen the centrally planned economic system with more nationalisation in the south 
(Beresford 1988) and a crack down on private sector economic activity that drove many 
to flee, as described in Chapter 3. Despite the restrictions on private industry, some of 
the Vietnamese-Chinese industrial enterprises in HCMC were able to continue to operate 
by transforming themselves into co-operatives and thus evade the restrictions imposed 
by the Party (Lindahl and Thomsen 2002). Yet overall, the impact of the crack down was 
to significantly weaken the formal economic power of the private sector in Southern 
Vietnam. This was to have important implications for industrialisation under 
liberalisation.  
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The crisis for industry 
 
The attempt to bring about industrialisation through central planning reached its height 
by the end of the 1970s. Overall, the industrial sector was still very small in comparison 
to other socialist centrally planned economies and only employed around 8% of the total 
labour force (Doanh 2002). By this time, however, the system was under considerable 
strain. An industrialisation policy based on centrally planned targets, which had worked 
well during the war period, seemed no longer able to drive industrial growth.  
 
Growth rates of output in manufacturing declined steeply after the war with textiles, 
cement, coal, power and steel plummeting (Doanh 2002) and by the end of the decade 
the whole sector was stagnating. The war economy had created strong pressure to keep 
output in critical industries high. However, this impact was not equivalent to the type of 
discipline that would have been needed for successful technological capability acquisition 
that would allow equipment to be used in the most effective way. Rather, the war created 
pressures for subsidies to be sustained for critical industries. Nevertheless, in some 
sectors some implicit learning did take place simply because the prolonged war forced 
capability acquisition and the development of production in a few critical sectors. 
 
External factors such as the decline in Soviet aid, which made the imported industrial 
inputs on which the system depended increasingly scarce, was an important reason for 
industrial slowdown but there were also internal reasons related to political constraints 
on the Party in managing the industrialisation process. As in Tanzania, the Party had 
difficulty in controlling and managing the managers of state owned industries. The 
central Party had no effective way of obliging SOEs to follow the centrally determined 
plans (Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). This was exacerbated by the fragmentation of 
ownership of SOEs with different ‘parent’ institutions at different levels of the Party 
having relative freedom to establish and manage SOEs as they chose.  
 
Attempts were made to reduce this fragmentation with the establishment of Enterprise 
Unions in the 1970s which were groupings of SOEs under the management of planning 
departments in line ministries. However, these groupings became largely redundant 
(Cheshire and Penrose 2007) as SOE managers gained greater informal, and then later, 
formal, autonomy. Emphasis on production targets in this context led enterprises to 
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focus on maximising their allocations of capital and inputs rather than on productivity 
and output. Even when the centre managed to impose budget constraints on SOEs, 
there was a high degree of cross subsidization between SOEs themselves and, 
horizontally, between different ‘parent’ owners within the state at particular levels 
(Cheshire Penrose and Nguyen 2006). Cross subsidization could have been an effective 
mechanism for financing learning if it had been accompanied by credible performance 
criteria for firms receiving temporary subsidies. As in Tanzania and other centrally 
planned systems, there was a lack of credible threats on individual enterprises to raise 
their technological capability through sustained effort in learning. No agency was able to 
undertake task of monitoring productivity or any other measure of capability acquisition 
by individual firms and no agency had a credible capacity to sanction firms that failed 
these tests.  
 
As the system faced increasing economic constraints, SOEs began to engage in more 
activities outside the formal planning system, illegally selling goods or buying inputs from 
the black market in a similar pattern to the racketeering that occurred in Tanzania during 
the same period. SOEs were able to make huge profits from these activities, through 
their access to state subsidised inputs and goods (Fforde 2004). During the late 1980s 
small SOES proliferated at the district level which engaged in these rent seeking 
activities, particularly after the power to create new SOEs was decentralised in 1987 
(Van-Arkadie and Mallon 2003). Overlapping and competing interests within the Party 
attempted to control these SOEs in order to make illegal profits and engage in pervasive 
asset stripping (Fforde 2004). This form of corruption drained the central state of 
resources while undermining attempts to improve industrial production.  
 
6.2.3 Discussion 
 
Both Tanzania and Vietnam started the socialist era with very small industrial bases. 
Removing economic control over industry from the private sector and creating a strong 
industrial base were the central pillars of the socialist industrial policy. The 
nationalisation of existing industrial enterprises and the creation of new industrial 
activities under state ownership were pursued by both countries. A larger proportion of 
industry remained in private hands in Tanzania than in Vietnam, though a small 
proportion of industries in the South that were owned by Chinese business people were 
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able to continue to operate underneath the Party radar. There was more permanence in 
relations between the Party and certain sections of the business community in Tanzania 
than is often recognised. While foreign capital was rejected, some Asian business people 
retained their positions either formally through continued ownership of industry or 
informally by involvement in networks of illegal trading with party officials. Policies to 
promote indigenisation of ownership were critical to the Party to maintain its political 
support and it was impossible for it to formally support non-indigenous businesses.  
 
In Tanzania and Vietnam state owned industry operated on the centrally planned model 
where prices, inputs and outputs were centrally determined and co-ordinated. Yet in both 
countries, this centrally planned model of industry was never fully implemented in the 
way that is was in richer socialist countries and, in fact, only operated for a relatively 
short period in the 1960s and 1970s before market reforms were instituted. The centrally 
planned industrial sector never came to full fruition because of the limited finance and 
administrative capacity available at the time, given the huge resources needed to bring 
about a rapid industrialisation from a very low base. Without a market mechanism of 
compulsion, the state needed to provide an effective system of monitoring and discipline 
to drive through productivity increases. Both countries faced similar problems to those 
experienced in other centrally planned industrial systems in terms of the ability of the 
system to effectively monitor and discipline industrial managers. Very high demands on 
the capacities of state agencies to monitor industrial productivity growth in a situation 
where markets were not providing information on changing levels of competitiveness 
proved to be difficult in all centrally planned economies. Without a market disciplining 
mechanism, the state system of compulsions on managers had to be compatible with the 
underlying political settlement. Under the formative socialist political settlement, this 
required a much stronger centralisation of power within the Party so that different 
components of the inclusive party structures could be effectively disciplined. The level of 
centralisation of power needed to achieve this was clearly absent in both countries.  
 
Nevertheless, in Vietnam the socialist industrial process was much more successful than 
in Tanzania. The compulsion of fighting a prolonged war cannot be underestimated in 
this context. As a result, a much larger industrial base was constructed under the 
formative socialist political settlement. This created a greater pool of skilled workers and 
managers that had experience in the industrial process than in Tanzania. Also there was a 
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much denser structure of industrial economic institutions across the country due to the 
decentralising impact of the war. This had important consequences for the nature of 
competition at lower levels of the Party state under liberalisation. 
 
The underlying distribution of power within the Parties meant that the centre was unable 
to remove rents when they were used inefficiently. In both countries, managers were able 
to evade state compulsions to increase efficiency by colluding with other parts of the 
state. Legal rents that were supposed to generate rapid industrialisation and productivity 
growth formed the basis of corruption within the system mainly in the form of 
racketeering. There were differences in the way that racketeering operated in both 
countries reflecting the different distribution of political and economic power under the 
socialist political settlement. In Tanzania, racketeering involved co-operation between 
party officials and the remaining private sector. In Vietnam, it was dominated by party 
institutions, given the marginalised status of the remaining private sector.  
 
While open accumulation outside the state was prohibited under the formative socialist 
systems in both countries, this form of racketeering did lead to some small scale 
primitive accumulation. In Tanzania this enriched a small group of Party officials and 
some members of the private sector but did not create significant resources for 
investment in the domestic economy under liberalisation. In contrast, in Vietnam this 
accumulation occurred through the Party structures and its economic institutions. This 
form of primitive accumulation helped to establish the commercial activities of the lower 
level Party institutions that came out into the open during the period of liberalisation.  
 
6.3 Industrial Policy Reforms 
 
6.3.1 Industrial Policy Reforms and Privatisation in Tanzania 
 
In Tanzania, the political consensus on industrial policy slowly consolidated around the 
conclusion that state intervention and rents during the Ujamaa period had hampered 
successful industrialisation, because of high levels of corruption and market distortion. 
Along with many other developing countries, the answer that was adopted was to reduce 
state created rents and withdraw state ownership in the industrial sector (Campbell and 
Stein). The initial liberalisation in the 1980s of prices, distribution, trade and exchange 
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rates had a huge negative impact on the industrial sector. Controls on the prices of 
manufactured goods were among the first group of price controls to be significantly 
reduced. Controls on domestic trade and marketing of all imported and domestic 
manufactured goods were also dismantled.  
 
In practice, even by the end of the 1980s, unofficial markets and a very lax regime on 
imports meant that state control of the distribution and price of manufactured products 
had come to an end (Husain and Faruqee 1994). Control over imports and foreign 
exchange were also dismantled. In 1984, the Government of Tanzania introduced an 
own-funds scheme, where importers could acquire import licences without having to 
declare the source of funding, and ended the Commodity Import System that favoured 
imports to parastatals. Trade and exchange rate liberalisation continued with the 
introduction of IMF sponsored structural adjustment from 1986. By 1994, a market 
determined exchange rate had been adopted and many barriers to importing and 
exporting had been removed. These reforms reduced the effective rate of protection for 
manufactured goods and as a consequence, many of the poorly performing 
manufacturing parastatals found it increasingly difficult to sustain themselves. 
 
The most important change to the state’s involvement in industrial policy was the 
programme of privatisation. The privatisation programme in Tanzania was similar in 
most respects to other privatisation programmes of the era across Africa, implemented 
under the tutelage of the IFIs (White and Bhatia 1998). The essence of the programme 
was supposed to be a market based process of reallocating property rights, underpinned 
by the rule of law and transparent state engagement in overseeing the privatisation 
process. In reality, many aspects of the privatisation process occurred outside the formal 
arena, through forms of corruption and primitive accumulation involving actions such as 
selling assets below market price, non-transparent transactions, different parts of the 
state engaging in illegal sales of state assets, and the use of political power to influence 
market outcomes.    
 
The first structural adjustment programme of 1986 tied the Government to a 
privatisation programme, yet this had little impact and was very slow to get off the 
ground. In the 1980s, attempts to give the private sector a greater role in running 
parastatals were strongly resisted by most CCM politicians. For example, the decision to 
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allow private investors to take over a share within the breweries company, were 
rescinded under political pressure (Tripp 1997). In this early phase a handful of 
liquidations and sales took place (Kiondo) but a more rigorous approach towards 
privatising industrial parastatals only really came into effect from 1992 with the 
establishment of the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (PSRC) and the Loans and 
Advances Realization Trust (LART). The PSRC and the LART were established by the 
Public Corporations Act of 1992. The role of the PSRC was to oversee the privatization 
process, while the LART was established to liquidate non-performing assets and to take 
over the debts of privatized companies that were mainly held by the National Bank of 
Commerce (NBC) (Bigsten and Danielson 2001). A number of different methods of 
privatisation were adopted by the state. The liquidation of parastatal firms that were 
officially or effectively bankrupt as a result of the removal of rents was the largest 
component of the privatisation of industrial parastatals. Up until 1997, closures, 
liquidations under LART and other liquidations accounted for over half of all 
privatisation processes (Temu and Due 2000). Other forms of divestiture included 
management buyouts, management contracts and leasing arrangements, although these 
played a very peripheral role compared to the outright and partial direct sale of 
parastatals and parastatal assets (Afrodad 2007).  
 
Apart from a spate of early closures of parastatal manufacturing firms, overall, the 
privatisation process was initially quite slow and by 1995 divestiture had almost ground 
to halt. Many of the planned sales failed to materialise and many of the industrial assets 
that the state had planned to sell off remained without suitable buyers. In addition, the 
institutional fragmentation of the state led to different parts of the state attempting to sell 
off state assets without central state approval. Bureaucratic infighting took place between 
different parts of the state as to who had the right to sell off parastatals, primarily 
between the LART and the Parastatal Sector Reform Commission (Tripp 1997). The 
LART had been given administration over a number of companies that were heavily 
indebted to the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) and sold at least one company 
(Tanganyika Packers) by private treaty without any kind of tendering process (Gibbon 
1999). Another case occurred in 1998 when the Tanzania Railways Corporation 
effectively privatized some of the railway network without approval or knowledge of the 
PRSC (Gibbon 1999).  
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The consequence of privatisation was to transfer ownership and economic power away 
from the state and into private hands, both at a domestic and international level. A 
problem in assessing the impact of the privatisation process is that the actual data on 
what was sold off, to whom and for how much is confused and not transparent (Gibbon 
1999), (White and Bhatia 1998). The privatisation process did not involve a transparent 
transfer of property rights but involved significant informal processes that were poorly 
documented. It is known, however that at least 24 manufacturing firms were sold to 
international buyers. These included many of the large and more profitable industrial 
parastatals that were sold off to international investors as on-going concerns during the 
first phase of privatisation.  
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Table 6.2: Types of investors in privatized manufacturing firms 
 
 
Sales of shares or assets Total  
(as of  June 1997) 
To major multinationals 12 
To other foreign firms 12 
To indigenous buyers 25 
To other local buyers 19 
Unknown 15 
Subtotal 83 
Liquidations 53 
Liquidations under LART 20 
Closures 14 
Subtotal 87 
Leases 24 
Performance management 
contracts 
5 
Sub-total 29 
Total 199 
   Source: Temu and Due (1998) 
 
Other smaller manufacturing parastatals, most of which were not operational, were sold 
off as asset sales to local purchasers (Waigama 2008). Much less is known about the local 
purchasers and the conditions of sale than the international purchasers. Just over half of 
the local purchasers were indigenous Tanzanians while the other half were predominantly 
Asian Tanzanians (Temu and Due 1998). In some cases, registered Tanzanian buyers 
were acting as fronts for pre-Ujamaa owners who had left the country following the 
nationalisations of 1967 (Waigama 2008). Some well known names from Tanzania’s 
private sector have been recorded as having purchased industrial assets through the 
privatisation process, such as Rostam Aziz and Mohammed Enterprises, whose Chief 
Executive is Mohammed Dewji (Gibbon 1999). Under liberalisation both of these 
individuals gained formal positions of power within CCM. Some of the companies 
concerned had been trading throughout the socialist period but the privatisation process 
enabled them to expand their activities into new economic areas.  
 
The group of domestic buyers of privatised state industries also included a number who 
had themselves been the previous owners prior to Ujamaa. For example, Aluminium 
Africa (ALAF) was sold back to its original Asian-Tanzanian owners the Chandaria 
Group (Gibbon 1999). The privatisation process fuelled a growth in a number of larger 
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business groups that had been involved in trade, such as Mohammed Enterprises that 
bought up a number of manufacturing units to add to its activities in trade. As described 
above, the leaders of some of these largest business groups have very close links to the 
CCM. The re-sale of manufacturing firms to previous owners and the involvement of a 
small group of prominent business people tied to the CCM reflects the degree to which 
relations between the CCM and sections of the private sector were remarkably stable 
during both the socialist and liberalised era. However, under liberalisation the 
distribution of power shifted so that the Asian-Tanzanian private sector could more 
openly hold economic power.  
 
The attempt to reduce state ownership and curtail legal and illegal rents in the industrial 
sector through liberalisation and privatisation led to a significant transfer of ownership to 
the private sector, the removal of price restrictions that had been the basis of 
racketeering opportunities and also the reduction of many formal mechanisms of state 
support to industry. The relaxation of restrictions on the private sector led to the re-
emergence of a private manufacturing sector, although mainly focussed on very small 
scale operations such as flour mills and bakeries (Tripp 1997). Joint ventures also 
developed between the state and international investors such as with the General Tyre 
East Africa Company and the Portland Cement Company discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
 
Despite the shift in ownership to the private sector, the privatisation process did not 
remove many of the informal relations that reduced the effectiveness of industrial policy 
during the socialist period. For example, the General Tyre East Africa Ltd had been 
established in 1971 and had been the largest industrial plant in East Africa (Mikaili 2011). 
In the mid 1990s, Continental AG bought a 24% stake in the company and promised to 
revive production. In 2005, the performance of the company was still very poor and 
profitability had not improved despite privatisation. The company was able to persuade 
the Government to agree to a subsidised loan through the National Social Savings Fund 
(NSSF) of USD 10 million to enable the company to purchase raw material and restart 
production (Ihucha 2011). This type of loan to a poorly performing company was very 
similar to the loans available through the nationalised banking system to weak parastatals. 
Six years later, production at the plant had not been revived and auditors found that the 
loan had been squandered by the management (Mikaili 2011).  
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The change to the ownership pattern within industry has not, therefore, insulated 
industrial subsidisation from corruption. Perhaps more importantly for Tanzania’s 
industrial performance, neither does it seem to have strengthened the state’s capacity to 
monitor and discipline rents, such as subsidised finance, available to industry. Rather, the 
process of privatization has been driven by an economic consensus that the market alone 
can drive technology acquisition and capability development from the outset. This 
ignores the significant market failures constraining capability development. The problem 
of devising a successful industrial policy system that could channel resources to 
companies to finance the learning period while also imposing discipline on the rent 
recipient were clearly not resolved by the privatisation process.  
 
6.3.2 Industrial Policy Reform and Equitisation in Vietnam  
 
In Vietnam, by the end of the central planning period, significant parts of industry were 
operating outside the formal system. The central state attempted to deal with the 
extensive ‘fence-breaking’ within the industrial sector by bringing many of the illegal 
commercial activities into the open. These commercial activities were formally 
institutionalised from the early 1980s with microeconomic reforms that allowed SOEs to 
operate on a three plan system. The first part was state assigned output manufactured 
with state assigned inputs, the second was above plan output sold to the state using 
inputs procured by the SOE itself, and the third part was unplanned output that could be 
sold on the free market (Doanh 2002). Prices were also partially liberalised in order to 
realign official prices for manufactured goods with market prices. These reforms had a 
particularly positive effect in the South during the 1980s while the North, which 
continued its focus on heavy industry, responded less to these market based incentives 
(Beresford 1988). By the beginning of the 1990s, SOEs were highly commercialised, but 
they were still under the control of the state in a number of critical areas, for example, in 
the appointment of management, labour recruitment and asset disposal (Fforde 2004). 
As described in Chapter Four, the recruitment of senior managers within SOEs was 
undertaken by local Party Committees, this provided critical leverage for the party 
institutions over the SOEs. 
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Despite these controls, rampant corruption continued to drain resources at the lowest 
level of the state. The state therefore engaged in a much more direct attempt to stop this 
form of primitive accumulation by allowing small non-performing SOEs to close down 
or be absorbed into larger SOEs (Cheshire, Penrose, and Nguyen 2006). The party had 
tried to achieve this as early as 1981 but had not been able to drive the policy through in 
the face of non-cooperation by lower level party institutions. The removal of blanket 
state subsidies and controlled prices meant that many of the smaller SOEs that had 
depended on racketeering essentially went bankrupt (Vu 2005) and, therefore, probably 
lost much of the backing that they had received from the state as mechanisms for profit 
making for party officials. In 1991, a new law was brought in that permitted SOEs to be 
closed down or taken over if they were deemed to be unsustainable. This led to a fall in 
the number of industrial SOEs from 2,599 to 2,062 by 1994 (Ngu 2002), thus removing 
SOEs from the lowest level of party control at the district (Fforde 2004). Other policies 
seeking to control forms of corruption and primitive accumulation within SOEs and to 
redefine the relationship between the state and SOEs had much less impact than this 
initial reform. For example, regulations introduced at the same time such as redefining 
the legal ownership of the state over assets of SOEs did nothing to stop many SOE 
managers in co-operation with local party officials, increasingly using state assets as 
private assets (Fforde 2004). 
 
The next step in the attempt to restructure the relationship between the Party and SOEs 
was launched in 1992 with a programme of privatisation, called equitisation (co phan 
hoa). While this was similar in some ways to conventional privatisation programmes in 
that it aimed to reduce state subsidies and enforce greater market discipline, the intention 
was that the state should maintain a high degree of ownership over the majority of 
equitised firms, particularly in heavy industries. This was to be achieved by the state 
taking majority holdings of equity and by continued influence of party institutions in the 
recruitment process for key management positions. The state proceeded very slowly 
initially and in the first years of the programme, only five SOEs were equitised, but 
towards the end of the 1990s the process sped up (Vu 2005). This acceleration was 
related both to policy changes and to international pressure as Vietnam prepared itself to 
join the Asia Free Trade Area and the World Trade Organisation. From 1998 the scope 
of equitisation was increased to cover all non-strategic SOEs and there were various 
subsequent re-launches of the SOE policy each attempting to increase the speed of 
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equitisation. Yet despite the party’s formal commitment, overall the process of 
equitisation remained very slow and did not lead to a major change in the formal 
ownership of the industrial sector. In fact, the share of the state in the economy grew in 
the 1990s and over the longer period, up to the mid 2000s, remained almost constant 
despite equitisation, because of the growth of the remaining SOEs (Sjoholm 2006). This 
meant that the Vietnamese Government maintained direct control over most industrial 
output even after more than a decade of reform (Perkins 2001).  
 
Table 6.3: Partial and Internal Equitizations (1998 – 2004) in Vietnam 
 Until 
1998  
1999  2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  Total  
Average 
chartered capital 
(VND bn)  
6.21  5.21  5.79  7.09  6.95  11.32  16.13  10.69  
State  28.9%  30.1%  26.4%  27.9%  30.5%  55.4%  49.9%  46.1%  
Managers, 
workers  
50.4%  43.9%  53.0%  49.2%  51.6%  35.4%  33.3%  37.8%  
Outside 
domestic 
investors  
20.7%  25.0%  18.1%  15.8%  16.7%  8.1%  16.8%  15.1%  
Foreign 
investors  
0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.4%  1.2%  0.1%  0.0%  0.1%  
Source: CIEM (2005) 
 
Part of the reason for the small scale and slow pace of reform was the attitude of 
managers and workers within SOEs. While funds were established by the state to pay off 
workers who lost their jobs as a result of equitisation, most workers remained opposed 
to the process. The attitude of managers was often the critical factor in delaying or 
expediting an equitisation of a SOE. In theory, equitisation should have been popular 
with managers as it would have provided formal ownership rights to managers who had 
frequently been operating under de facto ownership of the SOE assets anyway(Fforde 
2004). Many of the equitisations involved internal purchase of the SOE (Vu 2005) yet, 
despite this, many managers opposed equitisation. This suggests that continued state 
ownership may have provided privileged access to resources that were seen to be critical 
for ongoing profitability for managers (Fforde 2004). This may be an important reason 
why there was a growth in the share of industrial SOEs in GDP across the 1990s as 
SOEs continued to have privileged access to bank credit, (discussed in Chapter Four), 
and to land (discussed in Chapter Five) and to tariff and quantitative protection such as 
valuable export quotas for European market access (Thomsen 2007). Thus, managers 
were able, with the collusion of party officials, to continue to engage in forms of 
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corruption and primitive accumulation, while transforming state assets into semi-private 
assets, and were able to resist the central Party’s push for equitisation that would have 
removed their privileged access to state resources. 
 
Unlike Tanzania, Vietnam wanted to maintain a significant section of industry directly 
under state control. To strengthen the performance of the SOEs that remained under 
state ownership, the Party attempted to copy the industrial strategies of other East Asian 
countries and to create industrial groups similar to the South Korean Cheabol and the 
Japanese Keiretsu (Perkins and Vu Undated) that would be able to compete 
internationally by achieving economies of scale. Thus, shortly after the introduction of 
the policy of equitisation, the Party introduced another key aspect of its industrial policy 
with the establishment of General Companies (Tong Cong ty) and Groups (Tap Doan) 
from 1994. These groupings were initially built on the Enterprise Unions that had existed 
under the central planning system (Cheshire, Penrose, and Nguyen 2006). The GCs and 
Groups were under the direct control of various Ministries that were responsible for 
appointing their boards of directors, while the Prime Minister was responsible for 
selecting the general manager (Perkins 2001). The plan was that the newly created head 
offices of GCs would take over some of the functions of individual enterprises, which 
would retain their separate identity in other respects (Perkins 2001). These reforms to 
ownership structures were very comprehensive with 92% of state-owned capital placed 
under GC structures (Vu 2005). However, the actual impact in terms of centralising 
power over SOEs was quite small. The formal rules governing GCs and their component 
enterprises were rather vague and in many cases these structures had little impact on the 
SOEs under their control (Cheshire, Penrose, and Nguyen 2006).  
 
Many SOEs maintained separate relations with the local party and were not dependent 
on GCs for mediation with the Party. The GCs started to lose control over their 
component entities as some firms lower down in the structure equitised or set up joint 
ventures with foreign firms (Perkins and Vu Undated). By 2006, the GC model was 
deemed to have failed and, in response, the Government tried to bring about further 
centralisation of power by establishing Conglomerates (Perkins and Vu Undated). These 
were even bigger groupings of firms within particular heavy goods industries. The 
motivation for creating these groups was partly to maintain greater influence over firms. 
For example, under the new trade rules the Government could not require firms to buy 
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from particular producers but under the Conglomerate structure, the parent firm could 
require component enterprises to buy inputs from other firms within the structure. The 
problem with these attempts at centralisation was that the distribution of power between 
different levels of the Party meant that SOEs at lower levels of the state could resist 
requirements imposed upon them by the Parent SOE.  
 
6.3.3 Discussion of Reforms 
 
The attempts to remove and restructure state control in industry related in both 
countries to the perception that extensive rent seeking within the industrial sector had 
hampered the industrialisation process. In Tanzania, the withdrawal of the state from 
direct ownership of industry was much more profound than in Vietnam. Attempts to 
strengthen the central control over industrial parastatals had clearly failed by the early 
1980s and the proliferation of parastatal entities and subsidisation in the face of weak 
capacity utilisation showed that the state had been unable to effectively manage industrial 
policy rents. The weakness of central control to enforce effective compulsions through 
industrial policy was the man reason for this. Despite the consolidate power within the 
Party during the socialist period, power within the state was still fragmented to the extent 
that people within the system could forge small coalitions to resist their rents being 
removed. This fragmentation continued to be apparent during the privatisation process 
itself where different parts of the state attempted to sell off assets. 
 
Tanzania’s industrial sector overall was in a more parlous state than Vietnam’s and many 
industrial enterprises were hardly operating once privatisation was getting under way, 
leaving relatively weak opposition to the transfer of ownership to private hands. In 
contrast, in Vietnam, the power of SOEs within the state was much stronger and they 
were able to resist pressures to move outside the orbit of direct access to state privileges. 
This is partly a reflection of the different extent to which economic power had been 
reorganised under the formative socialist political settlement. In Tanzania this had been a 
much more superficial process and there was a much more significant re-emergence of 
the private sector, partly driven by the privatisation process. However, while there was a 
greater presence of Africans within the private sector compared to the colonial period, 
the distribution of economic power under liberalisation largely returned to the foreign 
and non-indigenous private sector. In Tanzania the transfer of industrial property rights 
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to the private sector did not occur through transparent processes but was influenced by 
informal political processes. The privatisation process allowed foreign and domestic 
capital, groups that had had held economic power under colonialism to re-establish 
themselves. It also meant that many of the on-going relations between segments of 
domestic private sector that had maintained certain more covert relations with the Party 
under socialism were able to more openly re-establish their economic position within 
industry. 
 
In Vietnam, the distribution of power internally to the Party meant that SOEs could 
resist both equitisation and centralization of control through General Corporations etc. 
Methods of disciplining through the market and through the state were less effective 
where SOEs could resist both processes by making alliances with provincial and local 
level Party institutions. The capabilities of the state to manage industrial policy under 
liberalisation, that involve complex processes of monitoring and disciplining rent 
recipients were not strengthened by the policy of removing the socialist industrial rent 
structures. The underlying distribution of political and economic power that constrained 
industrial policy under the formative socialist political settlement continued to hamper 
effective management of industrial rents under liberalisation.   
 
6.4  Industrial Policy Under Liberalisation 
 
6.4.1 Tanzania 
 
The major strategy for inducing technology acquisition in industry was delegated to the 
promotion of FDI. The Sustainable Industries Development Policy 1996 to 2020 (SIDP) 
envisaged an industrialisation process led by the private sector through the continued 
privatisation of industrial parastatals and new private sector investments (United 
Republic of Tanzania 1996). A formal policy of promoting foreign direct investment was 
adopted and the 1990 Investment Act and 1997 Tanzania Investment Act liberalised 
regulations restricting foreign ownership across all sectors of the economy. The 
legislation also attempted to provide a number of ring fenced incentives to attract in 
foreign investment as described in Chapter Four. These included removal of ownership 
restrictions and performance requirements, a fiscal stability clause that provided a 
guarantee to investors that incentives would not be modified ex post, removal of 
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restrictions on the repatriation of profits and the currency in which transfers could be 
made (United Republic of Tanzania 1997). These ring fenced incentives had a strong and 
positive impact on FDI flows into the industrial sector overall and into manufacturing. 
From a very low base, foreign direct inflows increased rapidly across the 1990s, reaching 
5% of GDP by 1999, and inflows into manufacturing were high (Utz 2007). By 2001, the 
manufacturing sector had received the greatest share of stock of FDI at 33.5% of total 
stock (Kabelwa 2006).  
 
The inflow of FDI was a major reason for the return to growth in manufacturing by the 
end of the 1990s and the manufacturing sector started to grow faster than overall GDP 
(Kahyarara 2011). Much of the growth in manufacturing output was driven by a handful 
of large manufacturing enterprises that had been taken over by foreign capital and were 
producing low value added goods for the domestic market such as beverages, tobacco, 
other chemicals and plastic. A number of these firms experienced a dramatic 
improvement in their performance, for example, Tanzania Breweries Ltd increased 
capacity utilisation from 10% in 1992 to over 90% in 2001 and the Tanzania Electrical 
Goods Manufacturing Company increased capacity utilisation from below 50% in 1995 
to 100% by 2001 (Waigama 2008). From the end of the 1990s, other manufacturing 
sectors such as textiles and garments also began to grow again after the severe 
disinvestment of the early 1990s. Apart from the firms that were privatized, most of the 
new firms in the textile sector were process plants that imported bleached fabrics and 
printed them for the local market. A few of these firms were previously involved in trade 
related activities importing finished textile goods from India and were owned by Asian 
Tanzanians. They subsequently brought in the Indian technology to start production 
units or to upgrade the units that they had purchased through privatisation (Ladha 2000).   
 
As well as opening up to foreign investment to bring in new technology, the main 
element of policy designed to increase manufacturing productivity involved providing a 
number of implicit and explicit subsidies for exporters. The most popular aspects were 
the retention of export proceeds in a foreign country, the bonded warehouse scheme, the 
customs duty drawback, duty certificates, and the profit tax exemption scheme (Chandra, 
Kacker, and Li 2007). As well as these domestic incentive schemes there were a number 
of international schemes that created potential rents for Tanzanian manufacturers. The 
most important of these were the US African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA) 
 253 
and the EU Everything but Arms (EBA), as well as market access initiatives from France, 
Japan and Canada (Kweka 2004). Tanzania qualified for the wearing apparel provision of 
AGOA in 2002 and it also had lesser developed country status. This meant that it could 
import textile inputs from non qualifying third countries. These incentives schemes only 
had a very limited impact on exports of manufactured goods, the reasons for this are 
discussed below.  
 
Export Processing Zones 
 
Probably the most important initiative of the state in providing incentives to 
manufacturing producers was the establishment of Export Processing Zones (EPZs). 
Legislation to permit the establishment of EPZs came relatively late to Tanzania as it was 
only in 2002 that the Export Processing Zones Act established the legal framework for 
EPZs. This was followed by the establishment of a competing programme for Special 
Economic Zones (SEZs) that was launched by the Ministry of Planning and Economic 
Empowerment in 2006, following the publication of the Government’s Mini-Tiger 
Industrialisation Plan (United Republic of Tanzania 2004). The EPZ initiative was 
initially under the National Development Corporation while the SEZs were under the 
control of the Ministry for Trade and Industry. The difference between an EPZ and an 
SEZ was that EPZs firms had to invest in manufacturing and had to export over 70% of 
output. EPZ status could be granted to stand alone enterprises as well as firms locating 
in particular physical zones that had access to specifically provided infrastructure. SEZs, 
on the other hand, were created to support investment across all sectors and allowed 
producers to sell in domestic as well as foreign markets. The industrial policy idea behind 
EPZs was to attract investors into manufacturing and to impose some compulsion on 
improving productivity through requirements to sell in international markets.  
 
Despite the passage of the SEZ Act, the programme was never properly made 
operational as no legislation was ever passed establishing an institutional structure for 
regulating and managing the programme (Farole 2011) After considerable delays in 
setting up the programme, the management of EPZs was given to a newly established 
parastatal, the Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA), under the Ministry of Trade 
and Industry in 2006. Management of the EPZs through the EPZA was highly 
centralised. The management board consisted of seven ministers, the Attorney General, 
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the Chairman of the Tanzania Private Sector Foundation, the Executive Secretary of the 
Tanzania National Business Council and the Secretary of the Trade Unions Congress of 
Tanzania.  
 
Fig. 6.1: Incentives Offered to Manufacturers in EPZ/SEZs in Tanzania 
 10 year corporate tax holiday 
 10 year withholding tax holiday 
 Duty and VAT exemptions on raw material,  
 capital goods, administrative vehicles etc 
 VAT exemptions on utilities and wharfage 
 Exemptions on taxes and levies charged by local authorities 
 One licence issued by the EPZA 
 Visa support 
 Unconditional transferability of profits, dividends and royalties 
 On-site customs documentation 
    Source: (Tanzania Export Processing Zone Authority 2011) 
 
In the first years of the EPZ programme construction on three EPZs started in the Dar 
es Salaam area. By April 2004 more than USD 60 million had been invested in EPZs. 
Around half of this had been to cover the infrastructure costs at three new parks in Dar 
es Salaam. However, uptake of plots within the EPZs was very low with only 35% of the 
space rented (URT; 2004). By 2010 five industrial parks had been gazetted (Meru 2010) 
and future EPZs and SEZs were earmarked for 14 regions. By far the most common way 
for the EPZ initiative to be rolled out, however, was by granting individual businesses 
EPZ status, without requiring them to be located within a specific Zone. Nineteen stand 
alone EPZ licences had been issued by 2010. The total number of firms operating inside 
the physical SEZs was actually very low. Rather than primarily targeting FDI as the early 
EPZs in Vietnam did, the Tanzanian EPZ programme primarily involved domestic 
companies. This may partly have been a result of failures to attract foreign investors as 
FDI inflows into SEZs only accounted for 18% of total FDI flows since the start of the 
programme (Farole 2011). Another reason, however, was that the industrial learning 
rents were primarily redistributive rents for local domestic businesses. The stand alone 
aspect of the programme attracted existing domestic producers to switch into the EPZ 
programme to attain the fiscal incentives without changing their existing pattern of 
production or export orientation.  
 
Performance of Export Incentives 
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The reasons for the successes and failures of this aspect of industrial policy under 
liberalisation can be related to the constraints imposed by the political settlement. While 
most of the manufacturing sector remained oriented towards the domestic market, 
exports of manufactured goods stared to increase from the end of the 1990s and by 
2005, exports of manufactured goods had tripled, albeit from a very low base (Treichel 
2005). However, the incentive schemes to promote exports seem to have had quite a 
peripheral impact on export performance. The firms that were involved in exporting 
were generally the larger manufacturing firms that had some amount of foreign 
investment and a history of exporting (Harding, Kahyarara, and Rankin 2002).  
 
The impact of rents generated by international export initiatives appear also to have had 
quite a weak impact on industrial performance overall. Tanzania only qualified for textile 
exports under AGOA in 2002 but the majority of goods exported through this 
programme overall were agricultural and forestry products rather than manufactured 
goods (Kweka 2004). Even in the years following Tanzania’s qualification for textile 
exports, the total volume of exports under this programme remained extremely low, 
accounting for under 1% of the total volume of exports to the US. The entire quantity of 
exported textiles were produced by just a handful of factories (Kweka 2004). Overall, 
AGOA only achieved a moderate supply response and limited dollar earnings for the 
country in comparison to neighbouring countries such as Kenya, Uganda, Malawi and 
Ethiopia (World Bank 2005). 
 
Other domestic incentives also appeared to be quite ineffective.  Table 7.1 below lists the 
major export incentives and their use by companies. Overall less than 25% of firms used 
any of the incentives offered to them to export goods.  
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Table 6.4: Usefulness of existing export promotion programs 
Type of Incentive Percent of Firms that Use 
the Incentive 
Manufacture-in-Bond Scheme 6.8 
Customs Duty Drawback 16.4 
Duty Suspension on imported inputs 5.3 
Bonded warehouse or similar scheme 21.3 
Profit tax exemption 13.7 
Export Credit Guarantee 5.4 
Export Development Fund 2.7 
Retention of export proceeds in foreign country 24.7 
Export Processing Zone 2.7 
Export Adjustment Fund Scheme 0.0 
Foreign Inputs Facility 2.7 
Duty Certificates 15.0 
Other 5.3 
Source: World Bank 2005 
 
In 2005, only 2.7% of manufacturing firms were located within an EPZ. The vast 
majority of manufacturing occurred outside these zones. One of the main reasons for 
this was that the EPZs themselves have operated very poorly for most of the 2000s. 
Subsidised infrastructure, which, along with fiscal incentives, was supposed to be one of 
the major attractions for setting up within an EPZ, was severely deficient.  In 2005, of 
the three EPZs established in Dar es Salaam, only one had sufficient infrastructure, while 
basic facilities such as electricity and roads were lacking in the other two (World Bank 
2005). Unreliable power and water supplies, undependable infrastructure and expensive 
administration costs were all identified as major constraints on firms operating within 
EPZs (World Bank 2005). Another limitation was the lack of on-site customs offices and 
management offices. A World Bank survey of EPZs in Africa identified that the 
clearance times within Tanzanian EPZs were actually worse than for manufacturing 
firms outside EPZs (Farole 2011). While the clearance procedures for SEZ firms were 
established by law, many customs agents working at the port and airport were unaware of 
the system. Serious port delays significantly hampered the SEZ programme. The fact that 
duty-free access arrangements were implemented by many different government 
agencies, especially the customs authority (Farole 2011) was also a problem. 
Fragmentation of control over delivery of the programme, particularly difficulty in 
enforcing performance from infrastructure providers meant that subsidised industrial 
incentives were difficult to obtain for specific users located within the Zones.  
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Performance of Firms inside EPZs 
 
The performance of the firms located within the EPZ was also disappointing. Apart 
from the infrastructural constraints listed above, manufacturing firms under the EPZ 
programme suffered from a combination of other problems. These include changes to 
international agreements on market access. The timing of the Tanzanian EPZ 
programme was poor as the MFA had just come to and end and the world market for 
low value added manufactured exports had become much more competitive with the rise 
of producers such as Bangladesh and Vietnam. The rents provided by export promotion 
programmes were, therefore, much less incentivising compared to earlier initiatives that 
had helped other poor countries to follow a labour intensive manufacturing path of 
growth. Labour supply problems also affected domestic producers and the lack of an 
adequate industrial work force was frequently listed as a reason for business failure. For 
example, in 2003 Star Apparel, owned by a Sri Lankan company Tri-Star, started 
production at an EPZ in Dar. It was one of the most successful companies exporting 
under AGOA from the EPZ. Yet in 2005, Star Apparels closed, reportedly due to an 
inability to abide by its contractual obligations partially relating to labour disputes that 
hampered production (Tancotton 2005).  
 
Tanzania was also not able to establish itself as an obvious regional export platform for 
multinational companies wishing to access cheap labour or resources. Low wages and 
international export incentives did not work in Tanzania to the same extent as in other 
developing countries, such as Bangladesh, where there was a very rapid supply response 
to a similar set of incentives (Khan 2009). This was because Bangladesh provided 
credible and significant pressure on the recipients of these temporary rents to raise their 
productivity and achieve competitiveness quickly. Bangladesh did not achieve this system 
of incentives through a strongly centralised state.  Instead, the temporary rents combined 
with aspects of the political settlement in Bangladesh, such as a large potential industrial 
labour force, previous primitive accumulation that had generated the potential for a rapid 
emergence of entrepreneurs, and a viable political relationship between these 
entrepreneurs and the state (Khan 2009). These contrast with Tanzania’s relatively low 
levels of primitive accumulation under the formative socialist political settlement, the 
smaller potential industrial workforce (for reasons relating to the lower level of 
population and agrarian transformation), and the difficulty that Tanzania faced in 
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constructing a viable political settlement with the mainly non-indigenous domestic 
capitalist class.  
 
The difficulties with enforcing export targets were also partly due to problems of 
fragmentation within the polity similar to those which hampered industrial policy during 
socialism. Firms within EPZ appeared to be able to avoid the requirement to export. 
Some of the firms that had been granted EPZ status were actually primarily producing 
for the domestic market rather than for export. In 2006 a case was widely reported of 
fiscal incentives that had been granted to a textile firm on condition that it met 
requirements for exporting. NIDA was among the first textile and apparel making 
companies to operate under an EPZ licence (Mande 2007). As well as garments, it 
produced yarn and cloth for the overseas market. In addition to the fiscal incentives 
offered as part of the EPZ programme, the company managed to negotiate a special tax 
exemption from the Ministry of Finance for the importation of raw materials from its 
parent company in Pakistan. NIDA had asked the Ministry of Finance to grant it zero 
per cent import duty on extra-wide grey fabrics materials of a width wider than 80 inches, 
which it claimed was not available within Tanzania or the region (Chhatbar 2006).  
 
The company claimed that the imports of raw material were essential for the operation of 
its textile mill that had been built for around USD 8 million. It claimed that it needed 
between 2 and 3.2 million metres of grey fabric per month to sustain its mills and 
produce two million bed sheets a month for the domestic market and for export (Tarimo 
2004). Other industrialists strongly opposed the exemption on the grounds that NIDA 
would flood the domestic market and have an unfair advantage. They also claimed that 
the raw materials were available from within Tanzania (Chhatbar 2006). A committee was 
subsequently established to review the granting of the exemption made up from the 
Ministries of Industry, Trade and Marketing, and Finance, the Tanzania Revenue 
Authority and the CTI (Mande 2007). The final decision reached by Government was 
that the exemption could stand as long as Nida exported 50% of its output 
(Correspondent 2006). This was below the official level required for exporting as an 
EPZ. These examples of poor enforcement of the EPZ programme and fiscal incentives 
to industry suggest that a set of problems that existed under the socialist political 
settlement in terms of the ability of the state to effectively manage critical industrial rents 
have to hamper effective industrial policy under liberalisation. Formal and informal 
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compulsions to raise productivity through these industrial policy incentives were not 
effective in Tanzania.  
 
6.4.2 Vietnam  
 
As described in Chapter One, Vietnam’s remarkable industrial output expansion under 
liberalisation was largely a result of the very high inflows of foreign direct investment, 
originally into gas and oil and later into low value added labour intensive manufacturing. 
Regional trade and investment dynamics were critical to Vietnam’s industrial expansion 
(Gauthier 1996). The high level of foreign investment into labour intensive 
manufacturing would seem to conform to the market liberalisation theory that by freeing 
market mechanisms, resources would flow to sectors with comparative advantages. 
However, explanations based simply on comparative advantage do not take account of 
the significant impact of the socialist period on the development of a relatively well 
organised labour force experienced in manufacturing activities. Further, under 
liberalisation there were significant subsidies to foreign investors in the manufacturing 
sector to make investment worthwhile where initial competitiveness was low. Vietnam 
was able to give a credible offer of subsidies to new investors from the region because of 
particular features of its political settlement under liberalisation, related to the political 
security that partnerships with SOEs could offer and the links between the Chinese-
Vietnamese diaspora and regional investors.   
 
During the 1990s, investment from other Asian countries, and particularly the Asian 
NICs into manufacturing took off dramatically. As Table 6.9 below indicates, the top five 
sources of FDI for Vietnam across the 1990s were all East Asian countries. 
 
Table: 6.5: Top 5 Countries Committing Foreign Direct Investment to 
Vietnam, 1988 – 1999 
 
Rank Country Committed 
FDI ($ mil) 
Share in 
total (%) 
1 Singapore 5,713.1 16.1 
2.  Taiwan 4,415.9 12.4 
3.  Hong Kong 3,570.9 10.0 
4. Japan 3,299.1 9.3 
5. South Korea 2,973.7 8.4 
                     Source: Adapted from Mai (2004) 
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As described in Chapter One (p30), it is important not to underestimate the impact of 
Vietnam’s geographical location within a high-growth, rapidly industrialising region as a 
major factor in its success in attracting FDI into manufacturing. These investment flows 
reflected Vietnams’ rising role as an important export platform for expanding regional 
multinationals. Regional multinationals were looking for cheap and reliable labour to 
undertake simple manufacturing activities within the production process. Vietnam’s close 
proximity and cultural similarities to its high growth neighbours made it a very attractive 
destination for regional FDI. The major manufacturing sectors that attracted FDI were 
textiles and garments as well as footwear, food products, beverages and some simple 
electronics activities. For example, Fujitsu set up a 100% foreign owned project in 1995 
to produce printed circuit board assembly lines that were then exported to its factories 
for higher level assembly in other countries in the region (Mai 2004). The growth of 
regional FDI into textiles and garments was particularly important for the rise in 
manufactured exports, accounting for 41% of manufactured exports by the end of the 
1990s (Hill 1998). 
 
 
Control over FDI devolved to Provincial Party and SOEs 
 
As in Tanzania, the most important formal rents created for foreign companies were 
provided through the Export Processing Zone and Industrial Zone initiatives. The 
Export Processing Zone Policy was launched in 1991 with the offer of duty-free access 
to all inputs and various tax concessions for industries locating within one zone. This was 
followed shortly afterwards, in 1994, by the policy for Industrial Zones which allowed 
production for both international and domestic markets within zones based on 
subsidised land, infrastructure and fiscal incentives. Initially formal control of FDI was 
highly centralised. During the initial stage of the implementation of the Law on Foreign 
Investment, all foreign-invested projects were managed by the State Committee for 
Cooperation and Investment (SCCI). From the end of the 1980s, some of the provincial 
level party committees had started to break the official regulations on FDI and take 
initiatives into their own hands to attract foreign investors. This was reflected in the fact 
that the South, and particularly HCMC, received much higher levels of FDI despite the 
formal centralised allocation of FDI (Malesky 2008).  The distribution of FDI to 
different provinces is shown in Table 6.6 below: 
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Table 6.6. Regional and Provincial distribution of FDI projects, 1988–2006 
(Number of projects, percentage of total and dollars) 
 
Province Number of 
Projects 
Percentage 
of total 
Registered 
capital 
(million 
dollars) 
Percentage 
of total 
Registered 
capital per 
capita 
(dollars) 
Red River 
Delta Total 
1781 21.5 20241 25.9 1.11 
Hanoi 949 11.5 12561 16.1 3.90 
Hai Phong 266 3.2 2648 3.4 1.47 
Other 566 6.9 5031 6.4 0.38 
North-East 
Total 
358 4.3 2445 3.1 0.26 
North-West 
Total 
27 0.3 115 0.2 0.04 
North 
Central 
Coast 
125 1.5 1473 1.9 0.14 
South 
Central 
Coast 
349 4.2 5276 6.7 0.74 
Central 
Highlands 
113 1.4 1041 1.3 0.21 
South East 
Total 
5126 62.0 42377 54.1 3.07 
Binh Duong 1315 15.9 6700 8.6 6.95 
Dong Nai 870 10.5 10410 13.3 4.70 
Ho Chi 
Minh City 
2504 30.3 17896 22.9 2.93 
Other 437 5.3 7332 9.4 1.62 
Mekong 
River Delta 
334 4.0 2315 3.0 0.13 
Source: UNCTAD 2008 
 
The formal regulations surrounding the establishment of EPZs and IZs appeared highly 
centralised with the requirement of formal approval of the Prime Minister and the 
involvement of senior officials in the SCCI in the identification of pilot plots (Malesky 
2008). However, in reality the central Government initially offered very limited support 
for these initiatives (Grenier, Mackay, and Morrissey 1999). Across the 1990s, the formal 
rules that established the legal rents that could be offered to FDI were gradually 
decentralised to provincial level government and IZ and EPZ management boards at the 
provincial level (Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007). After 2001, the extent to which the 
provinces were circumventing central restrictions on rents to FDI increased and the 
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phenomenon of ‘fence-breaking’ with regard to provinces offering extra-legal incentives 
for foreign investment became increasingly apparent. Such incentives involved fiscal 
incentives and incentives relating to land, as discussed in Chapters Four and Five.  
 
Anh (2007) reported that in thirty-two provinces, rules on incentives to FDI were broken 
in very obvious ways, with the provincial People’s Committee issuing decisions or 
documents that contravened state laws on foreign investment. Other provinces, 
however, engaged in ‘fence breaking’ in ways that were more difficult to observe, for 
example by simply ignoring the violations of lower levels of state agencies and firms 
(Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007). The popularity of these industrial policy initiatives with 
Provincial Party institutions was reflected in the fact that by December 2005 there were 
130 IPZs and EPZs operating in Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam 2011). Unlike 
the Tanzanian EPZ programme that primarily attracted domestic investors, the 
Vietnamese programme was dominated by foreign owned companies. For example, up 
to 2000, 85% of firms licensed within EPZs were foreign owned (Doanh 2002).  
 
FDI was encouraged by the VCP but the private sector was still treated with suspicion by 
the Party and access to resources and rents were still overwhelmingly targeted to SOEs. 
This situation forced FDI to seek out partnerships with SOEs and in the 1990s, 98% of 
foreign invested joint ventures occurred with SOEs (Doanh 2002). Partnership with 
SOEs gave FDI a degree of political security for their investments, reflecting the 
distribution of power within the state. It ensured that the provincial party institutions 
would support them due to the pattern of joint influence over appointments to 
management positions and projects that supported the commercial activities of Party 
Committees.  
 
The types of incentives offered by the industrial policy programmes in Tanzania and 
Vietnam were in many ways quite similar, but they were associated with different 
compulsions. The dominance of SOEs over the domestic market meant that FDI that 
entered Vietnam was under greater compulsion to export. Even foreign companies that 
established themselves in Vietnam with the intention of selling in domestic markets 
found that their access to these markets were restricted by the many SOEs that had 
protected domestic market access (Yeoh and Ngee 2007). Thus, the incentives offered to 
FDI through cheap land and tax breaks were associated with greater compulsion to 
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achieve international competitiveness in order to be able to export, rather than to sell in 
domestic markets. This ensured that the enterprises concerned would have to achieve 
international competitiveness. Investors also knew that in that context the incentives they 
were receiving to sustain their exports would be temporary. The compulsions for 
productivity growth and improvements in competitiveness would arguably have been far 
less if the FDI was primarily coming to access a protected domestic market.  
 
The ability of Vietnam to attract FDI under liberalisation also related to the pivotal role 
played by segments of the remaining Vietnamese-Chinese commercial classes in southern 
Vietnam. While a significant proportion of this group fled Vietnam following the fall of 
the Southern Republic, some of the group that had remained in Vietnam had been able 
to continue their economic activities under the radar of the restrictions on private 
economic activity, as described in Chapter Three. For example, some of the Vietnamese-
Chinese in HCMC that had been engaged in small scale manufacturing enterprises 
formally changed the status of their businesses to co-operatives after reunification had 
taken place. These co-operatives were permitted by the Party and, therefore, they could 
continue producing (Mallon and Irvin 2001). They were in a position to quickly re-
establish themselves in private commerce after the relaxation of restrictions on the 
private sector (Dolinski 2006). Over the period of private sector liberalisation that 
culminated in the Enterprise Law of 2000, Chinese-Vietnamese manufacturing firms re-
emerged in the official economy.  
 
Yet the private domestic manufacturing sector remained very constrained across the 
period of liberalisation. For example, in the mid 2000s, 80% of the private sector was 
defined as micro enterprises employing less than 50 people (Hakkala and Kokko 2006). 
The domestic private sector remained constrained across the liberalisation period as 
industrial policy rents in the form of access to credit and land went predominantly to 
SOEs. Many restrictions were imposed on the private sector deriving both from the 
central level and from provincial party committees and people’s councils. Obtaining 
licences was very difficult and there was considerable administrative discretion by 
bureaucrats, which worked against private sector businesses. Attitudes of the Party 
towards the private sector were in general much more suspicious than towards foreign 
capital (Mallon 2004). The political weakness of the domestic private sector was a legacy 
of the formative socialist political settlement.  
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As described in Chapter Three, since the colonial period, Vietnamese-Chinese had 
organised themselves into economic groups based on congregations related to language. 
While many of the Vietnamese-Chinese in the South were marginalised from political 
power one group of Vietnamese-Chinese, the Teochew congregation had played a 
prominent role in supporting the resistance in Southern Vietnam (Lindahl and Thomsen 
2002). People from this group were given the role of running the Chinese Business 
Department of the HCMC after the war (Lindahl and Thomsen 2002). They were able to 
play a role in facilitating relations between the Party and the remaining Vietnamese-
Chinese in HCMC, such as those from the Guangdong speech group who had 
dominated the garment and textile sector before 1975 in Southern Vietnam (Khanh 
1993).  
 
Informal networks had been established even before Doi Moi between the remaining 
Vietnamese-Chinese commercial classes and regional producers. This meant that 
business networks already existed informally when liberalisation was put in place. For 
example, while Singapore was strongly in favour of the trade blockade, the total volume 
of trade between Singapore and Vietnam rose by 20% per annum from 1980 to 1985. 
This growth in regional trade occurred outside the official bilateral trade agreements 
characteristic of centrally planned regimes. Instead these trading relations were based on 
the activities of local state entities and unofficial trade relations that survived the official 
clampdown on private sector activities (Beresford and Phong 2000). Under liberalisation 
many in this group re-established small firms in garments, textiles and plastics. They 
received high inflows of investments from the overseas Chinese with the East Asian 
region, based on ‘guanxi’, the informal network relations between Chinese business 
people (Lindahl and Thomsen 2002). Informal economic links with the Chinese diaspora 
across the region facilitated FDI from Taiwan and Singapore (Perkins 2001).  
 
However, the politically marginalised position of the Vietnamese-Chinese meant that 
relations with SOEs were critical for access to state subsidies. Thus, while there were a 
few private sector companies that subcontracted directly with foreign firms, nearly all 
private sector manufacturing was subcontracting via SOEs (Lindahl and Thomsen 2002). 
The process of commercialisation that had been going on within the state-owned sector 
and VCP institutions meant that individuals within this sector had developed 
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entrepreneurial skills and had accumulated resources that could be invested in developing 
partnerships with foreign companies. As described in the previous two chapters, the 
horizontal competition between different VCP institutions and SOEs led to competition 
between coalitions to develop partnerships with foreign firms. However, the overall 
political framework of the VCP meant that this competition did not descend into 
outright anarchy that might have deterred foreign investors from making deals with 
SOEs.  
 
Limitations of Decentralised Power 
 
The decentralized distribution of power facilitated partnerships between provincial level 
government and foreign investors that led to high inflows of FDI into certain provinces 
under liberalisation. Yet, this distribution of power also limited the capacity of the central 
state to manage rents effectively. This had negative consequences in certain areas of 
industrial policy under liberalisation. One of the critical limitations has been on the ability 
of the poorer provinces to attract in FDI through informal and implicit subsidies similar 
to those offered by the fast growing provinces. Over the period of liberalisation many of 
the poorer provinces attempted to create an incentive structure through subsidies in 
fiscal policy and land to attract FDI that contravened centrally imposed regulations. 
These illegal incentives caused significant loss in fiscal revenue for the central state (Anh, 
Thai, and Thang 2007). The central Government attempted to regain control over this 
process by issuing a Decree in 2005 ordering an immediate suspension of the illegal and 
informal incentives and demanding that all provincial People’s Committees provide a 
report on all violations that had taken place within their provinces. These requirements 
were not, however, followed through rigorously with many of the provinces ignoring the 
Decree completely (Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007).  
 
More importantly, the incentives offered by the poorer provinces to encourage FDI to 
locate within their IZs were not very effective (Anh, Thai, and Thang 2007). This was 
reflected in the very uneven rate of occupancy between IZs in different regions (Doanh 
2002). Industrial FDI remained very concentrated within the handful of fast growing 
regions and some of the poorer regions received virtually no FDI (Perkins and Vu 
Undated). The types of investment needed to make the poorer regions more attractive to 
FDI were probably greater than could be delivered by a provincial level political 
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settlement. As described in Chapter Four, some large scale investment projects have 
been targeted towards the poorer provinces that had political influence due to the 
independence struggle. However, as the economic power of the provinces becomes 
increasingly unequal it is questionable whether this dynamic will remain sufficient to 
generate adequate central inflows to overcome the costs facing new industries in poorer 
provinces.  
 
Another limitation of the decentralised features of the political settlement has been the 
limited extent to which a dynamic industrial learning process has been created through 
openness to FDI. For industrial policy to be successful a more coherent set of ‘contracts’ 
between FDI and foreign technology providers would have had to be enforced. Even in 
industries with lower technological demands, there has been very little technology spill 
over from FDI (Leproux and Brooks 2004). For example, the garment industry remained 
based on assembly activities across the liberalisation period and most of the clothes 
exported from Vietnam are produced on cut-make-and-trim (CMT) contracts, where the 
buyer provides the fabric, accessories and designs. In some cases even the cutting is done 
overseas, leaving simpler and even lower value-added assembly work to be done in 
Vietnam (Thomsen 2007).  
 
Industrial policy initiatives to promote technology transfer within higher value added 
industrial processes such as automobile and motorbike production were also very 
ineffective (Ohno 2004). When the state attempted to enforce localisation targets on the 
automobile sector, the manufacturers were able to successfully lobby the Government to 
avoid enforcement (Staff 2003). The ability of producers to evade even the most direct 
forms of regulation on technology acquisition such as localisation targets suggests that 
these firms had enough political power to resist the central state. This may partly reflect 
the fact that much of the FDI in industry was in partnership with SOEs. The SOEs were 
able to use their political power through links to local party institutions to avoid 
industrial policy disciplining. This suggests that if an industrial policy rent was generating 
sufficient returns to satisfy a significant coalition within the VCP, the coalition could 
effectively resist attempts to impose performance requirements. In these cases, the 
industrial policy rents may have become purely redistributive and their intended impact 
on technological acquisition was lost.  
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6.4.3 Discussion 
 
Under liberalisation, both countries extensively reformed their industrial policies. Both 
countries adopted an approach to industrialisation based on attracting FDI. Vietnam 
retained a more activist industrial policy than Tanzania. The policies to attract FDI into 
manufacturing and industry were successful in both countries. However, this was not 
simply a result of low wages or market based comparative advantage. Extensive 
interventions to create an industrial base under socialism were important for explaining 
the pattern of investment. Industrial policy in the form of subsidies in land and fiscal 
policy also played a role in attracting firms into sectors with low initial competitiveness. 
In both countries, the political framework of the Party helped to create an overall social 
order that was attractive to international investors. However, neither had the kind of 
centralised management of industrial policy rents that characterised the ‘developmental 
states’. 
 
In Tanzania, FDI flowed into sectors that had been established under the socialist 
period. However, most FDI in manufacturing was in businesses that were targeting the 
low value added domestic market. Industrial policy initiatives to increase competitiveness 
by forcing firms to sell in international markets were not very successful. The flagship 
EPZ programme did not receive the required support from the state and rents were 
subverted by firms that were able to avoid export criteria. Industrial policy was hindered 
by the problem of constructing a viable political settlement between the largely non-
indigenous domestic capitalist class and the state. It was difficult for the state to openly 
provide resources to domestic capitalists. The political commitment needed to ensure the 
successful delivery of subsidised infrastructure to the private sector was not sufficient. 
Part of the political legitimacy of the Party constructed under socialism was its 
commitment to equality. It is still very difficult for Tanzania to promote a capitalist class. 
Open forms of subsidy to business and the private sector are not politically acceptable to 
most people. This has hindered the political commitment to initiatives such as EPZ that 
require central coordination to provide large scale infrastructure capable of lowering the 
cost of production within these zones enough to make them commercially attractive. 
 
However, informal relations between those with economic power and the political 
system were strong. This is clear from the number of ‘stand-alone’ EPZ licences granted 
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without the enforcement of export criteria. Industrial policy failures were partly 
generated by the same problems of fragmented power within the state that hampered 
successful industrial policy in the socialist period. Temporary rents created by 
international trade agreements were not sufficient to overcome the constraints caused by 
the political settlement. Further, Tanzania’s more limited rural transformation and lower 
population density is a deeper cause of the relatively slow emergence of an industrial 
workforce compared to many countries in Asia.  
 
In Vietnam, previous industrial experience under socialism had created a larger industrial 
base and a well organised urbanised industrial work force. Vietnam’s regional position 
facilitated investment from more industrialised countries in the region that were looking 
for cheap labour and secure export platforms that would fit within their production 
networks. As well as the political stability of the system, other aspects of the political 
settlement facilitated this inflow. Investors from the Chinese diaspora were brought into 
Vietnam through the remaining domestic Chinese-Vietnamese business community. This 
group lacked the political legitimacy to be able to access state rents in land and finance 
necessary for production. Instead, foreign investors had to go into partnership with 
coalitions of SOEs and local VCP institutions. Previous commercialisation of VCP 
institutions and SOEs meant that entrepreneurial experience already existed within the 
state. The compulsions on local VCP institutions and SOEs to use primitive 
accumulation for productive activities, that were discussed in Chapter Four, was the basis 
of this experience. 
 
Many foreign firms entered Vietnam with the intention of producing for international 
markets. Further, the density of SOEs and their greater economic control over the 
domestic market meant that foreign firms had a more difficult time selling domestically. 
These features meant that the subsidies offered to foreign investors through Industrial 
Zone initiatives were linked to a credible set of compulsions that encouraged these firms 
to achieve internationals standards of competitiveness. Thus, industrial policy was 
successful in terms of generating learning in basic manufacturing activities not because of 
the centralised control of the state but because of the particular distribution of political 
and economic power within the provincial and district levels of the state.  
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This distribution of power, however, made it more difficult to enforce other aspects of 
industrial policy, such as localisation targets on FDI. Moreover, the competitive 
pressures between provinces to attract FDI did not overcome the larger problem of 
inequality between the provinces in terms of cost differences generated by lack of large 
scale infrastructure. Some of these provincial level inequalities are being addressed 
through centralised redistribution, as described in Chapter Four. However, as the 
capitalist transition process continues to generate inequalities and as the legacy of the war 
on the distribution of political power fades, it may become increasingly difficult for a 
political settlement based on decentralised power to address these problems.  
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Chapter 7 
 
Conclusion 
 
‘… I am a long term optimist. I believe that mankind does struggle upwards, in however halting a 
manner, and however many set-backs we experience as we progress ...’ (Nyerere, 1973) 
 
 
How to bring about a productive economic transition in developing countries that frees 
people from the chains of poverty and oppression remains one of the most important 
questions of our times. Some of the poorest countries in the world attempted to achieve 
this through a socialist path of economic transformation in the second half of the 
twentieth century. As the century drew to a close, these attempts were largely abandoned 
in the face of geopolitical and ideological changes, as well as constraints that emerged at 
the national level in the construction of viable socialist political settlements. In their 
place, there was a return to capitalist paths of economic transition. Failures in economic 
development were blamed squarely on state intervention in the market under socialism. 
However, in reality the factors involved were more complex than this interpretation 
suggests. The political economy of the legacy of the socialist period for subsequent 
economic performance under liberalisation has been under researched. What is clear is 
that the economic outcomes of the return to a capitalist dynamic of transformation have 
been very diverse. Some ex-socialist developing countries experienced rapid growth and 
industrialisation, while others fell further behind.  
 
In recent years, debate within mainstream economics has moved away from simple 
arguments about the superiority of the market over the state towards a more complex set 
of arguments about the role of institutions in economic growth. A particular set of ‘good 
governance’ institutions were identified as being critical for growth in developing 
countries. However, the evidence used to support the good governance agenda is actually 
quite weak. The dominance of this approach within policy debate demands an urgent 
critical engagement with the theoretical arguments and the evidence from specific 
countries on the relationship between governance and economic transformation. The 
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thesis seeks to contribute to this debate. This chapter summarises the approach of the 
research and its main findings. In conclusion, the chapter draws out the broader 
implications of the research and poses some unanswered questions.  
 
An obvious question is why choose Tanzania and Vietnam as the basis for exploring 
differences in the process of economic transition? There are, of course, very many 
differences between these two countries in terms of history, geography, culture and 
regional context. However, in crucial respects, they also share certain important features 
that provide the basis for insightful comparison. Chapter One established a case for 
comparing Tanzania and Vietnam in terms of, first, their common features in the 
socialist period, second, their economic performance under liberalisation and third, 
common features of their system of governance under liberalisation.  
 
Tanzania and Vietnam were two countries that led the way in attempting to implement 
socialism in the context of poor agrarian societies. The socialist parties that came to 
power through the independence struggle established one-party states. The ruling parties 
were institutionalised throughout society on the model of the Leninist Party-State. They 
both attempted to centralise political authority to bring about economic and political 
transformation towards socialism. Both countries sought to bring about an economic 
transition towards socialism through economic policies based on central planning. By the 
end of the 1970s, both countries were facing severe economic decline and they both 
adopted economic and political reform programmes from the mid 1980s.  
 
They were also success stories of economic growth under liberalisation within their 
regions. Both experienced higher GDP per capita growth with improved growth rates 
across agriculture, industry and services. Vietnam, however, outperformed Tanzania and 
achieved a much more profound structural transformation towards becoming an 
industrialised society. As outlined in Chapter One, Vietnam’s experience of rapid 
economic transition in the 1990s marked it out from most other developing countries. 
Nevertheless, Vietnam’s experience of productivity growth was slower than other rapid 
developers in Asia such as South Korea, Both countries are also similar in that they 
retained the dominance of the pre-reform political party throughout the period of 
liberalisation. Yet despite the legacy of the centralised institutions of the Party, within 
both Parties very high levels of corruption and patron-client relations existed that 
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became increasingly apparent over the period of liberalisation. How do their 
commonalities and differences in terms of the impact of the socialist period and their 
governance institutions under liberalisation help to explain their comparative economic 
transition?  
 
Different analytical approaches to explaining the impact of institutions on economic 
performance in developing countries were evaluated in Chapter Two. New Institutional 
Economics argues that economic transition is driven by a process of bargaining between 
individuals for compensated and mutually acceptable changes in structures of property 
rights. The structure of transaction costs influences the extent to which individuals can 
achieve mutually satisfactory bargains. Low transaction cost institutions are identified as 
being those associated with the liberal market economy model. This approach provides 
the theoretical basis for the good governance agenda and has received backing from 
evidence generated through econometric studies using a range of governance indicators.  
 
There are a number of theoretical and empirical problems with using this approach for 
the questions that this thesis seeks to address. On close inspection, there is considerable 
uncertainty over whether the governance indicators used in NIE inspired research are 
valid. Particularly, there are doubts about whether the indicators actually capture the 
institutions that they are supposed to reflect or whether they simply reflect subjective 
opinions influenced by general economic performance rather than objective institutional 
impacts. Further, econometric research has not yet satisfactorily answered the question 
of the direction of causality between the quality of institutions and economic growth. 
This is especially important given that developing countries that have had the most 
success in economic transformation did so through a range of institutions that were 
different from each other and from those recommended by the ‘good governance’ 
agenda.  
 
A more fruitful element of the NIE analytical framework for this thesis are the models of 
collective action that originated with Mancur Olson. Models of collective action help to 
explore why organisations are effective at achieving their aims. Collective action groups 
in this approach are redistributive coalitions that are successful to the extent that they are 
able to resolve the problem of free riding among the group. Collective action groups can 
damage economic growth if their demands for redistribution are excessive. Small 
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collective action group will tend to be more successful, but Olson argues that the more 
encompassing an organisation, the more it will promote broad economic growth rather 
than predation. Further, the more politically stable the ruling coalition, the longer its time 
horizons and the more its actions will tend to promote long term returns through 
economic growth rather than short term predation. While this analytical framework 
provides a number of relevant insights for exploring economic transition and the Party in 
Tanzania and Vietnam it cannot capture the informal nature of the distribution of power 
in these countries. The most important collective action groups making claims on the 
state often work both within and outside formal organisational structures. The success of 
collective action in demanding redistribution depends on the distribution of power 
between different groups in society that may, or may not, be reflected in the formal 
structure of institutions. 
 
A range of Weberian inspired theories about the role of the state in economic 
development face similar limitations. These include models of the patrimonial state 
compared to the bureaucratic state. These are important in that many developing 
countries, including Tanzania and Vietnam, are dominated by patrimonial politics. Yet 
these models fail to address the underlying structural reasons for why politics works in 
this way in developing countries. Nor do they explain the compatibility between 
patrimonial politics and a range of different economic outcomes. Heterodox theories of 
the developmental state provide another valuable strand of analysis based on examining 
the role of the state in managing industrial policy in a group of the most successful 
industrialisers in East Asia. These states had sufficient control over economic 
development rents to ensure that rent recipients were subject to enforceable performance 
standards. Yet, these state-centric explanations for economic performance cannot 
account for the diversity of experience with industrial policy. Further, this framework 
does not address other critical features of the economic transition process, such as 
informal processes of political stabilisation and collapse and restructuring of economic 
rights.  
 
Chapter Two outlined the Political Settlements framework, developed by Mushtaq Khan, 
and explained why this approach provided an appropriate basis for addressing the 
question posed by this thesis. Unlike the NIE and Weberian state-centric models, the 
Political Settlements framework explains why institutional analysis alone is insufficient to 
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explain economic transition. In most developing countries economic and political power 
frequently lies outside formal institutions. In order to explain the variable role of 
institutions in economic development we, therefore, need to look beyond institutions, to 
identify the underlying distribution of power. A political settlement defines the 
combination of institutions and the underlying distribution of power in a society. 
Institutions in the Political Settlements approach are not neutral ‘rules of the game’ but 
have distributive outcomes. They establish a pattern of rights that determine the 
distribution of income and resource flows in a society. Historically constituted social 
groups will attempt to use power to hold onto or gain rights that confer income flows 
through redistribution and production.  
 
The distribution of power depends on a range of socioeconomic factors. Economic 
resources are one factor in the power of any social group but the distribution of political 
power is not simply a function of the distribution of economic power. Political power 
can be gained through institutional positions but, more importantly in many cases, it can 
be gained through the ability to organise politically. Therefore, a picture of the 
distribution of power in any society is not just a description of its political institutions but 
needs to be constructed from a reading of social and economic history, looking at the 
past outcomes of social conflict and the organisation of production. 
 
Khan (2010) identifies four types of political settlement based on the alignment between 
formal institutions and the distribution of power and the extent to which the formal 
institutions generate growth. These are pre-capitalist, capitalist, clientelist, and ‘in-crisis’ 
political settlements. Most developing countries have forms of the clientelist political 
settlement as a result of the fundamental socioeconomic change that is occurring. 
Developing countries are in a process of transition in the sense that traditional 
alignments between formal institutions and power are collapsing and new viable 
alignments have not yet taken hold. As power is not aligned behind formal institutions, it 
operates mainly through informal patron-client networks. The clientelist political 
settlement can be stable and can produce a range of different outcomes in terms of 
economic transition. Economic transition in developing countries occurs through an 
iterative process of contested change in institutions and in the socioeconomic 
distribution of power. In the context of contemporary developing countries, three of the 
most important drivers of economic transition are the process of political redistribution, 
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primitive accumulation and technology acquisition. How these processes play out under 
different political settlements is central to understanding the pace and direction of 
economic transition.  
 
Tanzania and Vietnam were prominent examples of a group of countries that attempted 
to follow a non-capitalist path of economic transition. The attempt to create socialist 
societies in the context of traditional agrarian socioeconomic structures, led by a Party 
that had gained power on the back of a mass struggle against colonialism and imperialism 
created a particular political economy in these countries. We attempt to capture this 
through the concept of the formative socialist political settlement. There are four core 
common features of this political settlement that had important implications for the 
subsequent path of economic transition under liberalisation.  
 
First, the countries were ruled as one-party states by socialist parties that came to power 
with mass support through some form of revolutionary process. The specific nature of 
the struggle to power was critical to understanding the extent that they were subsequently 
able to consolidate power within their institutions.  
 
Second, the ideological commitment to a socialist transition meant that capitalism was 
suppressed and domestic and international capital were restricted from formal positions 
of power. Instead, economic institutions in the form of collectives and state owned 
enterprises were created to give formal economic power, through the control of the 
Party, to workers and peasants. The extent to which this commitment to socialist 
ideology actually led to a change in the distribution of economic power away from the 
existing capitalist classes is an important factor in explaining the subsequent economic 
transition under liberalisation.  
 
Third, despite the creation of formal institutions that were supposed to vest power in the 
hands of workers and peasants, the actual distribution of power was not held primarily 
by these groups. As in other developing countries, political power was largely held by 
intermediate class groups that led the Parties on behalf of the workers and peasants. The 
extent to which intermediate class groups were able to consolidate power within the 
party depended largely on their organisational capacities within the state, the extent of 
the suppression of political organisation outside the Party, and their ability to control the 
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economic assets of the state, even though these were not highly productive. The extent 
to which the intermediate class groups were able to consolidate their political power 
within the party state and create a centralised party structure had important consequences 
for economic transition under liberalisation.  
 
Fourth, despite the fact that the distribution of power was not aligned behind the formal 
institutions representing the poor, the extent to which formal institutions were created to 
give political voice to these groups had implications and unintended consequences for 
the subsequent path of economic growth under liberalisation.  
 
Chapter Three set out the comparative evolution of the political settlement in both 
countries. Vietnam had a long history as a nation state with central and village level 
political authority systems constructed over centuries. Social hierarchies within agrarian 
society were more developed than in Tanzania. The state had a much more recent history 
in Tanzania and rural level authority structures were diffuse and diverse. In both 
countries, peasant agriculture remained dominant across the colonial period and there 
was very limited industrialisation. Under colonialism, governance institutions were 
grafted onto ‘traditional’ power structures. Tanzania’s status as a protectorate made the 
British Government wary about implementing more transformative economic policies. 
Colonial capital dominated the economy but smaller scale economic activities were 
carried out by non-indigenous commercial groups in both countries. Chinese-Vietnamese 
business people in Vietnam and Indian business people in Tanzania were granted certain 
economic rights by the Colonial authorities that encouraged the expansion of these 
groups in commerce and production. The colonial administrative and educational system 
forged the emergence of intermediate class groups, even though these groups were much 
more circumscribed than in countries with more urbanised populations or longer 
colonial histories and larger colonial governments.  
 
The nature of the independence struggle was critical to the distribution of power in 
Tanzania and Vietnam. In both countries the parties that led the mass independence 
struggle were forged by members of the intermediate classes. In Tanzania the 
independence struggle took a largely constitutional route although political organisation, 
mass action in the form of strikes and tax non-compliance initiatives, were important. In 
Vietnam, the long drawn out war that was fought initially against the French and then 
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against the US, created a very different legacy of political and organisational power. The 
war gave the VCP a decisive legitimacy in terms of its political authority over the nation 
and shored up its power over society. However, the way that the war was fought also led 
to a more decentralised dispersion of power within the VCP. The war left a more 
hierarchical and differentiated society overall but political power was contained within 
the structures of the VCP. 
 
During the socialist period both countries attempted to bring about a socialist transition 
by centralising power within the institutional structures of the ruling Party. Economic 
transformation was pursued by establishing collective ownership structures in agriculture 
and state owned industries. Constraints were placed on domestic and international 
capital. These developments went much further in Vietnam than in Tanzania. In 
Tanzania, commercial activities continued to a much greater extent than in Vietnam, 
where land reform and constraints on private sector economic activities removed 
considerable economic power of groups outside the party structure. In both countries, 
the process of state-led socialist primitive accumulation was quite limited so peasant 
economic structures in rural society remained dominant.  
 
The attempt to centralise power within the Party was successful to the extent that 
political mobilisation outside the institutions of the Party was very limited in both 
countries. However, the failure to bring about a productive economic transition within 
the collectively owned economic institutions weakened the centralised power of the Party 
and the formal power of the workers and peasants that the Party formally represented. 
Thus, both countries maintained features of the distribution of power that was similar to 
other developing countries in terms of the fact that significant power remained in the 
hands of intermediate class groups with a significant role for patron-client networks 
within the Party structures. The attempt to forge an alternative path for economic 
transition through socialism ultimately failed in both cases. However, the formative 
socialist political settlement had important legacies for the political settlement under 
liberalisation.  
 
The findings of the research 
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To explore the comparative economic transition under liberalisation of the two countries 
the thesis investigated how political stabilisation, primitive accumulation and technology 
acquisition had been achieved by looking at three critical areas of state activities. These 
were public finances, land management and industrial policy. In these three areas an 
influential strand in the reform agenda was the ‘good governance’ approach to reduce 
state intervention and legal rents that were established during the socialist period as well 
as illegal rent seeking and corruption. In reality, informality, corruption and illegality 
shaped these processes. Features of the evolving political settlement and their 
implications for economic transition are drawn out from this analysis. 
 
Public Finance 
 
Chapter Four presented the findings on public finances. The successes and failures of the 
attempts to reform public finances provide useful insights into the political settlement in 
both countries under liberalisation. Public Finances are an important way that states 
make formal redistributions but they also play a role in the informal pattern of 
redistributive demands on the state through off-budget transfers and forms of 
corruption. How these demands are met influences the political stability of the state and 
also impacts on other aspects of economic transition such as primitive accumulation and 
the capacity of the state to manage technology acquisition rents. 
 
In Tanzania, public finance reforms were very successful in certain areas. Petty and 
bureaucratic forms of corruption within public finances were constrained, and improved 
budgeting procedures brought in greater transparency. Ring fenced fiscal incentives to 
attract FDI were introduced and the Tanzania Investment Centre was established to try 
to reduce the perception of political manipulation of exemptions. These changes had 
important implications for economic transition as they resulted in higher aid and FDI 
flows that supported economic growth. However, other forms of corruption in public 
finance continued unabated. Cases of grand corruption involving huge sums of money 
and senior politicians came to light during the course of liberalisation. The types of deals 
that resulted from this form of corruption appeared to be particularly negative for 
Tanzania’s economic transformation.  
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In Vietnam, the VCP also implemented ‘good governance’ reforms to public finances. 
This involved decentralisation and formalising transfers between different levels within 
the Party. Public finance reforms significantly reduced the formal level of subsidies to 
powerful SOEs. Vietnamese public finances were characterised by very rapid increases in 
capital expenditure, funded by foreign aid and rising state revenues. Much of this 
increased capital expenditure occurred ‘off budget’ through financial institutions that 
played a semi-fiscal role in public finance. Many of these capital investments were mired 
in corruption allegations. Corruption in state capital investment projects was particularly 
associated with provincial and district levels of the VCP working in partnership with 
SOEs. In many cases, corruption was linked to productive investments however there 
were also many investment projects that seemed to be driven primarily by redistributive 
demands and there were high levels of inefficiency in public expenditures.  
 
In both countries, the centralisation of political power within the party institutions as a 
legacy of the formative socialist political settlement helped to create political stability by 
restricting forms of fragmented clientelist political competition outside the Party 
framework. Political stability was one of the reasons that both countries were able to 
attract high levels of aid and foreign investment to support their public finances under 
liberalisation. In Tanzania, the centralisation of power within the Party aided the 
proximity of the legislative and executive arms of the state. This facilitated targeted 
reforms to reduce corruption where the payoff to CCM was highest in terms of greater 
inflows of aid and investment.  
 
The central institutions of the Party were unable to enforce greater discipline and stop 
cases of grand corruption that were blatantly damaging for Tanzania’s growth prospects. 
This suggests that while the state had a degree of centralised power, this was based on a 
fluid equilibrium between factions at the centre rather than a strong centralised 
leadership that could impose decisions upon senior Party officials. The apparent strength 
of the CCM was, therefore, partly a result of the weaker distribution of political power 
within society overall. These features of Tanzania’s political economy result from  
aspects of its formative socialist political settlement such as the more limited 
independence struggle, the predominance of egalitarian peasant agricultural structures 
and, further back in history, to the more recent genesis of political organisation within 
Tanzania. The result was that the Party could achieve political stability at relatively low 
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cost but could not override small collective action groups in the form of internal factions 
when they coalesced to protect rent flows. Yet these same characteristics also limited the 
extent to which internal factions could mobilise outside the Party and threaten the overall 
stability of CCM’s political control. 
 
The cases of grand corruption within public finance also provide an insight into the 
relationship between the CCM and sections of the business community under 
liberalisation. Under the formative socialist political settlement, formal relations with the 
domestic private sector were politically untenable. Informal relations were, however, 
constructed however between political power holders and those who held economic 
power. While there were expropriations and nationalisations during the socialist period, 
the economic power of this group remained much more intact than in Vietnam or in 
other more industrialised socialist countries.  
 
Under liberalisation, the formal power of business leaders has increased and there are 
now CCM politicians who are also successful business people. Yet overt political 
relations between those in business and those who hold official positions within the 
Party are still politically complicated as the legitimacy of the party that was constructed 
during the socialist period on the basis of the idea that the Party was the representative of 
the poor, against the rich. The fact that many of these business people come from the 
Asian Tanzanian community further complicates the political legitimacy of this group. 
The public finance corruption cases suggest, however, that the informal links between 
sections of the Asian business community and the Party that survived through the period 
remained strong under liberalisation. The Party cannot easily openly support policies that 
would further enrich this group. Nevertheless, the close relationship that exists may have 
discouraged risk taking by this group by allowing them access to income flows through 
political rent seeking rather than through economic activities such as industry. 
 
In Vietnam, centralised control over aid and oil revenues helped the central VCP 
institutions meet the redistributive demands of provincial level leaders. The distribution 
of power between the provinces was largely constructed in the course of fighting the war 
although this balance has shifted over the course of liberalisation as wealth differentials 
between provinces have increased. Centralised control over these resources facilitated 
redistribution without impinging excessively on the revenues of the provinces that had 
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greater economic growth. As the legacy of the war wanes, will the political settlement be 
strong enough to address these inequalities through centralised redistribution without 
causing greater political conflict? The answer is probably no.  
 
The political settlement produced very different outcomes in the two countries in terms 
of the impact of primitive accumulation within public finances on economic transition. 
In neither country was primitive accumulation a process directed by the central state. It 
was largely a decentralised process. Differences in the underlying distribution of power 
within society can help explain why decentralised corruption and primitive accumulation 
had such differing outcomes. In Vietnam at provincial and district level there was a 
greater density of organisations such as banks and financial institutions that played a role 
in allocating resources through corruption and primitive accumulation processes. There 
had been a rapid commercialisation of Party institutions at the lower levels that started at 
the end of the socialist period that engaged with these financial institutions to attract 
resources. However, the small factional networks behind these commercial activities 
within the VCP were subject to greater discipline in using these resources. These 
compulsions were not provided by the oversight by the central state but through 
horizontal competition between power holders.  
 
Provincial and district party institutions did not have a completely free hand in terms of 
their ability to engage in forms of primitive accumulation over public financial 
investment. Such activities had to be, at least formally, justified in terms of their 
contribution to economic development. The complexity and density of organizations 
within and outside the party in Viet Nam made it impossible for an individual or small 
network to operate on its own. This also meant, however, that the centre was 
constrained in its ability to impose its rules on lower levels. If a significant coalition 
within the VCP could find some type of collective action that provided sufficient rents to 
satisfy the coalition, it could go ahead even if the resulting investment project was 
scarcely developmental or highly inefficient. This resulted in high levels of capital 
investment but also in high levels of inefficiency. In Tanzania, a thinner legacy of 
political and economic institutions from the socialist period meant that there was much 
less discipline imposed upon those who engaged in primitive accumulation and 
corruption at the local level. The fragmentation of power also meant that smaller 
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coalitions could engage in corruption without having to generate the resources to pay off 
a larger number of people within the Party. 
 
Land 
 
Chapter Five presented the findings on reforms to land management in Tanzania and 
Vietnam under liberalisation. Similar approaches to land under the formative socialist 
political settlement in the two countries had created a highly egalitarian land distribution 
in rural areas and private land accumulation had been suppressed. State led primitive 
accumulation had also been quite limited. The reforms under liberalisation sought to 
reduce corruption and introduce transparent market based mechanisms, while retaining 
state control of the process of managing land transition in the interests of national 
economic development. However, in both countries strong elements of corruption and 
illegal primitive accumulation by individuals and institutions influenced the outcome of 
land transactions.  
 
In Vietnam land transition was rapid and accommodated extensive transformation of 
agricultural land into land for industry and commerce. In Tanzania land transfers to 
accommodate new economic activities, such as mining, tourism and commercial 
agriculture, occurred. In both countries there were rising tensions surrounding land over 
the period of liberalisation, yet these tensions did not spill out into more serious cases of 
conflict of a kind that might have risked undermining the central authority of the state. 
The centralisation of political power within the CCM and VCP under the formative 
socialist political settlement may have reduced the scope of political organisers to 
mobilise around these issues.  
 
While the central state sought to retain control and direct the land transition, through 
land planning and compulsory purchase systems, in reality much of the transition 
occurred through a decentralised, uncoordinated process. The drivers of this 
decentralised process were, however, very different in the two countries and this had 
implications for economic transition. 
 
In Tanzania much of the land transfer to new investors occurred through fragmented 
land grab by people with political connections at different levels of the Party. Land for 
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mining activities appeared to be one of the less controversial areas. Tensions usually 
focussed on mining rights rather than land rights. This was partly because small-scale 
mining had often occurred at the same locations over a long period and, therefore, land 
issues with existing land owners had been ‘resolved’ prior to the entry of the larger 
mining companies. The central leadership within the CCM gave formal backing to 
protect the property rights of new investors but these were often not seen through in 
reality. Attempts to ring fence land for foreign and domestic investors through the Land 
Bank were not very successful. This was partly a reflection of the limited success of state-
led primitive accumulation during the socialist period, as property rights taken by the 
state during this period to establish parastatals continued to be contested by traditional 
owners.  
 
Despite high level political commitment to new land investors, central commitments 
were often overridden by local level power holders. While CCM has well established 
hierarchical rules of authority within its institutions, actual control over society is more 
limited. This means that it is possible for people with economic and political power at 
the local level to block actions by the Party. Despite the centralising impact of the 
formative socialist political settlement, local level power holders could effectively veto 
central decisions over land under liberalisation. Central political control over the security 
services was weaker so local power holders could buy off security to sustain their hold on 
property against the wishes of the central state. Power was also more fragmented at the 
local level. Smaller, more fragmented coalitions would compete against each other over 
property rights. This led to a situation where the outcome of land transfers to new 
investors was less predictable. 
 
The political legitimacy of the Party as the representative of the poor also constrained the 
extent to which it could openly support an unequalising land transition. The political fall 
out of a large scale land transition was not one that could be countenanced by the CCM. 
Thus Regional Commissioners and District Commissioners had an overriding interest in 
maintaining the peace. As in the case of public finance, this suggests that part of the 
apparent strength of the political authority of the CCM related to the more egalitarian 
society in which it was formed, where political opposition was more muted due to the 
less differentiated structure of society as a whole. These features meant that the process 
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of land transition under liberalisation was much slower and more uncertain in Tanzania 
than in Vietnam.  
 
In Vietnam, there were more examples of large scale organised land transfers from 
existing land holders to new economic activities, for example in the coffee growing high-
lands and in semi-urban areas, for industrial zones. Some of these occurred through 
centrally directed initiatives and the ability of the state to push through these transfers 
suggests that the legitimacy of the VCP was more secure than the CCM, due to its role in 
the war. Land transfers on the basis of economic development had greater political 
legitimacy in Vietnam than in Tanzania, perhaps because in Vietnam, it was people who 
had political power within VCP that were often enriched in the process. Most land 
transfers were driven by provincial and district level coalitions of VCP institutions and 
SOEs, often working with foreign investors. Foreign investors wishing to access land had 
to go into partnership with SOEs and provincial or district VCP institutions, but this 
gave them considerable political security. A viable political settlement between foreign 
investors and the Party was negotiated – if foreign investors worked through the Party 
they would be given security. 
 
Land transition was driven by the rapid commercialisation of lower levels of the VCP. 
Entrepreneurs with formal political positions within the VCP or within SOEs used state 
assets in semi-private ways. Broader coalitions had to be formed to access land involving 
institutions of the VCP and SOEs, often in partnership with foreign investors. If a land 
deal could be set up that provided enough payoff to the group, the deal could go ahead 
even if it was opposed by the central level within the Party. This meant that the centre 
could not direct the land transition very effectively and many land deals were mainly 
redistributive rather than productive. Many of the Industrial Zones were established but 
not all of them have been successful. As in the case in public finance, primitive 
accumulation in land was subject to greater discipline in Vietnam than in Tanzania. 
However, this was not the result of a centrally enforced process, but through 
competition generated by the density of political power vested within lower level 
institutions of the Party and state.  
 
Industrial Policy 
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Chapter Six presented findings on industrial policy. Tanzania and Vietnam both adopted 
ambitious industrial policy strategies that relied mainly on building up a state-owned 
industrial sector. Vietnam engaged in a much more profound restructuring of existing 
economic power and removed industrial activities from the private sector. Tanzania, on 
the other hand, left some areas of industry in private hands. State owned industry was 
decentralised in Vietnam, as a legacy of fighting the war. The impact of the war on 
industrialisation was very significant in that it led to compulsions to maintain high levels 
of support from the state and to expand into new industrial areas such as heavy industry 
that hardly existed before. 
 
While industry expanded during the socialist period, neither country achieved 
international industrial competitiveness in any area of industrial production. The 
compulsions for engaging in learning and driving productivity growth were highly 
ineffective in both countries. Industrial policy rents descended into redistributive rents 
rather than learning rents. Without a role for market discipline, pressure to increase 
productivity and put effort into learning had to come from within the state system itself. 
As with other centrally planned industrial systems, the agencies monitoring and enforcing 
productivity growth were ineffective. Effective centralised monitoring is a very ambitious 
task for any country, let alone countries such as Tanzania and Vietnam that had very 
limited financial resources and industrial experience. Fundamentally, however, there was 
a lack of compatibility between the structure of industrial incentives and the compulsions 
that could be applied within the formative socialist political settlement.  
 
Industrial managers were able to evade demands to improve performance because of the 
degree to which actual control was fragmented within the state structure. Thus, in 
Tanzania it was possible for collusion to occur between managers and key officials within 
ministries to gain subsidised credit or direct transfers from the state with little 
compulsion to use these resources efficiently because there was no credible threat that 
the centre could withdraw the subsidy. Aspects of industrial policy, such as trade 
restrictions, that were designed to provide infant industry rents formed the basis of 
racketeering activities without generating sufficient learning effort within the system. In 
Vietnam, control of SOEs was decentralised to different levels of the Party but, here too, 
the centre had no way of ensuring that SOEs followed centrally determined plans or used 
resources efficiently. By the end of the socialist period, both countries were subsidising 
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industry heavily but industrial productivity and output had fallen dramatically. 
Nevertheless, the establishment of an industrial base was an important achievement of 
the period for the longer term and had implications for the path of economic transition 
under liberalisation. 
 
Important differences developed between the two countries in terms of the approach to 
industrial policy under liberalisation. Tanzania followed a more orthodox structural 
adjustment reform programme and abandoned much more of its socialist industrial 
policy than Vietnam. Industry started to grow again from the mid 1990s, based on 
foreign direct investment and private sector investment. The main strategy for improving 
industrial performance involved extensive privatisation of industrial parastatals. While a 
much more significant group of African capitalists had developed than at any point in 
Tanzania’s history, the privatisation process predominantly led to a return of economic 
power to the groups that had held economic power under colonialism, foreign and Asian 
Tanzanian capital. Essentially, the policy of privatisation ignored the market failure 
problems constraining Tanzanian industrial development and did not resolve the 
enduring problem of devising a successful mechanism to channel resources to companies 
to finance the learning period while also imposing discipline on rent recipients. 
 
Vietnam adopted a different approach to its state owned industries. They modelled their 
strategies on other countries in the region that had maintained a much more 
interventionist approach to industrial policy. The degree of centralised control in 
Vietnam was sufficient to push through a policy of closing down the smallest SOEs 
while maintaining control of larger enterprises. However, the distribution of power 
within the Party meant that many of the larger SOEs could resist both equitisation and 
the centralization of control that was intended by the creation of General Corporations 
and Conglomerates.  
 
In both countries, FDI flows played a critical role in boosting industrial performance 
under liberalisation. Their success in attracting FDI resulted partly from the sufficiently 
effective architecture of overall political stability provided by the Parties. Aspects of the 
social order created under the formative socialist political settlement that generated this 
stability, such as the institutionalisation of political competition within the Party 
structures, endured into the era of liberalisation. Tanzania’s public finance reforms, 
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which ring fenced tax incentives for FDI, were important in terms of giving a signal to 
foreign investors about the security of their investments. More targeted industrial policy 
initiatives, however, failed to be effective. The flagship EPZ programme did not receive 
the required political backing to ensure that different parts of the state would deliver the 
required subsidised infrastructure. Rents to industry provided through the programme, 
which were meant to ensure a minimum export level that would incentivise attaining 
levels of international competitiveness, failed. These became largely redistributive as a 
result, once again, of the lack of effective compulsions by the state that had hampered 
productivity growth under socialism.  
 
An important difference, however, was that under liberalisation these rents were directed 
to the private sector. The lack of compatibility between the structure of industrial policy 
and the underlying political settlement resulted partly from the difficulty of negotiating a 
viable settlement between largely non-indigenous capitalist groups and the Party. This is 
in contrast to Malaysia, for example, where the ruling UMO party was able to negotiate a 
more successful distribution of rents and incomes between the non-indigenous Chinese 
capitalists and the indigenous Malay. Under liberalisation, CCM has been able to expand 
its inclusive political coalition to include Tanzanian Asians from the business sector as 
the relations that were created informally between political and economic power under 
socialism became more overt. However, it is still politically difficult for the CCM to 
openly support a disequilibriating process of capitalist development that would lead to 
the enrichment of any group, but particularly a group whose wider political legitimacy is 
weak. This reflects the fact that the power of the Party is constructed on a stable but 
weak political equilibrium between different social groups that has its deeper roots in the 
relatively limited socioeconomic transformation in the colonial and socialist periods.  
 
High flows of FDI into manufacturing in Vietnam helped to shape the path of economic 
transition under liberalisation. These investment flows reflected Vietnams’ rising role as 
an important export platform for regional multinationals. These multinationals were 
looking for cheap and reliable labour to undertake simple manufacturing activities within 
the production process. However, the decision to locate in Vietnam cannot simply be 
explained through market liberalisation. Previous investments under socialism in the 
creation of an industrial base and a work force with industrial experience were important. 
Informal links that had built up between the Chinese diaspora in Asia and the remnants 
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of the Chinese commercial classes also initially played a role in bringing in regional 
investment. However, the private manufacturing sector remained marginal throughout 
liberalisation. Domestic private sector enterprises were still too politically weak to gain 
access to needed resources or quotas to enable them to compete against the on-going 
dominance of SOEs.  
 
This meant that for FDI to enter Vietnam, it had to go into partnership with SOEs and 
Provincial and District level political institutions. Coalitions of SOEs and Party 
institutions competed with each other to attract FDI by offering subsidised access to 
land and finance through industrial policy initiatives such as the creation of Industrial 
Zones. Unlike in Tanzania, where these Zones were run by the state, the most successful 
Zones in Vietnam were actually run by foreign investors themselves. The success that 
some provinces and districts had in terms of generating resources from these zones 
encouraged other Provinces to attempt to do the same. However, considerable disparity 
developed between the level of FDI inflows to different provinces, which reflected to 
fundamental cost differences that provincial level industrial policy rents could not 
overcome.  
 
The political settlement allowed credible incentives to be offered to FDI at the provincial 
level and below. The dominance and dense structure of SOEs within the domestic 
market also meant that foreign invested enterprises were not able simply to sell within 
domestic markets but were obliged to target international markets. This provided a form 
of compulsion to achieve learning within manufacturing activities that were built on the 
base that had been constructed during the socialist period. However, industrial policy 
initiatives to drive up value added within industry were much less effective. The ability of 
producers to evade even the most direct forms of regulation on technology acquisition 
such as localisation targets suggest that these firms had sufficient political power to resist 
the central state. This may partly reflect the fact that much of the FDI in industry was in 
partnership with SOEs. The SOEs were able to use their political power through links to 
local party institutions to avoid disciplines imposed through industrial policy. 
 
These facets of the evolving political settlement may have made it more difficult for 
Vietnam to generate a rapid process of technological learning from FDI under 
liberalisation. The outcome of this was that while Vietnam’s manufacturing sector 
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expanded rapidly, climbing up the technology ladder into new higher productivity 
manufacturing activities was slow. The dynamism provided by Vietnam’s political 
settlement comes from a degree of local level political and economic competition that 
resulted from the distribution and density of local level political and economic power. 
This competition was contained within the overarching framework provided by the Party 
whose centralised power was constructed under the formative socialist political 
settlement. Vietnam was successful in terms of its ability to attract FDI that was then 
required to achieve international competitiveness in certain niche sectors. However, an 
effective system of compulsion to drive more rapid technology acquisition across the 
economy through industrial policy was not attained. 
 
The Political Economy of Economic Transition in Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
Economic transitions in developing countries have been classified by political economists 
as occurring ‘from above’ through the concerted efforts of a minority in charge of the 
central state, or ‘from below’ through the uncoordinated activities of actors at lower 
levels of the state or society. The process of economic transition in Tanzania and 
Vietnam does not fit neatly into either of these two categories. The legacy of socialism 
meant that the state in Tanzania and Vietnam was able to centralise decision making to a 
much greater extent than in developing countries that had not centralised power to the 
same extent through mass movements and institutionalisation of the one party state. In 
both countries, the limited development of intermediate classes prior to the socialist 
period and the absorption of these groups within the party structure was one of the 
critical reasons for the appearance of centralised political power. In contrast to Olson’s 
argument that large redistributive coalitions would hinder economic performance, 
Tanzania and Vietnam were able to engage in political redistribution to maintain the 
stability of the political order through their relatively inclusive party institutions. 
 
Yet this centralised legacy was not as great as in other states where power had been even 
more centralised through specific historical experiences and distributions of power, such 
as in South Korea. Thus, while political redistribution was successful during the 
transition, the critical transition processes related to technology acquisition were less 
successful. Neither state was able to successfully engage in the type of centralized rent 
management evident in the NICs that experienced the most rapid productivity growth 
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and structural change. Both countries largely failed to manage rents that could generate 
the type of productivity growth experienced in the front runners of economic 
development.  
 
While Tanzania and Vietnam had certain similar features in terms of the 
institutionalisation of the party, the distribution of power within the party and within 
wider society led to different economic outcomes with regards to primitive accumulation. 
In both countries, informal processes related to primitive accumulation occurred outside 
the control of the central political institutions. These played a critical role in determining 
the path of the key transition processes in Tanzania and Vietnam. In the absence of 
strong central monitoring, in Vietnam there was much more effective power at the local 
level which led to more intensive monitoring of the competitive processes related to 
primitive accumulation. Theorists have pointed to the advantages of decentralised 
decision making processes for economic performance, for example, the fragmented 
clientelist system described by Donner and Ramsay for Thailand discussed in Chapter 4, 
shows that in some cases a decentralised distribution of political and economic power is 
compatible with rapid economic growth. More generally, the advantages of decentralised 
compared to centralised political systems are explored through a principle-agent model 
by Joseph Stiglitz in Wither Socialism (1997). He argues that decentralised models of 
decision making produce better economic results, not because they approximate to the 
neo-classical model of the competitive market economy encapsulated in the Arrow-
Debreu market model. Instead, decentralised decision making may produce higher 
economic growth because it is better able to process information, spreads risk, make 
commitments more credible and generate greater levels of experimentation. Beyond 
these theoretical advantages of decentralised or centralised systems, however, studying 
the political economy of transition in Tanzania and Vietnam shows that the distribution 
of power in society is a critical influence on the actual effectiveness of different decision 
making processes rather than the formal structure of political institutions. 
 
Mainstream economics has mainly approached the political economy of socialism by 
highlighting the failures of state intervention. However, by rolling back the state, 
liberalisation has failed to address the critical constraints on economic transition. 
Examining the political economy of the socialist period is a central part of understanding 
these constraints. Conventional economic approaches to development underplay the 
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importance of politics. While viable socialism was not constructed in Tanzania or 
Vietnam, the efforts to create socialism continue to reverberate through more recent 
economic history. Socialism in Tanzania and Vietnam had an enduring institutional 
impact, but more importantly, a profound socioeconomic legacy that is often overlooked. 
The political economy of transition in Tanzania and Vietnam demonstrates that political 
movements have the power to reshape socioeconomic structures and influence paths of 
economic transition in intended and unintended ways and with important consequences 
for future attempts to build just and prosperous societies. 
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Appendix One: Tables and Data for Tanzania and Vietnam 
 
Table A.1: Vietnam Exports of Goods and Services as a % of GDP 
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
6.62 6 3.95 23.85 36.04 30.92 34.75 28.7 34.01 32.81 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
40.87 43.1 44.85 49.97 55.03 55.61 56.8 59.29 65.74 69.36 
Source: World Development Indicators 2011 
 
Table A .2: Savings as a % of GDP 
 
 
 Tanzania Vietnam 
1990 1.28 3.33 
1991 2.69 9.99 
1992 0.32 13.55 
1993 -4.60 15.49 
1994 1.67 16.03 
1995 2.36 18.05 
1996 4.63 17.13 
1997 5.43 20.16 
1998 7.48 21.75 
1999 7.21 24.77 
2000 10.05 27.15 
2001 13.17 28.89 
2002 16.88 28.04 
2003 16.09 27.08 
2004 15.24 27.91 
2005 14.00 31.39 
2006 11.05 31.67 
2007 12.65 28.19 
2008 10.31 24.51 
2009 17.88 27.78 
2010 16.85 27.79 
  
Source: World Bank 2011. World Development Indicators. Edition April 2011. EDSD 
International. University of Manchester. DOI http://dx.doi.org/108287/wb/wdi/2011-
04 
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Table A.3 : Investment as a % of GDP in Tanzania 1968 to 1986 
Year 
Investment 
as a % of 
GDP 
1968 18.4 
1969 16.3 
1970 22.9 
1971 26.8 
1972 23.6 
1973 22.6 
1974 21.6 
1975 20.8 
1976 29 
1977 29.4 
1978 33.8 
1979 33.6 
1980 33.1 
1981 28.6 
1982 26 
1983 19.3 
1984 20.2 
1985 18.7 
  
Source: Bigsten and Danielsen 2001 
